Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign
In the end, Horner found the field, dropped down to the treetops in the dark, and—using dimly lit references—found the runway. He landed, his drag chutes worked, and he gently used the emergency brakes to bring his wounded jet to a stop on the runway. By then, the fog was so thick that the fire truck that came racing down the runway almost collided with his jet. He sat there, wet with sweat, hands shaking more from fatigue than anything else, and realized one more time there was a God who didn’t want to talk with Chuck just yet. Just a routine day in the life of a fighter pilot, cheating death and thinking he did it on his own, but knowing in his heart it was divine intervention that let him beat the odds.
Chuck went home and picked up Mary Jo and their year-old daughter Susan, and they boarded the transport home to the United States.
SEYMOUR JOHNSON
Horner’s next assignment (it was now 1963) was to the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, at Seymour Johnson AFB, Goldsboro, North Carolina, where he would fly the famous, or infamous, F-105 Thunderchief. There his son, John Patrick Horner, would be born, and from there he would go off to combat for the first time.
The Thud, as it was called—at first by its detractors, and then by everyone else, after it proved to be the jet of choice if one was going to be shot at—was big and spacious: A man could stand up under its wing, and he needed a ladder to climb up into the cockpit. The cockpit was roomy, and the instruments were as modern as one could get, with tapes instead of dials, which made it a breeze to read while screaming down the chute during a dive-bomb pass. The Thud was also solid; since fuel was not stored in the wings, AAA could blow huge holes in them, and a pilot could still come home without a problem. And it was fast—nothing could touch it for top speed; it routinely exceeded twice the speed of sound, Mach 2, on test flights. What made it fast was a huge gas-sucking engine and very thin wings, so it flew faster in military power than most aircraft did in afterburner. Unfortunately, this capability was achieved at the cost of lift. The thin wings took forever to fly on takeoff. When a pilot had a full load of fuel and bombs, he used the entire runway. Even then, the Thud didn’t want to fly; but rather than set a land speed record, the pilot would pull the beast off the ground and stagger into the air, whacking off branches of small trees with his aircraft until he was able to start a climb.
This same reluctance manifested itself when he wanted to turn in air-to-air combat. The Thud would go fast, but it did not like to turn. Thus, the preferred tactic in a fight was just to enter it, pick a target, scream in for a shot, and then blow on through. A pilot didn’t have to look back, because no one was going to catch him.
Similar principles applied in bombing runs: just after a pilot released his bombs, he put both hands on the stick and pulled it back into his lap. He didn’t have to worry about over-geeing the aircraft, because the Thud was so solid, it didn’t seem to mind ten or twelve Gs. But if he didn’t immediately begin the recovery, he was sure to hit the ground.
Early F-105s had two seriously bad habits: they had a tendency to blow up in the air; and if the pilot wasn’t alert, they slammed into the ground.
They blew up because of a design problem. At times fuel got trapped between the hot section of the engine and the fuselage. After a while, a fire got going back there, which in time would melt through hydraulic lines (no flight controls then) or a fuel cell (a small fire instantly became a very big fire and the pilot was the marshmallow).
They hit the ground because of mistakes in Air Force tactics. In the erroneous belief that one would avoid enemy defenses that way, tactics in those days emphasized flying at low level; but the Thud, being slow to pull out on a dive-bomb pass, needed more air under it than those tactics wanted to give it.
Still, the pilots came to love flying the F-105, especially after the design and tactical flaws were fixed. It was an honest aircraft; a pilot loves a jet that obeys his commands, and a jet that makes it easier to put the bombs on target. And if he wanted to strafe a target, he had an M-61 Gatling gun. With that, much of the time, he could expect to put every round through the target, for a 100 percent score. Today, many of the attributes of the F-105—such as stability and accuracy—are found in the A-10. On the other hand, the A-10 turns, but it won’t go fast. All things being equal, fighter pilots will tell you, “speed is life.”
★ Horner had a good tour at Seymour Johnson. The 335th was a fine squadron, and there was a lot of excitement with firepower demonstrations and plans to attack Cuba—in those days there was well-justified fear that the Russians would install nuclear missiles on the island. On the other hand, the otherwise joyous squadron parties and deployments around the world were tempered by the F-105’s bad habits, blowing up in the air or slamming into the ground, either of which meant somebody had to erase a name off the pilot board, empty a locker, and return the pilot’s effects to his widow or parents.
That happened when Horner’s flight commander “bit it”—another one of those expressions people use when they don’t want to face the reality— when he flew into the water on the gunnery range off the coast of North Carolina. Parts of his body were recovered, and then came the ceremony of sitting with the grieving widow, taking care of the children, helping arrange for the funeral, and attending the memorial ceremony, with its missing-man flyby. . . . By now, all this was a familiar routine for Chuck Horner, except this time it all hit him on the head with a powerful new insight.
At that funeral, I guess I was beginning to grow up; for I started to notice something about our warrior culture that I hadn’t really noticed before: the pain and agony of the widow.
