20. PREPARING THE ALLIED COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
* It is worth noting that Generalmajor von Waldenburg of the 116th Panzer argued later that the Allied ‘counter-attack started too early’ and that this was what saved the German forces ‘from total annihilation’.
* Even Bradley’s 12th Army Group headquarters seemed to believe in a renewed attack northwards towards Liège with ‘from four to five panzer divisions’, according to Hansen. Three days later Hansen made the unexpected remark: ‘Americans are very poor on intelligence; we have to depend upon the British for almost everything we have.’
* The role of Nazionalsozialistischen Führungsoffizier, or National Socialist leadership officer, was instituted on Hitler’s orders in imitation of the Soviet commissar, or political officer, to watch over the loyalty and determination of army officers.
* Montgomery had in fact just sent his favourite corps commander home on enforced medical leave. He feared that his judgement had become impaired through exhaustion. Horrocks had suddenly advocated that they should let the Germans cross the Meuse then defeat them on the battlefield of Waterloo just south of Brussels.
22. COUNTER-ATTACK
* This idea at 12th Army Group must have been based on speculation, since the first hint of withdrawal through Ultra intercepts did not come until late on 8 January when the 9th Panzer-Division revealed that it had pulled back to a line east of Rochefort and Marche, while the first indication of retreat around the Bastogne pocket came on 9 January.
* General Patton, who unfortunately was drawn to writing verse, penned the following lines:
O little town of Houffalize, Yet in thy dark streets shineth
How still we see thee lie; Not any Goddamned light;
Above thy steep and battered streets The hopes and fears of all thy years
The aeroplanes sail by. Were blown to hell last night.
* ‘We are aware of your views on this question but again wish to emphasize that this offensive is an all-out effort in which Hitler will employ any weapon. It has always been appreciated by you that Germany might initiate gas warfare to obtain a decisive result. The battle having gone badly, Hitler may regard this as the moment. We should not overlook the chaos which would result among the civilian population in NW Europe on the possible employment of a gas warhead in V-1and V-2 [missiles] … Would you please re-examine the matter in light of this further information and inform us of your views urgently.’
23. FLATTENING THE BULGE
* Hale recovered, but with a crooked oesophagus. The doctor gave him a medical chit excusing him from wearing a tie. Hale was later confronted by an obsessive General Patton demanding to know why he was improperly dressed. The sergeant was able to produce his authorization, which apparently left Patton speechless.
* The call from SHAEF in this account was said to be from Bedell Smith, but his biographer is certain that it was Major General Whiteley.
24. CONCLUSIONS
* The rancour lasted for the rest of his life. When Cornelius Ryan asked about Montgomery some years after Suez and long after the war, Eisenhower exploded. ‘He’s a psychopath, don’t forget that. He is such an egocentric … He has never made a mistake in his life.’ Montgomery was trying ‘to make sure that the Americans, and me in particular, had no credit, had nothing to do with this war. I just stopped communicating with him.’
Antony Beevor, Ardennes 1944: Hitler's Last Gamble
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