Enlightenment Now

  48. Bona fides on political correctness: I am on the advisory boards of the Foundation for Individual Rights on Education (https://www.thefire.org/about-us/board-of-directors-page/), the Heterodox Academy (http://heterodoxacademy.org/about-us/advisory-board/), and the Academic Engagement Network (http://www.academicengagement.org/en/about-us/leadership); see also Pinker 2002/2016, 2006. Evidence on climate change: See citations in notes 41, 45, and 46 above.

  49. Lukewarming: M. Ridley, “A History of Failed Predictions of Doom,” http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/apocalypse-not/; J. Curry, “Lukewarming,” Climate Etc., Nov. 5, 2015, https://judithcurry.com/2015/11/05/lukewarming/.

  50. Climate Casino: W. Nordhaus 2013; W. Nordhaus, “Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong,” New York Review of Books, March 22, 2012; R. W. Cohen et al., “In the Climate Casino: An Exchange,” New York Review of Books, April 26, 2012.

  51. Climate justice: Foreman 2013.

  52. Klein vs. carbon tax: C. Komanoff, “Naomi Klein Is Wrong on the Policy That Could Change Everything,” Carbon Tax Center blog, https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2016/11/07/naomi-klein-is-wrong-on-the-policy-that-could-change-everything/; Koch brothers vs. carbon tax: C. Komanoff, “To the Left-Green Opponents of I-732: How Does It Feel?” Carbon Tax Center blog, https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2016/11/04/to-the-left-green-opponents-of-i-732-how-does-it-feel/. Economists’ statement on climate change: Arrow et al. 1997. Recent arguments for the carbon tax: “FAQs,” Carbon Tax Center blog, https://www.carbontax.org/faqs/.

  53. “Naomi Klein on Why Low Oil Prices Could Be a Great Thing,” Grist, Feb. 9, 2015.

  54. The problem with “climate justice” and “changing everything”: Foreman 2013; Shellenberger & Nordhaus 2013.

  55. Scare tactics less effective than practical solutions: Braman et al. 2007; Feinberg & Willer 2011; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, et al. 2012; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole 2009; L. Sorantino, “Annenberg Study: Pope Francis’ Climate Change Encyclical Backfired Among Conservative Catholics,” Daily Pennsylvanian, Nov. 1, 2016, https://goo.gl/zUWXyk; T. Nordhaus & M. Shellenberger, “Global Warming Scare Tactics,” New York Times, April 8, 2014. See Boyer 1986 and Sandman & Valenti 1986 for a similar point about nuclear weapons.

  56. “World Greenhouse Gas Emissions Flow Chart 2010,” Ecofys, http://www.ecofys.com/files/files/asn-ecofys-2013-world-ghg-emissions-flow-chart-2010.pdf.

  57. Scale insensitivity: Desvousges et al. 1992.

  58. Moralization of profligacy and asceticism: Haidt 2012; Pinker 2008.

  59. Sacrifice vs. benefit as a source of moral approbation: Nemirow 2016.

  60. See http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/pinker/files/ten_ways_to_green_your_scence_2.jpg and http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/pinker/files/ten_ways_to_green_your_scence_1.jpg.

  61. Shellenberger & Nordhaus 2013.

  62. M. Tupy, “Earth Day’s Anti-Humanism in One Graph and Two Tables,” Cato at Liberty, April 22, 2015, https://www.cato.org/blog/earth-days-anti-humanism-one-graph-two-tables.

  63. Shellenberger & Nordhaus 2013.

  64. Trading economic development against climate change: W. Nordhaus 2013.

  65. L. Sorantino, “Annenberg Study: Pope Francis’ Climate Change Encyclical Backfired Among Conservative Catholics,” Daily Pennsylvanian, Nov. 1, 2016, https://goo.gl/zUWXyk.

  66. The actual carbon-to-hydrogen ratio in the cellulose and lignin making up wood is lower, but most of the hydrogen is already bound to oxygen, so it does not oxidize and release heat during combustion; see Ausubel & Marchetti 1998.

  67. Bituminous coal is mainly C137H97O9NS, with a ratio of 1.4 to 1; anthracite is mainly C240H90O4NS, with a ratio of 2.67 to 1.

  68. Carbon-to-hydrogen ratios: Ausubel 2007.

  69. Decarbonization: Ausubel 2007.

  70. “Global Carbon Budget,” Global Carbon Project, Nov. 14, 2016, http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/.

  71. Ausubel 2007, p. 230.

  72. Carbon plateau, GDP rise: Le Quéré et al. 2016.

  73. Deep decarbonization: Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 2015; Pacala & Socolow 2004; Williams et al. 2014; http://deepdecarbonization.org/.

