Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign

  CONTROL

  Control is the goal of most warfare. When we are unable to achieve our political ends through persuasion or threat, then physical attack, with the goal of controlling the behavior of our enemy, looks increasingly attractive.

  In the past, achieving control has required the physical dominance of one side over the other. Today, new technology provides other means of control. For example, with information technology, we can dominate his senses, reasoning, or mental faculties.

  During the Gulf War, the vast majority of the Iraqi Army who had not already deserted, surrendered to Coalition land forces. Both the surrenders and the desertions came about because Iraqi soldiers had been dominated by the psychological campaign we had waged. This campaign came with both a stick and a carrot.

  The stick: We fatigued and terrified them with unwavering air attack. They knew no peace; they were always in danger; they could not easily be resupplied with food and water; and communications between levels of command were close to impossible.

  The carrot: The Arab elements of the Coalition understood which arguments would sway the Iraqis away from their own leadership. Saddam had insisted that Kuwait was part of Iraq, and that it was right and just to return it to the fold, while at the same time he exploited the normal dislike Iraqis felt for Kuwaitis. By way of contrast (and with the help of our Arab allies), we played on their faith in Islam and Arab brotherhood. We told them they were Muslims and Arabs, just as the Kuwaitis were Muslims and Arabs, and it was sinful to make war on brothers of the same faith. While they did not like the Kuwaitis, they felt guilty about the evils the occupation was bringing to Kuwait City. While they were loyal to their families in Iraq, they had no loyalty to Saddam.

  For those themes to take root, we needed to control the environment. The air attacks did that.

  The Iraqi soldier became fearful. Often, our advancing ground forces found vehicles, tanks, and artillery positions abandoned and filled with blowing sand. With Iraqi soldiers hiding in their bunkers and wondering when the next B-52 strike or A-10 attack would kill them, leaflet, radio, and television messages telling them to give up this unholy occupation of Kuwait easily took root.

  Soon, those who could, went home. Those who couldn’t desert, waited for the chance to surrender.

  By the time Coalition ground forces moved into the Iraqi lines, we had clearly established control over most of the Iraqi Army, as was evident by the surrender of nearly 88,000 Iraqi soldiers. Most had not fired a shot.

  ★ Control can also be exerted on the environment.

  For example, during the Gulf War, we made extensive use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) and anti-radiation missiles to exert control over Iraqi air defense radar sensors. The ECM hindered the effectiveness of individual radars and confused the long-range search radars used to cue the short-range, and more accurate, radars used to control guided antiaircraft missiles.

  This war also featured a new and highly successful form of control, Stealth. The F-117 proved to be the only aircraft we could send into the air defense cauldron of Baghdad and be certain it would survive, and it could do that with unprecedented efficiency—that is, it did not require large support forces of air-to-air escort, ECM support jamming aircraft, and Wild Weasels carrying anti-radiation missiles, while its laser-guided bombs made it truly efficient in terms of targets destroyed per sortie.

  The secret of Stealth: it controls its environment.

  The F-117 can go anywhere its pilot commands, and it cannot be sensed by the enemy except visually, meaning that it flies only at night and/or during adverse weather. Though an enemy may be aware that an F-117 is present (he can, after all, see or hear bombs exploding), he cannot locate it with enough accuracy to shoot it down.

  Stealth and supercruise will give the F-22 even greater control of the environment. With supercruise, F-22s will fly at supersonic speeds without using afterburner. Thus they can cruise at speeds above Mach 1 with their engines at fairly economical fuel flows. Flying that fast cuts down an enemy’s time for action once he detects you—and with Stealth, he will detect you very late in the game. Supercruise and Stealth also collapse the envelope for the employment of his weapons. An air-to-air missile shot from a tail aspect at a supersonic jet has a very small effective range, since the missile has to spend all its energy catching up.

  With these advantages, F-22s will almost certainly achieve air superiority over enemy aircraft, and in turn this will permit the entire spectrum of the joint force’s non-Stealth aircraft to operate unhindered by enemy defenses.

  ★ Another good way to control the environment is by using information warfare—the current hot topic in military circles, and for good reason.

  Everyone talks about weirdo, geek computer hackers who break into heavily protected bank or military computer systems. But imagine using hacker skills for military purposes. For instance, imagine the military value of taking an enemy’s command-and-control system, and inserting a depiction of forces you want him to see, instead of the real-world situation. How about entering his air defense system and letting him “see” false attacks to the west, while your real attack comes from the east? Why not lead him to believe that your ground forces are located where they are not, so he will exhaust his artillery ammunition pounding barren land, while your force escapes unharmed? Or even make him believe the forces arrayed against him are so vast and dominating that he will sue for peace before the battle begins?

  Information warfare can be conducted at all levels of conflict, and includes a defensive side as well.

