Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House

  235 With the Berlin Wall: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 283; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 61–63.

  236 But no one could deny: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 336–46; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 66–71.

  237 In choosing the team: Halberstam, Best and Brightest, 165–66; FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 359, 362–63.

  238 On October 16: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 381–82, 443.

  238 Despite Kennedy’s directive: Ibid., 456–57, 467–70.

  239 Mansfield’s memo: Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 72, n.2.

  239 Taylor and everyone on the mission: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 427–30, 477–81, 489–94; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 72–78.

  240 After seeing President Kennedy: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 532–34, 538–40, 543–44, 547–48, 550–52, 572–73; Ball, Past Has Another Pattern, 363, 365; McNamara, In Retrospect, 38–39; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 547.

  241 The memo gave Kennedy support: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 576–78; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 91–92.

  242 A fierce argument: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 580–83, 601–603, 605–607; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 101–102; Halberstam, Best and Brightest, 154.

  244 Bundy’s advice resonated: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 607–10, 603–604.

  245 Yet for all his skepticism: Ibid., 591–94, 604, 615–18.

  245 McNamara later asserted: Ibid., 615–18, 636–39, 664.

  246 In retrospect, McNamara saw: McNamara, In Retrospect, 39–40.

  247 Writing thirty-five years after: Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Fifty Years on the Firing Line (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 332–33; Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 379.

  248 In November 1961: FRUS: Vietnam, 1961, 672, 678–79.

  248 As 1961 came to an end: Steinbeck is quoted in T. D. Schellhardt, “Do We Expect Too Much?” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1979; “JFK on Presidency,” Box 23, David Powers Papers, JFKL; RFK interview, Oct. 23, 1961, Box 2, RFK Personal Papers, JFKL; PPP: JFK, 1962, 276.

  Chapter 7: “The Greatest Adventure of Our Century”

  251 At the start of 1962: Schlesinger, Journals, 141–42. Both State of the Union speeches can be viewed online. JFK’s January 15, 1962, press conference is also online. Roy Wilkins, OH, Columbia University; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 307–10, 376–78; Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, 108–109, 112; Dallek, Unfinished Life, 492–96.

  253 In Kennedy’s view, the greatest danger: FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962, 710, 720–21, 745–46, 771, 785.

  254 Yet the administration’s: Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 513; William Manchester, The Death of a President (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 48–49, 85; Robert Kennedy in His Own Words, 27–28, 311; FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, 308–310.

  255 Khrushchev’s aggressiveness: Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 126–31; FRUS: Arms Control, 295–97, 331–32, 411, 414–15, 439–42.

  256 Yet Kennedy was unwilling: FRUS: Arms Control, 357–58, 372, 384, 447–48, 450, 456–59 .

  256 It also had the advantage: Ibid., 487–88, 410–14; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 62–66; Philip Zelikow, Ernest May, and Timothy Naftali, eds., The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, July 30–October 28, 1962, 3 vols. (New York: Norton, 2001), vol. 1, 47–50.

  258 The resurfacing of the civil rights struggle: Memorandum in the March 21–31, 1962, Folder, Box 50, POF, JFKL; Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 159–61; Robert Kennedy in His Own Words, 157–58, 162–65; Berl Bernhard, OH, JFKL.

  258 Kennedy took comfort: The Gallup Poll, 1959–1971, 1751, 1755, 1764–65, 1769, 1771.

  259 In the spring of 1962: Dallek, Unfinished Life, 483–87.

  260 The struggle to find: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 3–4, 14–16, 32; The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making on Vietnam (Boston: Bantam Books, 1971), vol. 2, 662–66.

  261 But Kennedy remained: PPP: JFK, 1962, 17; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 108.

  262 As the American role: FRUS, Vietnam, 1962, 54, 73–90, 92–93, 95, 98, 124–25.

  263 On February 14: New York Times, Feb. 14, 1962; PPP: JFK, 1962, 136–37.

  264 But the reporters in Vietnam: Montague Kern, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering, The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 5; FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 129–32, 139, 156, 158–60.

  265 In February, as the U.S. effort: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 171, 176–82, 186–87, 194–97; on Bobby Kennedy, see New York Times, Feb. 19, 1962, and FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 230.

  267 While Kennedy battled: McNamara, In Retrospect, 41–45.

  268 In the first half of 1962: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 209, 216–19, 222, 233–34, 244–45, 273, 283.

  268 Kennedy had a sense of urgency: New York Times, Feb. 8, 9, 10, 12, 17, 24, 28, March 8, April 1, 1962; FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 206–207, 276, 305–306; Ball, Past Has Another Pattern, 367.

  269 Kennedy’s eagerness: Galbraith, Letters to Kennedy, 98–103.

  271 The same day Galbraith: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 299–303; Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, 583.

  271 By contrast, on April 6: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 309–10, 317–18, 324–27; Halberstam, Best and Brightest, 35; Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941–1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 410–14.