  74. Carbon tax consensus: Arrow et al. 1997; see also “FAQs,” Carbon Tax Center blog, https://www.carbontax.org/faqs/.

  75. How to implement a carbon tax: “FAQs,” Carbon Tax Center blog, https://www.carbontax.org/faqs/; Romer 2016.

  76. Nuclear power as the new green: Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015; Ausubel 2007; Brand 2009; Bryce 2014; Cravens 2007; Freed 2014; K. Caldeira et al., “Top Climate Change Scientists’ Letter to Policy Influencers,” CNN, Nov. 3, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/nuclear-energy-climate-change-scientists-letter/index.html; M. Shellenberger, “How the Environmental Movement Changed Its Mind on Nuclear Power,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, May 2016; Nordhaus & Shellenberger 2011; Breakthrough Institute, “Energy and Climate FAQs,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/energy-and-climate/nuclear-faqs. Though many environmental climate activists now support an expansion of nuclear power (including Stewart Brand, Jared Diamond, Paul Ehrlich, Tim Flannery, John Holdren, James Kunstler, James Lovelock, Bill McKibben, Hugh Montefiore, and Patrick Moore), remaining opponents include Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Friends of the Earth, and (with some equivocation) Al Gore. See Brand 2009, pp. 86–89.

  77. Solar and wind provide 1.5 percent of the world’s energy: British Petroleum 2016, graphed in https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-how-much-energy-does-the-world-get-from-renewables.

  78. Land required by wind farms: Bryce 2014.

  79. Land required by wind and solar: Swain et al. 2015, based on data from Jacobson & Delucchi 2011.

  80. M. Shellenberger, “How the Environmental Movement Changed Its Mind on Nuclear Power,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, March 2016; R. Bryce, “Solar’s Great and So Is Wind, but We Still Need Nuclear Power,” Los Angeles Times, June 16, 2016.

  81. Chernobyl cancer deaths: Ridley 2010, pp. 308, 416.

  82. Relative death rate from nuclear vs. fossil fuels: Kharecha & Hansen 2013; Swain et al. 2015. A million deaths a year from coal: Morton 2015, p. 16.

  83. Nordhaus & Shellenberger 2011. See also note 76 above.

  84. Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 2015. Deep decarbonization of the United States: Williams et al. 2014. See also B. Plumer, “Here’s What It Would Really Take to Avoid 2°C of Global Warming,” Vox, July 9, 2014.

  85. Deep decarbonization of the world: Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 2015; see also the preceding note.

  86. Nuclear power and the psychology of fear and dread: Gardner 2008; Gigerenzer 2016; Ropeik & Gray 2002; Slovic 1987; Slovic, Fischof, & Lichtenstein 1982.

  87. From “Power,” by John Hall and Johanna Hall.

  88. Variously attributed; quoted in Brand 2009, p. 75.

  89. Necessity for standardization: Shellenberger 2017. Selin quote: Washington Post, May 29, 1995.

  90. Fourth-generation nuclear power: Bailey 2015; Blees 2008; Freed 2014; Hargraves 2012; Naam 2013.

  91. Fusion power: E. Roston, “Peter Thiel’s Other Hobby Is Nuclear Fusion,” Bloomberg News, Nov. 22, 2016; L. Grossman, “Inside the Quest for Fusion, Clean Energy’s Holy Grail,” Time, Oct. 22, 2015.

  92. Advantages of technological solutions to climate change: Bailey 2015; Koningstein & Fork 2014; Nordhaus 2016; see also note 103 below.

  93. Need for risky research: Koningstein & Fork 2014.

  94. Brand 2009, p. 84.

  95. American gridlock and technophobia: Freed 2014.

  96. Carbon capture: Brand 2009; B. Plumer, “Can We Build Power Plants That Actually Take Carbon Dioxide Out of the Air?” Vox, March 11, 2015; B. Plumer, “It’s Time to Look Seriously at Sucking CO2 Out of the Atmosp
here,” Vox, July 13, 2015. See also CarbonBrief 2016, and the Web site for the Center for Carbon Removal, http://www.centerforcarbonremoval.org/.

  97. Geoengineering: Keith 2013, 2015; Morton 2015. Artificial carbon capture: See the preceding note.

  98. Low-carbon liquid fuels: Schrag 2009.

  99. BECCS: King et al. 2015; Sanchez et al. 2015; Schrag 2009; see also note 96 above.

  100. Time headlines: Sept. 25, Oct. 19, and Oct. 14, respectively. New York Times headline: Nov. 5, 2015, based on a poll from the Pew Research Center. For other polls showing American support of climate mitigation measures, see https://www.carbontax.org/polls/.

