Pax Indica: India and the World of the Twenty-first Century

  Our region has been blessed with an abundance of natural and human resources, a rich spiritual and civilizational heritage, a demography where youth is preponderant and a creative zeal manifest in all spheres of human endeavour. Our collective identity may be rooted in a turbulent history but the challenge is to translate the many factors that bind us into a self-sustaining, mutually beneficial and cooperative partnership that transcends the vicissitudes of the recent past. Indian officials like to argue that the people of South Asia have already made their choice and that the spirit—if not yet the reality—of an organization like SAARC embodies the aspirations of people from Herat to Yangon. It is imperative that all nations of SAARC work collectively to realize their vision. Yet, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted at the April 2010 SAARC summit: ‘We have created institutions for regional cooperation but we have not yet empowered them adequately to enable them to be more proactive.’

  The Government of India, from the prime minister down, has a strategic vision of a peaceful subcontinent. The Indian foreign policy establishment genuinely believes that the peace, prosperity and security of our neighbours is in our interest. Many efforts have been made by India in recent years to ensure a marked improvement in its relations with most of its immediate neighbours, particularly following (and building upon) the articulation of the ‘Gujral Doctrine’ in 1996, which declared the accelerated development of every country in the subcontinent to be a key goal for India. Unlike some, India has never believed in undermining or destabilizing other countries; we believe that each of us deserves an equal chance to attend to the needs of our people without being distracted by hostility from any of our neighbours. When I was briefly a minister in the Government of India, I proudly declared that ‘where we have disagreements, we will never abandon the path of dialogue and reconciliation. We are as resolute in our commitment to peace as we are firm in defending our country.’ These are sentiments anchored in a long tradition, one that official India still gladly stands by.

  A significant number of official initiatives have been taken in recent years to strengthen relations with the neighbours: regular contacts, including meetings of the top leaderships and of senior officials; an urgent emphasis on resolving major bilateral issues in order to build an atmosphere of trust; and a conscious stress on the economic dimension of these relations. India has repeatedly made it clear that it desires friendly, good-neighbourly and cooperative relations with all its neighbours. As by far the biggest country in the subcontinent (in size, population and GDP terms), we are often (in New Delhi’s view, wrongly) perceived as throwing our weight around and (in my view, rightly) expected to show magnanimity in our dealings with our smaller neighbours. This we have done often in the past and must continue to do more often in the future. However, while it is not New Delhi’s expectation that our neighbours display an equal measure of reciprocity, we certainly expect that they remain sensitive to our concerns regarding our sovereignty, our territorial integrity and our security. We do not think this is an unreasonable expectation. Within this framework a great deal can be achieved to our mutual benefit. People-to-people contacts, intra-and inter-regional connectivity, cultural exchanges, trade, investment flows and integrated approaches to vital issues like water, food, health, education and climate change will have to define any future architecture for the region.

  It is also true that a cooperative future is not guaranteed unless we all work together on this unique project of a South Asia looking confidently to the future, each country secure in its own identity and putting development and the interests of its people above perceived fears and antagonistic posturing. No one country can do this alone. It must be a shared project.

  The scourge of terrorism has cast its malevolent influence across the region and remains a major threat to all of us. It is a global menace, the epicentre of which is unfortunately located in our region, and whose malign influence has sometimes spread to other countries with which India shares borders. The ISI has been particularly active in Nepal and Bangladesh, which many strategists in Islamabad see as part of the ‘soft underbelly’ of the Indian state. This threat needs to be addressed purposively and with grim determination. Terrorism must be repudiated, and terrorists and those who provide them succour and sustenance must be tackled resolutely. It is imperative that all of India’s neighbours understand that there are no ‘good terrorists’ and that those who strike Faustian bargains with such elements are often left to rue the consequences for their own countries. Part of India’s uncompromising message to its neighbours must be that countries and organizations need to eschew the temptation to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy and stop selectively targeting only those terrorist entities that are at present perceived to be a threat to them. This is a short-sighted and self-destructive strategy, as Pakistan has already learned: it is one of the truisms of the subcontinental experience that those elements that profess an ideology of hatred, intolerance and terror often bite the hand that feeds them. The need is for concerted action against terrorists wherever they operate, whether in Pakistan, in India or in Afghanistan, and wherever they seek sanctuary or transit, whether in Bangladesh, in Nepal or in Myanmar.

