Discourses and Selected Writings

  47. ‘Every Soul is deprived… will’: Plato, Sophist 228c.

  48. I know that the acts… children safe: The lines are from Euripides’ Medea, lines 1078-9. In order to get back at her unfaithful husband, Jason, Medea kills the children they had together. The lines quoted were standard in discussions of what the Greeks called akrasia, ‘lack of control’, the inability to do what one knows is right – or to refrain from doing what one knows is wrong – for being subject to a contrary emotion or desire. Epictetus tries to show that the two lines can be reconciled with the law of psychological determinism expressed in §6. So in §7 he gives an intellectualist account of Medea’s motivation, implying that ‘But anger is master of my intentions’ need not be taken to mean that she is forced to sin under the pressure of passion; it is merely a poetic way of expressing her value system – she places revenge above her children’s welfare. As for her confession that I know that the acts I intend to do are wrong’, this amounts to no more than an admission that she knows the murders she is contemplating are criminal; but the fact that she goes forward with them demonstrates that she considers herself above the traditional laws of human society.

  49. The Phoenix … Hippolytus: The Phoenix and the Hippolytus are plays by Euripides. The Hippolytus still survives.

  50. ‘Anytus… harm me’: Plato, Apology 30c.

  51. This is how I came to lose my lamp: Cf. I 18, 15.

  52. But what if someone in authority… atheistic?: Epictetus evokes the circumstances of Socrates’ execution on grounds of impiety.

  BOOK II

  1. When deer… hunters’ nets: ‘The beaters use to frighten deer into the nets by stretching a cord, with brightly coloured feathers on it, across the safe openings in the woods’ (W. A. Oldfather (ed.), Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, 2 vols., London and Cambridge, Mass., 1925-8, vol. 1, p. 214).

  2. Socrates used to call such fears ‘hobgoblins’: Plato, Phaedo 77e.

  3. The door needs to stay open… disappear: Suicide should remain an option of last resort in intolerable material circumstances.

  4. But wasn’t Socrates… at that?: Socrates is generally thought not to have written anything, so this passage is a puzzle.

  5. I mean, do you think… different result?: The quotation is from Plato’s Apology 30c. Epictetus implies that this and other statements in the Apology further antagonized Anytus and Meletus, Socrates’ accusers, and that his defiant attitude not only showed his indifference to worldly fortune but actually contributed to his condemnation, even though, strictly speaking, his fate at this point lay in the hands of a jury, not Anytus and Meletus, the men who originally brought the accusation. But in the sentencing portion of the trial, after the jury had found him guilty, Socrates suggests that his ‘punishment’ should consist of free meals for the rest of his life at public expense, words that -if Plato reports them accurately – would have incited the jury members and may even have influenced some to vote for death. Epictetus may allude to this additional piece of provocation on Socrates’ part in the next sentence.

  6. Heraclitus: Not, of course, Heraclitus the famous philosopher referred to at Enchiridion 15, but a contemporary of Epictetus otherwise unknown.

  7. it is stupid to say, ‘Tell me what to do!’: ‘Stupid’ because one has to decide for oneself what to do depending on circumstance, as the preceding section showed.

  8. this general principle: The principle established in the opening paragraph of this chapter, concerning the importance of ‘protecting one’s own’.

  9. Diogenes: Diogenes the Cynic philosopher, as at I 24, 6. Diogenes rejected the polite conventions of society, including, as we learn here, reliance on letters of recommendation.

  10. analytic: The exact meaning of analyticon, which I have translated – or transliterated – as ‘analytic’ is a matter of conjecture.

  11. doesn’t nature intend women to be shared?: Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, advocated the community of wives in his book The Republic, just as Plato had done, to a limited extent, in his own Republic; cf. Fragment 15. This radical social doctrine was something of an embarrassment to later, Roman Stoics, as this section suggests.

  12. like Socrates’ fellow diners in the Symposium: The reference is to works by Plato and Xenophon both entitled Symposium, featuring Socrates at a party with other cultured guests; the comparison, of course, is sarcastic.