  101. Paris agreement: http://unfccc.int/paris agreement/items/9485.php.

  102. Likelihood of temperature rises under the Paris agreement: Fawcett et al. 2015.

  103. Decarbonization driven by technology and economics: Nordhaus & Lovering 2016. States, cities, and world vs. Trump on climate change: Bloomberg & Pope 2017; “States and Cities Compensate for Mr. Trump’s Climate Stupidity,” New York Times, June 7, 2017; “Trump Is Dropping Out of the Paris Agreement, but the Rest of Us Don’t Have To,” Los Angeles Times, June 16, 2017; W. Hamaidan, “How Should World Leaders Punish Trump for Pulling Out of Paris Accord?” The Guardian, June 15, 2017; “Apple Issues $1 Billion Green Bond After Trump’s Paris Climate Exit,” Reuters, June 13, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-climate-greenbond-idUSKBN1941ZE; H. Tabuchi & H. Fountain, “Bill Gates Leads New Fund as Fears of U.S. Retreat on Climate Grow,” New York Times, Dec. 12, 2016.

  104. Cooling the atmosphere by reducing solar radiation: Brand 2009; Keith 2013, 2015; Morton 2015.

  105. Calcite (limestone) as a stratospheric sunscreen and antacid: Keith et al. 2016.

  106. “Moderate, responsive, temporary”: Keith 2015. Removing 5 gigatons of CO2 by 2075: Q&A from Keith 2015.

  107. Climate engineering increases concern about climate change: Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, et al. 2012.

  108. Complacent vs. conditional optimism: Romer 2016.

  CHAPTER 11: PEACE

  1. The graphs in Better Angels and in this book include the most recent year available. However, most datasets are not updated in real time but are double-checked for accuracy and completeness and thus released well after the most recent year they include (at least a year, though the gap has been shrinking). Some datasets are not updated at all, or change their criteria, making different years incommensurable. For these reasons, together with the publication lag, the latest years plotted in the Better Angels graphs were before 2011, and those plotted in this book extend no later than 2016.

  2. War as the default state of affairs: See the discussion in Pinker 2011, pp. 228–49.

  3. In this discussion, I use Levy’s classification of great powers and great power war; see also Goldstein 2011; Pinker 2011, pp. 222–28.

  4. Crisscrossing trends in great power war: Pinker 2011, pp. 225–28, based on data from Levy 1983.

  5. Obsolescence of war between states: Goertz, Diehl, & Balas 2016; Goldstein 2011; Hathaway & Shapiro 2017; Mueller 1989, 2009; and see Pinker 2011, chap. 5.

  6. The standard definition of “war” among political scientists is a state-based armed conflict which causes at least 1,000 battle deaths in a given year. The figures are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: Gleditsch et al. 2002; Human Security Report Project 2011; Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015; http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/.

  7. S. Pinker & J. M. Santos, “Colombia’s Milestone in World Peace,” New York Times, Aug. 26, 2016. I thank Joshua Goldstein for calling my attention to many of the facts in that article, repeated in this paragraph.

  8. Center for Systemic Peace, Marshall 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm, total for 32 episodes of political violence in the Americas since 1945, excluding 9/11 and the Mexican drug war.

  9. Counts from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015, with updates from Therese Pettersson and Sam Taub (personal communication). The wars in 2016 were: Afghanistan vs. Taliban, and vs. ISIS; Iraq vs. ISIS; Libya versus ISIS; Nigeria vs. ISIS; Somalia vs. Al-Shabab; Sudan vs. SRF; Syria vs. ISIS, and vs. Insurgents; Turkey vs. ISIS, and vs. PKK; Yemen vs. Forces of Hadi.

  10. Syrian civil war battle death estimates: 256,624 (through 2016) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/652, accessed June 2017); 250,000 (through 2015) from the Center for Systemic Peace, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm, last updated May 25, 2016.

  11. Civil wars that ended since 2009 (technically, “state-based armed conflicts,” with more than 25 battle deaths per year but not necessarily more than 1,000): personal communication from Therese Pettersson, March 17, 2016, based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict dataset, Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015, http://ucdp.uu.se/. Earlier wars with large death tolls: Center for Systemic Peace, Marshall 2016.

  12. Goldstein 2015. The numbers are for “refugees,” who cross international borders; the number of “internally displaced persons” has been tracked only since 1989, so a comparison of those displaced by the Syrian war and by earlier wars is impossible.

  13. Genocides as old as history: Chalk & Jonassohn 1990, p. xvii.

  14. Peak death rate in genocides: From Rummel 1997, using his definition of “democide,” which includes the UCDP’s “one-sided violence” together with deliberate famines, deaths in internment camps, and the targeted bombing of civilians. Stricter definitions of “genocide” also result in counts during the 1940s in the tens of millions. See White 2011; Pinker 2011, pp. 336–42.

