Discourses and Selected Writings
[30] ‘Strip him.’ What do you mean, ‘him’? Take his garment, you mean, and remove that. ‘I have insulted you.’ ‘A lot of good may it do you.’ [31] That is what Socrates practised, maintaining always the same even temper. But it seems that we would practise and study anything rather than how to remain free and unenslaved.
[32] ‘Philosophers speak in paradoxes.’
And what of the other arts – are they different? What is more paradoxical than cutting into a person’s eye to restore their vision? If someone suggested this procedure to a person ignorant of medicine, they would laugh in the practitioner’s face. [33] Little wonder, then, if many of the truths of philosophy also impress the masses as paradoxical.
I 26 What is the law of life?
[1] When a person was reading the hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said, ‘This is a law concerning hypotheses, that we must accept what follows by way of conclusion. Even more cogent is the law of life that obliges us to act in accordance with nature. [2] If we mean to obey it in every area, on every occasion, clearly we must never allow what nature prescribes to escape us, and allow into our lives what runs contrary to nature.
[3] ‘So philosophers start us out with logic, since it’s easier, reserving more problematic subjects for later. In the study of logic, there is nothing to distract us; whereas in practical matters our attention is constantly pulled in other directions. [4] Whoever insists on jumping right into practical matters risks making a fool of himself, since it’s not easy tackling harder subjects first. [5] And this is the right defence to use with parents upset with their children because they study philosophy: “Have it your way, father: my judgement is poor and I don’t know what I really should be doing. But if this can neither be learned nor taught, then don’t blame me for it. If it can, however, then either teach it to me yourself, or let me learn it from someone who professes to know; [6] since I hope you don’t suppose that if I’m doing the wrong thing it’s by choice. So what else could explain my error but ignorance? [7] And wouldn’t you rather I be cured of that? When did anger, however, ever teach someone to play music or pilot a ship? Do you imagine that your anger is going to help teach me the far more complex business of life?”
[8] ‘But that line of argument assumes that such actually is your motive for studying philosophy; [9] anyone learning logic and attending philosophy lectures to make a show of erudition at a dinner party is satisfied just to win the respect of some senator seated beside him. [10] For that is where the important matters are, and treasures there are accounted trifles here. Consequently, it is hard to be master of one’s impressions in matters of ethics, where things that muddle the judgement are so many.
[11] ‘I know of one man who cried, clinging to Epaphroditus’ knees, saying how miserable he was now that he was down to his last million. [12] And what did Epaphroditus do – laugh at him as you are laughing now? No, he was appalled, and said, “Dear man, how did you keep silent up till now? How have you endured it?” ’
[13] When Epictetus corrected the person reading the hypothetical arguments and the person who had set him the reading began ridiculing him, Epictetus said, ‘You are laughing at yourself. You did not prepare the student properly or make sure he could understand these arguments. And still you use him as a reader. [14] Well then,’ he said, ‘if a mind doesn’t have the aptitude to follow and judge a conjunctive argument, why do we assume it’s capable of awarding praise, assigning blame or forming a judgement about things good and bad? If that person thinks ill of a person, will the other person care? Or if he admires someone, will that someone jump for joy – when in such minor matters of logic he can’t make an inference or draw a correct conclusion?
[15] ‘This, then, is the beginning of philosophy – an awareness of one’s own mental fitness. Consciousness of its weakness will keep you from tackling difficult subjects. [16] As it is, though, some people strain at a pamphlet and still want to devour an entire treatise. Naturally they can’t digest it, and get heartily sick of the whole business. [17] They need to first figure out what their capacity is. In the realm of logic it is easy to refute someone ignorant of the subject. But in the affairs of life, no one offers himself to be examined, and whoever presumes to examine us we resent. [18] And yet Socrates used to say that the unexamined life was not worth living.’
I 27 In how many ways impressions arise, and what aids we should provide against them.
