The Supreme Commander

  The plan, COBRA, hinged on air power. Bradley wanted a small area (2500 by 6000 yards) saturated by bombs. Eisenhower saw to it that 1887 heavy and medium bombers and 559 fighter bombers, carrying more than 4000 tons of explosives, were made available to meet Bradley’s requirements. It was, in a way, a 1916-style operation, with bombers substituting for artillery. The big difference between it and a World War I operation, however, was not the presence of air forces, but rather the relative thinness of the German line in 1944 coupled with the presence of Allied tanks to exploit the hole blasted in the line.

  One advantage artillery had over air was that the guns could fire in any weather. COBRA was due to start on July 21, and Eisenhower flew over to Normandy to witness the beginning. The sky was overcast and his B-25 was the only plane in the air. By the time he arrived it was raining hard. Bradley told him the attack had been called off and dressed him down for flying in such weather. Eisenhower tossed away his soggy cigarette, smiled, and said his only pleasure in being Supreme Commander was that no one could ground him. “When I die,” he added, looked at the steady rain, “they ought to hold my body for a rainy day and then bury me out in the middle of a storm. This damned weather is going to be the death of me yet.”4

  Despite the disappointment, Eisenhower had great confidence in Bradley and felt little need to encourage him to greater efforts. In the only message he sent Bradley before COBRA, the Supreme Commander promised to take full personal responsibility for answering to the American people for the casualties that would necessarily be incurred. He reminded Bradley that “a break through at this juncture will minimize the total cost.” He wanted the Americans to “pursue every advantage with an ardor verging on recklessness.…” If both armies broke through, “the results will be incalculable.”5

  The Supreme Commander did, however, feel that it was necessary to put pressure on Montgomery, and he did so in a variety of ways. In the end Montgomery reponded handsomely, showing that at least in this instance Eisenhower’s methods—cajoling, gentle persuasion, and pressure via third parties—worked better than threats or direct orders.

  Eisenhower wanted Second Army to attack when COBRA began—in fact had promised Bradley that he would see to it that it did—and he flew to Montgomery’s headquarters to urge on the British general. What he wanted, as Smith noted, was “an all-out coordinated attack by the entire Allied line, which would at last put our forces in decisive motion. He was up and down the line like a football coach, exhorting everyone to aggressive action.”6 On July 24 Eisenhower talked to Montgomery’s chief of staff, De Guingand, for an hour; the next day De Guingand phoned Eisenhower to assure him that Montgomery had strengthened his supporting attack. Eisenhower also talked to Churchill, who agreed to the necessity of “keeping the front aflame” and accepted Eisenhower’s conclusion that the British forces could and should be doing more. Churchill visited Montgomery in Normandy and told him as much.7

  All of this was highly irritating to Montgomery and Brooke. “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does,” Brooke wrote to Montgomery. “It is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war.” The British officers agreed that Eisenhower had no notion of balance. If everybody was to attack, Montgomery argued, nobody would have the strength to make a decisive breakthrough or to exploit it. Eisenhower “evidently … has some conception of attacking on the whole front,” Brooke complained, “which must be an American doctrine judging by Mark Clark with Fifth Army in Italy.” Unfortunately, he continued, the idea of attack along the whole front appealed to Churchill too, so “Ike may … obtain some support in this direction.”8

  While Eisenhower did everything possible to get Montgomery to move, he had at the same time to stall off Tedder, who was becoming almost obsessed by his countryman’s lack of action. Tedder called Eisenhower on the telephone the morning of July 25, the day COBRA began, demanding to know why Montgomery was not doing more and what Eisenhower was doing about it. Eisenhower said he had talked with Churchill and that they were satisfied that this time Montgomery’s attack would be in earnest. Tedder “rather un-huhed, being not at all satisfied, and implying the PM must have sold Ike a bill of goods.” Eisenhower told Butcher of the conversation and said he thought he could work things out satisfactorily, for “there’s nothing so wrong a good victory won’t cure.”9

