The Supreme Commander

  In the face of such gaucherie it was difficult for AFHQ officers to keep from laughing. After he returned from Brindisi, Smith told reporters that “the Italian Government, at the present time, consists of the King, Marshal Badoglio, two or three generals, and a couple of part-time stenographers. The day that I was there, a couple of cheap help from the Foreign Office came down from Rome on foot (an Under-Secretary or two).” He said the King was not too bad after he had had his breakfast and before lunch, but “after that he is a little bit slow on the uptake.” For this reason he used the one typist the government had in the morning, while Badoglio had the typist’s services in the afternoon.40

  While he was at Brindisi, Smith carefully laid the groundwork for the Eisenhower-Badoglio meeting on Malta. He was able to get complete agreement from Badoglio, but the King remained stubborn. He did authorize Badoglio to sign the long terms, but he refused to declare war on Germany, to pledge to broaden his government, or to promise to permit the people to choose their own form of government at the end of the war.41

  At 11 A.M., September 29, aboard the British battleship H.M.S. Nelson at Malta, Eisenhower finally met Badoglio. Ambrosio, Roatta, Murphy, Macmillan, Alexander, Smith, Cunningham, Mason-MacFarlane, and a whole bevy of lesser officials were there. Eisenhower and Badoglio stiffly shook hands and signed the long terms.

  Then Eisenhower handed Badoglio a letter which said, in effect, that the terms of the agreement they had just signed were already out of date and could be disregarded. “They are based,” Eisenhower said, “upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.” Eisenhower continued that his governments “fully recognized … that these terms are in some respect superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent.…”42 It was, most agreed, a strange form of unconditional surrender. Some wondered why they bothered to sign the terms at all.

  A conference followed. Badoglio said that if the title of the document he had just signed (“Instrument of Surrender of Italy”) and the first clause, which contained the phrase “surrender unconditionally,” became known, his government would be “overwhelmed by a storm of reproach and he would be forced to resign.…” Eisenhower promised to use his strongest efforts to get it changed, and said if he could not he would keep the whole thing confidential. He was as good as his word, sending a recommendation the next day to the CCS that the title be changed to read “Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy,” and that the phrase “surrender unconditionally” be omitted.43 After a week’s discussion the heads of government agreed.

  The wording settled, Eisenhower turned to other matters. He asked Badoglio if the government could promptly be given a definitely anti-Fascist character. Badoglio avoided a direct answer, even when Eisenhower made it clear that the government would have to adopt an anti-Fascist complexion before it could join the Allies in combat. Eisenhower asked when the declaration of war would be made. Badoglio wanted to make it as soon as the Italian government returned to Rome. Eisenhower said he wanted it right away and would be willing to turn over the administration of Sicily to Badoglio as soon as the Italians declared war on Germany. Badoglio lamely replied that only the King could declare war.

  It then became Badoglio’s turn to ask the direct questions and Eisenhower’s to be evasive. Badoglio wanted to be initiated into Allied plans and requested that Italian troops participate in the entry into Rome. Eisenhower said he would see what could be done. The two soldiers exchanged pleasantries, promised continued co-operation, remarked on how pleased they were with the outcome of the conference, and separated. Two weeks later the Italians, expecting the Allies to be in Rome shortly, declared war on Germany.44

  Eisenhower had carried out his orders—to knock Italy out of the war—and through his careful handling of the negotiations achieved even more, since Italy was now a partner. He had not, however, occupied Italy.

  He was well aware of the limitations of his achievement. “The King-Badoglio government is a pretty weak affair,” he confessed to Dill on September 30, “yet it is the only medium through which Italians can be inspired to help us.…” On the by now far more important point of German resistance, Eisenhower was optimistic. “We are getting along,” he said, “and in my opinion will be in Rome” before the end of October.45 The test would come on the battlefield. Eisenhower’s troops were in Naples, restoring the port and building in strength. AFHQ’s forces were poised for the dash to Rome.

