The Supreme Commander

  At this time it was assumed that Marshall would command Operation OVERLORD, the 1944 invasion of France. Eisenhower said that if Marshall had to take a British ground commander from the Mediterranean, he should take Alexander. “He is broad-gauged and should perform excellently.… He works on the ‘Allied’ basis.” Eisenhower would be content to keep Montgomery “because during these months I have learned to know him very well, feel that I have his personal equation, and have no lack of confidence in my ability to handle him.”33

  A few hours after Eisenhower finished dictating his recommendation to Marshall, he received a message from the Chief asking for suggestions as to who should command the American army preparing for the cross-Channel invasion.34 Eisenhower sent a long cable in reply, repeating most of what he had already put into the letter. He did add that, of the three seniors in the theater, Bradley was “the best rounded in all respects,” although it was true that Bradley had little experience in planning amphibious operations. Clark on the other hand had the advantage of being the ablest and most experienced planner of amphibious operations, and Eisenhower told Marshall that, if he picked Clark for OVERLORD, Bradley could take command of Fifth Army.35

  The next day Eisenhower decided that he had been subconsciously trying to hold onto Bradley. He knew that this was not fair of him, both for Bradley’s sake and for the Allied cause, since OVERLORD was the most important operation of the war, and that he had therefore better make a clear and forceful recommendation. He sent a short cable to Marshall: “The truth of the matter is that you should take Bradley and, moreover, I will make him available on any date you say. I will get along.” Less than a week later Bradley had his orders, and on September 8 left for England and command of the U. S. First Army.36 His slug fest at Troina and his deliberate choice of the unspectacular advance through central Sicily cost him the headlines, but it got him the most coveted combat command in the U. S. Army.

  Eisenhower, meanwhile, had dozens of other worries. One of the main reasons the Sicilian campaign went so slowly was that the higher commanders never had the time to give it their full attention. A great deal was going on in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1943.

  Part IV

  THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

  [July 1943–December 1943]

  THE story of the second half of 1943 in the Mediterranean is one of missed opportunities. Because the Allies were unwilling to abandon Roosevelt’s unconditional-surrender formula, deal once again with a Fascist like Darlan, or even move quickly, the Italian campaign was long, slow, bloody, and sterile.

  The caution of the Allied governments on the diplomatic front was matched by the caution of the Allied soldiers on the battlefield. One of the reasons Eisenhower and his deputies were unwilling to take risks in Italy was the steady relegation of the entire Mediterranean theater to a secondary status. For a year the Allied warriors in the Mediterranean had been directing the major offensive in what had then been the primary theater and for the most part they were accustomed to getting from the CCS the men and supplies for which they asked. From the early fall of 1943 onward, however, preparations for OVERLORD took precedence over operations in the Mediterranean, a situation which Eisenhower and his subordinates found frustrating. This, however, was only a psychological factor that could not be accurately measured. What could be counted were acute shortages in vital equipment, especially bombers and landing craft. Eisenhower could not persuade the CCS to provide him with his minimal needs and therefore had constantly to reduce his objectives—in short, to be cautious. The key figure in the refusals of support was George Marshall, who would do almost anything for Eisenhower except provide him with equipment that would have to be taken from the cross-Channel build-up.

  The best thing that could be said for the campaign was that in the end the Allies did conquer the Italian Peninsula. The generals and admirals involved, especially Eisenhower, gained experience in amphibious operations that would prove invaluable later in the war.

  CHAPTER 17

  The Beginning

  For the officers at AFHQ, as for the Allied soldiers fighting on Sicily, the last two weeks of July and the first two weeks of August were marked by nearly unbearable heat and constant frustration. Fortunately for the sake of internal harmony, the source of the frustration came from outside North Africa. Eisenhower and his officers, British and American, could do nothing about the merciless sun, but they could join together in their feelings of irritation at the CCS and both of their governments. These were good targets for a needed release of emotion, the CCS because the Chiefs would not give AFHQ the material it needed, the governments because they would not set a clear policy line and then let AFHQ handle all the details. The result was that neither of the two major objectives—preparing for the invasion of Italy and taking advantage of the political possibilities opened in Italy following a change in government—could be worked through. Eisenhower and his subordinates, both military and diplomatic, felt they could have done a better job if left alone.

  On July 17, 1943, Eisenhower had Cunningham, Tedder, and Alexander come to Algiers for a meeting to consider post-HUSKY operations. Although HUSKY was only a week old, Eisenhower feared that Sicily would not be cleared of the enemy until mid-August. His commanders agreed with him, but they also agreed that Italian morale was so low that an invasion of the mainland of Italy would drive the Italians out of the war or, failing that, at least cause the overthrow of Mussolini.

  But the Italians were not the only enemies, not even the most important ones. Eisenhower warned his deputies that they could not discount the possibility of a substantial German reinforcement of southern Italy. He thought that the way to minimize its effects was to get onto the peninsula quickly. Alexander pointed out that, while this was theoretically sound, no firm plans for an invasion could be made until the Sicilian campaign had progressed further. Cunningham added that only events could tell what landing craft losses in Sicily would be. Seventh Army was still being supplied by the craft over open beaches. Other unknown factors included German and Italian movements, both on Sicily and Italy, and Tedder added that he had no idea as to how much aircraft the CCS would give him for an invasion.