  To get away from the carping, and hopefully to enjoy seeing the beginning of the “great victory,” Eisenhower went to Normandy after talking to Tedder to watch the start of COBRA. The tremendous bombardment was impressive, but Eisenhower returned to London that evening glum, even depressed. There had been a series of bombardments from the American bombers that had fallen short, killing and wounding several hundred G.I.s. General Lesley McNair, commander of the Army Ground Forces, who had gone to the front lines to observe, had been killed. In addition the ground attack which began at 11 A.M. seemed to be going slowly. The only encouraging note came when Bradley, who accompanied Eisenhower to the airstrip for the flight back to London, said he was convinced that the next day his forces would make extraordinary advances. Eisenhower would not allow his hopes to rise—he had heard the same thing the first day of GOODWOOD. Worse than the slow progress on the ground were the short bombardments, which convinced Eisenhower that he could not use his air power to help the troops break out. He told Bradley he would no longer employ heavy bombers against tactical targets. “That’s a job for artillery,” he said to Bradley. “I gave them a green light this time. But I promise you it’s the last.”10

  The next day news from the front filtered in slowly, and the over-all picture was unclear. Eisenhower dictated a letter to Marshall, telling him only that an offensive was under way on both flanks. If either went well, he added, “we will be in a much improved position.”11 He had lunch with Churchill, who said he would see to it that Montgomery launched a major attack. The Supreme Commander then dictated a note to Montgomery. Eisenhower said he had had no news at all about activities on Second Army’s front, but “I know the troops are fighting for all they are worth and I am certain the enemy will somewhere crack under the pressure.” Churchill, he added, thought so too.12 Montgomery was irritated at the thought that Eisenhower had complained about him to the Prime Minister, but there was little he could do about it except try to remove the reason for the complaint.13

  This he did in exemplary fashion. On the morning of July 25 his Canadian forces started southward toward Falaise, attacking an area strongly held by Panzers. The Canadians suffered 1000 casualties and took little territory, but they did effectively screen the major offensive and delayed a German shift of reserves to the United States front. Still, neither Montgomery nor Brooke was at all happy with the way things were going. To Brooke it was “clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains, but no military education in its true sense.” Even Smith, however, failed to recognize Montgomery’s strategic genius, and thus lent his voice to the demands for all-out attacks everywhere.14 Whatever his own feelings, Montgomery could not ignore all this pressure, and on July 27 directed the Second Army to strike in the Caumont area and ordered all British and Canadian forces to attack to the greatest possible degree with the resources available. He declared that the enemy “must be worried, and shot up, and attacked, and raided, whenever and wherever possible.”15

  By the evening of the second day of COBRA, meanwhile, the situation on Bradley’s front was beginning to clarify. Major General J. Lawton Collins’ VII Corps was breaking through. The air attack had stunned the enemy, destroying his communications and rendering many of his weapons ineffective.16 The VII Corps was extremely strong, with two armored and four infantry divisions, and it began to overrun enemy positions. Gerow’s V Corps, on Collins’ left, and Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps, to the right, were also making progress. Before going to bed an elated Eisenhower wrote Bradley, “You have got the stuff piled up and we must give the enemy no rest at all until we
have achieved our objective. Then we will crush him.”17

  The Americans had achieved a penetration and were on the verge of scoring a complete breakthrough. Brooke continued to complain in his diary about Eisenhower’s lack of strategic sense, but the Supreme Commander’s insistence on attack everywhere had brought about the crisis of the war in the West. If the Germans could not hold the line, American troops would pour through the gap and be free in the enemy rear. Eisenhower was rushing divisions over to the Continent to prepare for the exploitation and was ready to activate the U. S. Third Army, with Patton commanding, to take advantage of the situation. Fresh divisions under Patton, unopposed behind German lines, with their flanks protected by Allied air forces and their mobility insured thanks to their tanks and trucks, would create havoc. Short of the West Wall, the Germans had nothing to stop them with.

