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      Others there are who, indeed, believe that chance is a cause, but

      that it is inscrutable to human intelligence, as being a divine

      thing and full of mystery.

      Thus we must inquire what chance and spontaneity are, whether they

      are the same or different, and how they fit into our division of

      causes.

      5

      First then we observe that some things always come to pass in the

      same way, and others for the most part. It is clearly of neither of

      these that chance is said to be the cause, nor can the 'effect of

      chance' be identified with any of the things that come to pass by

      necessity and always, or for the most part. But as there is a third

      class of events besides these two-events which all say are 'by

      chance'-it is plain that there is such a thing as chance and

      spontaneity; for we know that things of this kind are due to chance

      and that things due to chance are of this kind.

      But, secondly, some events are for the sake of something, others

      not. Again, some of the former class are in accordance with deliberate

      intention, others not, but both are in the class of things which are

      for the sake of something. Hence it is clear that even among the

      things which are outside the necessary and the normal, there are

      some in connexion withwhich the phrase 'for the sake of something'

      is applicable. (Events that are for the sake of something include

      whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature.) Things of

      this kind, then, when they come to pass incidental are said to be

      'by chance'. For just as a thing is something either in virtue of

      itself or incidentally, so may it be a cause. For instance, the

      housebuilding faculty is in virtue of itself the cause of a house,

      whereas the pale or the musical is the incidental cause. That which is

      per se cause of the effect is determinate, but the incidental cause is

      indeterminable, for the possible attributes of an individual are

      innumerable. To resume then; when a thing of this kind comes to pass

      among events which are for the sake of something, it is said to be

      spontaneous or by chance. (The distinction between the two must be

      made later-for the present it is sufficient if it is plain that both

      are in the sphere of things done for the sake of something.)

      Example: A man is engaged in collecting subscriptions for a feast.

      He would have gone to such and such a place for the purpose of getting

      the money, if he had known. He actually went there for another purpose

      and it was only incidentally that he got his money by going there; and

      this was not due to the fact that he went there as a rule or

      necessarily, nor is the end effected (getting the money) a cause

      present in himself-it belongs to the class of things that are

      intentional and the result of intelligent deliberation. It is when

      these conditions are satisfied that the man is said to have gone 'by

      chance'. If he had gone of deliberate purpose and for the sake of

      this-if he always or normally went there when he was collecting

      payments-he would not be said to have gone 'by chance'.

      It is clear then that chance is an incidental cause in the sphere of

      those actions for the sake of something which involve purpose.

      Intelligent reflection, then, and chance are in the same sphere, for

      purpose implies intelligent reflection.

      It is necessary, no doubt, that the causes of what comes to pass

      by chance be indefinite; and that is why chance is supposed to

      belong to the class of the indefinite and to be inscrutable to man,

      and why it might be thought that, in a way, nothing occurs by

      chance. For all these statements are correct, because they are well

      grounded. Things do, in a way, occur by chance, for they occur

      incidentally and chance is an incidental cause. But strictly it is not

      the cause-without qualification-of anything; for instance, a

      housebuilder is the cause of a house; incidentally, a fluteplayer

      may be so.

      And the causes of the man's coming and getting the money (when he

      did not come for the sake of that) are innumerable. He may have wished

      to see somebody or been following somebody or avoiding somebody, or

      may have gone to see a spectacle. Thus to say that chance is a thing

      contrary to rule is correct. For 'rule' applies to what is always true

      or true for the most part, whereas chance belongs to a third type of

      event. Hence, to conclude, since causes of this kind are indefinite,

      chance too is indefinite. (Yet in some cases one might raise the

      question whether any incidental fact might be the cause of the

      chance occurrence, e.g. of health the fresh air or the sun's heat

      may be the cause, but having had one's hair cut cannot; for some

      incidental causes are more relevant to the effect than others.)

