Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces
Terrorism finally reached U.S. shores in 1993, with the bombing of the World Trade Center by a group of Islamic extremists. I have never been able to learn whether this event was state-sponsored or only the work of an Islamic extremist group.
In the same year, the wealthy Saudi expatriate Osama bin Laden emerged as a mastermind and organizer of terrorism, with an especially virulent hatred of the United States. His organization, called Al-Qaeda (The Base), was a network of terrorist organizations and cells around the world, united in a holy war against the United States.
Bin Laden is believed to be responsible for the bombings of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, as well as the suicide attack on the USS Cole in 2000, in the harbor of Aden, Yemen. And he is considered the prime suspect in the attack of September 11,2001.
In other words, a war has been waged against the United States for several years. It took the attack of September 11 to wake us up to it.
HOW DID SUCH AN ATTACK HAPPEN HERE?
The answer is simple: Our intelligence services failed us massively in the days before September 11, 2001. They must be much improved.
Let’s look at a few facts:
The infrastructure necessary to support operations of such magnitude and sophistication had to be very sizable. The terrorists had to operate abroad as well as here in the United States. And these operations had to have been launched long before the act itself was committed.
The attack was extraordinarily efficient. Agents had to case airports to determine security operations. Support cells and infrastructures had to rehearse their parts so they could perform efficiently at the appropriate time. The hijacking teams probably rode on flights like the ones they would actually hijack when the code signal came.
Such a vast organizational and operational effort inevitably leaves traces that should have been apparent to our intelligence agencies—but weren’t.
Many other reasons will eventually be given for the failure; these will all be examined in congressional hearings, and fixes will be made—unfortunately too late. They’ll be closing the barn door after the horse has already bolted.
Fundamental to our vulnerability is our current lack of what is called HUMINT (human intelligence). We have had that deficiency for years. IIUMINT is necessary to penetrate clandestine religious-based terrorist organizations.
Overhead systems (satellites) can’t do that job. Neither will the hiring of agents from other countries bring a quick fix.
Unfortunately, it takes years to train operatives and to establish an effective I IUMINT intelligence capability—and we are way behind the time curve in this war.
WILL THERE BE MORE ATTACKS?
As long as fanatical groups and the forces of darkness continue to exist, we are vulnerable to attack. The real question is: Will we be able to prevent it?
As 1 said before, the attack of September 11 could have been even worse. Terrorist organizations have become much more sophisticated and may soon have access to weapons of mass destruction—if they don’t have them already—not to mention chemical and biological warfare. As always (like Mao’s guerrillas), they will attempt to maximize fear and terror by hitting us where we are most vulnerable, and at a time and place of their choosing. We face an enemy like we have never faced before, who does not operate on a linear battlefield, his forces in mass. It is called “asymmetrical warfare”—assaults on our weaknesses rather than on our strengths.
So, yes, even after we have spent billions improving our security, there will most likely be another attack, but in another form—if for no other reason than to show us they can still do it.
1 doubt that we will ever eliminate terrorism. It will be with us as long as there arc men who dream of bringing down a nation. But we can climinate the leaders and the resources it takes to sustain them and their operations. Hopefully, too, as with Noriega, we can eliminate the places where they lay their heads. But this will take a lot of time.
RESOLVE, ACTION, AND JUSTICE
What must we do?
First, I believe that President Bush’s strategy for combating terrorism—the application of all available national options concurrently—is right on the mark.
Second, I would recommend one more arrow in the Presidents long-range quiver (and I’m sure it is being considered at the national level), and that is a PSYOPs campaign. The goal is not to change the minds of terrorists—which is probably impossible—but to deny them the population they need for their support and recruits. We must—to use an old phrase—win their “hearts and minds.” Far too many in the Islamic world look up to the new terrorists as heroes and saviors. We have to bring the truth to these people, and to all the peoples of Islam that these men represent a perversion of Islam and not its highest expression; and in the meantime we have to show them by our actions that we respect them and their faith. But this job could take years, or decades.
In the near term, we must clean out all the terrorist cells and sympathizers in the United States. We must also improve our security systems and procedures. As the President has indicated, unilateral action by the United States will not solve this problem. We must build a strong multinational coalition that will cooperate in every way possible, and this coalition must include the modern Arab nations. We must have the help of other governments’ intelligence services. We must stand behind the President and not become complacent.
Success will be a long, drawn-out process. Victory will be ambiguous; and there will be few victory parades. We will lose good people in the struggle, but we must not weaken in our resolve.