  * Badoglio had had a long conference with the King and merely reported that the alternatives were staggering. The Italians could refuse to make any announcement, in which case Eisenhower would carry out his threat to make public the negotiations, which would leave them in an impossible position vis-à-vis the Germans, or they could make the announcement, in which case the Germans would take over their capital and probably their country. The King finally made the decision. He declared that Italy could not change sides once again and ordered Badoglio to make the announcement. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, pp. 512–13.

  ** Eisenhower told McNarney a week later, “… when the results eventually justify the decision most people think it was obviously an easy one to make,” but in fact it was not. There had been “a lot of guess work” involved. Eisenhower said that he had decided that if Badoglio did not make the announcement, “there was no use fooling with him any more.” The big worry was the Italian fleet, and Eisenhower was willing to gamble to get it. Eisenhower to McNarney, September 16, 1943, EP, No. 1262.

  * “A German commander at Salerno reported to Kesselring on the 14th: ‘The attack this morning … had to endure naval gunfire from at least 16 to 18 battleships, cruisers and large destroyers.… With astonishing precision and freedom of maneuver, these ships shot at every recognized target with overwhelming effect.’ ” Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War, A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston, 1963), p. 356.

  CHAPTER 20

  Stalemate in Italy

  “The long drawn out and exhaustive campaign [in Italy] may be divided into three stages: (1) The reasonable, to the capture of Naples and Foggia. (2) The political, to the occupation of Rome. (3) The daft, from the occupation of Rome onwards.”1

  By early October 1943, AFHQ had achieved the objectives set for it in Italy. The country itself had left the Axis and joined the Allies. The Germans had evacuated Sardinia and Corsica. The Allies occupied Naples, and American engineers soon had it in workable order. The capture of Foggia gave the Allies excellent airfields from which they could carry out strategic bombing raids against Germany. The Germans had put twenty-four divisions into Italy, including some crack Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions, which would be sorely missed on other fronts, so AFHQ was in addition tying down German forces. From a strategic point of view, there was nothing more of substance to be gained in Italy and it was time to call a halt to operations there.

  From a tactical point of view a further offensive also seemed ill advised. The hundred miles between the Volturno River (which Clark reached on October 12) and Rome was a maze of jumbled mountains cut by swift streams that ran east and west, across the Allied line of advance. The country was ideally suited for defensive warfare and Eisenhower had no divisions trained for mountain operations. The fall was the wettest season in Italy, with coastal areas flooded and the mountain streams running in torrents. Although Cunningham’s ships controlled the seas, the absence of landing craft made it difficult for the Allies to exploit this advantage through amphibious end runs. Finally, the best American and British divisions in the Mediterranean were scheduled to go to England for OVERLORD.2

  Despite the limitation, Eisenhower and his deputies wanted to press on in Italy. The doctrine and tradition of the Anglo-American armies emphasized the importance of the offensive. Rome beckoned. Its political significance was temptin
g, and it had airfields around it that Tedder could use. Intelligence reported that the Germans were prepared to pull back north of Rome anyway, and Eisenhower could not afford to leave a no man’s land between his forces and the Germans, as that would allow Von Kesselring to shift divisions to other theaters or mount a counterattack. Thus even with his limited forces and the adverse conditions, Eisenhower decided to drive on.

  The week Naples fell, Eisenhower was made painfully aware of just how limited his forces were. The lesson had its origins in plans made in August by the British commanders in chief in the Middle East. General Henry Maitland Wilson, the Army commander in the Middle East, popularly called “Jumbo” because of his enormous bulk, large, bald head, and bushy mustache, wanted to make an assault on Rhodes. The island was the largest and most strategically significant in the Dodecanese and was occupied by the Italians. Wilson had been unable to mount the operation because of inadequate forces, however, and when Italy switched sides the Germans quickly overpowered the Italians on Rhodes and reinforced their garrison there. Unable to capture the main island, on September 14 the British landed small parties on Cos, Samos, Leros, and still lesser islands. Wilson’s forces were so limited, however, that on none of the islands did he have enough strength to withstand a determined German attack.

