Various Works

  it is that they recollect even without the effort of seeking to do so,

  viz. when the movement implied in recollection has supervened on

  some other which is its condition. For, as a rule, it is when

  antecedent movements of the classes here described have first been

  excited, that the particular movement implied in recollection follows.

  We need not examine a series of which the beginning and end lie far

  apart, in order to see how (by recollection) we remember; one in which

  they lie near one another will serve equally well. For it is clear

  that the method is in each case the same, that is, one hunts up the

  objective series, without any previous search or previous

  recollection. For (there is, besides the natural order, viz. the order

  of the pralmata, or events of the primary experience, also a customary

  order, and) by the effect of custom the mnemonic movements tend to

  succeed one another in a certain order. Accordingly, therefore, when

  one wishes to recollect, this is what he will do: he will try to

  obtain a beginning of movement whose sequel shall be the movement

  which he desires to reawaken. This explains why attempts at

  recollection succeed soonest and best when they start from a beginning

  (of some objective series). For, in order of succession, the

  mnemonic movements are to one another as the objective facts (from

  which they are derived). Accordingly, things arranged in a fixed

  order, like the successive demonstrations in geometry, are easy to

  remember (or recollect) while badly arranged subjects are remembered

  with difficulty.

  Recollecting differs also in this respect from relearning, that

  one who recollects will be able, somehow, to move, solely by his own

  effort, to the term next after the starting-point. When one cannot

  do this of himself, but only by external assistance, he no longer

  remembers (i.e. he has totally forgotten, and therefore of course

  cannot recollect). It often happens that, though a person cannot

  recollect at the moment, yet by seeking he can do so, and discovers

  what he seeks. This he succeeds in doing by setting up many movements,

  until finally he excites one of a kind which will have for its

  sequel the fact he wishes to recollect. For remembering (which is

  the condicio sine qua non of recollecting) is the existence,

  potentially, in the mind of a movement capable of stimulating it to

  the desired movement, and this, as has been said, in such a way that

  the person should be moved (prompted to recollection) from within

  himself, i.e. in consequence of movements wholly contained within

  himself.

  But one must get hold of a starting-point. This explains why it is

  that persons are supposed to recollect sometimes by starting from

  mnemonic loci. The cause is that they pass swiftly in thought from one

  point to another, e.g. from milk to white, from white to mist, and

  thence to moist, from which one remembers Autumn (the 'season of

  mists'), if this be the season he is trying to recollect.

  It seems true in general that the middle point also among all things

  is a good mnemonic starting-point from which to reach any of them. For

  if one does not recollect before, he will do so when he has come to

  this, or, if not, nothing can help him; as, e.g. if one were to have

  in mind the numerical series denoted by the symbols A, B, G, D, E,

  Z, I, H, O. For, if he does not remember what he wants at E, then at E

  he remembers O; because from E movement in either direction is

  possible, to D or to Z. But, if it is not for one of these that he

  is searching, he will remember (what he is searching for) when he

  has come to G if he is searching for H or I. But if (it is) not (for H

  or I that he is searching, but for one of the terms that remain), he

  will remember by going to A, and so in all cases (in which one

  starts from a middle point). The cause of one's sometimes recollecting

  and sometimes not, though starting from the same point, is, that

  from the same starting-point a movement can be made in several

  directions, as, for instance, from G to I or to D. If, then, the

  mind has not (when starting from E) moved in an old path (i.e. one

  in which it moved first having the objective experience, and that,

  therefore, in which un-'ethized' phusis would have it again move),

  it tends to move to the more customary; for (the mind having, by

  chance or otherwise, missed moving in the 'old' way) Custom now

  assumes the role of Nature. Hence the rapidity with which we recollect

  what we frequently think about. For as regular sequence of events is

  in accordance with nature, so, too, regular sequence is observed in

  the actualization of kinesis (in consciousness), and here frequency

  tends to produce (the regularity of) nature. And since in the realm of

  nature occurrences take place which are even contrary to nature, or

  fortuitous, the same happens a fortiori in the sphere swayed by

  custom, since in this sphere natural law is not similarly established.