  Eisenhower was fully aware that the crisis had come and was desperately anxious to make sure the opportunity was not lost. The Supreme Commander continued to press Montgomery. “Never was time more vital to us,” he told the British general on July 28, and “we should not wait on weather or on perfection of detail of preparation.” He wanted Montgomery to speed up Second Army’s main blow, telling him that “I feel very strongly that a three division attack now on 2nd Army’s right flank will be worth more than a six division attack in five days’ time.” He urged Montgomery not to waste an hour. “I am counting on you and as always will back you to the uttermost limit.”18 Montgomery, beginning to share the spirit of urgency, ordered Dempsey to throw all caution overboard and “to accept any casualties and to step on the gas for Vire.”19

  Bradley needed no special urging. On July 28 his forces captured Coutances, completing Operation COBRA. He immediately began to exploit his victory, ordering four U.S. corps to press their attack southward. He told Eisenhower his men were feeling “pretty cocky” and refused to have their enthusiasm dampened by reports that the enemy was sending reinforcements. “I can assure you,” Bradley said, “that we are taking every calculated risk and we believe we have the Germans out of the ditches and in complete demoralization and expect to take full advantage of them.”20

  The German high command was as aware of the crisis at hand as Eisenhower. On July 27 Von Kluge got Hitler’s permission to transfer a Panzer corps from the British front to Bradley’s side of the line, and to move two divisions to Normandy from Pas de Calais and a third there from the Atlantic coast of France. Hitler did turn down Von Kluge’s request for the transfer of a division from southern France to Normandy. But otherwise, he put everything he had into stabilizing the front, telling Von Kluge to “keep his eyes riveted to the front and on the enemy without ever looking backward.”21

  The German reinforcements came too late. Montgomery’s insistence on drawing the Germans to Second Army’s front was about to pay huge dividends.

  General Collins, “Lightning Joe” to the newspapers, a veteran of Guadalcanal, led the attack. Bradley had deliberately put him at the point because he thought Collins “nervy and ambitious.” Collins had a secret weapon. In World War I enormous artillery barrages had often created a gap in the enemy’s front lines, but there had been no exploitation of them because of the depth of the line and because infantrymen slogging through the craters were mowed down by machine guns. Eventually tanks made it possible to exploit these gaps. In Normandy the hedgerows substituted for the depth of the World War I trench system. Always before, when Bradley got his tanks loose behind the German lines, the hedgerows had stopped them, for when the Sherman tanks hit the hedgerows the vehicles rose up over the tops of the mounds, exposing their soft underbellies to the enemy while their own guns pointed helplessly toward the sky. One of Bradley’s tank sergeants solved the problem. Taking scrap steel from an enemy roadblock, he welded four steel tusklike prongs to the front of a tank. When the Sherman hit a hedgerow, the tusks bore into the earth, pinned down the belly, and allowed the tank to break through. Thanks to this simple invention, Collins was able to keep up the momentum of his advance.22

  He held nothing back, committing all his reserves on the second day of the battle. By July 27 he had reached Tessy-sur-Vire and Coutances; by the thirtieth the VIII Corps, to his right, had taken Granville and Avranches and were on the verge of breaking into Brittany.23 The Germans, analyzing Collins’ attack later, were impressed: “Co-operation between reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-bombers, armour, and infantry was excellent,” they admitted.24

  Montgomery did all he could to help. As he saw the situation, the Germans were still so strong in the Caen area that operations there “are definitely unlikely to succeed; if we attempt them we would merely play into the enemy’s hands, and we would not be helping on our operations on the western flank.” He therefore told the Canadians to hold position across the Orne River and initiate only local attacks to keep the Germans off balance. On his own right, however, Montgomery wanted the Second Army to move out. He directed Dempsey to regroup his army and begin a major offensive, involving at least six divisions, toward Caumont. “The main blow of the whole Allied plan has now been struck on the western flank,” he told Dempsey, and “that blow is the foundation of all our operations, and it has been well and truly struck.” In this “critical and important time” he wanted Dempsey to hurl his forces full strength at the enemy.