  On September 26 Churchill took up the subject with Eisenhower. The Prime Minister wanted AFHQ to send additional troops to the Middle East, some to reinforce Leros and Cos and others to participate in an attack on Rhodes. He said Rhodes was the key to both the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean and thought it was worth one tenth of the total Allied effort in the Mediterranean. Another tenth should go to the Adriatic, with the remaining four fifths to be used in Italy. Churchill assured Eisenhower both that Rhodes would fall easily and that it was important, because of its airfields and because Allied possession of the island might bring Turkey into the war.3 Eisenhower had not had time to study the implications but he did not want to dampen Churchill’s enthusiasm. He made his reply noncommittal but nevertheless hopeful. AFHQ was examining its resources, he said, and “we feel sure that we can meet minimum requirements of Mideast.”4

  Eisenhower now found himself in the same position vis-à-vis Wilson as Devers earlier had been vis-à-vis AFHQ. The most immediate help Eisenhower could give was through air power, but Tedder did not want to take his bombers away from the Italian campaign. Nor did Eisenhower want him to, but when Wilson reported on October 3 that German bombers based in Greece were pounding his men on Leros and Cos, the commander in chief decided he had to act. One reason for Eisenhower’s decision was additional pressure from Churchill, who wired on October 3 to say he was much concerned about Cos, since the airfield there was necessary to provide fighter cover for an invasion of Rhodes. The Prime Minister wanted to be assured “you will do all in your power to prevent a vexatious injury to future plans occurring through its [Cos’s] loss.”5 Eisenhower sent bombers and P-38s from Twelfth Air Force against German airfields in Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese on raids that spanned a four-day period.6

  Tedder was unhappy, not so much about the temporary diversion as its implications, especially since Wilson now demanded more. On October 4 he received a request from Wilson asking for air support for ACCOLADE (code name for the Rhodes operations). Tedder told Eisenhower that it was impossible to help and he protested against Wilson’s having planned an operation without consulting with the people who would have to supply the material. Tedder needed all the aircraft he could get for Italian operations and told the air commander in the Middle East that the procedure by which the Mideast commanders “launch operations without full consultation with me and Eisenhower is, I feel, most dangerous.”7

  Eisenhower told Tedder not to worry. He would not make any commitments to ACCOLADE beyond bombing German airfields in Greece, which helped the forces in Italy anyway. “All our experience has shown that when the land forces undertake a major move,” Eisenhower said, “a period of most intensive work devolves upon the air force,” and since the push to Rome was about to begin, Eisenhower wanted Tedder’s forces available for use in Italy.8

  Immediately after Eisenhower completed his message to Tedder, two telegrams from Wilson came in. Wilson reported that the Germans were counterattacking in the Dodecanese and Cos would fall within a matter of hours, with Leros sure to follow soon after. He wanted immediate air and sea assistance that would enable him to hold Leros until Rhodes was attacked and captured, from which island he could then provide adequate air facilities for his forces in the Middle East.9 Eisenhower talked with General John Whiteley of the AFHQ staff and some Mideast representatives who were in Algiers and then had Whiteley draft a reply. Whiteley said AFHQ was afraid of a continuing drain on its resources and could not justify such a commitment.10

  Churchill saw the message and was much distressed. He communicated directly with Eisenhower, stressing the importance of the Aegean, both in itself and in relation to Italy, and asked Eisenhower to approve the diversion of a division to Mideast, along with ships and planes, to insure the capture of Rhodes. He contended that the diversion that would be forced upon the enemy would be greater than that Eisenhower would have to produce, and added that an operation against Rhodes would give the Allies an opportunity to engage and wear down the enemy’s air power in a new region. It might even bring Turkey into the war.11

