The African Dream

  The attitude of the Congolese had not been as bad as on the other occasions. It is true that at first they all disappeared, but it was to get some dawa. They returned later, and there were some who gave a good account of themselves. We might have begun to select combatants from among them if the situation had not been so compromised by the defeat that made them desert after a period of conducting themselves with dignity.

  From a political point of view, all the credit we had gained through our fraternal, sympathetic and fair-minded attitude toward the peasants foundered on the terrible fact that all their houses were burned. Expelled from an area where they had been able to eat, however poorly, they now had to go and live in mountains that offered virtually no food and where there was a constant threat of enemy occupation.

  The local chieftains paid us back with interest. All of them—Calixte, Jean Ila, Lambert and his commanders, a commissar called Bendera, and possibly a number of headmen—began to spread it around that the Cubans were a bunch of fakers who talked a lot, but who, in the heat of the battle, retreated and left the peasants to bear the consequences. They, on the other hand, wanted to remain in the mountains and defend the key points; now everything had been lost because of those charlatans.

  This was the propaganda that the commanders circulated among their soldiers and among the peasantry. Unfortunately, there was some objective basis for their insinuations; I had to struggle long and hard to regain some of the confidence of those men, who, hardly knowing me, had placed their trust in me and our people, more than in the commissars and commanders whose arbitrariness they had endured for such a long time.

  THE WHIRLWIND

  Our first concern was to fight for loyalty of the peasants because of the adverse conditions we confronted. The constant withdrawals and defeats suffered by our army, the maltreatment or neglect experienced by the local inhabitants, and now the malicious explanations that various commanders were using to take their revenge—all this contributed to the difficulties of our situation. We gathered together the kapita from the area and leading figures from nearby villages, as well as the peasants living there, and spoke to them with the help of the invaluable Charles. We explained the present situation, the reason why we had come to the Congo, and the danger facing the revolution because we were fighting among ourselves and not focusing on the struggle against the enemy. We found the kapita receptive and willing to cooperate; he told anyone who would listen that it was outrageous to compare us to the Belgians (which had already been said), because he had never seen a Belgian in these parts, let alone a white man eating bukali in the same quantity as his soldiers. The peasant’s views were some comfort to us, but we had to achieve more than winning over individuals. To gain everyone’s confidence, given the large number of villages in the area, I would have to spend days eating bukali from a bowl in each one, making success rather unlikely.

  We asked them to guarantee a supply of cassava and any other food they might be able to obtain; to give us a hand in building a hospital at a nearby place away from the road that the guardsmen might use in any advance; to lend us their tools so that we could dig trenches and improve the site’s defenses; and to form a little group of scouts so that we could get to know the enemy better. They readily agreed, and it was not long before quite a large and comfortable hospital was in place, on a hill protected from aircraft, and where we had dug a number of ditches to keep the tools and to prevent anything falling into the enemy’s hands, as had happened before.

  An unfortunate incident helped to ensure the peasants’ quick and enthusiastic response to our appeal. At the Lubondja barrier, a group of Congolese decided to set up some grenade-traps for greenhorns but did not inform their compañeros; another group of Congolese passed by and fell into the trap designed for the enemy. Three slightly wounded men came in for treatment, plus a fourth with a more serious stomach perforation that they attributed to a mortar round fired by the advancing enemy. Those slightly wounded were soon treated, but the other man had to have a delicate intestinal operation in the open air, under very difficult conditions, with a constant threat from aircraft flying over the area. In spite of everything, the operation was a success and raised the respect for Compañero Morogoro, the surgeon, and allowed us to insist on the rapid completion of the hospital, at a quiet and peaceful spot where such tasks could be carried out in proper safety.

  That same evening, another wounded man came in with a double perforation. What had happened? The whole group had fled when they heard the explosion; the slightly wounded man and the man with the stomach wound, who was able to help himself, also took to their heels and were later picked up by their compañeros. But no one stayed behind, possibly because his condition was too serious for him to be moved, or perhaps simply because he was terrified. With night approaching, it was clear that the guardsmen were not advancing and some of the Congolese resolved to go back closer and retrieve the weapons they had thrown away in their flight. It was then that they came across the wounded compañero and brought him to the hospital during the night. We had no lamps or proper lighting, nor adequate drugs, and so an even more difficult operation than the previous one had to be performed by the light of just a couple of lanterns on a man in a terrible physical state. At dawn, when the four perforations had finally been treated, the patient died. All these efforts, as well as our care for a woman wounded in a strange struggle with a buffalo (which was eventually killed with spears), did a lot to lift the peasants’ regard for us and to help us form a nucleus capable of withstanding the malignant influence of the commanders.

  The commanders continued to spread insidious rumors. The incident with the grenades, for example, was passed by “Radio Bemba” [word of mouth] in a way that suggested the Cubans had placed the devices and that the Congolese had fallen into the trap. Such outrageous stories were the specialty of Commissar Bendera Festón, Commander Huseini and others of their ilk; Calixte and Jean Ila, along with all Lambert’s people, never tired of throwing insults around about me.

