Diary of a Combatant
Che with members of the Second Front of the Escambray, including Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo.
Che meeting with the leaders of the Second Front (including Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo) in preparation for the signing of the Unity Pact, December 12, 1958.
Che with Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo.
Combatants of Column Eight in the Escambray.
Che at the radio transmission station of Column Eight in Caballete de Casa, Escambray.
Che at the radio transmission station of Column Eight in Caballete de Casa, Escambray.
Che resting with members of his column, including Olo Pantoja, who died in Bolivia. Photo taken by Hernando López.
At the Gavilanes Hospital, which was Che’s first camp in the Escambray. On the far right is the doctor Vicente de la O attending to the wounded.
Che and Ramiro Valdés with members of the Revolutionary Directorate (including Faure Chomón, Rolando Cubela and Humberto Castelló) on the signing of the Pedrero Pact, December 1, 1958.
Class at the recruits’ school, Caballete de Casa, Escambray.
Trainees at the recruits’ school, Caballete de Casa, Escambray, 1958.
Surrender of Batista’s troops.
Second from right: Roberto Rodríguez, “el Vaquerito” (Little Cowboy).
Che greeting an enemy soldier after the capture of Fomento.
Wanted poster for Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos at the time of the campaign in Las Villas.
The doctor Fernández Mell attending to the wounded during the battle of Santa Clara.
Che and Aleida March above the shop La Buena Nueva, Santa Clara, December 1958.
Che and René Rodríguez, Santa Clara.
Che and Aleida March walking through the streets of Santa Clara, December 1958.
Che and Aleida March in the Leoncio Vidal barracks, Santa Clara.
Che during the surrender of the armored train, Santa Clara.
Che talking with some citizens of Santa Clara.
Che in Independencia Street, Santa Clara, with combatants from his column, José Argudín, Aleida March, Harry Villegas and Ramón Pardo Guerra.
Che in the Leoncio Vidal barracks, January 1, 1959.
The people of Santa Clara celebrating the victory over Batista, January 1, 1959.
1. Commander Paz, one of the most efficient combatants of the guerrilla forces, died in Providencia during the battle of Santo Domingo.
2. There was an ambush in El Naranjal of great importance, not because of the number of weapons captured but rather for having impeded the enemy’s advance and administering a crushing psychological blow.
3. The manifesto was the logical reaction to the aerial bombing campaign launched by Batista’s forces.
4. Gravely wounded by a howitzer shell that hit the house of a peasant collaborator where the rebels were sheltering, Geonel was taken to the La Plata command headquarters where an emergency operation was performed, but it was impossible to save him. He was an engineering student and an outstanding combatant, who collaborated with Che in the creation of El Cubano Libre, the first newspaper of the Sierra Maestra.
5. Ángel Verdecia (Angelito), a brave combatant, was surprised by the enemy in an ambush when he was led astray by the guide when they were going to Meriño.
6. Captain Andrés Cuevas was posthumously promoted to commander of the Rebel Army for his example of valor in the battle of Purialón, where he was killed by Batista’s troops.
7. In the battles at El Jigüe and Purialón a total of six compañeros died: Andrés Cuevas, Teodoro Banderas, Roberto Corría, Eugenio Cedeño, Victuro Acosta and Francisco Luna.
8. Fidel writes in La Victoria Estratégica that Faustino Pérez and Carlos Franqui signed the prisoner handover document in name of the Rebel Army. During the course of the day they turned over 238 prisoners, including 42 wounded, for a total of 253 guardsmen: “If the presence of a woman guerrilla (Teté Puebla) was cause for great excitement among the Guards, even more upsetting was the surprise arrival of Che… [who] had already become a legend, and the Guards relished the opportunity to see the Argentine guerrilla fighter [in person].” pp. 298-99.
9. Manuel Hernández Osorio (Miguel) was an outstanding combatant from Che’s columns. He was part of the guerrilla detachment led by Che in Bolivia and died in combat near La Higuera on September 26, 1967.