  Eisenhower handled the whole thing with the utmost care, since the tone of Churchill’s messages indicated that he was clearly upset and since reports from London implied that he was almost in a frenzy. An offensive, once started, would generate its own momentum, and Churchill, always expansive in his thinking, had already projected operations beyond Rhodes into the Balkans, with the Allies moving on the left flank and the Turks on the right. What Churchill sometimes spoke of as Germany’s soft underbelly would fall into Allied hands and perhaps there would not be any need for OVERLORD and an expensive campaign in northern France. “He seemed always to see great and decisive possibilities in the Mediterranean,” Eisenhower later recalled, “while the project of invasion across the English Channel left him cold.” Churchill had often said, in speaking of OVERLORD, “We must take care that the tides do not run red with the blood of American and British youth, or the beaches be choked with their bodies.” Eisenhower thought there were two additional reasons for Churchill’s advocacy of attack on Rhodes; the first was his desire to have a strong political position in the Balkans after the war, and the second was to vindicate the disastrous World War I campaign at Gallipoli.12

  Whatever Churchill’s motives,* it was obvious that he regarded Rhodes as an issue of primary importance, and Eisenhower thus had to treat it as such. He called for a full-scale meeting between all the senior AFHQ officers and the commanders in chief, Middle East, to be held on October 9 in Tunis. The whole issue could be thrashed out then. What had begun as a fairly small affair in a fairly remote corner of the war had blown up into a strategic situation requiring a major decision. To American eyes it was “scatteration” all over again, with the British wanting to open up a new theater and move even farther eastward in the Mediterranean.13 But in fact it was only the British in London and in the Middle East who wanted to move in that direction; not a single British member of AFHQ supported ACCOLADE.

  Churchill however certainly did, and Eisenhower gave his views full consideration. On October 7, Eisenhower informed Marshall of the coming conference at Tunis and asked for guidance from the War Department. His own view, he said, was that the greatest contribution AFHQ could make to OVERLORD was through a fall and winter offensive that would carry the Allies into northern Italy. From there they could attack the south of France in the spring of 1944 as a diversion for OVERLORD. To reach northern Italy, however, Eisenhower needed all his resources and could spare none for ACCOLADE.14 If OVERLORD retained priority, in short, there was nothing to argue about—ACCOLADE should be canceled. If there were new priorities or a shift in world-wide strategy, Eisenhower wanted to be infor
med, and he requested a new directive.

  Marshall talked with Roosevelt, who had also been subjected to Churchill’s pressure for ACCOLADE, and they agreed that Eisenhower was right—no diversion should be made. Roosevelt cabled this conclusion to Churchill, with a copy to Eisenhower.15 Not satisfied, Churchill contacted the President again, repeated his strategic arguments, and said he was willing to come with the BCOS to Eisenhower’s headquarters to discuss plans with Eisenhower and Marshall, whom Roosevelt should send over for the conference. The President thought that such a trip was unnecessary and by transatlantic telephone Hopkins informed the Prime Minister that there was little chance of Marshall’s coming to such a meeting. Tedder meanwhile expressed the view to Portal that a visit from Churchill was “most dangerous and might have a disastrous effect on Anglo-American relations.”16

  The next day, October 8, an intelligence discovery made the whole issue academic. G-2 reported that the Germans had moved three additional divisions that were in Italy south of Rome. It suddenly became obvious that Von Kesselring intended to make the campaign a real fight, and the Allies would have to pay a high price to take Rome.17 Churchill’s assumption that Rome would be won cheaply and that the Allies could afford the diversion to the Aegean was shattered. Still, the Prime Minister was not willing to give up, even though his commanders in the Middle East had departed from his view.

  The meeting at Tunis on October 9 was, Eisenhower later recalled, “the simplest, most unargumentative of any … I attended during the war.” Eisenhower outlined the situation and announced his decision, which was to make no diversion for ACCOLADE. Every officer present, including Wilson, agreed.18 Churchill, however, deserved and would demand a complete explanation, so after the meeting Eisenhower dictated a two-part, six-page, single-spaced report for the CCS that could be handed to the Prime Minister. He concluded by saying that ACCOLADE could be re-examined after Rome was captured.19 Then he sent a special, personal message to Churchill in which he stressed that his decision had been unanimously supported by all the commanders in chief from both theaters, all of whom were British. “It is personally distressing to me to have to advise against a project in which you believe so earnestly,” Eisenhower concluded, “but I feel I would not be performing my duty if I should recommend otherwise.”20