  13. how to strike a balance… on the other: The contrast is analogous to the contrast between ‘confidence’ and ‘caution’ drawn in II 1, and their respective objects are the same, although the terminology is different.

  14. The chips… my responsibility begins: The text says dice, not cards, and ‘counters’ instead of chips; but since most modern dice games don’t have counters I have ventured on a different analogy. Strictly speaking, Epictetus exaggerates in saying that the fall of the dice (or deal of the cards) does not matter: some rolls (or hands) are clearly better than others. But ultimately it is what you do with what chance hands you that matters; a skilled player will know how to turn defeat into victory.

  15. It isn’t easy… would be impossible: Cf. Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of the Philosophers VII 104: ‘[The Stoics] call “indifferent” things that contribute neither to happiness nor unhappiness, like wealth, reputation, health, strength and so on. For it is possible to be happy without these, although how they are used determines one’s happiness or unhappiness.’ Thus Epictetus says that we should be indifferent toward external things or circumstances such as wealth, reputation, etc., because they too are ‘indifferent’ in a moral sense, i.e. neither good nor bad in themselves. Only virtue is good, and it consists in proper use of these external things – thus the call to be careful as well as indifferent at the same time.

  16. You will find that skilled ballplayers… sporting match: The player who is unsure of himself is too focused on catching the ball, or throwing it, to get into the flow of the game; to the expert player the ball is only the means used to execute the essential tasks of throwing and catching – and he doesn’t freeze when it comes his way, or need coaching by the other players as to what his next move is.

  17. ‘Well, if someone acknowledged… produced them?’: A paraphrase of Plato, Apology i6e sq.

  18. Then how are some externals… nature?: Cf. Stobaeus II 79, 18 sq.: ‘[According to the Stoics] some indifferent things are in accordance with nature, others are contrary to nature… The following are in accordance with nature: health, strength, well-functioning sense organs, and the like… and these are preferable.’ Stoics acknowledged a value difference among externals, i.e. ‘indifferents’, between health and sickness, for instance, though the right thing to do in some cases is to reject the ‘things in accordance with nature’, as Socrates did. The point of the question, then, is why do the Stoics recognize such a distinction between indifferents and call the ‘things in accordance with nature’ preferable, if we don’t always choose them? Epictetus answers by invoking the ‘universal perspective’ that he alludes to in §13 above and cites more explicitly at II 6, 10 and II 10, 5.

  19. On ‘indifference’: This discourse is in some ways a continuation of the preceding one, II 5; see the notes there for the philosophical background relevant to certain sections.

  20. The conjunctive argument: See note 7 to Enchiridion, below.

  21. life and the like: The reference is to the Stoic ‘indifferents’, i.e. life, health, wealth, etc. and their opposites, sickness, etc.; see note 15 above.

  22. Look at Chrysantas… welfare: The story of Chrysantas appears in Xenophon’s Cyropedia IV 1, 3; by pausing mid-stroke he consciously left himself open to his intended victim’s counter-stroke.

  23. ‘All roads to Hades are of equal length’: A saying attributed to Diogenes the Cynic among others.

  24. his Zeus or his Athena: The fifth-century BC sculptor Phidias made the cult statue of Zeus at Olympia (mentioned also at I 6, 23) and of Athena in the Parthenon at Ath
ens. The latter supported a winged figure representing Victory in her right hand.

  25. ‘My word is true and irrevocable’: Zeus is quoted from the Iliad 1. 526.

  26. look at what wrongdoing is… philosophers: The ‘philosophers’ here are not just Stoics but also Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias, who argues against doing harm, even in retaliation, on the grounds that it does the agent more harm than it does the victim.

  27. lead someone to the truth… follow: This confidence in everyone’s capacity to arrive at the truth with help from an able guide derives from Socrates; cf. the episode with the slave boy in Plato’s Meno 82b–85b.

  28. No one’s vote counts… dialogue: A paraphrase of Plato, Gorgias 474a.

  29. Is a man racked… Obviously not: This snatch of dialogue appears to be based on Xenophon, Memorabilia III 9, 8, where Socrates argues that people can help their friends in difficulty and still be ready to envy them when they are successful; but that passage is not in dialogue form, so citing it here seems to miss much of the point.

