The African Dream
Changa had problems crossing the lake. Each time there were more boats keeping watch, and his Congolese crew hesitated to face the dangers of the crossing. Some annoying situations developed because, after the order had been given to evacuate the women and children, among the “children” were some aged 20 to 25 who shoved everyone else aside and took control. As the ship made two or three attempts to leave, situations like this occurred night after night and gave rise to friction with our men who were responsible for the ship’s security, as well as causing demoralization among our men.
A message came from Kabila that said:
Massengo:
I am passing on your message to the Tanzanians. I leave today for Tabora and will return immediately with weapons and ammunition. I am sending you all the remaining Congolese money. The strangulation of our struggle is a plot between the authorities here and the imperialists. There is no money.
Kabila
Kabila says here that he was going to Tabora, but he told us he was going to Dar es-Salaam, and that is what he did. He went to have talks with the authorities, but at the time of the disaster he was not in Kigoma but in Dar es-Salaam.
On November 16, Compañero Siki received the following letter from Azima:
Compañero Siki:
These lines are to explain that I have only 16 Congolese and nine Cubans; it is very difficult to retreat, and the position we have is completely open; there is no way of withdrawing in order to hide from the aircraft. The Congolese are planning to leave; they won’t fight. I hold them here with a gun; as soon as the soldiers start advancing, they will be off. I am telling you this because the situation is very difficult; forgive me for saying so, but l think I have lost my nerve. We are forcing those who don’t want to fight and I don’t think that makes sense; I honestly don’t think it is right to do this. I don’t have any great knowledge, but it seems very bad to me. Besides, there is no food, there is a meat crisis, there’s nothing to give them to eat. And it rains every day; it starts pouring in the morning and there’s no shelter. Well, forgive any spelling mistakes I may have made.
Azima
I thought this was a very worrying letter and I ordered Siki to go and investigate. His view was that this was just one of Compañero Azima’s frequent outbursts. My doubts made me send Kisua up there, Aly’s second-in-command, who had arrived with Aly and his men from Kibamba, in order to take charge of the defense in case Azima was in a very bad way.
“Tremendo Punto” arrived at the same time as Aly, having traveled with him. He sent me a letter explaining that the tense situation in Kabimba was due to Aly’s character and recounted a number of incidents that occurred there. He said that he had done everything possible to create unity, and that relations with the other Cubans were friendly, but that Aly and the major did not see eye to eye. Then he repeated these statements in person and related some anecdotes, but Aly reacted violently to these claims, recalling, among other things, a funny episode arising from a lack of caution on the part of “Tremendo Punto”; he had insisted on traveling on the lake by day, against Aly’s advice, and they had hardly left the shore when an aircraft appeared on the horizon. Quick as a flash, Compañero “Tremendo Punto” jumped into the water with such force that he overturned the boat; but the worst of it was that Aly didn’t know how to swim and nearly drowned. His resentment against “Tremendo Punto,” expressed in frequent interruptions to his story caused by his stammering with outrage, was very comical in those tragic moments.
Mbili sent me fresh reports explaining what he had done at the Jungo junction; there had been an enemy advance, and neither the Congolese nor the Rwandans had taken their positions. There were eight Cubans on each of the two defensive wings, and it was not possible to count on many other defenders. Commanders Calixte and Huseini remained at the rear, despite being urged to accompany their men. Mbili trusted only the Cubans—and them not even completely—to defend the position. He estimated there were 400 guardsmen confronting them, and it appeared as though they had some reinforcements.
Such was the situation on November 16 when various telegrams were dispatched. One of these, signed by myself, said:
Rafael:
We urgently need SKS bullets, 75 mm. cannon and Chinese bazooka shells; if possible, 200 rifles with the corresponding ammunition. The former is very important. They are blockading things in Kigoma. If they’re not going to let them go, they should say so straight out. Insist on clear language. Changa cannot leave here. There are enemy ships. We need to act fast.
Massengo sent another:
Impossible for me to carry out offensive. So planned evacuation enemy siege impossible. Must stress gravity of situation. Request urgent information about possibility of provisions, weapons and ammunition.
Massengo
The situation was growing more difficult every moment and there were no favorable signs anywhere. We simply had to wait and see how large the enemy forces would be, and how determined they were to push things to a conclusion.
1. Che’s note: To defend the base from the north.
THE COLLAPSE
Siki conducted another round of inspections and reported that it had gone quite well; the defensive positions were good and it was possible to fight while carrying out a gradual retreat as it did not make sense to organize a fixed defense with men in such a low state of morale. He said that the Congolese could not be trusted, but the Rwandans had reacted quite well and would support Mbili; the only thing they requested was not to mix them with the others; they had given all kinds of assurances of their loyalty. Azima sent a personal message swearing to defend that place as if it were a little corner of Cuba; it was not necessary to replace him.
Siki had left early in the morning. He had not delivered his entire report or rested from his tiring trip when a messenger arrived with the following letter from Mbili; the first part noted the time as 9:00 [a.m.].