      Chance or fortune is called 'good' when the result is good, 'evil'

      when it is evil. The terms 'good fortune' and 'ill fortune' are used

      when either result is of considerable magnitude. Thus one who comes

      within an ace of some great evil or great good is said to be fortunate

      or unfortunate. The mind affirms the essence of the attribute,

      ignoring the hair's breadth of difference. Further, it is with

      reason that good fortune is regarded as unstable; for chance is

      unstable, as none of the things which result from it can be invariable

      or normal.

      Both are then, as I have said, incidental causes-both chance and

      spontaneity-in the sphere of things which are capable of coming to

      pass not necessarily, nor normally, and with reference to such of

      these as might come to pass for the sake of something.

      6

      They differ in that 'spontaneity' is the wider term. Every result of

      chance is from what is spontaneous, but not everything that is from

      what is spontaneous is from chance.

      Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to agents that

      are capable of good fortune and of moral action generally. Therefore

      necessarily chance is in the sphere of moral actions. This is

      indicated by the fact that good fortune is thought to be the same,

      or nearly the same, as happiness, and happiness to be a kind of

      moral action, since it is well-doing. Hence what is not capable of

      moral action cannot do anything by chance. Thus an inanimate thing

      or a lower animal or a child cannot do anything by chance, because

      it is incapable of deliberate intention; nor can 'good fortune' or

      'ill fortune' be ascribed to them, except metaphorically, as

      Protarchus, for example, said that the stones of which altars are made

      are fortunate because they are held in honour, while their fellows are

      trodden under foot. Even these things, however, can in a way be

      affected by chance, when one who is dealing with them does something

      to them by chance, but not otherwise.

      The spontaneous on the other hand is found both in the lower animals

      and in many inanimate objects. We say, for example, that the horse

      came 'spontaneously', because, though his coming saved him, he did not

      come for the sake of safety. Again, the tripod fell 'of itself',

      because, though when it
    fell it stood on its feet so as to serve for a

      seat, it did not fall for the sake of that.

      Hence it is clear that events which (1) belong to the general

      class of things that may come to pass for the sake of something, (2)

      do not come to pass for the sake of what actually results, and (3)

      have an external cause, may be described by the phrase 'from

      spontaneity'. These 'spontaneous' events are said to be 'from

      chance' if they have the further characteristics of being the

      objects of deliberate intention and due to agents capable of that mode

      of action. This is indicated by the phrase 'in vain', which is used

      when A which is for the sake of B, does not result in B. For instance,

      taking a walk is for the sake of evacuation of the bowels; if this

      does not follow after walking, we say that we have walked 'in vain'

      and that the walking was 'vain'. This implies that what is naturally

      the means to an end is 'in vain', when it does not effect the end

      towards which it was the natural means-for it would be absurd for a

      man to say that he had bathed in vain because the sun was not

      eclipsed, since the one was not done with a view to the other. Thus

      the spontaneous is even according to its derivation the case in

      which the thing itself happens in vain. The stone that struck the

      man did not fall for the purpose of striking him; therefore it fell

      spontaneously, because it might have fallen by the action of an

      agent and for the purpose of striking. The difference between

      spontaneity and what results by chance is greatest in things that come

      to be by nature; for when anything comes to be contrary to nature,

      we do not say that it came to be by chance, but by spontaneity. Yet

      strictly this too is different from the spontaneous proper; for the

      cause of the latter is external, that of the former internal.

      We have now explained what chance is and what spontaneity is, and in

      what they differ from each other. Both belong to the mode of causation

      'source of change', for either some natural or some intelligent

      agent is always the cause; but in this sort of causation the number of

      possible causes is infinite.

      Spontaneity and chance are causes of effects which though they might

      result from intelligence or nature, have in fact been caused by

      something incidentally. Now since nothing which is incidental is prior

      to what is per se, it is clear that no incidental cause can be prior

      to a cause per se. Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to

      intelligence and nature. Hence, however true it may be that the

      heavens are due to spontaneity, it will still be true that

      intelligence and nature will be prior causes of this All and of many

      things in it besides.

