Valentino

obtained such respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or

  violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio

  having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities of

  corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had

  chastised some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary

  obedience was rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours,

  and was made a Roman senator. This dignity was assumed with the

  greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had

  the following words embroidered on its front: "I am what God wills."

  Whilst on the back was: "What God desires shall be."

  During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that

  Castruccio should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how

  they could tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not

  be difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence

  were Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to

  face danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in

  Pistoia, and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by

  night, and after driving out some of Castruccio's officials and

  partisans, and killing others, they restored the city to its freedom.

  The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of

  Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines

  heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they decided

  to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the

  belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia.

  Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the

  Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand,

  Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where

  the Florentines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of

  Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he

  possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He

  believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured,

  although he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men,

  whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence

  in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to

  attack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers.

  Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill

  which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a

  bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst

  in general it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the

  summit where the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could

  hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who, before

  Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to remain in

  possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and the

  Pistoians, and unclaimed by either--neither of them wishing to

  displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and

  came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because

  the castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his

  position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his

  enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no

  fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they

  became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with

  Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession

  of this castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with

  a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four

  hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle the night

  before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put to death.

  Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the

  Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away

  from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his

  army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they

  reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill

  on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the

  castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching

  from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of

  Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the

  hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his

  infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a

  path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four

  hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never

  expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they

  aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the

  Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by

  surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close

  were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It

  was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were

  assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their

  own, although some few of them got through. When the noise of the

  fighting reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with

  confusion. The cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the

  captains were unable to get their men either backward or forward,

  owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one

  knew what ought to be done or what could be done. In a short time the

  cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's infantry were scattered or

  killed without having made any effective defence because of their

  unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a

  stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on

  both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their

  friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a

  decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one

  thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four

  hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the

  whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they

  carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the

  attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by

  their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in

  the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each

  man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very

  sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were

  Bandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa,

  all Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought

  on the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the

  Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out

  the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not

  content with occupying Prato and all the castles
on the plains on both

  sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola,

  about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing

  the spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding

  horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals

  in commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to

  corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city

  gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the

  participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso

  Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the

  Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty,

  they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion

  of their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the

  maintenance of the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed

  with the Florentines to receive from them a yearly tribute of two

  hundred thousand florins, and he send his son Carlo to Florence with

  four thousand horsemen.

  Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the

  pressure of Castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave

  his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress

  a conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi,

  one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland

  should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this

  conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of

  Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy

  paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few

  are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy

  Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio.

  This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio

  Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering

  their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and

  put him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove

  their families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both

  Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought

  and energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the

  Florentines their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await

  the coming of Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived

  they decided to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more

  than thirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called

  to their aid every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether

  they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be

  better to march on the latter--a course, owing to the recent

  conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them,

  because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the

  acquisition of Pisa.

  In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army

  and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing

  from thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous

  army which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no

  degree alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune

  would deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no

  reason to think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had

  better prospects of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled

  twenty thousand foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with

  this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa

  with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than

  any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its situation between

  the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation above the

  surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being

  victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach

  it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get

  through to Pisa, or attack Castruccio's forces except at a

  disadvantage. In one case they would find themselves placed between

  his two armies, the one under his own command and the other under

  Pagolo, and in the other case they would have to cross the Arno to get

  to close quarters with the enemy, an undertaking of great hazard. In

  order to tempt the Florentines to take this latter course, Castruccio

  withdrew his men from the banks of the river and placed them under the

  walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of land between them and

  the river.

  The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to

  decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,

  having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the

  latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet

  the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the

  saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the

  Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of

  cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action

  was fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the

  Florentines with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen,

  not allowing them to issue from the river before he charged them; he

  also sent one thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same

  number down the Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much

  impeded by their arms and the water that they were not able to mount

  the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the

  river more difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had

  crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep

  with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many of

  them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine

  captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew

  them and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less

  treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met

  at the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward,

  who, being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let

  fly with tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry.

  The horses, alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move

  forward, and trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between

  the men of Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing

  was sharp and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation

  and neither would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive

  the others back into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a

  footing on land in order to make room for the others pressing forward,

  who if they could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and

  in this obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains.

  Castruccio shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom

  they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst t
he Florentines

  reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the few. At

  length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that

  both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides

  had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry

  to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then

  commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to

  retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to the

  left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took

  advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield.

  But when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with

  Castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once

  fell back into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet

  gained any decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio,

  knowing his inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to

  stand on the defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he

  hoped that when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make

  short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he

  saw the Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the

  remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This

  they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry,

  fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight.

  The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had

  met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry

  cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of

  Castruccio's army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already

  lined by the men of Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless.

  Thus the Florentines were so completely defeated at all points that

  scarcely a third of them escaped, and Castruccio was again covered

  with glory. Many captains were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of

  King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the

  Florentine commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great,

  the slaughter was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a

  battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and

  thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and

  seventy men.

  But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his

  life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus

  ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry

  into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but

  death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the

  battle the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although

  fatigued and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome

  his men on their return from victory and personally thank them. He was

  also on the watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the

  fortunes of the day; he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a

  good general to be the first man in the saddle and the last out of it.

  Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on

  the banks of the Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he

  took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to

  such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On the following

  night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so rapidly that

  the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called

  Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows:

  "If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the

  midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my

  successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have

  left thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils,

  because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and

  Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the

  Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these