Tatu:
The Congolese who stayed refuse to dig trenches, and the man I consider their leader proposes to go off and attack the guardsmen, which he says is better than digging trenches. We sent Charles to explain to him that it was better to dig trenches; there was a sharp clash between Charles and the Congolese leader; they threw a few punches at each other and the Congolese leader picked up his rifle to kill Charles, so we took it away from him. He said Charles was on the Cubans’ side, that the Cubans were bad and that Charles was the same, and that when the guardsmen came they were going to retreat and shoot at us. This is because one of the officers here is the man who told me at the ambush that the Cubans were no good.1 I think he has continued with that line here; the attitude of the Congolese is one of open hostility and this is evident in their inactivity.
Important: 11:15 [a.m.]
Tatu:
All the Rwandans have left. I was told the news at 10:00. I sent Akika off to check and it was true, they had gone. We agreed on a plan yesterday, and today they’ve gone off without saying a word to me. I think they’re heading for their own country because that is what they talked about doing previously. When we got the news, Mundandi’s adjutant was with me and I told him. He was stunned, went away and didn’t come back. As I see it, they have taken the weapons and said nothing. Yesterday they agreed to give me 10 extra men and a machine gun on a trolley. As the Congolese were gone and no one came, I sent someone to find Calixte to ask what was happening. But no one has seen him, and no one can tell me where he is.
This may be a case of treachery. I propose that we withdraw a little as planned, split into two groups, take up new positions and mine the road. We need reinforcements urgently. I’ll take some precautionary measures in case we have been betrayed. The compañero hearing your reply should come by the new road.
Patria o Muerte! [Homeland or death!]
Note: The Congolese here have already heard the news and are leaving.
Within a few hours, planes strafed the positions Mbili previously occupied, but he had already withdrawn. This might have been
a coincidence or it may have meant we had simply been betrayed. We began to look for men as reinforcements; we disarmed men who came fleeing toward the base and gave their weapons to others. This exchange did not promise a lot, but it was all we could do.
At each of the ambushes we had eight Cubans and roughly 10 Congolese. The new recruits, the students who had arrived from the Soviet Union, were told that they had to go to the front line. They declared that they could not go in dribs and drabs but must all go together. After the appropriate rebukes and threats (either you go or you must leave), a few were willing to go to the front line.
“Tremendo Punto” arrived in the evening with a compañero whose name I unfortunately don’t remember and I did not note down; he seemed intelligent and willing to act, except that he had no experience. We talked about a lot of things, but fundamentally we discussed my statement: “We are facing a situation of total collapse and have two options: we either put up an elastic defense, give ground and retreat to another place, or mount a fixed defense and fight to the extent of our strength. What we cannot do is to wait with our arms folded for the guardsmen to advance and take a new position from us without a fight; that would lead to the desertion of more men.” Such a tactic (or lack of tactics) would result in the loss of everything and total disorganization. Compañero “Tremendo Punto” asked to speak and said that, if these were the two choices, he would immediately opt for a fixed defense. The Cubans with me looked as though they would kill him or eat him alive; it was very painful for me. Given our location and the circumstances, a fixed defense seemed the best option, but a fixed defense with whom? The Congolese and the Rwandans were gone. Could I ask the Cubans to die in their trenches to defend this piece of nothing? More importantly, if they did this, would it produce any result? The fact was that I had raised the fixed defense as a pedagogic alternative; the only thing to be done was to “leave a mark.”
In spite of the inclement weather, “Tremendo Punto” went down that same night to talk with Massengo, and I did the same the next day. Those who participated in this discussion were: “Tremendo Punto,” the compañero whose name I don’t remember, Compañero Kent from Kenya (who had joined the Liberation Army), Charles Bemba (who had come to discuss his concerns), and perhaps someone else. There was some deliberation on the military options. A fixed defense was excluded because I eventually admitted that there were too few people—only ours—and we could not have complete confidence in them. A retreat to Fizi was also excluded because of the conditions prevailing there. That left two possible places of refuge: one was Uvira, which had to be reached via the lake (a dangerous route) or on foot, first crossing enemy lines and then passing through Fizi territory on a very long and difficult march; the second area was to the south, where a few villages such as Bondo offered the possibility of organizing a defense. It was decided that Aly and Moja would go to scout around Bondo quickly and make the decision on the same day. Aly argued this was necessary because of “Tremendo Punto’s” unreliability as in his view it was a bad position. I had a little altercation with Aly, who grumbled about how he’d had enough of running around the hills without the cooperation of the local people; I replied sharply that we would organize the evacuation from Bondo and that he could leave with the group that gave up the struggle. He shot back that he would stay with me to the end but, so as not to lose the argument, he added, “running around the hills for 20 years.”
