Valentino

declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first

  case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey

  to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been

  conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to

  protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want

  doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who

  loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in

  hand, court his fate.

  Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive

  out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of

  the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand

  the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be

  discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of

  Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate

  answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more

  advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can

  be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left,

  without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus

  it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your

  neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare

  yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers,

  generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when

  a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the

  party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be

  powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and

  there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless

  as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories

  after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some

  regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself

  loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid

  you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.

  In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that

  you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it

  greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction

  of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have

  saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do

  with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to

  be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance

  with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking

  others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he

  conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much

  as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined

  with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused

  their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as

  happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to

  attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the

  prince ought to favour one of the parties.

  Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe

  courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,

  because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid

  one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in

  knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice

  to take the lesser evil.

  A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour

  the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his

  citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and

  agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not

  be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken

  away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but

  the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things

  and designs in any way to honour his city or state.

  Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and

  spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is

  divided into guilds or into societies,[*] he ought to hold such bodies

  in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an

  example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining

  the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in

  anything.

  [*] "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were craft or

  trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole company of any trade

  in any city or corporation town." The guilds of Florence are most

  admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the

  subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar

  character, called "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir

  Mackenzie Wallace's "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were

  always during the working season members of an artel. In some of

  the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex kind--

  permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily

  responsible for the acts of the individual members." The word

  "artel," despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude

  assures me, no connection with "ars" or "arte." Its root is that

  of the verb "rotisya," to bind oneself by an oath; and it is

  generally admitted to be only another form of "rota," which now

  signifies a "regimental company." In both words the underlying

  idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were

  possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included

  individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "septs" or

  "clans" would be most appropriate.

  CHAPTER XXII

  CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

  The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and

  they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince.

  And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his

  understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when

  they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise,

  because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them

  faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion

  of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.

  There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of

  Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to

  be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there

  are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;

  another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which

  neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first

  is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.

  Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the

  first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to

  kn
ow good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may

  not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in

  his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the

  servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

  But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one

  test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his

  own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in

  everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you

  ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in

  his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,

  and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not

  concerned.

  On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to

  study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing

  with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that

  he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire

  more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make

  him dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards

  servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is

  otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the

  other.

  CHAPTER XXIII

  HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

  I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it

  is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless

  they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of

  whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own

  affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved

  with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves

  they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no

  other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men

  understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when

  every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.

  Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the

  wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking

  the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,

  and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and

  listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.

  With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry

  himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more

  freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of

  these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and

  be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either

  overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions

  that he falls into contempt.

  I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man

  of affairs to Maximilian,[*] the present emperor, speaking of his

  majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in

  anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite

  to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not

  communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on

  them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and

  known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around

  him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows

  that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever

  understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on

  his resolutions.

  [*] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman

  Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold;

  after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in

  Italian politics.

  A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he

  wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every

  one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to

  be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning

  the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that nay one, on

  any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger

  be felt.

  And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an

  impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but

  through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they

  are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a

  prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by

  chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens

  to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed,

  but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short

  time take away his state from him.

  But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more

  than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to

  unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,

  and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through

  them. And they are not to found otherwise, because men will always

  prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint.

  Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they

  come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the

  prince from good counsels.

  CHAPTER XXIV

  WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

  The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince

  to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and

  fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the

  actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an

  hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men

  and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted

  more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present

  good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost

  defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will

  be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and

  adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies,

  and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who,

  born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.

  And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in

  Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and

  others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in

  regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in

  the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the

  people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known

  how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that

  have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.

  Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he wh
o

  was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to

  the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being

  a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the

  nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and

  if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he

  retained the kingdom.

  Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their

  principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own

  sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a

  change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the

  calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they

  thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that

  the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would

  recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is

  very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you

  would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find

  someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen,

  or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that

  deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those

  only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and

  your valour.

  CHAPTER XXV

  WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

  It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the

  opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by

  fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and

  that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us

  believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let

  chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times

  because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may

  still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes

  pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.

  Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true

  that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[*] but that

  she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little

  less.

  [*] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older one gets the

  more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does

  three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe."

  Sorel's "Eastern Question."

  I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood

  overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away

  the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to

  its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,

  though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when

  the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences

  and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass

  away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so

  dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where

  valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her

  forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised

  to constrain her.

  And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes,

  and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an

  open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had

  been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France,

  either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made

  or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say

  concerning resistance to fortune in general.

  But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may