  Hence it is that (from the same starting-point) the mind receives an

  impulse to move sometimes in the required direction, and at other

  times otherwise, (doing the latter) particularly when something else

  somehow deflects the mind from the right direction and attracts it

  to itself. This last consideration explains too how it happens that,

  when we want to remember a name, we remember one somewhat like it,

  indeed, but blunder in reference to (i.e. in pronouncing) the one we

  intended.

  Thus, then, recollection takes place.

  But the point of capital importance is that (for the purpose of

  recollection) one should cognize, determinately or indeterminately,

  the time-relation (of that which he wishes to recollect). There

  is,-let it be taken as a fact,-something by which one distinguishes

  a greater and a smaller time; and it is reasonable to think that one

  does this in a way analogous to that in which one discerns (spacial)

  magnitudes. For it is not by the mind's reaching out towards them,

  as some say a visual ray from the eye does (in seeing), that one

  thinks of large things at a distance in space (for even if they are

  not there, one may similarly think them); but one does so by a

  proportionate mental movement. For there are in the mind the like

  figures and movements (i.e. 'like' to those of objects and events).

  Therefore, when one thinks the greater objects, in what will his

  thinking those differ from his thinking the smaller? (In nothing,)

  because all the internal though smaller are as it were proportional to

  the external. Now, as we may assume within a person something

  proportional to the forms (of distant magnitudes), so, too, we may

  doubtless assume also something else proportional to their

  distances. As, therefore, if one has (psychically) the movement in AB,

  BE, he constructs in thought (i.e. knows objectively) GD, since AG and

  GD bear equal ratios respectively (to AB and BE), (so he who

  recollects also proceeds). Why then does he construct GD rather than

  ZH? Is it not because as AG is to AB, so is O to I? These movements
/>
  therefore (sc. in AB, BE, and in O:I) he has simultaneously. But if he

  wishes to construct to thought ZH, he has in mind BE in like manner as

  before (when constructing GD), but now, instead of (the movements of

  the ratio) O:I, he has in mind (those of the ratio K:L; for

  K:L::ZA:BA. (See diagram.)

  When, therefore, the 'movement' corresponding to the object and that

  corresponding to its time concur, then one actually remembers. If

  one supposes (himself to move in these different but concurrent

  ways) without really doing so, he supposes himself to remember.

  For one may be mistaken, and think that he remembers when he

  really does not. But it is not possible, conversely, that when one

  actually remembers he should not suppose himself to remember, but

  should remember unconsciously. For remembering, as we have conceived

  it, essentially implies consciousness of itself. If, however, the

  movement corresponding to the objective fact takes place without

  that corresponding to the time, or, if the latter takes place

  without the former, one does not remember.

  The movement answering to the time is of two kinds. Sometimes in

  remembering a fact one has no determinate time-notion of it, no such

  notion as that e.g. he did something or other on the day before

  yesterday; while in other cases he has a determinate notion-of the

  time. Still, even though one does not remember with actual

  determination of the time, he genuinely remembers, none the less.

  Persons are wont to say that they remember (something), but yet do not

  know when (it occurred, as happens) whenever they do not know

  determinately the exact length of time implied in the 'when'.

  It has been already stated that those who have a good memory are not

  identical with those who are quick at recollecting. But the act of

  recollecting differs from that of remembering, not only

  chronologically, but also in this, that many also of the other animals

  (as well as man) have memory, but, of all that we are acquainted with,

  none, we venture to say, except man, shares in the faculty of

  recollection. The cause of this is that recollection is, as it were

  a mode of inference. For he who endeavours to recollect infers that he

  formerly saw, or heard, or had some such experience, and the process

  (by which he succeeds in recollecting) is, as it were, a sort of

  investigation. But to investigate in this way belongs naturally to

  those animals alone which are also endowed with the faculty of

  deliberation; (which proves what was said above), for deliberation

  is a form of inference.