Hey, fighter pilots are tough. When one of us died, we felt sad, got drunk, and made jokes, in an effort to laugh in the face of our own deaths. But without our knowing it, it was our wives who really suffered. Air Force wives are indoctrinated from the get-go, “Don’t make a big issue over a death. Don’t make a thing about the loss. Cover it over. Don’t get your own pilot husband upset. He needs to be alert and to concentrate when he’s flying his six-hundred-mile-an-hour jet.” And they do cover it over. Meanwhile, the wives, and not the warriors, know the real horror.
Among the American Plains Indians (so the story came to me), when a warrior died in battle, everyone was happy (dying in battle was about as noble an act as you could imagine) . . . everyone except the warrior’s widow. She tore her clothing, rubbed ashes in her hair, cut her arms with a knife, and wailed as though her soul had been torn out of her body. For the widow, it was more than losing her husband (Indian husbands not being famously loving, caring mates, anyway). Rather, with her husband dead, she no longer had standing as a human being in the tribe. Unless she remarried, she would cease to exist in the eyes of her former friends, and she would be left to fend for herself. When the tribe moved on to new hunting grounds, she’d fall behind, she’d have nothing to eat, and soon, she’d starve, or else weather or wolves would kill her. For the warrior’s widow, in other words, the death of a warrior husband was a sentence condemning her to a death that was lonely, slow, and shameful.
Our warrior society, I began to see, isn’t all that different. The husband would die. The widow would be comforted, food would be brought over, there’ d be tears and shared memories and that missing-man flyby that chilled all of our souls. But Monday would roll around, the pilots would go back to their jet aircraft mistresses, the wives would go back to raising kids and bonding with one another, and the movers would be pulling up to the widow’s house. She no longer qualified to live on the base; and her former pals, her inner circle, didn’t want their own husbands hanging around her, lest she snag a new husband. Worse, none of our warriors, husbands or wives, wanted her reminder of the death that lived seconds away whenever we strapped on our jet and took to the wild blue yonder.
It hit me then that, daily, our wives had to contend with the unspoken horror of all that. Not only did they dread our death, but just as real was the knowledge that their lives, as members of an extreme
ly close interdependent society, also hung in the balance. And I came to appreciate the steel in their unspoken and unacknowledged courage—as opposed to our own drunken ribaldry, which we pretended was “guts”—in the ever-present face of death. The pilots were scared children who used booze, offensive behavior, and profane language to hold the awareness of their fragile mortality at arm’s length. But our women shared a gut-wrenching horror that someday the wing commander would show up at their front door to announce that they were now going to have to provide for and raise the children alone, that they were about to be turned out into the world to fend for themselves, and that their closest confidantes in the world would soon stare through them, lest they see what might be in store for themselves.
Service wives, especially fighter pilot wives, are the most underrated warriors in the world. Daily, they confront their own fears, staying home to change a dirty diaper and getting ready for the next move, while shoring up the inflated egos of their mates before they go off to chase around the sky. God bless and watch over them.
★ Death came personally to Chuck Horner during his time with the 4th TFW.
One of the 4th’s missions was to deploy to Turkey and sit alert with a nuke on their F-105s. They flew gunnery training over the Mediterranean, air-to-ground at Koyna range in Turkey, and low level all over Turkey. While Horner was in Turkey around Christmas of 1964, his parents, his sister, Mary Lou Kendall, her husband Bill, and their three children were killed in a car accident in Iowa (Christmas was not a lucky time for the Horner clan; John Towner had been killed during the Christmas season of 1953-54).
Those deaths were terrible, and so was Horner’s grief. Despite them, however, there was a fascinating side story that made, and still makes, the horror and grief a little more bearable.
When Chuck Horner came back to the States for the funeral, he was a nobody captain with a lot of pain, yet the USAF took care of him royally—actually, they treated him like a warrior. They arranged transport that brought him from Turkey to Des Moines before his sister from San Diego could get there. Colonel John Murphy, his wing commander, even had the TAC commander’s personal T-39 transport meet Horner at McGuire AFB when he got off the military air transport system aircraft that brought him from Germany.
All of this cost a great deal of money. Nowadays, the media might even have a field day with the story of misuse of government jets. But the cost of that government jet that flew Chuck Horner from McGuire to Des Moines got paid back many times over during the next few years. There are some things you have to do for warriors.
After the 4th TFW, Horner’s next move was into combat in Vietnam.
2
The Big Lie
IN April of 1965, Chuck Horner was on TDY at McCoy AFB in Orlando at a gunnery workup, preparing for a weapons meet called Red Rio. Because it was a major meet, he had done a lot of flying to prepare for it—pure gunnery missions three times a day, bombing and strafing—and he was at the peak of his performance. One night at the bar, the ops officer fingered him. “You’ve got orders,” he said. “Take a jet and get yourself back home to Seymour.”
“I better wait until morning,” Horner answered; he had a couple of drinks in him.
“No way,” the Ops said. “Get your ass in the jet and go.”
So Horner packed that night and flew home to Seymour Johnson, where he was met when he arrived. “You’ll be leaving in the morning on a secret mission,” he was told. “Pack for hot weather.” He went home and kissed Mary Jo hello; the next morning a staff car arrived, and he kissed her goodbye.