10. All the Arabic numerals are encircled.
11. Commander Armando González Finalé led Batista’s 23rd Battalion based in Arroyones.
12. The home of the peasant Bismark Galán Reina served for a time as Celia Sánchez’s command post for supplying the guerrilla forces.
13. Before joining the guerrillas, Commander René Ramos Latour (Daniel) had taken on the leadership of the July 26 Movement in Oriente province after the death of Frank País and had gone on to become the national chief of the action squads as a member of the national leadership of the movement. The “profound ideological differences,” as Che described them were due to Che’s deeper political radicalization and his identification with positions of the left. Nevertheless, the courage and integrity Ramos Latour showed led Che to change his opinion, as he expresses here.
14. Commander Corzo Izaguirre was the chief of a battalion in Batista’s army.
15. This is the moment in which the battle of Las Mercedes began, which concluded August 6, with the Rebel Army inflicting a decisive defeat over Batista’s offensive. The counteroffensive lasted for 74 days, producing the strategic turning point of the war that meant the imminent collapse of the dictatorship. In his book La Victoria Estratégica, Fidel states: “In this final balance sheet it is obligatory to highlight first of all Che and Camilo, who completely fulfilled their role of being my principal deputies at different times....” p. 348.
August 1958
1
An intense gunfight began from early on. Herman [Marks] took a group of 10 men to attack but as it became light we realized that the mortar fire was totally random; if the machine gun fired the gringo would go to his death with no chance of escape, so I ordered the withdrawal of all of the weapons. I set up a line of sharpshooters to cover the withdrawal of those below; one of the guys from Las Vegas was wounded in a lung. He was taken to a little house near the line, where the mortars that didn’t show up as they should have. I waited in vain all day for some communication from Fidel. Herman reappeared at night with nothing new. Two deserters from the Las Mercedes troop, who fled the same day the attack began, were caught. They gave the following interesting information: the [army] battalion is made up of three companies with 370 men, two captains and the following weapons: three tanks, three bazookas, 10 tripods, six [Brownings], one Johnson, one mortar 81, one 60, 200 Garands, two Springfields and a Cristobal [carbine]. The plane continues dropping supplies via parachutes.
2
The plane informed us that the bazooka had hit the tank three times. This morning I conferred with Fidel and it was decided to move the ambushes as close to Manzanillo as possible, accelerating the transfer of the tank that was unharmed in the air attack with napalm bombs and missiles. It was decided to transfer el Guajiro and Mora to Tío Lucas, while Fonso will go further between El Purial and Jibacoa to ambush the Rural Guards from behind.
Internationally a serious problem arose when Batista asked the US Navy to guard the aqueduct that supplies Caimanera, an enclave in Cuban territory.1 Fidel read me the statements to be released in the name of the July 26 Movement, which are very strong.
A woman who was coming to visit her husband was wounded.
3
The day passed without incident. I received a communication from Fidel telling me to send Fonso to harass the rearguard of the soldiers of Cienaguilla. I waited until I had a chance to express my disagreement, and Fidel revoked the order, deciding that they should go ahead to harass the guardsmen if they advanced beyond this point to rescue their compañeros, something which they show no inclination to do. The woman who was wounded was evacuated and, because the planes passe
d very close by, I arranged the transfer of the man with the wounded lung, which could happen tomorrow.
4
The wounded were evacuated early with a counterproductive result because the hospital in Las Vegas was bombed, slightly wounding our soldier. A communiqué arrived from Fonso stating that Batista’s troops had abandoned Cienaguilla, so I ordered him to set up between Purial and Sao Grande to be ready to fight any troops that advanced from either of those two directions. Fidel ordered me to dig two trenches for the 50 and a 30 [weapons] that I have, with the objective of shooting at the observer plane that drops supplies for the besieged troops. Today the helicopter landed so I gave the order to shoot it down if it tried to land again. The shortage of money impedes the full provisioning of our troop, which is nevertheless well armed. Troops keep accumulating in La Herradura-Cuatro Caminos region, but the tank is still not ready and to move it would require some teams of oxen.