  Montgomery did not, however, realize the full implications of the situation. He pointed out that the summer was already partly gone and that there were not many more months of good campaigning weather left. There was still much to be done. What, then, did he expect to accomplish thanks to COBRA’s success? “We must secure the Brittany ports before the winter is on us,” Montgomery declared.25

  Eisenhower’s view was not so limited. In commenting on Montgomery’s operational orders, the Supreme Commander told Montgomery that “it is easily possible that the most tremendous results will follow.” He reminded Montgomery that the Twenty-first Army Group still had “plenty of strength” in the Caen area to take advantage of any opportunity that might arise there. With a few days of good weather, which “would be a Godsend,” the Allies “would possibly find the enemy Divisions exhausted both of fuel and ammunition and could capture and destroy them in place.” To encourage Montgomery, he added, “This … is what you have been aiming toward for a long time and I must say that you deserve the luck of having a bit of good weather at such a critical time.”26

  Eisenhower’s wishes were sincere. On July 29 he flew to Normandy to see Bradley, who gave a glowing progress report, and Montgomery. The British commander had a complaint. Newspaper stories in the American press had been sharply critical of Montgomery, charging that he sat in front of Caen and did nothing while the Americans took all the risks and casualties. Eisenhower said he would see what he could do about the situation. When he returned to Portsmouth he wired the chief public relations officer in the War Department, General Surles, telling him that the reporters were ignoring “the fact that I am not only inescapably responsible for strategy and general missions but they seemingly also ignore the fact that it is my responsibility to determine the efficiency of my various subordinates.…” He asked Surles to hold some off-the-record press conferences and in them to emphasize that he, Eisenhower, was the responsible officer. “When criticism is believed to be necessary it should be directed toward me equally at least with any of my principal subordinates.”27

  On the Continent, meanwhile, organization changes that Eisenhower had arranged earlier were about to be put into effect. With American divisions pouring into Normandy, the Supreme Commander wanted two American armies gathered together in one group. Bradley would take command of the whole, to be called Twelfth Army Group, with Courtney Hodges taking over First Army and Patton assuming command of Third Army. Until SHAEF could establish a forward command post on the Continent and Eisenhower could take command of the 12th Army Group, Bradley would continue to receive his operational instructions from Montgomery. Acting on Eisenhower’s orders, Bradley declar
ed that the organizational change would take place on August l.28 Both Patton and Hodges went to the Continent early to familiarize themselves with their staffs and subordinates, and the positions and objectives of their divisions.

  By July 31 organizations and operations were meshing beautifully. The Allied armies in Europe began to swing into the open. On the western flank, VIII Corps had moved beyond Avranches. Collins’ VII Corps had captured Villedieu and Tessy-sur-Vire, and V Corps was advancing southward. Dempsey began his attack on July 30, broke through at Caumont, and the next day was quite close to Le Bény-Bocage. The Canadians were stepping up their local attacks. On August 1 Patton was unleashed and began his race through Brittany and down to the Loire River. The nightmare of a static front similar to that of World War I was over. “This is great news,” Eisenhower exulted. “Bradley has plenty of infantry units to rush into forward areas to consolidate all gains and permit armor to continue thrusting and surrounding enemy.”29

  His optimism growing with each bit of incoming news from the front, Eisenhower was determined not to lose the opportunity at hand. He still felt Montgomery needed occasional prodding, and on August 2 sent a note of encouragement to the Twenty-first Army Group commander. Enemy resistance in the Avranches region had disintegrated and Patton was in the open. Eisenhower wanted him to push into Brittany as rapidly as possible, and asked Montgomery to make sure all commanders were aware “that in an emergency we can drop them supplies by airplane in considerable quantities.” Whatever happened, Eisenhower insisted, the momentum should not be lost. “I know that you will keep hammering,” the Supreme Commander added, “as long as you have a single shot in the locker.”30