Also in the car was Major Roger Myhrum, a friend from the 4th TFW, Seymour Johnson, who had joined the wing at about the same time in 1963 that Horner had. Myhrum was older than Horner and was in another squadron, the 333d, but they both flew F-105s and got along well. Now they were traveling together on commercial airline tickets to San Francisco, destination classified; they didn’t have a clue about where they were going.
In San Francisco, a bus picked them up, along with some other pilots from McConnell AFB, Kansas, and took them to Travis AFB near Oakland. After the bus left them off, their destination began to grow clearer: Somebody handed them an empty bag and sent them down a line. They filled the bag with soldiers’ gear—rifle, pistol, mosquito netting, sleeping bag, poncho, helmet, mess kit, and web belt with canteen. In the military, they handed out that kind of gear when a man was about to go off to war, just in case he needed it. On the one hand, it was better to be safe than unprepared, but on the other hand, when a pilot gets handed a rifle and a poncho, he gets a bit edgy. It suggests that he’s about to go and live with the Army in the field, directing air strikes. Horner wanted to fly jets, not stomp around on the ground. Fortunately, they also gave him a .38 pistol, which was a weapon you carried when you flew jets in combat, so that was reassuring. Well, time would tell.
Horner and Myhrum were then loaded onto a commercial jet contracted to the military and headed west. They landed in Bangkok, where they were told they would be going upcountry in a couple of days on the Klong Courier—that was the call sign of the C-130 that took people and supplies clockwise from Bangkok around to all the Thai bases in the morning, and counterclockwise in the afternoon. They were going to a base called Korat, in central Thailand, about a hundred miles northeast of Bangkok, where two squadrons of F-105s were located.
Korat was one of four bases—the others were Ta Khli, Ubon, and Udorn—the Air Force was then operating in Thailand, though the bases remained under the control of the Thai Air Force. The Air Force had been at these bases on and off for several years, training Thais. Early in 1965, F-105s from Korat raided North Vietnamese munitions storage areas supplying the Vietcong in the South. Even though more raids soon followed, the U.S. presence at the air bases in Thailand was kept very quiet, partly to keep it a secret from the enemy and partly to avoid embarrassing the Thai government.
Two days later, while Horner and Myhrum were waiting at the Bangkok airfield for the Klong Courier, Horner ran into a pilot from Korat whom he knew named Dick Pearson. Along with another pilot from Korat, Pearson was passing through on his way to Washington, D.C., where they were being sent to answer hard questions about an embarrassing incident over North Vietnam.
Horner was eager to pick Pearson’s brain, for this was his first in-person conversation with anyone who had flown combat missions over North Vietnam. And it was here that he received the first of many lessons pointing out the gulf between reality and fantasy in the Vietnam War.
On April 6, during a strike at Vinh, in North Vietnam, two North Vietnamese MiG-17s had shot down two F-105s, numbers one and two in a flight of four.
The flight had been holding south of the target awaiting another flight to clear the area. As they waited, the flight leader let the formation get slow: The Thuds were loafing along at about 350 knots, and they were bomb-laden, and thus clumsy and vulnerable. To make matters worse, the two elements became separated by a couple of miles, though they were still in visual contact.
Dick Pearson, who had been number three in the flight, had looked up and watched in horror as the two MiGs slid in between the formations, and then each MiG blew an F-105 out of the air. He and his wingman immediately jettisoned their bombs and tanks and went after the MiGs, but they dove for the deck and escaped. Pearson and his wingman then returned to the scene of the shoot-down and started a RESCAP (Rescue CAP)—circling the area and looking for chutes or flares and listening for beepers.
What the commanders in Washington wanted to know was how a couple of ignorant Third World peasants flying two vintage MiGs could take out two supersonic, state-of-the-art American jets. The answer was no surprise to Horner, no more than to the two pilots who were about to get laid out on the carpet in Washington. However, it was not welcome information to the commanders in Washington: Fighter pilot training during previous years had concentrated on nuclear delivery, and now the pilots were fighting a conventional war. Such incidents were bound to happen.
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The MiG story, of course, came as a shock to Horner, but then he simply passed the North Vietnamese success off to a flight leader mistake. In fact, he was right up to a point. The flight leader had let his formation get too slow; and he hadn’t made sure that everyone in the flight was alert to intruders. He had let himself fall into stateside gunnery range habits, where one tended to concentrate on spacing rather than combat alertness. On Horner’s first mission, he remembers that his own pull-off from the target was not all that aggressive. Aggression came fast, however, when he noticed the orange golf balls passing his canopy and all the black puffs with orange centers of smoke between him and the number one aircraft.
More important, however, Chuck Horner was as naive as other Americans when he deployed to war for the first time. He was a believer. He thought he and the other American pilots would eat the enemy alive, that American jets were unstoppable, that American tactics were superb, that America’s cause was just, and that American generals knew what they were doing. As for the actual leadership in Washington and the decisions they were making about the war in Vietnam, he didn’t have a clue. As it turned out, neither did they.