      7

      It is clear then that there are causes, and that the number of

      them is what we have stated. The number is the same as that of the

      things comprehended under the question 'why'. The 'why' is referred

      ultimately either (1), in things which do not involve motion, e.g.

      in mathematics, to the 'what' (to the definition of 'straight line' or

      'commensurable', c.), or (2) to what initiated a motion, e.g. 'why

      did they go to war?-because there had been a raid'; or (3) we are

      inquiring 'for the sake of what?'-'that they may rule'; or (4), in the

      case of things that come into being, we are looking for the matter.

      The causes, therefore, are these and so many in number.

      Now, the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist to

      know about them all, and if he refers his problems back to all of

      them, he will assign the 'why' in the way proper to his science-the

      matter, the form, the mover, 'that for the sake of which'. The last

      three often coincide; for the 'what' and 'that for the sake of

      which' are one, while the primary source of motion is the same in

      species as these (for man generates man), and so too, in general,

      are all things which cause movement by being themselves moved; and

      such as are not of this kind are no longer inside the province of

      physics, for they cause motion not by possessing motion or a source of

      motion in themselves, but being themselves incapable of motion.

      Hence there are three branches of study, one of things which are

      incapable of motion, the second of things in motion, but

      indestructible, the third of destructible things.

      The question 'why', then, is answered by reference to the matter, to

      the form, and to the primary moving cause. For in respect of coming to

      be it is mostly in this last way that causes are investigated-'what

      comes to be after what? what was the primary agent or patient?' and so

      at each step of the series.

      Now the principles which cause motion in a physical way are two,

      of which one is not physical, as it has no principle of motion in

      itself. Of this kind is whatever causes movement, not being itself

      moved, such as (1) that which is completely unchangeable, the

      primary reality, and (2) the essence of that which is coming to be,

      i.e. the form; for this is the end or 'that for the sake of which'.

      Hence since nature is for the sake of something, we must know this

      cause also. We must explain the 'why' in all the senses of the term,

      namely, (1) that from this that will necessarily result ('from this'

      either without qualification or in most cases); (2) that 'this must be

      so if that is to be so' (as the conclusion presupposes the premisses);

      (3) that this was the essence of the thing; and (4) because it is

      better thus (not without qualification, but with reference to the

      essential nature in each case).

      8

      We must explain then (1) that Nature belongs to the class of

      causes which act for the sake of something; (2) about the necessary

      and its place in physical problems, for all writers ascribe things

      to this cause, arguing that since the hot and the cold, c., are of

      such and such a kind, therefore certain things necessarily are and

      come to be-and if they mention any other cause (one his 'friendship

      and strife', another his 'mind'), it is only to touch on it, and

      then good-bye to it.

      A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for

      the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the

      sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity?

      What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water

      and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly

      if a man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not

      fall for the sake of this-in order that the crop might be

      spoiled-but that result just followed. Why then should it not be the

      same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth should come up of

      necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars

      broad and useful for grinding down the food-since they did not arise

      for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all

      other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then

      all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had

      come be for an end, such things survived, b
    eing organized

      spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise

      perished and continue to perish, as Empedocles says his 'man-faced

      ox-progeny' did.

      Such are the arguments (and others of the kind) which may cause

      difficulty on this point. Yet it is impossible that this should be the

      true view. For teeth and all other natural things either invariably or

      normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of

      chance or spontaneity is this true. We do not ascribe to chance or

      mere coincidence the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in

      summer we do; nor heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in

      winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of

      coincidence or for an end, and these cannot be the result of

      coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be for an end;

      and that such things are all due to nature even the champions of the

      theory which is before us would agree. Therefore action for an end

      is present in things which come to be and are by nature.

      Further, where a series has a completion, all the preceding steps

      are for the sake of that. Now surely as in intelligent action, so in

      nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, if nothing

      interferes. Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end;

      therefore the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g. had

      been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way

      as it is now by art; and if things made by nature were made also by

      art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature. Each step

      then in the series is for the sake of the next; and generally art

      partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly

      imitates her. If, therefore, artificial products are for the sake of

      an end, so clearly also are natural products. The relation of the

      later to the earlier terms of the series is the same in both. This

      is most obvious in the animals other than man: they make things

      neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation. Wherefore people

     
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