[1] Impressions come to us in four ways: things are and appear to be; or they are not, and do not appear to be; or they are, but do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. [2] The duty of an educated man in all these cases is to judge correctly. And whatever disturbs our judgement, for that we need to find a solution. If the sophisms of the Pyrrhonists and the Academics44 are what trouble us, we must look for the antidote. [3] If it is the plausibility of things, causing some things to seem good that are not, let us seek a remedy there. If it is habit that troubles us, we must try to find a corrective for that.
[4] What aid can we find to combat habit? The opposed habit. [5] You hear people commonly saying things like, ‘He died, the poor man’; ‘His father perished, his mother too’; ‘He was cut down in his prime, and in a foreign land.’ [6] Lend your ear to different descriptions, distance yourself from statements such as these, check one habit with its opposite. Against sophistry one should have the practice and exercise of rational argument. Against specious impressions one should have clear preconceptions polished and ready to hand.
[7] When death appears an evil, we should have ready the fact that it is a duty to avoid evil things, whereas death is necessary and cannot be avoided. [8] I mean, where am I going to go to get away from it? Maybe I am not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, so that I can say in the same grand manner, ‘I will go, and either win the prize for valour myself, or give another the opportunity to gain it.’45 The former may be beyond us, but at least the latter is within our reach. [9] And where can I go to escape death in any case? Tell me the country, give me the name of the people who are safe from death, where I can get asylum; provide me with the magic charm. No, I cannot escape death, [10] but at least I can escape the fear of it – or do I have to die moaning and groaning too?
Passions stem from frustrated desire; [11] so if I am able to shape conditions to suit my wishes, I will do so, but if not, I am ready to maul anyone who stands in my way. [12] People by nature cannot endure being deprived of the good or meeting up with evil. [13] And if, in the end, I can’t alter circumstances, or tear to pieces the person who prevents me, then I sit and bawl, abusing everyone I can think of, including Zeus and the other gods. For if they do not look after me, why should I care about them? [14] ‘But you will be blasphemous.’ Well, what punishment could they devise in that case that would make my situation worse? Remember that, as a rule, unless piety and self-interest can be reconciled, piety cannot be preserved. Don’t you find that convincing?
[15] Let the Pyrrhonist and Academic philosophers step forward to face us.
‘For my part, I have no leisure for these controversies, nor can I simply side with convention.’46
[16] Now, if I had a dispute about property I would have called in a lawyer to help with my case. What will meet my needs in this instance? [17] The process of perception – whether it involves the entire body or only a part – this I may not be able to explain, because either alternative seems problematic to me. But that you and I are not the same person – of that I’m quite certain. [18] I mean, when I want to swallow something, I never carry it to your mouth, but my own. And when I want bread, I don’t grab a broom, I head straight for the bread like an arrow to its target.∗ [19] And you Sceptics, who dismiss the evidence of the senses – do you act any differently? Which one of you ever went to the mill when you were in need of a bath?
[20] ‘Well, shouldn’t we be diligent defenders of convention, then, and watchful for any attack on it?’ [21] Certainly – provided we have the leisure for controversies of this kind. The p
erson who is trembling, upset and inwardly broken in spirit needs to spend his time differently, though.
I 28 That we should not be angry with people; and
what people account great and small
[1] The cause of our assenting to the truth of something is that it appears to be fact. [2] And it is impossible to assent to anything that does not appear to be fact. Why? It is the mind’s nature: it will assent to the truth, reject what is false and suspend judgement in doubtful cases.
[3] Here, I will prove it to you: feel, if you can, that it is night now. ‘Impossible.’ Don’t feel that it is now day. ‘Impossible.’ Feel, or don’t feel, that the number of stars is even. ‘Impossible.’ [4] So when someone assents to a false proposition, be sure that they did not want to give their assent, since, as Plato says, ‘Every soul is deprived of the truth against its will.’47 [5] They simply mistook for true something false.
Now, with respect to our actions, the case is analogous, only instead of true and false we react to impressions of right and wrong, good and bad, honest and dishonest. [6] And it is impossible to think that an action will do us good and not choose to do it.