  30. He could cut short… his diplomacy: Hesiod, Theogony 87.

  31. ‘this constant fretting and shifting from foot to foot’: Epictetus quotes a line from the Iliad 13. 281.

  32. Zeno… Antigonus: Zeno was founder of the Stoic school; Antigonus Gonatas was one of the Macedonian rulers of Greece in the third century bc; their meeting is reported in Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of the Philosophers VII 6.

  33. Syllogisms and changing arguments: On ‘changing arguments’, see note 14 to Book I, above.

  34. Socrates must have practised… in jail: The Thirty Tyrants were an oligarchic faction that controlled Athens in 404–403 bc; Socrates refused to involve himself in their violence against other Athenians. A version of his defence against the charge of impiety and corrupting youth is given in Plato’s Apology, his conversations before and after trial are reported in Plato’s Crito and Phaedo.

  35. Diogenes… Alexander, Philip… slave: Diogenes is Diogenes the Cynic; Alexander is Alexander the Great, the Macedonian king and conqueror; Philip is Alexander’s father. The ease and honesty with which Diogenes addressed them were characteristic of Cynics generally; he exhibited the same fearlessness before pirates and the man to whom he was sold when his boat was seized on one occasion. The incidents are reported in Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of the Philosophers VI 38, 43 and 74.

  36. To Naso: Naso is presumably the name of the man from Rome to whom Epictetus addresses much of the discourse. He may be the Julius Naso several times mentioned by Pliny the Younger (Letters IV 6; V 21; VI 6 and 9).

  37. Our condition can be compared to a festival: The famous comparison of life to an Olympic festival originated with the fourth-century BC philosopher Heraclides of Pontus, who distinguished among three classes of people: the athletes, who equate with the segment of humanity devoted to the pursuit of glory and public honours; the merchants, who represent people devoted to making money and acquiring wealth; and the spectators, who stand for the philosophers, motivated purely by curiosity and a wish to see and learn as much as they can of the world around them. Epictetus in his version of the metaphor also distinguishes three classes of attendees at the festival, but not the same three; and the way he departs from his model catches the reader off guard, as he ends up offering a rather sardonic twist on the theme.

  38. if it is the right decision… passage: The Stoics, Epictetus included (cf. II 1, 19, etc.), condoned suicide in desperate material circumstances; Seneca, Thrasea Paetus and Marcus Cato were notable Stoic suicides.

  39. the big one and the small: The big city is the cosmic community of god and man; cf. II 5, 26.

  40. the water of Dirce: The fountain of Dirce was located in Thebes.

  41. Ah, for Nero’s baths, and the water of Marcia: A parody of Euripides’ Phoenissae 368: ‘The gymnasia in which I was reared and the water of Dirce’ (Polyneices speaking). The Marcian aqueduct brought water to the city of Rome.

  42. Diogenes: This is Diogenes the Cynic.

  43. Whoever can exit the party… until death: In other words, he would sooner die (‘leave the party’) than live in uncongenial circumstances.

  44. Eurystheus: The cowardly king who dispatched Heracles on twelve labours from the safety of his palace.

  45. you are not even Theseus… troubles: Theseus was Athens’ hometown hero, whose exploits were modelled on Heracles’, but confined to the area around Athens called Attica.

  46. Procrustes or Sciron: Two robbers killed by Heracles.

  47. the orator Theopompus… every little thing: Epictetus refers to Theopompus, the fourth-century BC historian, as an ‘orator’ because his writing reflects the training in rhetoric he received at the feet of Isocrates, from whom he also absorbed his bias against Plato; Isocrates’ philosophical differences with Plato are laid out in his speech Against the Sophists.

  48. impulse… appropriate acts: Cf. I 4, 11–12.

  49. It is just this that Medea… dashed: The brilliant psychological handling of the Medea legend in Euripides’ play was invoked by later philosophers in support of their own theories of moral misguidance; Epictetus treats her case in greater detail at I 28, 7. The following monologue is loosely based on lines 790ff. of the play.

