Pentagon Papers

  (b) Four missions for reinforcement of in-place teams.

  (c) Four missions to airdrop new psyops/sabotage teams depending upon development of drop zone and target information. These are low-key propaganda and intelligence gathering teams with a capability for small-scale sabotage on order after locating suitable targets.

  (5) Dates for actual launch of maritime and airborne operations are contingent upon the intelligence situation and weather conditions.

  # 73

  State Department Aide’s Report on Actions Taken after Tonkin

  Part VIII, “Immediate Actions in the Period Prior to Decision,” of an outline for Assistant Secretary Bundy, Nov. 7, 1964. Markings indicate that it was drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green.

  The U.S., together with the RLG and GVN, are involved in a number of operations—34-A, Yankee Team, Recce, and RLAF T-28 ops—designed to warn and harass North Vietnam and to reduce enemy capabilities to utilize the Lao Panhandle for reinforcing the Vietcong in South Vietnam and to cope with PL/VM pressures in Laos. The U.S. also has under consideration De Soto Patrols and Cross Border Ground Operations. The present status and outlook of these operations are described below, together with a checklist of outstanding problems relating to each of the field of operations.

  In general the working group is agreed that our aim should be to maintain present signal strength and level of harassment, showing no signs of lessening of determination but also avoiding actions that would tend to prejudge the basic decision.

  A. OPLAN 34-A

  Although not all of Oplan 34-A was suspended after the first Tonkin Gulf incident, in effect little was accomplished during the remainder of August and the months of September. Several successful maritime and airborne operations have been conducted under the October schedule. A schedule for November is under discussion and will probably be approved November 7.

  1. Maritime Operations

  Since the resumption of Marops under the October schedule, the following have been completed:

  Recon L Day (Oct. 4) Probe to 12 miles of Vinh Sor.

  Recon L + 2 (Oct. 10) Probe to 12 miles of Vinh Sor.

  Loki IV L + 5 Junk capture failed

  32 & 45 E L 8 (Oct. 28/29) Bombard Vin Son radar and Mui Dai observation post.

  The following operation was refused approval:

  44c L + 10 Demolition by frog men supported by fire team of bridge on Route 1.

  Currently approved is:

  34B L + 12 (Nov. 4, on) Bombardment of barracks on Hon Matt and Tiger Island.

  The following maritime operations remain on the October schedule and presumably will appear on the November schedule along with some additional similar operations:

  L + 13 Capture of prisoner by team from PTF

  L + 15 Junk capture

  L + 19 Bombard Cap Mui Ron and Tiger Island

  L + 25 Bombard Yen Phu and Sam Son radar

  L + 28 Blow up Bridge Route 1 and bombard Cap Mui Dao

  L + 30 Return any captives from L + 1 15

  L + 31 Bombard Hon Ne and Hon Me

  L + 36 Blow up pier at Phuc Loi and bombard Hon Ngu

  L + 38 Cut Hanoi-Vinh rail line

  L + 41 Bombard Dong Hoi and Tiger Island

  L + 24 Bombard Nightingale Island.

  2. Airborne Operations

  Five teams and one singleton agent were in place at the beginning of October. Since then one of the teams has been resupplied and reinforced. The remaining four were scheduled to be re-supplied and reinforced but weather prevented flights. These operations, plus the dropping of an additional team, will appear on the November schedule.

  Two of the teams carried out successful actions during October. One demolished a bridge, the other ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol. Both teams suffered casualties, the latter sufficient to cast doubt on the wisdom of the action.

  3. Psychological Operations

  Both black and white radio broadcasts have been made daily. Black broadcasts have averaged eight to ten hours weekly, white broadcasts sixty hours weekly.

  Letters posted through Hong Kong have averaged about from 50 to 100 weekly.

  During September and October only one leaflet delivery was made by air. This was done in conjunction with a resupply mission.

  The November schedule will call for a large number of leaflet and deception operations.

  4. Reconnaissance Flights

  An average of four flights per week have covered the bulk of Oplan 34-A targets.

  PROBLEMS

  1. Surfacing of Marops—The question of whether to surface Marops remains unresolved. While Washington has suggested this be done, General Khanh has been reluctant to do so. It is argued that surfacing the operations would enable the U.S. to offer some protection to them; the counterargument postulates U.S. involvement in North Vietnam and consequent escalation.

  2. Security of Operations—The postponement of an operation, whether because of unfavorable weath or failure of Washington to approve at the last moment, jeopardizes the operation. Isolation of teams presents hazards.

  3. Base Security—After the Bien Hoa shelling some attention has been given to the security of the Danang base. Perimeter guard has been strengthened, but action remains to be taken for marine security, although a survey is underway.

  4. Team welfare—In-place teams Bell and Easy have been in dire need of supplies for several weeks. Weather has prevented resupply, which will be attempted again during the November moon phase.

  5. NVN Counteraction—The capability of the North Vietnamese against Marops has improved somewhat, although not yet sufficiently to frustrate these operations.