  It is, however, important for Indians to look beyond terrorism to the motivations of those who would give terrorists succour. This is often simply a manifestation of deeper issues at play—income inequality, environmental issues, social upheaval and displacement, the search for migrant work, and lack of access to education, all mounting to a paroxysm of frustration that can sometimes lash out blindly at the seemingly complacent strength of the Indian state. A Pakistani farmer who is repeatedly told about India’s intransigence on Kashmir or its alleged diversion of Indus water; a devout Bangladeshi incessantly lectured about the sins of the Indian infidel; a Sri Lankan Buddhist taught that India gives aid and comfort to Tamil secessionist guerrillas—all these people could well become complicit in assaults on India, the Indian state and the Indian people. The need to correct such misguided views and to forge a common vision for all the peoples of the subcontinent are vital parts of the challenge facing India in South Asia.

  Afghanistan, the newest member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, but geographically very much a part of our region, provides an example of how much we can achieve if we work together. Afghanistan is closer to India than the absence of a direct border between them might suggest. As David Malone pungently observes, ‘psychologically, India and Afghanistan think of each other as neighbours and friends (their positive relationship deriving added saliency from the difficulties each has experienced with Pakistan)’. Afghanistan represents, for the countries of South Asia, the gateway to Central Asia and beyond, and to West Asia. Historically, it has formed the natural frontier in the north-west of the South Asian landmass. Given its geographic location, Afghanistan has an immense potential to develop as a hub of trade, energy and transport corridors, which would help the long-term sustainability of development efforts in the region. This is something India would like to see happening, and that is why New Delhi was very happy to support the admission of Afghanistan to SAARC.

  The other South Asian countries offer markets for Afghan produce, both agricultural and manufactured goods, which can help in the rapid development of the Afghan economy and the stabilization of that country. With its rapidly growing economy and outward-looking entrepreneurs, India has also emerged as a source of investment and capacity building expertise. As a significant bilateral donor, India has already spent $1.5 billion undertaking projects virtually in all parts of that country, in a wide range of sectors, including hydroelectricity, power transmission lines, road construction, agriculture and industry, telecommunications, information and broadcasting, education and health, fields which have been identified by the Afghan government as priority areas for reconstruction and development. India has supported maternal and child health hospitals (the Indira Gandhi Hospital in Kabul, connected through a telemedicine link with two superspec
iality medical centres in India, is the country’s largest and best), rebuilt and helped run girls’ schools and carved a road across south-western Afghanistan, from Zaranj to Delaram, opening up a trade route towards the west to supplement the existing routes through Pakistan. We have lit up Kabul; the first time Kabul has 24 hours of electricity a day since 1982 is because of the courage and enterprise of Indian engineers in stringing up electrical cables at a height of 3000 metres from Pul-e-Khumri to bring power across the mountains to the capital.

  Our education and training programmes for Afghans are the largest such programmes that India has for any country in the world, and India’s is the largest skill and capacity development programme offered to Afghanistan by any country in the world. We have welcomed students and civil servants from Afghanistan to our educational and training institutions as part of our contribution towards helping stabilize the country and the region, increase capacity and human resource development and build upon the solid foundation of our historical and civilizational ties. India offers 675 scholarships a year to Afghan students.

  We are digging tube wells in six provinces, running sanitation projects and medical missions, and working on lighting up a hundred villages using solar energy. India has also given at least three Airbus planes to Afghanistan’s fledgling national airline, Ariana. Several thousand Indians are engaged in development work. We are currently engaged in the construction of the Salma Dam across the Hari Rud river in Herat, and we are finishing the Afghan Parliament building, a visible and evocative symbol of democracy and of India’s desire to see the Afghan people determine their own political destiny. During his May 2011 visit to Afghanistan, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced additional assistance of $500 million, over and above India’s existing commitments, which are now expected to cross the $2 billion mark.

  In all this, our endeavour is to help Afghanistan stand on its own feet. We have no other agenda there, other than an acknowledgement that stability and pluralism in Afghanistan and its integration into the regional ecosystem are also fundamentally in our national interest. As an Indian I have no difficulty with the proposition that Afghanistan should not be seen as a battleground for competing spheres of influence. India and Afghanistan, of course, share a strategic and development partnership, based on millennia-old historical, cultural and economic ties. We have an abiding interest in the stability of Afghanistan, in ensuring social and economic progress for its people, and getting them on the track of self-sustaining growth, and enabling them to take their own decisions without outside interference. And we have paid a serious price for our efforts, in lives lost to terrorist action, including in two assaults on the Indian embassy in Kabul and on a residence occupied by Indian development workers, as well as the kidnapping and killing of road-building crews and construction personnel. But we have persisted.

  The myriad problems that confront the country can only be resolved in a peaceful environment, devoid of violence and terror. The international community needs to come together to overcome this grave challenge. A sense of defeatism has been pervading some sections of international opinion. New Delhi feels that needs to be guarded against, because it runs the risk of encouraging insurgent groups into thinking they might actually triumph. India has argued, therefore, that Afghanistan needs a long-term commitment, even while remaining mindful of the challenges. The Afghan people have displayed great courage and resilience, and a survival instinct even against the greatest odds. The international community must do its utmost to support them.