  At the mixed barrier at Lubondja, they would call together all the Congolese soldiers under our command and poke fun at them for being forced to dig trenches, in contrast to their own soldiers, who stayed comfortably indoors and needed to have only three or four sentries posted. They also refused to show us the place where some of the ammunition was hidden. We needed infinite patience to endure such deceit.

  Commander Huseini called a meeting with all the Congolese, which someone monitored for us. He complained that I rebuked him like a child, that we divided the food brought up from the Lake [Base] only among our own companies, that we were taking away all their weapons and ammunition and eating all the maize and cassava. What would happen when the food ran out, they asked. The saddest thing about this was that they had asked us to come there.

  Despicable though it was, this behavior was understandable because of our really sharp treatment of the commanders, of their ignorance and superstition, their inferiority complex, the way we had offended their sensibilities, and perhaps the pain these poor people felt when a white man rebuked them like in the old days.

  Lambert’s men did a similar thing and tried to confront our men directly, accusing them of cowardice and of provoking the enemy army and then running away. This certainly stirred things up and did nothing to raise our men’s flagging morale. Mbili proposed several times to move away a little from the commander, so as to avoid a clash with him and the total demoralization of his men. This situation was developing everywhere; Compañero Maffu wrote me the following note from Front de Force, which I immediately forwarded to Massengo:

  This is to inform you of the current situation. I requested from the captain and the commander that we should go and cut the lines, and they responded that they have neither bullets nor food. The tinned provisions have all been consumed.

  They said the same thing after receiving your message.1 On the day it arrived, the captain told us that the Congolese had laid an ambush for him, that they had pursued a
nd disarmed them and brought their rifles here. The commander had been called to a meeting there, and he told me that the situation was very bad and that he could not go because the Congolese would kill him.2 But they have two meetings a day, with lots of clapping and shouting. I thought they were preparing themselves for combat, but then I found out that the topic of the meetings was how to get out of the Congo. At first, they told me it would be next week, but at another meeting they decided to send some scouts to the lake to locate the boats and seize them. They sent a captain and 10 soldiers for that purpose. They also sent the commissar with another group to Kigoma on a different mission but with the same objective.

  I should also tell you that eight of the Congolese who came to a meeting were beaten, and they left only three of them here.

  The man who informed us didn’t say whether they talked about us in the event of their leaving. He told me that if they caught him talking about this with us, they would shoot him. If I can find out any more details, I’ll let you know.

  With this information, I ordered Maffu to go and strengthen the base, and Azi (who was at the Makungu front) to come and meet with me.

  While all this was happening, I tried to regroup my men and sent scouts to look for all the weapons that had been scattered around in the flight and not fallen into the enemy’s hands: Bahasa’s cannon, mortars and machine guns, which had been left for safekeeping with the Congolese and which they had hidden so that they could flee more quickly. I sent a letter to Siki in which I repeated many of the things that had been reported to me. I will quote just a couple of paragraphs to give some idea of my assessment of the situation:

  The decline of the men is terrible, and everyone wants to flee to the lake; there are probably many descending on you there; send them back to me immediately, with plenty of ammunition. Only the really sick should stay. I have decided in principle to remain here at Nabikumo 10 hours away from the lake (Upper Base), a day and a half from Kazima, and two hours from a feeble barrier set up near Lubondja. If I were to go to the lake myself, it would be a huge political defeat because all the peasants trusted us and would find themselves abandoned. Once we have reorganized, we will be able to offer effective assistance; this afternoon we will begin shooting practice with a Soviet Mauser for which we have bullets. We lack 30 ammunition (SKS) and are short on stuff for the FALs. If you’ve got any, send us 5,000 SKS and 3,000 FAL rounds. If you don’t have any, please let me know; the lack of news is making me desperate.

  We heard rumors that three boats arrived with ammunition, that Kabila crossed to Kabimba, and that there are 40 Cubans there. Try to take as few of them as possible and send them to me. After the (objective) situation there is known, it will be possible to make a decision.

  The information about Kabila had come by word of mouth from a Congolese messenger, who assured me that he had seen the Cubans and that Kabila himself had landed in the area; the letter said Kabimba, but it should have read Kibamba.

  The compañeros wrote to me at length, but the letters crossed and did not really answer each other. Here, in full, is one of these from the last days of October:

  Compañero Tatu

  We deeply regret the death of Compañero Bahasa and sympathize with your feelings, given the circumstances surrounding his case. We are very glad that you and the other compañeros are doing well.

  We hope that by the time you receive this letter we will have vindicated ourselves in your eyes for our apparent failure to send reports and materials. As you can see, the first messenger and the first letter were sent on the 21st, two days after our arrival. Not much happened and another messenger was already leaving with our more extensive report in which we told you about the men we have at our disposal at present.