  B. YANKEE TEAM OPERATIONS

  For several months now the pattern of Yankee Team Operations has [words illegible] a two-week period and about ten flights during the same time interval [words illegible] for Panhandle coverage. Additionally, we have recently been authorized a maximum of two shallow penetration flights daily to give comprehensive detailed coverage of cross border penetration. We have also recently told MACV that we have a high priority requirement for night photo recce of key motorable routes in Laos. At present about 2 nights recce flights are flown along Route 7 areas within a two-week span.

  YT supplies cap for certain T-28 corridor strikes. Cap aircraft are not authorized to participate in strike or to provide suppressive fire.

  Pending questions include: (a) whether YT strikes should be made in support of RLAF T-28 corridor operations; (b) whether YT recce should be made of areas north of 20° parallel; (c) YT suppressive attacks against Route 7, especially Ban Ken Bridge; and (d) YT activity in event of large-scale ground offensive by PL (this issue has not arisen but undoubtedly would, should the PL undertake an offensive beyond the capabilities of Lao and sheep-dipped Thai to handle).

  C. T-28 OPERATIONS

  There are now 27 T-28 (including three RT-28) aircraft in Laos, of which 22 are in operation. CINCPAC has taken action, in response to Ambassador Unger’s request to build this inventory back up to 40 aircraft for which a pilot capability, including Thai, is present in Laos.

  The T-28’s are conducting the following operations:

  1. General harassing activities against Pathet Lao military installations and movement, primarily in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua Provinces. This also includes efforts to interdict Route 7.

  2. Tactical support missions for Operation Anniversary Victory No. 2 (Saleumsay), the FAR-Meo clearing operation up Route 4 and north of Tha Thom.

  3. Tactical support for Operation Victorious Arrow (Sone Sai), a FAR clearing operations in southern Laos.

  4. Strikes on targets of opportunity, including in support of FAR defensive actions such as at Ban Khen northwest Thakhek.

  5. Corridor interdiction program. The original targets under this program have been hit and plans are now underway to hit four additional targets (including in the Tchepone area), plus restriking some of the original 13 targets. Ambassador Unger has submitted for
approval under this program 6 additional targets.

  6. The Ambassador has been authorized to discuss with the RLAF RT-28 reconnaissance in northwest Laos along the area just north of and to the east and west of the line from Veng Phou Kha-Muong Sai.

  In recent weeks, the T-28’s have been dropping a large number of surrender leaflets on many of their missions. These have already led, in some cases, to PL defections.

  U.S. participation in SAR operations for downed T-28’s, is authorized.

  We are faced by the following problems in connection with the T-28’s:

  1. Authority for Yankee Team aircraft to engage in suppressive strikes in the corridor area, in support of the T-28 strike program there, has not been given as yet.

  2. Also withheld is authorization for YT suppressive fire attack on Ban Ken Bridge on Route 7.

  3. We are investigating reports of greatly increased truck movement along Route 7 as well as enemy build-up of tanks and other equipment just across the border in NVN. Counteraction may be required involving attack on Ban Ken.

  4. Thai involvement. Hanoi claims to have shot down a T-28 over DRV territory on August 18 and to have captured the Thai pilot flying the plane. Although the information the North Vietnamese have used in connection with this case seems to be accurate, it is not clear the pilot is alive and can be presented to the ICC. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, nor that other Thai pilots might be captured by the PL.

  5. The DRV claims T-28’s have violated North Vietnamese airspace and bombed/strafed NVN villages on August 1 and 2, and on October 16 and 17 and again on October 28. The charges are probably accurate with respect to the first two dates (along Route 7) and the last one (Mu Gia Pass area). The October 16 and 17 strikes were actually in disputed territory which was recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements as being in Laos.

  6. The Pathet Lao has called to the attention of the ICC T-28 strikes in the corridor area and called for the ICC to stop them and inform the Co-Chairmen. The ICC has already agreed to investigate another PL charge concerning alleged U.S./SVN activities in the corridor area in violation of the Geneva Agreements.

  D. DeSOTO PATROLS

  Further DeSoto Patrols have been held in abeyance pending top-level decision. Ambassador Taylor (Saigon’s 1378) sees no advantage in resuming DeSoto Patrols except for essential intelligence purposes. He believes we should tie our actions to Hanoi’s support of Viet Cong, not to the defense of purely U.S. interests.

  E. CROSS BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS

  Earlier in the year several eight-man reconnaissance teams were parachuted into Laos as part of Operation Leaping Lena. All of these teams were located by the enemy and only four survivors returned to RVN. As a result of Leaping Lena, Cross Border Ground Operations have been carefully reviewed and COMUS-MACV has stated that he believes no effective Cross Border Ground Operations can be implemented prior to January 1, 1965 at the earliest.

  F. COVERT OPERATIONS IN LAOS

  Consideration is being given to improving Hardnose (including greater Thai involvement) and getting Hardnose to operate more effectively in the corridor infiltration areas.

  No change in status of Kha.

  G. OTHER SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

  These include “Queen Bee,” “Box Top,” “Lucky Dragon” and “Blue Springs.”

  * Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be considered completely satisfactory so long as it permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing uninterrupted and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN through Laos.