  Given the turbulence of the past eight years and the recent dramatic decline in security, there is need for an intensified focus on security, governance and development by the Afghan government, and here the international community should do what it can to assist. Failure in Afghanistan’s stabilization will entail a heavy cost for both the Afghan people and the region at large, including for Pakistan whose active current engagement in destabilizing the country could turn out to prove highly counterproductive.

  While the Afghan government should spell out its priorities, the international community should come forward to provide the resources for fulfilling them. The Afghan leadership has itself stressed the need for a strong and genuine effort to improve governance, remove corruption and focus on development, especially in agriculture, rural development and infrastructure, with a shift in focus from the central to the provincial and district levels. All stakeholders now agree on the need for greater ‘Afghanisation’ of the development process.

  The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) should be enlarged and developed in a professional manner, at a much faster pace. The ANSF should be provided appropriate resources, combat equipment and training. India is prepared to play its part, while mindful that any involvement in military matters in Afghanistan might be a neuralgic issue for Islamabad—a major reason for India’s self-restraint in confining its efforts in Afghanistan to development, while other countries handle security. India is not a member of the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a largely NATO operation to which New Delhi was not invited to contribute, given Pakistani sensitivities about any possible Indian military presence in Afghanistan. (I joked at the time that we were less interested in ISAF than in ‘INSAF’ or justice, which we wanted to prevail in Kabul.)

  President Obama’s announcement of a significant drawdown of American forces in Afghanistan, and an increasing emphasis on reconciliation with the Taliban, has obviously been studied attentively in New Delhi. It is hardly a secret that New Delhi sees the foreign military presence as indispensable in promoting political stability and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. Without the security provided by a serious troop presence, the kind of developmental activities in which India is engaged would become impossible.

  But no one in New Delhi really expects American forces to disappear overnight from Afghanistan, despite bin Laden’s elimination. The withdrawal plan began with the departure of only 10,000 troops by the end of 2011. Later, when winter set in (traditionally the season when military activity declines), Washington withdrew another 5000, and when the snows melt and the US election season starts hotting up, Obama says he intends to bring an additional 22,000 of the ‘surge’ troops home by this September. Even if he does that—a decision that will surely have to take into account the ground realities at that time—it will still leave 68,000 US troops in Afghanistan, or twice the number deployed there when he became president. The plan is for NATO forces to shift to a less proactive role next year, acting principally in support of Afghan forces, with combat operations winding down in the course of 2014. That would mark the official ‘withdrawal date’.

  After that point, a residual American counterterrorism force would still remain in Afghanistan. Bases are being fortified to house US forces beyond 2014. Several NATO allies hope to be home by then, but a residual ISAF is very much on the cards. After all, the reason for the original US intervention was that Afghanistan should not again become a safe haven for the next bin Laden. Indications are that the United States will retain some 20,000 troops in Afghanistan, even in the most modest scenario.

  Indians have every reason to be relieved. India realizes that an Afghanistan without ISAF is a land that will be prey to the machinations of Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence, which had created, financed, officered and directed the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s. This would be a proven security threat to India: the Taliban regime of the day, functioning as a wholly owned subsidiary of the ISI, had been complicit in the hijacking of an Indian airliner in 1999, resulting in the release (in Kandahar) of three diehard terrorists from Indian custody, one of whom went on to kidnap and kill the American reporter Daniel Pearl.

  In this context, America’s interest in reconciliation with the Taliban has been studied in New Delhi with some concern. After rejecting this for some time (on the not-unreasonable grounds that there can be no such thing as a good terrorist), New Delhi has come around to accepting dialogue with those Taliban ele
ments who are prepared to renounce violence. President Obama speaks of dealing with those who agree to break with Al Qaeda, abandon violence and abide by the Afghan Constitution, categories India would have no difficulty with. But New Delhi is wary of those who, under Pakistani tutelage, might pretend to be reborn constitutionalists, but seize the first opportunity after an American withdrawal to devour the regime that compromises with them.

  This is why New Delhi stresses the importance of improving the capacity of the Afghan government to fight and overcome terrorism; if Kabul’s sinews are not strengthened, it will again be vulnerable to an extremist takeover. The role of Pakistan—which has made no secret of its desire to control the government in Kabul in order to enjoy ‘strategic depth’ for its overambitious military—remains of particular concern. India shares the United States’ commitment to what Obama, in December 2011, had described as the ‘long-term security and development of the Afghan people’. But for New Delhi, any process of reconciliation should be Afghan led, as well as inclusive and transparent. India fully supports the ‘red lines’ laid down by the Afghan government in its London and Kabul communiqués, which it feels Kabul should not be forced to cross.