  With so many questions open it was impossible to make definite plans. After a long discussion, Eisenhower ordered his staff to study a series of alternatives, including a movement across the Strait of Messina into the Italian toe and from there a drive up the peninsula, a British invasion of southern Italy at Crotone, repeated outflanking movements by small amphibious forces up the Italian shin, an invasion by the U. S. Fifth Army at Taranto, and an assault on Naples.

  The overrriding conclusion of the meeting was clear—immediately upon the capture of Sicily, the Allies should take the war to the Italian mainland. Eisenhower so recommended to the CCS.1 How immediately such an invasion could take place, however, depended upon many factors. Eisenhower had already explained to the CCS that it would be necessary to withdraw landing craft from Sicily thirty days before any assault could be mounted. Since most of the craft in the Mediterranean were involved in supplying the Seventh Army, that meant there would have to be a pause between the fall of Sicily and the invasion of Italy.2

  But Churchill wanted to speed up the operations. On July 18 he asked the theater commander to do everything he could to get onto the Italian mainland quickly, and he urged him to think on a grand scale. The Prime Minister was disturbed by the cautious approach of the Mediterranean commanders. An invasion of the toe, or even at Naples, struck him as insignificant. In support of his conviction he passed along a message he had received from Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa and a man with an uncommonly large influence on Churchill. Smuts said that the next Allied operation should be directed against Rome, for “we should attempt only vital blows at this stage of the war and side shows should be avoided.”3

  Eisenhower replied, “I always find my sentiments in full accord with any suggestion that seeks to avoid nibbling and jabbing in order
to leap straight at the vitals of the enemy,” but he pointed out that no one could long be engaged in the business of conducting modern war without becoming convinced of the “absolute necessity” of keeping his shipping under the protection of shore-based fighter aircraft. He agreed with Churchill that German strength was the only real problem on the mainland and that the way to beat the Germans was to get there quickly. But to send a large invasion force directly to Naples or northward, where it would be without fighter cover, “would certainly be asking for trouble.” Eisenhower promised to do everything humanly possible to take Rome in a hurry; he added that he and his commanders agreed that the way to do it was to get established on the toe, take Naples, and then drive north overland.4

  Although Rome was beyond fighter range, it was well within bomber range, and because it was a railroad bottleneck it was a constant temptation to the Allies. There were obvious drawbacks: the Eternal City had a special meaning for artists, architects, historians, and others, not to mention Catholics, throughout the world. Tedder’s staff had made intensive studies, however, which indicated that the railroad marshaling yards and outlying airfields were far enough away from the historical buildings, and especially the Vatican, to guarantee that the military targets could be bombed without any danger of damage to sensitive areas. After talking with Eisenhower in Algiers in early June, Churchill had received permission from the War Cabinet for a raid on the city, and Marshall got Roosevelt’s approval.

  The operation was handled with the greatest possible care. Eisenhower saw to it that the crews were specially trained, that the targets were only the most essential railroad objectives, and that the margin for error was sufficient to prevent damage of any kind to historical or religious edifices. The press was completely briefed before the raid.5 On July 15, after the crews had had two weeks of training, Eisenhower set July 19 as the target date. Four hundred heavy bombers would drop more than a thousand tons of bombs on the railroad yards; in a subsidiary operation medium bombers would hit airfields south of Rome.6

  The raid went as scheduled and it was a success. Except for the Basilica of San Lorenzo, no major religious or historic shrine was damaged. Spaatz reported to Arnold that the raid had “very little interest” from an Air Force standpoint because it was “too easy.”7 But as Eisenhower had hoped, Italian morale was further shaken. Mussolini, who was in conference with Hitler about the situation in Sicily, returned to Rome on July 20 to find fires raging and the King “frowning and nervous.”8

  All of Italy now became a seething hotbed of intrigue and conspiracy. Plot after plot was planned; most had abortive births. The one that counted came on July 25, when the Fascist Grand Council met and had what amounted to a vote of no confidence in Mussolini. That evening a group of the conspirators arrested Mussolini. The King, who was himself involved, turned to Marshal Pietro Badoglio, an old soldier who had been dismissed by Mussolini in 1940 following the Greek disasters, and gave him the task of forming a new government.

  The next day Badoglio broadcast the news of Mussolini’s fall to the world. In his radio speech Badoglio stated “The war continues. Italy, cruelly hurt in its invaded provinces, in its destroyed cities, keeps faith to its pledged word.” But the statement convinced neither the Germans nor the Allies and only bewildered the Italian people.9

  Statesmen and leaders throughout the world reacted swiftly to Mussolini’s fall. The day the news came out Hitler began rushing troops into northern Italy (two divisions in France received their marching orders the very night of July 26) and began planning to occupy the South. Roosevelt wired Churchill, saying he thought the Italians were ready to give up the battle and that the terms the Allies offered should be “as close as possible to unconditional surrender.” The President did feel that Italy should be treated leniently so that the Italian armed forces could be used against the Germans in the north and so that the Allies could use Italian airfields. Roosevelt also told Churchill, “In no event should our officers in the field fix any general terms without your approval or mine.”