  273 On May 1: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 366–67.

  273 At the same time: Ibid., 375–76, 399.

  274 Administration resistance: Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 121–22; FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 337–39, 353, 358, 364, 373, 379, 386–87; Shapley, Promise and Power, 146–51.

  275 Journalists who trailed McNamara: Shapley, Promise and Power, 151–52; New York Times, May 17, July 25, 29, 1962; April 17, 1991; FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 403–404, 489; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 122–23.

  277 Because serious negotiations: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 418–19, 425–26, 432–33, 437; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 124–25.

  Chapter 8: “If We Listen to Them, None of Us Will Be Alive”

  279 And Schlesinger in particular: Schlesinger, Journals, 156–61.

  280 In the summer of 1962: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 484–97, 506–10, 541.

  280 Kennedy was reluctant: Ibid., 543–46; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 12–21.

  280 At the end of July: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 546–56; Shapley, Promise and Power, 160–61.

  281 In August, the State Department: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 581, 583–84.

  282 In September, Kennedy sent: Dallek, Unfinished Life, 495–500, 506–17.

  283 Aside from conversations: Branch, Parting the Waters, 656–70; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 315–16; Dallek, Unfinished Life, 514–18.

  283 While Kennedy temporarily fixed: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 636–41, 660; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 165, 169.

  284 No one close to Kennedy: New York Times, Aug. 19, 28, 1962; Oct. 9, 1962; FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 596–601.

  285 Joe Mendenhall: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 649–50, 661–62, 671–72.

  286 At the center of the administration’s: Ibid., 679, 687.

  287 While the administration struggled: FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962, 947–49; Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs, 159–60.

  287 John McCone: Halberstam, Best and Brightest, 152–53.

  288 The minute McCone saw evidence: FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962, 947, 950, 955, 957.

  289 Roger Hilsman: Halberstam, Best and Brightest, 123, 190; FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962, 963–66, 968, 1045, n. 1; Michael Forrestal, OH, JFKL; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 1, 130–31.

  290 In trying to mute speculation: FRUS: Cuba, 1004, 1052, 1070–71.

  290 When news of the Soviet buildup: FRUS: Cuba, 1002–1003; JFK Press Conference, Sept. 13, 1962, available online.

  290 As with C
IA and military: See Matthias Uhl and Vladimir I. Ivkin, “‘Operation Atom’: The Soviet Union’s Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the German Democratic Republic, 1959,” Bulletin: Cold War History Project (Fall/Winter, 2001): 299–306. Also see Dallek, Unfinished Life, note for p. 537 on p. 787, recounting my conversation with Raymond L. Garthoff, March 19, 2002; FRUS: Cuba, 1083–84.

  292 At the beginning of October: Foreign Relations of the United States: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 13–15; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 393–95; McGeorge Bundy, OH, JFKL; Widmer, Listening In, 77.

  293 Kennedy was convinced: Dallek, Unfinished Life, 538, 544; FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962, 1047; FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 28.

  293 The result shocked Kennedy: Bird, Color of Truth, 226–27; Goldstein, Lessons on Disaster, 72–73; McNamara, In Retrospect, 32, 117; Schlesinger, Journals, 171–72; Thomas, Robert Kennedy, 209.

  295 The presence of the missiles: Robert Kennedy in His Own Words, 14–16.

  296 Shortly before noon: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 397, n. 10, 409–11, 413–14; Jacqueline Kennedy, Historic Conversations, 273, n. 73, 274, 276, 278.

  297 Bundy, acting CIA director: Presidential Recordings, Vol. 2, 399–402, 407–11, 413, 423.

  299 Listening to the discussion: Ibid., 404–407, 411–13, 416, 421; Robert Kennedy in His Own Words, 38, 44; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), 214.

  300 During the meeting, Bobby: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 416, 425.

  301 In the five hours before the group: Ibid., 427–28; FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 45–47, 49, n., 100.

  302 The same group of advisers: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 429–33.

  302 Rusk and Martin now weighed in: Ibid., 433–35.

  303 Unwilling to decide: Ibid., 435–39. On McNamara and nuclear weapons, see Shapley, Promise and Power, 119–20; McNamara, In Retrospect, 345; Robert S. McNamara, Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 158–59.

  304 Kennedy’s hard line: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 439–43.

  305 Yet he could not discount: Ibid., vol. 2, 444–47.

  305 McNamara didn’t think the timing: Ibid, vol. 2, 448–50, 468–69. On RFK and Bolshakov, see Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 109–14; Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968), 19–22, 26–27; Isaiah Berlin, OH, JFKL.

  307 After Kennedy left: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 463–65.

  308 The recorded conversations: For Stevenson’s letter, see FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 101–102; Dallek, Unfinished Life, 576.

  309 By Thursday morning: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 512–15.

  310 As the advisers convened: Ibid., vol. 2, 516, 521–24.

  310 McNamara was more supportive: Ibid., vol. 2, 525–29.

  311 Kennedy was not convinced: Ibid., vol. 2, 528–29, 541, 550, 552.

  311 If Kennedy needed support: For a portrait of Bohlen, see Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 524–25; FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 96–97, 107.