5
We set up the ambush for the helicopter, but on Guillermo’s side, and it didn’t come. Corzo has been told of his promotion to lieutenant-colonel and [Colonel Manuel] Ugalde Carrillo [chief of operations] planned to come in the [helicopter] but something happened. The siege continued with the same features.
6
The siege continues with the same features but now we know that reinforcements are coming. Later we hear cannon fire and at night I overhear a radio conversation between Corzo and a subordinate officer asking about the outcome. He confessed to five deaths and that might be the case.
7
Since this morning unusual troop movement has been noticed and we learned from the radio that they were going to leave. But at the moment of their departure, they gave us so much lead [fired so much at us] that nobody felt like sticking their head out. When we did, there wasn’t a single soldier. We headed back only to hear a distant gunfight that ended before we reached La Herradura. We returned to Las Mercedes where we found a tank which the Rural Guards themselves had set fire to. We went to see Fidel, but when we got there another heavy firefight broke out. It was decided to continue after [the guardsmen] because the radio reported that the tanks were bogged.
We returned to Las Vegas and threw ourselves after them to no avail. Cordobí [Felipe Cordumy] was killed, crushed by a tank. We buried him. In my opinion there were several errors and a lack of combativeness that diminished the effectiveness of the siege.
8
This morning the planes machine-gunned Las Mercedes. The day was absolutely calm.
9
In the morning the planes machine-gunned a little and later the small plane tossed out some flyers indicating that the truce started at 6:00 a.m. along the Sao Grande trail. A member of the Cuban Red Cross asked for an interview with me, but I told him I couldn’t accept the conditions of the truce without consulting the commander-in-chief. I sent copies to Fidel. Beto Pesant2 died as a result of an unfortunate accident.
10
The messenger doesn’t arrive and I will go to talk with them, asking for a truce until 12:00. Fidel answers, telling me that I can’t accept and I send him a response at night explaining that I had already accepted, but the response doesn’t arrive in time.
11
In the morning I tell [the Red Cross] that the commander-in-chief doesn’t accept the conditions for the truce, but in a little while Fidel arrives. The messengers are almost entirely to blame [for the mix-up]. Fidel decides to take the jeep to the Red Cross post and we meet Lieutenant-Colonel Lorié there, who accepts part of the truce. I myself go with the helicopter to Las Vegas and the first of the wounded start arriving there. Captain Izquierdo’s disposition is genuinely collaborative. A Lieutenant Pina, a special envoy of General Cantillo’s,3 comes too. It’s not possible to evacuate all the wounded. Some are in La Plata, a long way away, and the helicopter runs into a lot of difficulties in getting there.
12
The evacuation of the wounded is completed and that of the prisoners begins, turning over one group that is almost the entire company from Las Vegas. Talks begin with the attorney Lieutenant-Colonel Neuman [Colonel Fernando Nugret], whom we suspect is Batista’s special envoy because he proposed in a veiled way his replacement by a supreme court magistrate (the oldest one) and a peaceful exit. Nothing concrete was decided.
13
The handover was completed during the morning and the Red Cross left, but they sent a message stating that Lieutenant-Colonel Corzo would come personally in the afternoon to bring some medicines. He did come, but didn’t bring the plasma, which he agreed to bring tomorrow despite the fact that the truce was over. An army deserter who tried to rape a young girl was executed.
14
At noon the helicopter bringing the medicine comes. No planes are flying.
15
The bombardment and machine-gunning began, but not over Las Mercedes.4 Carlos Rafael [Rodríguez]5 left for the unliberated zone. My impression [of him] is positive, despite all the intrigues inside and out. I haven’t been able to organize the column yet,6 as there have been somewhat contradictory orders about its composition. Angelito’s [Frías] people are to come with me, but I don’t know if the ones from Las Vegas will too. I ask to have Raúl [Castro Mercader] come but he doesn’t accept; we agree that I will only take from the troop those who volunteer to go. I will probably take Fonso [Zayas] as lieutenant. I ordered that an antitank trench is made on the Sao Grande road.