  Of all the nations of the world, the United States is the most vulnerable to computer attacks. We use computers everywhere. Our telephones are now simple computer entry pads. Our wristwatches are computers. We plan our days, operate our automobiles, and communicate with computers. Our military equipment is so advanced largely because computers aim our guns, fly our planes, and operate our ships.

  Therefore, even as we do our best to control the inputs to an enemy’s computers and knowledge system, we must also protect the integrity of the knowledge systems we are using to prosecute the battle.

  Most easily understood is the need to protect our own computer databases from corruption or other manipulation. Though private industry and the military have been working this problem for years, the threat has grown at a pace equal only to the raging change in computer capabilities worldwide. There are no longer “have” and “have not” nations when it comes to the capacity to access and manipulate computer databases and programs.

  Meanwhile, most current users are in a state of denial about the vulnerability of their data systems, simply because they have some small protection—and the alternative is too terrible to contemplate.

  For example, the banking industry loses millions of dollars each year to computer crime. They can afford to overlook that loss. But what if computer criminals learned how to attack the customer trust and confidence on which their industry is built and relies? Could they afford to overlook that? Other financial markets, such as stock exchanges, suffer the same vulnerability.

  The military operates under far different expectations. Where the financial industry likes to operate in a precise world, down to the fourth decimal point, the military is used to operating in the fog of war, a world of uncertainty, and at levels of efficiency that might reach 5 or 10 percent—that is, a soldier has less than one chance in ten of hitting the enemy when he fires his rifle. Such levels of uncertainty mean that we in the military so overload our capacity to conduct warfare that a hacker who steals our secrets, inserts misleading information, or injects confusion will not cripple a military operation, only lower its efficiency.

  Still, if the opposing military forces are somewhat close to parity, then computer attacks might spell the difference between victory and defeat in battle.

  This is the good news. The bad news is that the U.S. military has an extensive capacity to fool itself.

  We can talk ourselves into believing our o
wn lies.

  Imagine the situation I described earlier: We have entered the computer system associated with the enemy’s command and control for air defense, and have depicted a mythical raid in the western part of his country, while our Stealth bombers are in the east. Believing what he sees on his displays, he sends his interceptor forces to the west.

  In the meantime, another echelon of U.S. command is secretly pirating the enemy air defense command-and-control data and feeding this information to our air defense units. However, owing to the classification of the computer insertion activity, some good guys don’t know what the other good guys are doing. As a result, the intelligence gatherers believe we are really attacking to the west. As a result, when our attacking force returns to friendly territory after their unopposed attacks, they are engaged by their own friendly air defenses, who have concluded that they are enemy attackers.

  This example is simplistic, yet it illustrates how complicated new forms of warfare can become, and how dangerous can be the failure to work as one force, one team. Control must be all-encompassing in every aspect of the conflict, and it must be coordinated both offensively and defensively. Modern warfare’s widespread communications, computer-assisted information systems, and surveillance of the battle space will dictate that the dominant forces have full knowledge of the battle and control of its environment.

  They also mean that the victor will be the combatant who can act with the greatest speed.

  SPEED

  In future wars, the warring parties may not be equal in size or firepower, yet one side’s numerical advantages may be offset by a smaller opponent who acts rapidly, decisively, and accurately. Because any nation or group participating in organized warfare can now access computers, space systems, and commercial communications, any warring party can now act rapidly, decisively, and accurately. They can review and analyze data, decide to act, and then commit with such speed that their opponent is reacting to these actions rather than initiating actions that facilitate his own advantages.

  This is the advantage of surprise and initiative: long prized by United States military doctrine, and exemplified by the German blitzkrieg of World War II—but a difficult goal for the regimented military mind and ponderous ground armies.

  In the future, rapid movement over strategic distances will be required if our military power is to be deployed in time to prevent a crisis from escalating to war or to halt an invasion. This is why American military forces so highly value our vast strategic fleet of airlift aircraft. Going one step further, imagine conventional-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, based in the United States but capable of delivering a crippling blow within thirty minutes anywhere in the world. Surely, in that future, the words of warning delivered by the United States ambassador to a dictator marshaling his forces on his neighbor’s border would be more carefully evaluated than was the case in 1990.

  The essence of modern airpower is rapidity. It is truly the forte of the B-2. Though based in Missouri, it can reach anywhere on the globe in hours, with little preparation or support.

  ★ For the United States military, “rapidity” has strategic as well as tactical implications.

  The United States is blessed with good strategic location, safely tucked as it is between two large oceans on its east and west, and two friendly nations to its north and south. While it is subject to attack from the sea, air, and space, such attacks can be contained, given an adequate navy, air force, and ballistic missile defenses. Since naval, air, and space forces are highly mobile, they can be sized and operated both for domestic defense and warfare throughout the world. U.S. land forces, on the other hand, must expect to engage in faraway parts of the world and not in homeland defense, but their mobility is limited, and it takes time.