  15. The calculations are explained in Pinker 2011, p. 716, note 65.

  16. Numbers are for 2014 and 2015, the most recent years for which a breakdown is available. Though these are the “high” estimates in the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset version 1.4–2015 (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_one-sided_violence_dataset/), the numbers tally only the verified deaths and should be considered conservative lower bounds.

  17. Problems in estimating risks: Pinker 2011, pp. 210–22; Spagat 2015, 2017; M. Spagat, “World War III—What Are the Chances,” Significance, Dec. 2015; M. Spagat & S. Pinker, “Warfare” (letter), Significance, June 2016, and “World War III: The Final Exchange,” Significance, Dec. 2016.

  18. Nagdy & Roser 2016a. Military spending in all countries but the United States has decreased in inflation-adjusted dollars from their Cold War peaks, and in the United States it is lower than the Cold War peak as a proportion of GDP. Conscription: Pinker 2011, pp. 255–57; M. Tupy, “Fewer People Exposed to Horrors of War,” HumanProgress, May 30, 2017, http://humanprogress.org/blog/fewer-people-exposed-to-horrors-of-war.

  19. Enlightenment-era denunciations of war: Pinker 2011, pp. 164–68.

  20. Declines and hiatuses in war: Pinker 2011, pp. 237–38.

  21. Gentle commerce vindicated: Pinker 2011, pp. 284–88; Russett & Oneal 2001.

  22. Democracy and peace: Pinker 2011, pp. 278–94; Russett & Oneal 2001.

  23. Possible irrelevance of nuclear weapons: Mueller 1989, 2004; Pinker 2011, pp. 268–78. For new data see Sechser & Fuhrmann 2017.

  24. Norms and taboos as a cause of the Long Peace: Goertz, Diehl, & Balas 2016; Goldstein 2011; Hathaway & Shapiro 2017; Mueller 1989; Nadelmann 1990.

  25. Civil wars less deadly than interstate wars: Pinker 2011, pp. 303–5.

  26. Peacekeepers keep peace: Fortna 2008; Goldstein 2011; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannong 2013.

  27. Richer countries have fewer civil wars: Fearon & Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2011; Human Security Centre 2005; Human Security Report Project 2011. Warlords, guerrillas, and mafias: Mueller 2004.

  28. Contagion of war: Human Security Report Project 2011.

  29. Romantic militarism: Howard 2001
; Mueller 1989, 2004; Pinker 2011, pp. 242–44; Sheehan 2008.

  30. Quotes are from Mueller 1989, pp. 38–51.

  31. Romantic nationalism: Howard 2001; Luard 1986; Mueller 1989; Pinker 2011, pp. 238–42.

  32. Hegelian dialectical struggle: Luard 1986, p. 355; Nisbet 1980/2009. Quote from Mueller 1989.

  33. Marxist dialectical struggle: Montgomery & Chirot 2015.

  34. Declinism and cultural pessimism: Herman 1997; Wolin 2004.

  35. Herman 1997, p. 231.

  CHAPTER 12: SAFETY

  1. In 2005, between 421,000 and 1.8 million people were bitten by poisonous snakes, and between 20,000 and 94,000 of them died (Kasturiratne et al. 2008).

  2. Relative toll of injuries: World Health Organization 2014.

  3. Accidents and causes of death: Kochanek et al. 2016. Accidents and the global burden of disease and disability: Murray et al. 2012.

  4. Homicides more lethal than war: Pinker 2011, p. 221; see also p. 177, table 13–1. For updated data and visualizations on homicide rates, see the Igarapé Institute’s Homicide Monitor, https://homicide.igarape.org.br/.

  5. Medieval violence: Pinker 2011, pp. 17–18, 60–75; Eisner 2001, 2003.

  6. The Civilizing Process: Eisner 2001, 2003; Elias 1939/2000; Fletcher 1997.

  7. Eisner and Elias: Eisner 2001, 2014a.

  8. 1960s crime boom: Latzer 2016; Pinker 2011, pp. 106–16.

  9. Root-causism: Sowell 1995.

  10. Racism in decline in the 1960s: Pinker 2011, pp. 382–94.

  11. Great American Crime Decline: Latzer 2016; Pinker 2011, pp. 116–27; Zimring 2007. The 2015 uptick was likely caused in part by a retreat in policing following nationally publicized protests against police shootings in 2014; see L. Beckett, “Is the ‘Ferguson Effect’ Real? Researcher Has Second Thoughts,” The Guardian, May 13, 2016; H. Macdonald, “Police Shootings and Race,” Washington Post, July 18, 2016. For reasons why the 2015 uptick is unlikely to reverse the progress of the years before, see B. Latzer, “Will the Crime Spike Become a Crime Boom?” City Journal, Aug. 31, 2016, https://www.city-journal.org/html/will-crime-spike-become-crime-boom-14710.html.