16
Raúl’s people arrive and it turns out there are three of them. The planes bombed the tank that’s near here. I don’t receive any news from Fidel.
17
They bomb the tank again, but without doing any damage to it, although it’s impossible to move it due to the rain and the lack of skill on the part of the drivers. I receive a letter from Fidel saying that he couldn’t organize the bazooka and setting a date for us to meet the day after tomorrow in Mompié. He tells me of a new squadron led by el Vaquerito [the Little Cowboy, Roberto Rodríguez], but nothing else. He also orders me to remit everything extra to Raúl, Fonso and Angelito Verdecia’s people. Fonso agrees to go but his men went to the highway to look for trucks; he will come with a small but more or less select group.
18
Las Mercedes suffers an intense bombardment that destroys some houses. We decide to evacuate the rest of the people. I undertake the trip to La Plata in a jeep that Pepito Roja seized on the highway.
19
The air force bombs the Jíbaro area. A message comes from Fidel postponing tomorrow’s meeting. I leave, anyway, sleeping in the little store.
20
Fidel reads me two speeches that he will give in the following days; they are really good […] We agree on the invasion plan [of central Cuba] that will preferably be carried out in cars if possible. Ramiro will come as the column’s second-in-command. The planes are shooting where we are.
21
I leave early and sleep in the little Sierra Maestra store. Up there I hear about the formation of an opposition group led by Faustino, which also includes Franqui and Aldo Santamaría in the Sierra Maestra.7
22
I arrive at Las Vegas and continue the trip in the jeep. I get bogged and receive a note saying that the plane with Pedro Luis [Díaz Lanz]8 had already arrived. After a quick trip on horseback I get there. He brings about 70 rifles but no ammunition, also a magnificent radio transmitter and some small radios and three antitank guns. Pedro Luis tells me of the intrigues among the exiles who are trying to take control of the movement; he expresses his doubts whether he can continue in this because the FBI is on his tail. I ask for M-1 and 30.06 ammunition, which he should send in three days by parachute if nothing new comes up.
23
Nothing new today. I learn that the people I’d sent to the road are staying in Jíbaro itself and have been bombed; one man has been killed. I ask Fidel for an M-2, an antitank gun and bullets.9
24
Tonight I went to look for the radio transmitter, and after a
n odyssey, I gave up, with the jeep becoming bogged along the trail. We covered it with leaves.
25
The plane doesn’t see the jeep but does a lot of turns over Jíbaro and drops some bombs.
26
Magadán arrives with precise news about the road and a pick-up truck. I order that a command post on the road is readied. There are five jeeps and a pick-up truck. Two more are expected. The planes drop bombs during the night.
27
Day dawns with the planes beginning a violent bombardment of El Jíbaro, against the very house where I am. It smashes a few things but causes no loss of life. We had abandoned the shelter when a 100 lb. bomb fell on it that could have cost us our lives.
28
We’re held up, waiting for the arrival of the plane.
29
The day passes with nothing new, but in the early evening a plane arrives loaded with 23,000 bullets, almost all of them 30-06.10 With the jeep just loaded, the planes approach and begin the machine-gunning that continues uninterrupted until dawn. It was decided at 4:00 in the morning to burn the plane, given the impossibility of moving it. So we did this. Raúl Chivás [Chibás] arrived in this plane and he’s come to remain with us.
30
The Rural Guards arrived at Cayo Espino, blocking the highway and seizing two supply trucks, one of which contained the gasoline needed to leave. It was decided then to leave on foot, setting the journey for tomorrow.
31
At dusk it was decided to depart along the highway as we have no news about the army. We arrive at Jibacoa with no new developments, but almost two hours behind schedule; we can see that we won’t reach our destination by nightfall. We tried to go in a tractor but couldn’t, so we had to stay in a small thicket that we reached at dawn.11