  We cannot understand how you could have been so naïve as to believe that Kabila came with four boats. (At best, he was meant to have brought four big boatloads.) In fact, he remains unperturbed in Kigoma. As for the arrival of the Cubans, whoever gave you that information probably confused their wishes with reality. The only Cuban to arrive has been Changa who made two trips in the space of three or four days, after not coming for 19 days. He told us that he would like to go on making trips because he is afraid that they will abandon us and that communication via the lake will be lost. This is a new problem because I had already agreed to come, and it is due to the situation he senses both in Kigoma and here at the Lake [Base].

  The messenger told us that there was a letter for Massengo but he didn’t come, although we think that it is pointless to consider any idea of dealing with him because Massengo is a completely defeated man right now with no heart for anything, nor does he have the authority to give anyone orders, as he himself admitted in our talk with him yesterday. Massengo told us that not even Kabila, if he were to come, would have the authority to resolve anything because everyone blames the two of them for the disaster. We can tell you that Massengo’s attitude during our talk was enough to arouse pity. He said that he didn’t even have the authority to arrest those who had sent letters to combatants urging them to lay down their arms.

  He attributed all this to tribal differences and things like that. He insisted that we help him find safe hideouts for weapons and ammunition, in case it is possible to relaunch the struggle in the future. If you put this together with what we have already said about his preparations to go to Kigoma (which he was reluctant to tell us about, but which he communicated to Ngenje), you will have some idea of the state he is in.

  As to the situation at the Lake [Base], the [Upper] Base and Aly and Tom’s front (Kazima), everything is the same as in the previous report. The only difference is that things have been getting worse every day. (But that is normal here.)

  With regard to monitoring things that are being taken from here, which you mention in your letter, a detailed account will be sent to you in each report. We still have some reserves here, except for clothing (which has not arrived) and shoes (which we have only in small sizes). All we could give the 10 Congolese you sent us were some tennis shoes. Nor do we have any weapons because, although Ngenje is keeping track of everything there, it started too late and there is nothing much to check. Fifteen FALs remain in our reserves here at the [Lake] Base, but we are not sending them to you because we don’t think you would want us to.

  We think that our previous reports will give you a more complete picture of the general situation, viewed objectively, and that this will help you to reach a decision, as you say in your letter.

  The Cubans who have come here in the last two or three days are: Israel, Kasambala, Amia, Abdallah, Ami and Agano. We are sending them all back to you, except for Israel and Kasambala, whose feet are swollen from walking without shoes. We can’t send Bahati at the moment because he is still too sick. Regarding the bullets, 2,000 rounds of FAL and three boxes of 7.62 are on their way; we haven’t got any for AKs.

  We have been thinking that, given your situation, it might be a good idea for Tembo to transfer and join you. We also think that either you should take a stroll down here or one of us should come up and exchange views with you about the general situation. We are maintaining contact with Kigoma and Dar es-Salaam by radio.

  In our opinion, everything that is happening both here and where you are is known to the enemy. This is also Massengo’s view, as a lot of people—even high-ranking officers—have gone over to the enemy and we don’t know the whereabouts of many others.

  Something else that Massengo told us (and we agree with him on this) is that he expects an attack on the [Upper] Base and the Lake [Base] at any moment. The surprise attack they made on you confirms us in this opinion.

  In Siki’s estimate, the location you have chosen is very bad, and we could be cut off from each other at any moment. The barrier is in the immediate vicinity of Kaela and, as you know from earlier reports, Kazima was captured several days ago and there are only four Cubans there along with Almari and Tom. The Congolese cannot be relied on because they just run away.

&
nbsp; To bring some order into our messages, we will wait for your reply before sending our next one. Then we’ll be aware of what you know and what you need.

  Remember that there’s hardly anyone left here, that we have two compañeros staffing the lakeside mortars and two at an observation point around Nganja, and that we have to post a guard here to protect the stores (the Congolese are a light-fingered bunch). They’ve already relieved us of half a sack of beans and a sack of salt on the way from the boat to the base.

  Warm greetings,

  Siki

  Tembo

  After receiving this letter, in answer to mine that I quoted above, I got another letter, dated October 26, the main paragraphs of which I will quote here:

  The situation at the Lake and [Upper] Bases:

  The following agreements came from Siki’s meeting with Massengo. First, Ngenje will be in charge of the Lake Base, with all the authority inherent in that position and responsibility for its defense. He is authorized to take whatever measures he considers necessary for his orders to be carried out, and the only commanders above him are Massengo and Siki. Ngenje and Kumi have also been put in charge of everything reaching the Lake [Base] via our independent route. We attach sketches of the defense,3 with the location of all the fortifications and the heavy weapons. As you can see, the defense has been well organized within our capabilities, which include two lines of trenches. Like me, Siki only trusts Cubans to handle the weapons because with the others there are the same problems as elsewhere. Hapana masasi, hapana chakula, hapana travaille and the question is always how best to retreat. The framework for all this is Massengo’s obvious lack of authority. In addition, it should be noted that the Lake [Base] has become a refuge for all the fugitives, with the resulting relaxation of discipline. At the meeting with Massengo, we discussed the organization of the General Staff. The military structure we proposed was accepted, as well as the civilian structure after some modifications on their part. Justice and finances were included under the military part. As we previously informed you, they are thinking of making you commander of operations.