Various Works

  with that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands, while the

  latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does not always command, but

  sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit

  always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command,

  whenever the soul of a man is vicious.

  Of 'properties' the most 'arguable' are the essential and

  permanent and the relative. For a relative property gives rise, as

  we said before, to several questions: for of necessity the questions

  arising are either two or four, or that arguments in regard to these

  are several. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss

  in relation to many things, or can observe in relation to many periods

  of time: if essential', discuss it in comparison with many things: for

  the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every

  single thing that is, so that if the subject be not distinguished by

  it in comparison with everything else, the property could not have

  been rendered correctly. So a permanent property you should observe in

  relation to many periods of time; for if it does not or did not, or is

  not going to, belong, it will not be a property. On the other hand,

  about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to

  the time called 'the present'; and so arguments in regard to it are

  not many; whereas an arguable' question is one in regard to which it

  is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise.

  The so-called 'relative' property, then, should be examined by means

  of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether it

  belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand,

  permanent and essential properties should be considered by the

  following methods.

  2

  First, see whether the property has or has not been rendered

  correctly. Of a rendering being incorrect or correct, one test is to

  see whether the terms in which the property is stated are not or are

  more intelligible-for destructive purposes, whether they are not so,

  and for constructive purposes, whether they are so. Of the terms not

  being more intelligible, one test is to see whether the property which

  he renders is altogether more unintelligible than the subject whose

  property he has stated: for, if so, the property will not have been

  stated correctly. For the object of getting a property constituted

  is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered

  should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to

  conceive it more adequately, e.g. any one who has stated that it is

  a property of 'fire' to 'bear a very close resemblance to the soul',

  uses the term 'soul', which is less intelligible than 'fire'-for we

  know better what fire is than what soul is-, and therefore a 'very

  close resemblance to the soul' could not be correctly stated to be a

  property of fire. Another test is to see whether the attribution of

  A (property) to B (subject) fails to be more intelligible. For not

  only should the property be more intelligible than its subject, but

  also it should be something whose attribution to the particular

  subject is a more intelligible attribution. For he who does not know

  whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all, will

  not know either whether it belongs to it alone, so that whichever of

  these results happens, its character as a property becomes obscure.

  Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be

  'the primary element wherein the soul is naturally found', has

  introduced a subject which is less intelligible than 'fire', viz.

  whether the soul is found in it, and whether it is found there

  primarily; and therefore to be 'the primary element in which the

  soul is naturally found' could not be correctly stated to be a

  property of 'fire'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes,

  see whether the terms in which the property is stated are more

  intelligible, and if they are more intelligible in each of the

  aforesaid ways. For then the property will have been correctly

  stated in this respect: for of constructive arguments, showing the

  correctness of a rendering, some will show the correctness merely in

  this respect, while others will show it without qualification. Thus

  (e.g.) a man who has said that the 'possession of sensation' is a

  property of 'animal' has both used more intelligible terms and has

  rendered the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid

  senses; so that to 'possess sensation' would in this respect have been

  correctly rendered as a property of 'animal'.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms

  rendered in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether

  the whole expression too signifies more than one thing. For then the

  property will not have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) seeing

  that to 'being natural sentient' signifies more than one thing, viz.

  (1) to possess sensation, (2) to use one's sensation, being

  naturally sentient' could not be a correct statement of a property

  of 'animal'. The reason why the term you use, or the whole

  expression signifying the property, should not bear more than one

  meaning is this, that an expression bearing more than one meaning

  makes the object described obscure, because the man who is about to

  attempt an argument is in doubt which of the various senses the

  expression bears: and this will not do, for the object of rendering

  the property is that he may understand. Moreover, in addition to this,

  it is inevitable that those who render a property after this fashion

  should be somehow refuted whenever any one addresses his syllogism

  to that one of the term's several meanings which does not agree. For

  constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether both all the

  terms and also the expression as a whole avoid bearing more than one

  sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this

  respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'body' does not bear several

  meanings, nor quickest to move upwards in space', nor yet the whole

  expression made by putting them together, it would be correct in

  this respect to say that it is a property of fire to be the 'body

  quickest to move upwards in space'.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he

  renders the property is used in more than one sense, and no

  distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he

  is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly

  rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has

  been said above: for the same results are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.)