I thought the time had come to inform Compañero Massengo of Tanzania’s decision because I didn’t think it proper to keep it secret any longer. That government’s attitude was not honest; one might consider that it had behaved correctly toward us, but there was a revolutionary way of doing things that they did not respect. I told Massengo that a few days earlier I had received a cable communicating that government’s decision, but I had tried to stop this information leaking out, even to Cubans, because of the current situation; I was now telling him only so that he could draw his own conclusions. He apparently discussed it immediately with the compañeros because “Tremendo Punto” showed up as night was falling and informed me that Massengo had come to me to propose the abandonment of the struggle but that, as I had spoken to him about evacuating to a different place and a whole series of tasks that we had before us, he couldn’t bring himself to talk to me; all the compañeros in charge were in agreement to cease the struggle for now.
I answered that this was a very serious decision. There were men still organized at the fronts at Fizi and Mukundi, as well as the ones at Uvira, and there was also Mulele’s front. The moment we left, enemy troops would be free to attack those groups; our flight would hasten their dispersal because we knew that they were not strong enough to resist. I asked him to give me a letter in which Massengo set out this decision. “Tremendo Punto” looked surprised and a little aggrieved, but I insisted, saying that there was something called history, which is composed of many fragmented facts and which can be distorted. In short, I wanted to have that letter in my possession in case our actions were ever misinterpreted; in support of my argument, I reminded him of recent slanders against us. He replied that it was a tough thing to demand and he didn’t know whether Massengo would accept. It was clear to me that if Massengo did not agree to give me the letter, he must think he was doing something wrong. But I told him the responsibility for the retreat could never be ours.
The conversation remained inconclusive because “Tremendo Punto” went off to confer with his compañeros. At that point, a call came through from the Upper Base; the guardsmen had advanced and Azima had withdrawn without a fight; there had been many guardsmen and they had come in three columns. They were attacked during the retreat without suffering any losses, but the lookout apparently took refuge from the air attack that preceded the advance and did not see the guardsmen coming; there was little hope for him; Suleiman was his name. The other lookout, a Congolese, also disappeared.
I went immediately to inform Massengo of this and proposed the organization of an immediate retreat; this was accepted. “Tremendo Punto” spoke up to say that they had talked things over and that we should carry out a definitive withdrawal. The chief of the military police was there listening to the conversation. Five minutes later, all the telephone operators and all the military policemen had fled; the base fell into total chaos.
I suggested to Massengo that he should deal with his men and that I would organize the retreat at every point where the Cubans were present. This was done. I gave orders that all the equipment, including the transmitter, should be stored in those places that had been prepared in advance, and that they leave that very night, setting on fire everything that remained, and that the ammunition and heavy weapons should be hidden; I would wait for them down below. It was necessary to carry the portable transmitter with which we had already made contact with Kigoma from the Upper Base; at least we received and got through well, despite the fact that the equipment was designed for 20 kilometers rather than the 70 or so to the Tanzanian port.
In the meantime, a number of telegrams explaining the situation had been sent by radio. On November 18, a message said:
Rafael:
The situation is collapsing; entire units and peasants are going over to the enemy. None of the Congolese troops can be relied on. After today we may not be able to go on the air with the main apparatus. We will maintain contact with Kigoma by auxiliary apparatus. Changa here because of mechanical difficulties. Crew and boats in good condition urgently needed.
Nevertheless, Changa had finally been able to get across, with a huge load of women and children, which caused a row with the Kigoma commissioner; he said that we were only bringing him idlers and parasites, and that we should take them back to where they came from. Of course, we did not do that.
On the same day, Rafael sent me the following telegram.
Tatu:
Second conversation with Kawawa in which we forcefully presented the situation to him and asked for immediate supply of materials; he promised to resolv
e this before leaving for Korea. On the road to Kigoma we saw a truck with very few things for over there. We spoke with Cambona yesterday; he promised to look into it and give us reply today from conversation with the president. It was a direct and definitive discussion that made them responsible for consequences. We spoke with Soviets and Chinese and informed them of the absurd situation with delivery of material they have sent. We propose telling ambassadors of UAR [United Arab Republic], Ghana and Mali that under Accra agreement Tanzania is not delivering material to nationalists resisting white mercenaries and that responsibility for annihilation will lie with African leaders and Tanzanian government. In coordination with ourselves Kabila meeting government figures to make the same points, the same with the Chinese and the Soviets.
I sent him the following reply.
Rafael:
We want to know result of last report to Cuba about commission to discuss with Tanzanian government. On subject to discuss with governments of Ghana, Mali and UAR, put it in form of question: what was actual agreement, and was it to leave us in present situation? We think measures you are taking will come too late. That will take around a month, which we don’t have. We intend to evacuate this place and then evacuate most Cubans in second stage. A small group of us will remain as symbol of Cuba’s dignity. Inform Cuba.
My intention was to send back the sick, the frail and everyone “weak in the legs” and to fight on with a small group of men. With this in mind, I carried out a little “decisive test” among the compañeros that yielded discouraging results; if left to them, almost no one was disposed to keep on fighting.