  50. Give me one student… delirious: Cf. I 18, 23 for the putative perfectibility of the mind implied in Epictetus’ third field of study, which correlates with the traditional description of the Stoic sage.

  51. the Liar: One of the most notorious of the ‘logic problems’ alluded to above in §3. Cf. Cicero, Academica II 92–6: ‘If you say that you are lying, and say so truly, are you lying or telling the truth?… If you say that you are lying, and you say so truly, you are lying. But you say that you are lying, and you say so truly. Therefore you are lying.’ Epictetus references the Liar paradox again at II 18, 18 and II 21, 17.

  52. Antisthenes: On Antisthenes, one of the foundational figures of Cynicism, cf. I 17, 12.

  53. Antipater: This is Antipater of Tarsus.

  54. the Master Argument itself: On the Master Argument, cf. II 19, 1–9.

  55. the Quiescent: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors VII 416: ‘Since in the sorites the last cognitive impression is adjacent to the first non-cognitive impression and virtually indistinguishable from it, the school of Chrysippus say that in the case of impressions which differ so little the wise man will stop and become quiescent.’

  56. It will even do… the past: Cf. Plato, Laws 854b.

  57. how he lay… youthful beauty: The reference is to Plato’s Symposium 218d sq.

  58. an Olympic-sized victory… Heracles: Heracles was the mythical founder of, and first victor in, the Olympic games.

  59. pancratiasts: The pancration was an Olympic contest that combined elements of both boxing and wrestling.

  60. the Dioscuri: The Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux, were patron deities of sailors and seafarers generally.

  61. Hesiod’s verse… ever after: Hesiod was a seventh-century Greek poet; the quotation is from his poem Works and Days, line 413.

  62. The Master Argument: This is the primary surviving reference to what Diodorus Cronus (for reasons unknown) named the ‘Master Argument’. It owes something to the discussion of ‘The Sea Battle’ in chapter 9 of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. Stoics (and their opponents) explored the implications of the argument for free will and personal responsibility, and their place (if any) within a determinist system like the Stoics’ own. This probably also explains Epictetus’ interest in it.

  First, a precis of Aristotle’s ‘Sea Battle’. Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or there will not be. Only one of these statements can be true, the other must be false. But if it is now true that there will not be a sea battle tomorrow, then one might be led to infer that there is nothing one could do between now and tomorrow to bring about a sea battle – even supposing that one were king of the country, say, or either of the fleet commanders.

  Diodorus’ ‘Master Argument’
seems to have drawn on or developed this paradox insofar as it also engages the question of the truth value of statements about the future, and the deterministic implications of that question. But what Epictetus gives us is not Diodorus’ argument – or any argument, for that matter, in the sense of a set of premises yielding a conclusion – but instead three propositions that he declares to be irreconcilable. His decision to present the Master Argument in this form has complicated efforts to reconstruct Diodorus’ original, and distinguish it from rival counter-arguments. It would take us too far afield to analyse the Master Argument and its new modal language of possibility and necessity by adducing sources that complement Epictetus here. A tentative reconstruction of the Master Argument along the following lines, however, drawing on the present passage and continuing to use Aristotle’s example of the sea battle, may be useful for readers interested in pursuing the subject further.

  If a sea battle will not be fought tomorrow, then it was also true in the past that it would not be fought. And since (by principle 1 in Epictetus’ text) everything past that is true is necessary, it was necessarily the case in the past that the battle would not take place, and necessarily false that it would take place. Thus, it was impossible that the sea battle would take place. And since (by principle 2) an impossibility cannot follow a possibility, it was impossible from the first moment of time (or from eternity) that the sea battle would take place. Therefore, if something will not be the case, it is never possible for it to be the case. And thus principle 3 in the text is proven false, and shown to be logically incompatible with the other two propositions. The conclusion that remains is that nothing, in fact, is possible which is not either true, or going to be true.

  63. Antipater: This is Antipater of Tarsus.

  64. Look, I wasn’t born… subject: The sequel shows that these replies are meant as satire and that Epictetus disapproves of the purely scholastic interest in the controversy that they evince.

  65. Hellanicus: (c.480-395 BC), a writer on history, myth and ethnography.