[7] What about Medea, though – she who says:
I know that the acts I intend are wrong
But anger is the master of my intentions.
That only amounts to saying that she thinks gratifying her anger by exacting revenge on her husband is preferable to keeping her children safe.48 [8] ‘Yes, but she is in error.’ Well, demonstrate to her clearly that she is in error and she will not act on her idea. As long as you don’t lay it out for her, though, she has nothing besides her own idea of right and wrong to guide her. [9] So don’t get angry at the poor woman for being confused about what’s most important, and accordingly mutating from human being to snake. Pity her instead. We take pity on the blind and lame, why don’t we pity people who are blind and lame in respect of what matters most? [10] Whoever keeps in mind that our actions are all determined by our impressions, which can either be right or wrong – now, if the impression is correct, we are innocent, but if it is incorrect we pay for it ourselves, since it is impossible that someone else should be penalized for our error – whoever keeps this in mind will not be angry or upset with anyone, won’t curse, blame, resent or malign anyone either.
[11] ‘So in your view great tragedies are merely the result of this – somebody’s “impression”?’
The result of that and that alone. [12] You take the Iliad: it’s nothing but people’s impressions and how they dealt with them. An impression made Paris rob Menelaus of his wife, and an impression got Helen to run away with him. [13] Now, if an impression had come to Menelaus that perhaps he was better off losing such a wife – well, that would have meant the loss to us not just of the Iliad but of the Odyssey as well.
[14] ‘So you’re saying that matters so great owe their origin to something so trivial?’
But what do you mean by ‘matters so great’? Wars, factions, the loss of many men, the razing of cities – tell me what’s so ‘great’ about all that? [15] What’s so great about slaughtering many sheep or cattle, or burning a lot of storks’ or swallows’ nests? [16]
‘Can you really compare the two?’ Why not? In the one case human bodies are lost, in the other case the dead happen to be farm animals. People’s houses burn, so do storks’ nests. [17] What’s so earth-shaking or awful in that? Show me how a house, considered merely as shelter, is better than a stork’s nest. [18] ‘How can a stork be compared with a human being?’ Where the body is concerned, there is lots of similarity, only in man’s case his body inhabits houses composed of bricks and timber, while storks’ nests are made of sticks and mud.
[19] ‘So is there no distinction between a person and a stork?’
Of course there is, but not in regard to these externals. [20] Reflect and you’ll realize that man excels in other respects: in taking cognisance of his own behaviour; in being sociable, trustworthy and honourable; in learning from his own mistakes; in brains. [21] What counts as good and bad for man can be found precisely in those respects in which he differs from the beasts. If his special qualities are kept safe behind stout walls, and he does not lose his honour, trustworthiness or intelligence, then the man is saved. But lose or take away any of these qualities and the man himself is lost.
[22] Everything significant depends on this. Did Paris’ tragedy lie in the Greeks’ attack on Troy, when his brothers began to be slaughtered? [23] No; no one is undone by the actions of others. That was the destruction of storks’ nests. His tragedy lay in the loss of the man who was honest, trustworthy, decent and respectful of the laws of hospitality. [24] Wherein did Achilles’ tragedy lie? The death of Patroclus? Not at all. It was that he gave in to anger, that he whined about losing a mere woman and lost sight of the fact that he was there not for romance but for war. [25] Those are the genuine human tragedies, the city’s siege and capture – when right judgements are subverted; when thoughts are undermined.
[26] ‘Women are driven into captivity, children are enslaved, and men are put to the sword. Is none of this bad?’
[27] What’s the basis for adding that description? Let me in on it too.
‘Why don’t you explain instead how they are not evils?’