  Thus, in conflicts far from our shores, the maritime, air, and space forces will either already be on scene or will quickly arrive on scene; the limiting factor will be the arrival of ground forces. Space is on scene at any given time, based on the orbital characteristics of the system. Airpower can arrive in minutes or hours, depending on basing. Sea power may be on scene, or can arrive in days, depending on the location of the ships. But the ever-increasing CONUS basing of land forces means that they will take weeks or months to arrive in strength in a conflict region far from the United States.

  It follows that if we are to use military force to deter or resolve conflict in its earliest stages, then we must exploit the rapid strategic mobility of space, air, and naval forces. And if we are to advance the capability of our military forces to deter or resolve conflict, we must increase the rapidity of the land forces’ strategic mobility.

  Since we are seldom able to predict the outbreak of hostilities, it is vital that the United States have forces that can reach the scene of conflict as quickly as possible, and then move quickly within a battle space.

  ★ Any future enemy will surely have precision attack weapons that exploit standoff. This means that our military forces must be able to hide or disguise themselves (control the environment) and to rapidly relocate (to areas where enemy weapons are not aimed). This also means that air weapons systems must have longer range, to allow them to be based under our own defensive umbrellas or at airfields or on ships beyond the reach of enemy missiles. This also means that land forces must be able to mass and disperse rapidly in order to accumulate the decisive power needed to win a battle, while denying enemy standoff weapons large, lucrative targets. Tactical mobility is achieved in the air by high-performance aircraft, at sea by long-endurance powerful turbine engines, and on land by high-speed vehicles and by forces that are not tied to large logistic support lines.

  While military forces throughout the world are seeking these capabilities—long range, high speed, and freedom from encumbering supply trains—they are not always training and organizing to exploit the advantages of rapid thinking and acting.

  BRILLIANCE

  This brings me to the last of the elements needed to attain victory in the future—the “brilliance” with which we employ advanced technology. Brilliance is a code word for initiative, and is therefore nothing more than the decisions produced by humans in a decentralized environment.

  This is a revolution, not because it is new but because we live in an age when all the natural tendencies drive us toward centralization.

  So, for example, the revolution in computers and communications means that information can be transferred on an unprecedented scale from the battle back to some headquarters. From this, some conclude an increased value in centralized analysis and decision making. Why not, they claim, watch over the battle in the calm, cool environment of some headquarters that is close to the President and far from the agony of war?

  Wrong!

  This is the false trail that (at least in part) led to our failures in Vietnam, where targets were picked in the White House by leaders with immense knowledge of the politics of the war and little comprehension of battle. We must accept the reality that the closer we come to the battle, the more we are likely to know what it takes to fight effectively.

  Though each succeeding higher headquarters will—rightly—have a role in determining goals and objectives, we must keep in mind that those who are closest to the action are the most important participants in the action. They are the ones the so-called higher echelons are there to support.

  SPACE

  Any discussion of Desert Storm cannot ignore the immense contribution made by our space forces. Even less will we be able to ignore their contributions in the future. In Desert Storm, the primary role of space was to provide knowledge. Space, of course, has many other military uses.

  Space operations fall into one of two areas—information or combat. Information operations provide data, either as a medium (such as communications satellites) or as a source (such as ballistic missile launch warning, imagery, GPS navigation, and time data). Combat operations include weapons that pass through space (Scuds and ICBMs arrive through space), weapons that defend a
gainst such weapons (either lasers, target trackers,71 or kinetic impact devices), and weapons that shoot down satellites (in the 1980s, the USAF shot down a satellite using a missile launched from an F-15).

  The Air Force has been an able steward of space. The ballistic missile programs of the fifties, sixties, and seventies have matured into the space lift of today, and now upward of 95 percent of our military space assets and operations are acquired and operated by USAF programs and organizations. Blue suits dominate the military cooperative programs with NASA and the National Reconnaissance Office, and Patrick, Vandenberg, and Falcon Air Force Bases have become the core of our military space launch and on-orbit operations.

  This situation is not without problems. For starters, our reliance and ability to exploit space grew from support of Cold War deterrence operations. Some of these mind-sets still remain. Second, space is often seen as a subset of air operations.

  In fact, as Desert Storm has shown, space has become a pervasive influence in almost every aspect of military operations.

  Take GPS.

  The GPS system not only tells everyone where they are, it provides everyone the same time (which is vital to such things as the synchronization of encrypting devices on radios), and it is everywhere accessible to all.

  Take reconnaissance.

  We can watch the enemy nation and adjacent seas anytime in any condition.

  Take global broadcast.

  We can beam two hundred channels to our forces deployed in any country. The Army can watch updates of battle maps; the Air Force can get target information; the Navy can get weather reports; the chaplain can air his message for the day; and the commander can brief the troops on the upcoming offensive. Anything that is classified will require a decoder box for that channel; no problem.