Various Works

  counter-proof that it is not true, far more likely is he to be thought

  ill-tempered-although even counter-proof is not enough: for we often

  hear arguments that are contrary to common opinions, whose solution is

  yet difficult, e.g. the argument of Zeno that it is impossible to move

  or to traverse the stadium;-but still, this is no reason for

  omitting to assert the opposites of these views. If, then, a man

  refuses to admit the proposition without having either a negative

  instance or some counter-argument to bring against it, clearly he is

  ill-tempered: for ill-temper in argument consists in answering in ways

  other than the above, so as to wreck the reasoning.

  9

  Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer

  should try his hand at attacking it by himself; for clearly his

  business is to oppose those positions from which questioners

  demolish what he has laid down.

  He should beware of maintaining a hypothesis that is generally

  rejected: and this it may be in two ways: for it may be one which

  results in absurd statements, e.g. suppose any one were to say that

  everything is in motion or that nothing is; and also there are all

  those which only a bad character would choose, and which are

  implicitly opposed to men's wishes, e.g. that pleasure is the good,

  and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it. For people

  then hate him, supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of

  argument but because he really thinks them.

  10

  Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the right

  solution is to demolish the point on which the fallacy that occurs

  depends: for the demolition of any random point is no solution, even

  though the point demolished be false. For the argument may contain

  many falsehoods, e.g. suppose some one to secure the premisses, 'He

  who sits, writes' and 'Socrates is sitting': for from these it follows

  that 'Socrates is writing'. Now we may demolish the proposition

  'Socrates is sitting', and still be no nearer a solution of the

  argument; it may be true that the point claimed is false; but it is

  not on that that fallacy of the argument depends: for supposing that

  any one should happen to be sitting and not writing, it would be

  impossible in such a case to apply the same solution. Accordingly,

  it is not this that needs to be demolished, but rather that 'He who

  sits, writes': for he who sits does not always write. He, then, who

  has demolished the point on which the fallacy depends, has given the

  solution of the argument completely. Any one who knows that it is on

  such and such a point that the argument depends, knows the solution of

  it, just as in the case of a figure falsely drawn. For it is not

  enough to object, even if the point demolished be a falsehood, but the

  reason of the fallacy should also be proved: for then it would be

  clear whether the man makes his objection with his eyes open or not.

  There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his

  argument to a conclusion. It can be done either by demolishing the

  point on which the falsehood that comes about depends, or by stating

  an objection directed against the questioner: for often when a

  solution has not as a matter of fact been brought, yet the

  questioner is rendered thereby unable to pursue the argument any

  farther. Thirdly, one may object to the questions asked: for it may

  happen that what the questioner wants does not follow from the

  questions he has asked because he has asked them badly, whereas if

  something additional be granted the conclusion comes about. If,

  then, the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther, the

  objection would properly be directed against the questioner; if he can

  do so, then it would be against his questions. The fourth and worst

  kind of objection is that which is directed to the time allowed for

  discussion: for some people bring objections of a kind which would

  take longer to answer than the length of the discussion in hand.

  There are then, as we said, four ways of making objections: but of

  them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and

  stumbling-blocks to prevent the conclusions.

  11

  Adverse criticism of an argument on its own merits, and of it when

  presented in the form of questions, are two different things. For

  often the failure to carry through the argument correctly in

  discussion is due to the person questioned, because he will not

  grant the steps of which a correct argument might have been made

  against his position: for it is not in the power of the one side

  only to effect properly a result that depends on both alike.

  Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker and

  not his position, when the answerer lies in wait for the points that

  are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when

  people lose their tempers in this way, their argument becomes a

  contest, not a discussion. Moreover, since arguments of this kind

  are held not for the sake of instruction but for purposes of

  practice and examination, clearly one has to reason not only to true

  conclusions, but also to false ones, and not always through true

  premisses, but sometimes through false as well. For often, when a true

  proposition is put forward, the dialectician is compelled to

  demolish it: and then false propositions have to be formulated.

  Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward, it has to be

  demolished by means of false propositions: for it is possible for a

  given man to believe what is not the fact more firmly than the

  truth. Accordingly, if the argument be made to depend on something

  that he holds, it will be easier to persuade or help him. He, however,

  who would rightly convert any one to a different opinion should do

  so in a dialectical and not in a contentious manner, just as a

  geometrician should reason geometrically, whether his conclusion be

  false or true: what kind of syllogisms are dialectical has already

  been said. The principle that a man who hinders the common business is

  a bad partner, clearly applies to an argument as well; for in

  arguments as well there is a common aim in view, except with mere

  contestants, for these cannot both reach the same goal; for more

  than one cannot possibly win. It makes no difference whether he

  effects this as answerer or as questioner: for both he who asks

  contentious questions is a bad dialectician, and also he who in

  answering fails to grant the obvious answer or to understand the point

  of the questioner's inquiry. What has been said, then, makes it

  clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like strain upon

  the argument on its own merits, and upon the questioner: for it may

  very well be that the argument is bad, but that the questioner has

  argued with the answerer in the best possible way: for when men lose

  their tempers, it may perhaps be impossible to make one's inferences

  straight-forwardly as one would wish: we have to do as we can.

  Inasmuch as it is indeterminate whe
n people are claiming the

  admission of contrary things, and when they are claiming what

  originally they set out to prove-for often when they are talking by

  themselves they say contrary things, and admit afterwards what they

  have previously denied; for which reason they often assent, when

  questioned, to contrary things and to what originally had to be

  proved-the argument is sure to become vitiated. The responsibility,

  however, for this rests with the answerer, because while refusing to

  grant other points, he does grant points of that kind. It is, then,

  clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like manner upon

  questioners and upon their arguments.

  In itself an argument is liable to five kinds of adverse criticism:

  (1) The first is when neither the proposed conclusion nor indeed any

  conclusion at all is drawn from the questions asked, and when most, if

  not all, of the premisses on which the conclusion rests are false or

  generally rejected, when, moreover, neither any withdrawals nor

  additions nor both together can bring the conclusions about.

  (2) The second is, supposing the reasoning, though constructed

  from the premisses, and in the manner, described above, were to be

  irrelevant to the original position.

  (3) The third is, supposing certain additions would bring an

  inference about but yet these additions were to be weaker than those

  that were put as questions and less generally held than the

  conclusion.

  (4) Again, supposing certain withdrawals could effect the same:

  for sometimes people secure more premisses than are necessary, so that

  it is not through them that the inference comes about.

  (5) Moreover, suppose the premisses be less generally held and

  less credible than the conclusion, or if, though true, they require

  more trouble to prove than the proposed view.

  One must not claim that the reasoning to a proposed view shall in

  every case equally be a view generally accepted and convincing: for it

  is a direct result of the nature of things that some subjects of

  inquiry shall be easier and some harder, so that if a man brings

  people to accept his point from opinions that are as generally

  received as the case admits, he has argued his case correctly.

  Clearly, then, not even the argument itself is open to the same

  adverse criticism when taken in relation to the proposed conclusion

  and when taken by itself. For there is nothing to prevent the argument

  being open to reproach in itself, and yet commendable in relation to

  the proposed conclusion, or again, vice versa, being commendable in

  itself, and yet open to reproach in relation to the proposed

  conclusion, whenever there are many propositions both generally held

  and also true whereby it could easily be proved. It is possible also

  that an argument, even though brought to a conclusion, may sometimes

  be worse than one which is not so concluded, whenever the premisses of

  the former are silly, while its conclusion is not so; whereas the

  latter, though requiring certain additions, requires only such as

  are generally held and true, and moreover does not rest as an argument

  on these additions. With those which bring about a true conclusion

  by means of false premisses, it is not fair to find fault: for a false

  conclusion must of necessity always be reached from a false premiss,

  but a true conclusion may sometimes be drawn even from false

  premisses; as is clear from the Analytics.

  Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated, but

  that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing

  whatever on the conclusion, then no inference as to the latter can

  be drawn from it: and if there appears to be, it will be a sophism,

  not a proof. A philosopheme is a demonstrative inference: an

  epichireme is a dialectical inference: a sophism is a contentious

  inference: an aporeme is an inference that reasons dialectically to

  a contradiction.

  If something were to be shown from premisses, both of which are

  views generally accepted, but not accepted with like conviction, it

  may very well be that the conclusion shown is something held more

  strongly than either. If, on the other hand, general opinion be for

  the one and neither for nor against the other, or if it be for the one

  and against the other, then, if the pro and con be alike in the case

  of the premisses, they will be alike for the conclusion also: if, on

  the other hand, the one preponderates, the conclusion too will

  follow suit.

  It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a

  long chain of steps, when he might employ fewer steps and those

  already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e.g.)

  that one opinion is more properly so called than another, and

  suppose him to make his postulates as follows: 'x-in-itself is more

  fully x than anything else': 'there genuinely exists an object of

  opinion in itself': therefore 'the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more

  fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion'.

  Now 'a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more

  fully itself': and 'there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself, which

  will be "opinion" in a more accurate sense than the particular

  opinions': and it has been postulated both that 'a genuine

  opinion-in-itself exists', and that 'x-in-itself is more fully x

  than anything else': therefore 'this will be opinion in a more

  accurate sense'. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply

  in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends.

  12

  An argument is clear in one, and that the most ordinary, sense, if

  it be so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions

  necessary: in another sense, and this is the type most usually

  advanced, when the propositions secured are such as compel the

  conclusion, and the argument is concluded through premisses that are

  themselves conclusions: moreover, it is so also if some step is

  omitted that generally is firmly accepted.

  An argument is called fallacious in four senses: (1) when it appears

  to be brought to a conclusion, and is not really so-what is called

  'contentious' reasoning: (2) when it comes to a conclusion but not

  to the conclusion proposed-which happens principally in the case of

  reductiones ad impossibile: (3) when it comes to the proposed

  conclusion but not according to the mode of inquiry appropriate to the

  case, as happens when a non-medical argument is taken to be a

  medical one, or one which is not geometrical for a geometrical

  argument, or one which is not dialectical for dialectical, whether the

  result reached be true or false: (4) if the conclusion be reached

  through false premisses: of this type the conclusion is sometimes

  false, sometimes true: for while a false conclusion is always the

  result of false premisses, a true conclusion may be drawn even from

  premisses that are not true, as was said above as well.

  Fallacy in argument is due to a mistake of the arguer rather than of

  the argument
: yet it is not always the fault of the arguer either, but

  only when he is not aware of it: for we often accept on its merits

  in preference to many true ones an argument which demolishes some true

  proposition if it does so from premisses as far as possible

  generally accepted. For an argument of that kind does demonstrate

  other things that are true: for one of the premisses laid down ought

  never to be there at all, and this will then be demonstrated. If,

  however, a true conclusion were to be reached through premisses that

  are false and utterly childish, the argument is worse than many

  arguments that lead to a false conclusion, though an argument which

  leads to a false conclusion may also be of this type. Clearly then the

  first thing to ask in regard to the argument in itself is, 'Has it a

  conclusion?'; the second, 'Is the conclusion true or false?'; the

  third, 'Of what kind of premisses does it consist?': for if the

  latter, though false, be generally accepted, the argument is

  dialectical, whereas if, though true, they be generally rejected, it

  is bad: if they be both false and also entirely contrary to general

  opinion, clearly it is bad, either altogether or else in relation to

  the particular matter in hand.

  13

  Of the ways in which a questioner may beg the original question

  and also beg contraries the true account has been given in the

  Analytics:' but an account on the level of general opinion must be

  given now.

  People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first

  and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point requiring to

  be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words; but it is

  more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms, or a term

  and an expression, that mean the same thing. A second way occurs

  whenever any one begs universally something which he has to

  demonstrate in a particular case: suppose (e.g.) he were trying to

  prove that the knowledge of contraries is one and were to claim that