  seeing that 'the knowledge of this' signifies many things for it means

  (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by

  it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of

  knowledge about it-no property of the 'knowledge of this' could be

  rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these

  it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a
man

  should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids

  bearing many senses and is one and simple: for then the property

  will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing

  that 'man' is used in a single sense, 'naturally civilized animal'

  would be correctly stated as a property of man.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has been

  repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in

  rendering 'properties' also, just as they do in their 'definitions' as

  well: but a property to which this has happened will not have been

  correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus

  inevitably the meaning becomes obscure, and further, such people are

  thought to babble. Repetition of the same term is likely to happen

  in two ways; one is, when a man repeatedly uses the same word, as

  would happen if any one were to render, as a property of fire, 'the

  body which is the most rarefied of bodies' (for he has repeated the

  word 'body'); the second is, if a man replaces words by their

  definitions, as would happen if any one were to render, as a

  property of earth, 'the substance which is by its nature most easily

  of all bodies borne downwards in space', and were then to substitute

  'substances of such and such a kind' for the word 'bodies': for 'body'

  and 'a substance of such and such a kind' mean one and the same thing.

  For he will have repeated the word 'substance', and accordingly

  neither of the properties would be correctly stated. For

  constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids ever

  repeating the same term; for then the property will in this respect

  have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) seeing that he who has

  stated 'animal capable of acquiring knowledge' as a property of man

  has avoided repeating the same term several times, the property

  would in this respect have been correctly rendered of man.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in the

  property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does

  not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is

  the business of the language Of 'properties', as also of the

  language of definitions, to distinguish. In the case contemplated,

  therefore, the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus

  (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be a

  'conception incontrovertible by argument, because of its unity', has

  used in the property a term of that kind, viz. 'unity', which is a

  universal attribute; and therefore the property of knowledge could not

  have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other

  hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to

  everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from

  something: for then the property will in this respect have been

  correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a

  property of a 'living creature' to 'have a soul' has used no term that

  is common to everything, it would in this respect have been

  correctly stated to be a property of a 'living creature' to 'have a

  soul'.

  Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than

  one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he

  is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been

  correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there

  should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the

  essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be

  rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property

  mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e.g.) a

  man who has said that it is a property of fire to be 'the most

  rarefied and lightest body' has rendered more than one property (for

  each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could not be a

  correctly stated property of fire to be 'the most rarefied and

  lightest body'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see

  whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same

  thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this

  respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said

  that it is a property of a liquid to be a 'body adaptable to every

  shape' has rendered as its property a single character and not

  several, and so the property of 'liquid' would in this respect have

  been correctly stated.

  3

  Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either

  the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its

  species: for then the property will not have been correctly stated.

  For the object of rendering the property is that people may

  understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was

  to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it, and so

  is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand

  anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e.g.) any one who

  has said that it is property of 'animal' to be 'the substance to which

  "man" belongs as a species' has employed one of its species, and

  therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. For

  constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids

  introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for

  then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated.

  Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living

  creature to be 'compounded of soul and body' has avoided introducing

  among the rest either the subject itself or any of its species, and

  therefore in this respect the property of a 'living creature' would

  have been correctly rendered.

  You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms

  that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for

  destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either

  opposite to the subject or, in general, anything simultaneous by

  nature with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have

  been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature

  with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is

  posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus

  (e.g.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be 'the

  most direct opposite of evil', has employed the opposite of good,

  and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered.

  For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has

  avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general,

  simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for

  then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered.

  Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to

  be 'the most convincing conception' has avoided employing anything

  either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to,

  the subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect

  have been correctly stated. r />
  Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as

  property something that does not always follow the subject but

  sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not

  have been correctly described. For there is no necessity either that

  the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find

  such an attribute belonging; nor yet that the name of the subject will

  be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to

  belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he has rendered

  the property it will not be clear whether it belongs, seeing that it

  is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the property will not

  be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of

  animal 'sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still' rendered the

  kind of property which sometimes is not a property, and so the

  property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive

  purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something

  that of necessity must always be a property: for then the property

  will have been in this respect correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who

  has stated that it is a property of virtue to be 'what makes its

  possessor good' has rendered as property something that always

  follows, and so the property of virtue would in this respect have been

  correctly rendered.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the

  property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite proviso

  that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for

  else the property will not have been correctly stated. For in the

  first place, any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso:

  and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some

  attribute that always follows. In the second place, a man who omits to

  provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time

  which he intended to state, is obscure: and one should not give any

  occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as

  the property of a particular man 'to be sitting with a particular