  That the affection is corporeal, i.e. that recollection is a

  searching for an 'image' in a corporeal substrate, is proved by the

  fact that in some persons, when, despite the most strenuous

  application of thought, they have been unable to recollect, it (viz.

  the anamnesis = the effort at recollection) excites a feeling of

  discomfort, which, even though they abandon the effort at

  recollection, persists in them none the less; and especially in

  persons of melancholic temperament. For these are most powerfully

  moved by presentations. The reason why the effort of recollection is

  not under the control of their will is that, as those who throw a

  stone cannot stop it at their will when thrown, so he who tries to

  recollect and 'hunts' (after an idea) sets up a process in a

  material part, (that) in which resides the affection. Those who have

  moisture around that part which is the centre of sense-perception

  suffer most discomfort of this kind. For when once the moisture has

  been set in motion it is not easily brought to rest, until the idea

  which was sought for has again presented itself, and thus the movement

  has found a straight course. For a similar reason bursts of anger or

  fits of terror, when once they have excited such motions, are not at

  once allayed, even though the angry or terrified persons (by efforts

  of will) set up counter motions, but the passions continue to move

  them on, in the same direction as at first, in opposition to such

  counter motions. The affection resembles also that in the case of

  words, tunes, or sayings, whenever one of them has become inveterate

  on the lips. People give them up and resolve to avoid them; yet

  again they find themselves humming the forbidden air, or using the

  prohibited word. Those whose upper parts are abnormally large, as.

  is the case with dwarfs, have abnormally weak memory, as compared with

  their opposites, because of the great weight which they have resting

  upon the organ of perception, and because their mnemonic movements

  are, from the very first, not able to keep true to a course, but are

  dispersed, and because, in the effort at recollection, these movements

  do not easily find a direct onward path. Infants and very old

  persons have bad memories, owing to the amount of movement going on

  within them; for the latter are in process of rapid decay, the

  former in process of vigorous growth; and we may add that children,

  until considerably advanced in years, are dwarf-like in their bodily

  structure. Such then is our theory as regards memory and remembering

  their nature, and the particular organ of the soul by which animals

  remember; also as regards recollection, its formal definition, and the

  manner and causes-of its performance.

  -THE END-

  .

  350 BC

  PHYSICS

  by Aristotle

  translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye

  Book I

  1

  WHEN the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have

  principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with

  these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is

  attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are

  acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have

  carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly

  therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches of study, our

  first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.

  The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which

  are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which

  are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not

  'knowable relatively to us' and 'knowable' without qualification. So

  in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from

  what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is

  more clear and more knowable by nature.

  Now what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused

  masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us

  later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to

  particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception,

  and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things

  within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation

  of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. 'round', means vaguely a sort

  of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses.

  Similarly a child beg
ins by calling all men 'father', and all women

  'mother', but later on distinguishes each of them.

  2

  The principles in question must be either (a) one or (b) more than

  one. If (a) one, it must be either (i) motionless, as Parmenides and

  Melissus assert, or (ii) in motion, as the physicists hold, some

  declaring air to be the first principle, others water. If (b) more

  than one, then either (i) a finite or (ii) an infinite plurality. If

  (i) finite (but more than one), then either two or three or four or

  some other number. If (ii) infinite, then either as Democritus

  believed one in kind, but differing in shape or form; or different

  in kind and even contrary.

  A similar inquiry is made by those who inquire into the number of

  existents: for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of

  existing things are one or many, and if many, whether a finite or an

  infinite plurality. So they too are inquiring whether the principle or

  element is one or many.

  Now to investigate whether Being is one and motionless is not a

  contribution to the science of Nature. For just as the geometer has

  nothing more to say to one who denies the principles of his

  science-this being a question for a different science or for or common

  to all-so a man investigating principles cannot argue with one who

  denies their existence. For if Being is just one, and one in the way

  mentioned, there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be

  the principle of some thing or things.

  To inquire therefore whether Being is one in this sense would be

  like arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of

  argument (such as the Heraclitean thesis, or such a thesis as that

  Being is one man) or like refuting a merely contentious argument-a

  description which applies to the arguments both of Melissus and of

  Parmenides: their premisses are false and their conclusions do not

  follow. Or rather the argument of Melissus is gross and palpable and