[28] Let’s turn to our standards, produce our preconceptions. I mean, this is what flabbergasts me. If there’s a question about weight, we don’t formulate a judgement at random; if it’s a matter of judging straight and crooked, we don’t make our decision based on whim. [29] If the truth of the case makes any difference to us at all, then none of us operates in the dark. [30] Yet when it comes to the first and foremost cause of good and bad conduct; when it’s a matter of doing well or ill, of failure or success – only then do we proceed blindly and erratically, only then are we found to lack anything like a scale or measure. A sense impression appears and right away I react. [31] Am I better than Agamemnon and Achilles, insofar as they do and suffer such wrongs by following their impressions, while the impression does not satisfy me? [32] Is there any tragedy with a different source? What is the Atreus of Euripides? An impression. The Oedipus of Sophocles? An impression. The Phoenix? An impression. Hippolytus?49 An impression. [33] What kind of person, then, pays no attention to the matter of impressions, do you think? Well, what do we call people who accept every one indiscriminately?
‘Madmen.’
And do we act any differently?
I 29 On steadfastness
[1] The essence of good and evil consists in the condition of our character. [2] And externals are the means by which our character finds its particular good and evil. [3] It finds its good by not attaching value to the means. Correct judgements about externals make our character good, as perverse or distorted ones make it bad.
[4] God has fixed this law, and says, ‘If you want something good, get it from yourself.’ But you say, ‘No, I’ll get it from another.’ I say, ‘No – get it from yourself.’ [5] If a tyrant threatens me at court, I say, ‘What is he threatening?’ If he says, ‘I will put you in chains,’ I say, ‘He is threatening my hands and feet.’ [6] If he says, ‘I will behead you,’ I say, ‘He is threatening my neck.’ If he says, ‘I will throw you into prison,’ I say, ‘He is threatening my entire body’; if he threatens exile, I say the same. [7] ‘Well, then, aren’t you threatened, even a little?’ If I feel that these things are nothing to me, then no. [8] But if I fear for any of them, then, yes, it is I who am threatened.
Who is there left for me to fear, and over what has he control? Not what is in my power, because no one controls that except myself. As for what is not in my power, in that I take no interest.
[9] ‘So do you philosophers teach contempt for rulers?’
Not at all. You don’t find any of us preaching defiance of them within their range of competence. [10] My body, my property, my standing in society, my friends – they can have them all. And I challenge anyone to say that I encourage others to lay claim to thos
e things.
[11] ‘Yes,’ the king says, ‘but I want control over your judgements too.’ Who gave you that power? You cannot add the judgements of others to your conquests. [12] ‘I will win by way of fear.’ You do not seem to realize that the mind is subject only to itself. It alone can control it, [13] which shows the force and justice of God’s edict: the strong shall always prevail over the weak. [14] ‘Ten are stronger than one.’ Yes, for what, though? For taking people captive, for killing or dragging them off, for taking away their property. For main force, yes, ten are better than one. [15] But one person with right judgements is superior to ten without. Numbers here are irrelevant. Put them in the balance, the person with correct ideas will outweigh all the others.
[16] ‘To think of the indignities Socrates suffered at the hands of the Athenians!’ Not ‘Socrates,’ stupid, express yourself more carefully: ‘To think that Socrates’ poor body should have been seized and hauled off to prison by men stronger than it, that somebody gave his poor body hemlock, that it grew progressively colder until it was dead.’ [17] What seems unjust, or outrageous, in this, or worth blaming the gods for? Didn’t Socrates have resources to compensate? [18] Where was the essence of the good for him – and who is more to be heeded in that regard, him or you? ‘Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot harm me,’50 he says, and: ‘If it pleases the gods, so be it.’
[19] Produce a person who can get the better of someone whose judgements are superior. You can’t, though, try as you might. This is God’s law and nature’s: ‘Let the best man win.’ But ‘best’ in his area of expertise. [20] One body is stronger than another body, many bodies are stronger than one; a thief has the advantage here over one who is not a thief. [21] This is how I came to lose my lamp:51 the thief was better than I am in staying awake. But he acquired the lamp at a price: he became a thief for its sake, for its sake, he lost his ability to be trusted, for a lamp he became a brute. And he imagined he came out ahead!