Our strength is in our unity and in that resolve. For both our sake and our children’s sake, we must be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to win this war. We have invested too much in the defense of our freedoms to be cowed by such as bin Laden.
WHEN WILL WE STRIKE? WHEN WILL WE GO GET HIM?
In the time that has passed since the tragic September strike, I have been asked both of these questions hundreds of times—by all kinds of people, from ordinary citizens to those in the media. My usual answer has been “We will strike when it is to our advantage, and when we are ready. But it is just not ‘him’ we will be after; we are after the leadership and infrastructures of terrorist organizations around the world.”
At the beginning of this book, our Authors’ Note indicated that concerns for the safety of operational forces and their families, as well as security concerns, would prevent me from discussing some matters in which readers will legitimately be interested. That restraint applies now more than ever.
The national media, for example, has announced that U.S. and British Special Operations forces have already been inserted in Afghanistan. 1 cannot confirm the truth of this report, but if special operations forces are there, the announcement most certainly increased the risk associated with their mission.
I can say, therefore—without revealing details of how special operations forces will be used in the war against terrorism-that they will most certainly be involved. This has already been announced by our national command authorities. Because of their cultural orientation and language capabilities, and their unique skills, which span the entire spectrum of warfare, they will most certainly play a key role. All other forces will surely bring important capabilities into the mix, but it is the versatility of special operations forces that will make them the forces of choice at the point of the spear.
When Special Operations forces are committed to the campaign, we can also expect that they will conduct actions related to all their assigned mission areas of responsibility: Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Countcrprolifcration, Coalition Support, and Combat Search and Rescue—specifically choosing and tailoring each applicable capability for the most effective mission accomplishment.
It can also be expected that most SOF operations will be covert-meaning that the American public will r
arely hear of them. In far-reaching operations like these, media reports could not only mean increased risk for the forces involved, but affect political and tactical options for future operations. Information will therefore be released only by the National Command Authority, and only after coordinating with coalition partners.
It is common knowledge that Special Operations forces played unique roles in our operations a few years ago in Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, and Somalia, and contributed greatly to them. They will most certainly draw on these experiences. But there are major differences.
In Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, the recognized governments of Panama and Kuwait supported our actions. We knew the enemy, we had selected the targets in advance, and we had rehearsed the operations to the extent necessary for success. The majority of the civil populations of both countries were friendly to the United States and supported our actions.
The war against terrorism will be in stark contrast to any threat we have faced before, and carries with it greater challenges and risks. In the first place, we will not be focusing our efforts on just one individual or target, or even on several—as in Panama, where we had twenty-seven. We will be focusing on all key personnel and infrastructures associated with the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, and will attack several targets embedded covertly in many nations throughout the world. We have yet to identify most of these cells; critical intelligence is not available, and in many cases forces will have to produce their own.
Numerous sovereignty issues will also have to be worked out at the national level. We will encounter hostile governments and hostile populations, and most operational environments are likely to be nonpermissive.
We will be required to operate in very rugged terrain and in urban areas, and we will be at great distances from our logistical bases. The enemy is elusive ; he does not stand and fight on our terms. He has better field intelligence than we do. He knows the terrain, has his own support infrastructures, and uses civilians as shields. He does not recognize treaties, our principles of warfare, or our ethics. The organizations we will face do not take prisoners.
There will be many necessary missions, and each will be unique. Tactical, “cookie cutter” solutions will not be available from past military studies. The solutions to such tactical challenges are best left to those who will fight the battles. Therefore, the most effective solutions for dealing with this enemy will have to be unconventional.
All this will take time. Our enemies believe that the United States has no “staying power—as demonstrated by our “abandonment” of Somalia and Lebanon after terrorist onslaughts. They will learn a different lesson in the coming months—or, if necessary, years.
As a nation, we arc very fortunate to have special operations forces of such quality. We must give them the necessary latitude to deal with the challenges they will face. They have the judgment and skills to react appropriately and do what must be done.
The least we can do as a nation is to be patient and to stand behind them. We have no other alternative.
APPENDIX I:
THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: A BRIEF HISTORY
Before the book concludes, a quick overview of USSOCOM is in order.
President Reagan approved the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command on April 13, 1987, and on April 16, the Department of Defense activated USSOCOM and nominated General James J. Lindsay to be the first commander in chief. The Senate accepted him without debate.
