Containing and Deterring a Nuclear Iran

Diplomacy and sanctions are best thought of as the point of departure for a successful containment policy toward Iran, but these are not the only steps. Even if economic isolation does not dissuade the Iranian regime from acquiring a nuclear arsenal, the economic isolation of a nuclear Iran would be an essential element for after-the-fact containment.

  Certainly there ought to be no reward in the form of lessened economic isolation should Iran go nuclear. Some form of economic sanctions has been in place against Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Since 1995, executive orders and US law have progressively tightened the economic noose around the Iranian leadership, largely with the aim of bringing Iran to the negotiating table to give up its nuclear-weapons program. An Iran with nuclear weapons is an Iran against which sanctions will have failed. Nonetheless, sanctions will be a vital part of any containment regime, and the financial, trade, energy, and other sanctions currently in place can be expected to remain—with efforts needed to expand, invigorate, and maintain them over time. Similarly, it will be important to deny Iran access to capital from investment and trade and to limit the ability of Iranian officials and business leaders to trawl for support around the world.

  Beyond diplomacy and sanctions, containing a nuclear Iran would require increased efforts on other fronts, including:

  •Competing with and disrupting Iranian regional and global economic strategy.

  •Working with allies inside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to diminish Iranian influence in energy markets. This is a tall order, as the chambers of OPEC have hitherto been almost sacrosanct. However, there are myriad examples of politically motivated manipulation of the market, including Saudi efforts to balance prices in response to both Iranian and Iraqi threats, as well as Gulf efforts to incentivize both Russia and China to corral Iran. Iran is an important oil supplier, and revenues from oil sales are the Islamic Republic’s lifeline. Cutting it will be key.

  •Supporting effective opposition groups. While this policy has long existed in name, effecting a genuine policy toward the Iranian opposition will become more urgent once Iran possesses nuclear weapons. Identifying organized opposition groups, ensuring they are not connected to any terrorist organization, and finding usable channels to provide useful assistance is no small challenge. Independent and indigenous labor unions present a special opportunity, as do human rights and civil-society groups. Meaningful support—economic, political, and moral—to groups like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland has historically been instrumental in chipping away at authoritarian regimes and, ultimately, in toppling them from power. Once identified, such groups might receive financial and diplomatic support, if they are willing. The US government should not be overly concerned that the regime will seek to taint groups receiving foreign funding as disloyal, because the regime hurls such accusations about any and all opponents, regardless of their financing sources.

  •Conducting information operations and public diplomacy. This effort requires a multidirectional approach, but is a key element in any effective containment regime. Exposing the Islamic Republic’s falsities demands international effort as well as effort within Iran. It also requires facilitating information flow into and out of the country better, something the United States has yet to master despite major investments in surrogate radio and Voice of America.

  •Promoting human rights. The promotion of human rights has been a hallmark of US foreign policy. However, both during and after the Cold War, human rights issues have too often taken a back seat to other policy priorities. Nonetheless, the use of the issue as a casus belli in operations against Libya may have infused it with newfound international credibility. The human rights issue proved an enormously effective wedge issue during the Cold War and can again play a role in delegitimizing the Iranian regime in world opinion.

  •Controlling the movement of regime leaders. The Iranian regime exploits the willingness of the international community to explore engagement—economic or political—and avails itself of generous access to the outside world. It shows no such generosity in extending visas to foreigners. Information and access to alternative viewpoints will strengthen the hand of the Iranian public vis-à-vis the leadership. Imposing visa parity is a possible way to crowbar Iranian doors open, or at the least to constrain efforts by Iranian leaders to further their influence.

  As Cold War precedent reveals—and as many advocates of containing Iran acknowledge—the keystone of any containment policy is a military strategy of deterrence. Absent a credible deterrent posture, the United States risks Iran calling its bluff.