  ** Authority should be granted immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos, for the purposes of border control and of “hot pursuit” into Laos. Decision on “hot pursuit” into Cambodia should await further study of our relations with that country.

  * We have never defined precisely what we mean by “getting out”—what actions, what proofs, and what future guarantees we would accept. A small group should work on this over the next month. The actions we want the DRV to take are probably these:

  (a) Stop training and sending personnel to wage war in SVN and Laos.

  (b) Stop sending arms and supplies to SVN and Laos.

  (c) Stop directing and controlling military actions in SVN and Laos.

  (d) Order the VC and PL to stop their insurgencies and military actions.

  (e) Remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.

  (f) See that VC and PL stop attacks and incidents in SVN and Laos.

  (g) See that VC and PL cease resistance to government forces.

  (h) See that VC and PL turn in weapons and relinquish bases.

  (i) See that VC and PL surrender for amnesty or expatriation.

  ** This is in Phase One also

  Chapter 6

  The Consensus to Bomb North Vietnam:

  August, 1964 - February, 1965

  Highlights of the Period: August, 1964-February, 1965

  Between the Tonkin Gulf resolution of August, 1964, and the start of concentrated U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in 1965, the details of such an air war were being planned, discussed and debated within the Johnson Administration, according to the Pentagon chronicle.

  Here, chronologically, are highlights of those months:

  AUGUST 1964

  Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor cabled agreement with the Administration “assumption” that “something must be added in the coming months” to forestall “a collapse of national morale” in Saigon. He suggested “carefully orchestrated bombing attacks” on the North.

  The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, called an air war “essential to prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia.”

  SEPTEMBER 1964

  John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, outlined a “provocation” plan “to provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished . . .”

  The Pentagon analyst finds a “general consensus” on the necessity for early 1965 air strikes at a White House strategy meeting, but adds it was felt that “tactical considerations” required a delay. He cited the President’s “presenting himself as the candidate of reason and restraint,” the need for “maximum public and congressional support,” the fear of “premature negotiations” and the weakness of the Saigon regime.

  The President ordered low-risk interim measures, according to a memo by William P. Bundy, “to assist morale . . . and show the Communists we still mean business . . .”

  OCTOBER 1964

  Air strikes at Laos infiltration routes began, following a delay pending the outcome of the Laotian cease-fire talks. The U.S. feared a new Geneva conference might result. The analyst says this was “not compatible with current perceptions of U.S. interest.”

  NOVEMBER 1964

  The Vietcong attacked Bienhoa airfield. The Joint Chiefs urged “prompt and strong response,” including air strikes on the North. Ambassador Taylor urged bombing “selected” targets.

  The President declined, and directed the interagency working group under Bundy to consider Vietnam options.

  The group’s three recommended options all included bombing the North. The analyst says the group’s deliberations showed “remarkably little latitude for reopening the basic questions about U.S. involvement.”

  Option A—Called for reprisal air strikes and intensification of the covert pressure.

  Option B—Bomb the North “at a fairly rapid pace and without interruption” until all the U.S. demands were met; the U.S. was to define the negotiating position, the chronicle says, “in a way which makes Communist acceptance unlikely” if the U.S. were pressed to negotiate “before a Communist agreement to comply.”

  Option C—A graduated air war and possibly the deployment of ground troops.

  At a meeting of the select committee of the National Security Council, George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, indicated “doubt” about the effectiveness of bombing the North and argued against the d
omino theory, according to a Bundy memo.

  DECEMBER 1964

  The President approved the recommended plan—Option A for 30 days, then Option C. He stressed that he felt that “pulling the South Vietnamese together” was basic to any other action.

  Operation Barrel Roll—U.S. air strikes at infiltration routes in the Laotian panhandle—got under way. The National Security Council agreed that “no public statements” would be made unless a plane were lost, and then “to insist that we were merely escorting reconnaissance flights.”

  JANUARY 1965

  Two U.S. jets were lost over Laos, and there were press reports on “Barrel Roll.”

  South Vietnamese forces were trounced at Binhia. The study says that the “final collapse” of the Saigon regime and a Vietcong takeover seemed “distinct possibilities.”

  Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and Mr. McNaughton favored “initiating air strikes”; they agreed that the U.S. aim was “not to ‘help friend’ but to contain China,” the chronicle says.

  FEBRUARY 1965

  The Vietcong attacked the U.S. military advisers’ compound at Pleiku. The study says this “triggered a swift, though long-contemplated Presidential decision to give an ‘appropriate and fitting response.’ ”

  Forty-nine U.S. jets made the first reprisal strike, bombing Donghoi.

  Operation Rolling Thunder—the sustained air war—was ordered to begin.

  Chapter 6

  The Consensus to Bomb North Vietnam: August, 1964–February, 1965

  —BY NEIL SHEEHAN

  The Johnson Administration reached a “general consensus” at a White House strategy meeting on Sept. 7, 1964, that air attacks against North Vietnam would probably have to be launched, a Pentagon study of the Vietnam war states. It was expected that “these operations would begin early in the new year.”