  312 Bohlen’s departure: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 515, n. 20; Robert Kennedy in His Own Words, 18.

  313 Kennedy was also content to have: On Thompson, see Taubman, Khrushchev, 397, 449–50, 458; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 532–35, 539, 547–49.

  314 After two days of discussion: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 557, 563, 565, 567–68.

  314 A series of evening meetings: Ibid., vol. 2, 572–77.

  315 It is striking that Kennedy: Dallek, Unfinished Life, 92–94, 517; Reeves, President Kennedy, 363.

  315 The meeting confirmed his assumption: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 580–98.

  317 Kennedy was also angry: Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 511.

  317 While Kennedy had concluded: Sorensen, Kennedy, 692; FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 116–22.

  318 Despite his show of confidence: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 2, 600–01; FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 126–36, 141–51, 162–63.

  319 On Monday, October 22: FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 153, 157–63.

  319 The initial Soviet response: Ibid., 170–71, 174–75.

  319 That evening, at the end: Ibid., 177; Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 49, 98.

  320 October 24 was a day: FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 177; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 183–85; Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 258; Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 52; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 514.

  321 There were also hopeful signs: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 188, 191, 196–97, 209–10.

  321 Yet the crisis was far from over: Ibid., 197; Shapley, Promise and Power, 176–78.

  322 But even if Kennedy: FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 174–75, 185–87.

  322 But Schlesinger passed along: Ibid., 187–88, 198.

  323 Kennedy sent his reply: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 232–81; FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 210–12, 224–26, 232.

  324 On Friday morning: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 286, 297–302, 309–10, 313, 317, 321, 323, 328.

  324 If he had to resort: Ibid., 346–48.

  325 Meanwhile, all this talk: Ibid., 331–36; Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 259–60, 263–65.

  325 And then at about nine: FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 235–40.

  326 Although an end to the crisis: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 356–87.

  327 The discussion continued: Ibid., vol. 3, 387–483, especially 387–400 and 427–28. For JFK to NK, Oct. 27, 1962, FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 268–69.

  328 The letter was to be hand-delivered: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 483–88.

  328 Kennedy had ample reason: FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 275.

  329 Kennedy was spared: Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 283–87; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 512–17.

  329 Kennedy and his civilian advisers: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 517–18; Mimi Alford, Once Upon a Secret, 93–96; Jacqueline Kennedy, Historic Conversations, 236, 262–63; Isaiah Berlin, OH, JFKL; Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 544. JFK’s remark to Galbraith is quoted by Sheldon Stern, “Noam Chomsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Oct. 18, 2012, History News Network, online. JFK to McNamara, Nov. 5, 1962, Box 274, National Security File, JFKL; Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs, 183–85.

  331 What lessons did Kennedy: Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 507; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 831; Jacqueline Kennedy, Historic Conversations, 254, 271; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds., Presidential Recordings, vol. 3, 518; Robert Kennedy in His Own Words, 18, 420. Also see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 249, 352–56, on the likelihood of a nuclear exchange.

  333 Bobby should have included: Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1995), 78–79, 84–93.

  Chapter 9: “Mankind Must Put an End to War”

  335 In December 1962: Gallup, vol. 3: The Gallup Poll, 1959–1971, 1793, 1796, 1798–99, 1810; Meyer Feldman to
JFK, Aug. 15, 1963, POF; O’Donnell and Powers, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye, 13; PPP: JFK, 1963, 828; Schlesinger, Journals, 185.

  336 Only Vietnam cast a shadow: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 750–51, 757–58, 761, 763–65, 789–96.

  337 After visiting Vietnam: Ibid., 779–87, 797–98; Halberstam, Best and Brightest, 205–08; Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 131.

  338 A front-page New York Times story: Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, 132–34; O’Donnell and Powers, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye, 15; David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 180; New York Times, Dec. 3, 1962.

  339 In public, he tried to maintain: JFK Press Conference, Dec. 12, 1962, JFKL.

  339 Events in January: FRUS: Vietnam, Jan.–Aug., 1963 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1–3; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Dell, 1968), 447–49.

  340 Because Mansfield’s report: Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 453–54; FRUS: Vietnam, 1963, 3–4, n. 1, 5, 49–50, 52, 60.

  341 Kennedy at once read: Ibid., 63, 73, 89–91, 94–95, 97–98. On the tensions between the civilian and military advisers, see John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 305, 312–13.

  342 For the next three months: PPP: JFK, 1963, 11, 20, 34, 243–44.

  343 While Kennedy stood aside, the debate: David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), chapters 6 and 7. For the Wheeler quote, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 426.

  344 The argument in Washington and Saigon: FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963, 105–06, 126–28, 132–33.

  345 The one thing policymakers: Halberstam, Making of a Quagmire, 90.

  345 The U.S. military: Ibid., 89–90.

  346 There were also dissenting voices: Ibid., 93–101. Also see Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988).