  Churchill remembered the Darlan deal as well as Roosevelt and agreed at once to the policy of limiting Eisenhower’s authority. The Prime Minister did indicate, however, that he was inclined to deal more gently and freely with the Italians than the President. “I do not think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any non-Fascist government, even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone, I would deal with any non-Fascist Italian government which can deliver the goods.” Roosevelt took a stronger line. In a radio broadcast on July 28 he reassured his audience by emphatically affirming that “our terms to Italy are still the same as our terms to Germany and Japan—unconditional surrender. We will have no truck with Fascism in any way, shape, or manner.” And to the Prime Minister he cabled, “There are some contentious people here who are getting ready to make a row if we seem to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio. They are the same element that made such a fuss over North Africa.”10

  On Monday, July 26, Eisenhower was at breakfast in Tunis when the news of Mussolini’s fall reached him. He called Macmillan on the telephone and asked him to come right over; when Macmillan arrived he found Eisenhower in a “state of considerable excitement and full of plans and ideas for exploiting the situation created by Mussolini’s fall.”11

  Eisenhower told Macmillan that he wanted to build strong public sentiment among the Italians to encourage the King to negotiate quickly for peace, a peace that would eliminate Fascism and turn the Italians against the German soldiers on their soil. The emphasis was on the latter goal. Not much was known about Badoglio’s politics, but obviously he must have been a Fascist or he would not have headed the Italian Army in 1940. But in view of the potential military profit, this did not bother Eisenhower. He was far enough along in planning the invasion of Italy to realize how difficult an operation it was going to be. He knew how effectively the German could fight on the defensive in mountainous country. The CCS had already made it clear that, with OVERLORD approaching, AFHQ could no longer count on unlimited supplies and reinforcements. A quick pact with the Italian government, no matter how odious its personnel, would allow the Allies to occupy the mainland and to use Italian airfields, release troops for OVERLORD, save landing craft and time, and, most important of all, save lives.

  To attain these objectives, Eisenhower was willing to pay almost any price, including a public censure for another Darlan deal. Although the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, was widely regarded as a Fascist because of his long association with Mussolini, Eisenhower was concerned with victory, not ideological purity. He told Macmillan that the King should be assured that the House of Savoy might “stay as a symbol of Italian unity” if Italy sued for peace.12

  Eisenhower wanted to broadcast an immediate proposal to the Italians, but Murphy pointed out that AFHQ lacked the authority to make a political offer. Eisenhower replied wearily that in the old days generals were free to do whatever they thought best. Still, he knew Murphy was right, and agreed to consult his superiors.13

  Eisenhower and Macmillan drafted a message to the CCS outlining their ideas. “We regard it as of the utmost importance that full opportunity should be taken immediately of the dismissal of Mussolini,” they began, and warned that if the King remained as head of a country still at war with the Allies “full odium in our two countries now concentrated on Duce will be transferred to the King.” This would make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to work with the King, and there was no other responsible authority in Italy to deal with. Eisenhower and Macmillan therefore suggested that a propaganda message be “immediately and constantly” broadcast to Italy from AFHQ. The message would “commend” the Italians and the King on ridding themselves of Mussolini and point out that “the greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves.” The only remaining obstacle to peace was the German Army on Italian soil.

  The message would promise the Italians i
mmediate and honorable peace and say the Allies would come to Italy as liberators to “rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war.” Soldiers and prisoners of war would return to their homes, while the “ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored.”14

  Even as he helped compose the message, Eisenhower had a sinking feeling that while he waited for government approval he would lose the opportunity. He knew that Roosevelt especially would tread carefully in an area which involved Italy because of the hundreds of thousands of Italian-American voters, and that neither the President nor the Prime Minister was particularly anxious to have another Darlan deal on his hands.

  After two days, exchange of a number of messages, and modifications of the Eisenhower-Macmillan draft to eliminate such words an “honorable peace” and promises about the return of prisoners of war, the governments gave AFHQ permission to make the propaganda broadcast. By then it was more or less academic, as AFHQ was already preparing firm armistice proposals.15

  Eisenhower spent most of July 26 working with his staff on the problem of what AFHQ should do if the Badoglio government asked for an armistice. By July 27 they had a policy ready, but it needed CCS approval before it could be put into effect. Eisenhower therefore sent a long cable to the CCS, requesting that he be authorized to offer the Italians the general terms he outlined. He explained that he had to be “prepared to announce at once the conditions under which a general armistice would be granted” if Badoglio approached him. Eisenhower admitted that he had not had a chance to talk to his deputies about the problem and recognized that further details would have to be worked out by the governments.