USSOCOM had its activation ceremony on June 1, 1987. Guest speakers included William II. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral William J. Crowe, both of whom had opposed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. Admiral Crowc’s speech cautioned General Lindsay to integrate the new command into the mainstream military: “First, break down the wall that has more or less come between special operations forces and the other parts of our military, the wall that some people will try to build higher. Second, educate the rest of the military—spread a recognition and undcrstanding of what you do, why you do it, and how important it is that you do it. Last, integrate your efforts into the full spectrum of our military capabilities.” Putting this advice into action, General Lindsay knew, would pose challenges (a “sporty” course, he called it) considering the opposition the Defense Department had shown to the creation of SOCOM.
THE mission assigned to USSOCOM by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was “to prepare SOF to carry out assigned missions and, if directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to plan for and conduct special operations.” Mission responsibilities included to:Develop SOF doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures
Conduct specialized courses of instruction for all SOF
Train assigned forces and ensure interoperability of equipment and forces
Monitor the preparedness of SOF assigned to other unified commands
Monitor the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional development of all SOF personnel
Consolidate and submit program and budget proposals for Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11)
Develop and acquire special-operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services
These last two tasks, managing MFP-11 and developing and acquiring special-operations-peculiar items, made USSOCOM unique among the unified commands. These responsibilities—dubbed “servicelike”—had heretofore been performed exclusively by the services. Congress had given the command extraordinary authority over SOF force structure, equipping, and rcsourcing.
The Command’s mission evolved with the changing geopolitical environment. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of regional instability put SOF’s capabilities in ever-greater demand, and this increased operational tempo (optempo) and called for a large SOF involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. USSOCOM later added counterprolileration and information operations command-and-control warfare to its list of principal missions, and expanded the counterterrorism mission to include defensive measures (antiterrorism).
SINCE 1987, there have been six CINCSOCs: General James J. Lindsay served from April 16, 1987, to June 27, 1990; Carl W. Stiner from June 27, 1990, to May 20, 1993; Wayne A. Downing from May 20, 1993, to February 29, 1996; Henry H. Shelton from February 29, 1996, to September 25, 1997; Peter J. Schoomaker from November 5, 1997, to October 27, 2000; and Charlie R. Holland from October 2000 to the present. Each CINCSOC left his mark on the SOF community as he responded to significant changes on the military landscape. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the downsizing of the U.S. military, the appearance of new aggressor states, heightened regional instabilities, highly organized international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—all led to an increased use of SOF by conventional U.S. military commanders, ambassadors, and other governmental agencies.
General Lindsay’s greatest challenge was to make the command the driving force behind the congressionally mandated revitalization of SOF without alienating conventional military leaders. This was no casy task, given the opposition in many military circles to the command’s mere existence. As the first CINCSOC, he developed priorities to get the command functioning. They were to: organize, staff, train, and equip the headquarters; establish the necessary operating systems, including intelligence, as well as information and logistical support; develop the relationships necessary to discharge his roles and missions; create Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) to ensure SOF controlled its financial destiny; build command-and-control relationships with the components, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and the special operations commands assigned to the theater CINCs; define worldwide SOF requirements; and plot the future of the command. General Lindsay also faced two major operational tests—for which he provided trained and ready forces—Operation EARNEST WILL/PRIME CHANCE ONE in the Persian Gulf, and Operation JUST CAUST/PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. The use of SOF by the theater CINCs increased significantly during General Lindsay’s tenure.
br /> The creation of MFP-11 was a special and unique priority for both General Lindsay and Congress. Like the services, USSOCOM was to have its own budget and would be responsible for determining its own funding needs, including research and development, and equipping and training all the Special Operations forces of all the services.
Although the Nunn-Cohen Amendment had created MFP-11 to reform SOF funding, the wording of the law permitted varying interpretations, and some Defense Department officials argued that the new command should not submit its own Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which defines and justifies all programs and initiatives necessary for readiness, including the spread of funding over time (the POM thus serves as the basis for building the budget). The services wanted to keep control of the budgeting process for SOF forces so they could use the money on things other than SOF, as they had always been accustomed to doing.
This debate lingered until September 1988, when Senators Nunn and Cohen clarified congressional intent, saying that the sponsors of the law “fully intended that the commander of the Special Operations Command would have sole responsibility for the preparation of the POM.” Congress enacted Public Law 100-456 that same month, which directed USCINCSOC to submit a POM directly to the Secretary of Defense.