One minute to midnight

  As he drove back to Havana: Acosta, 165. For Castro's thoughts, see Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 211. Photographs of Castro's visit to the AA unit are available on Cuban Web sites.

  "Fidel gets his kicks": Franqui, 189.

  A few months earlier: Estimate by Soviet defense minister Malinovsky; Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 327.

  The Marine regiment selected: Marine Corps records, October 1962, JFKARC.

  "Where are we gonna go?": Author's interview with Maj. Gregory J. Cizek, operations officer, 2nd Marine Regiment, April 2005.

  who "spent his time": Author's interview with Don Fulham, assistant operations officer, 2nd Marine Regiment, May 2005.

  Whatever happened, casualties: CINCLANT message, November 2, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "diversionary replies": CNO Office logs, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "purposeful and completely unruffled": Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 69.

  He quickly agreed: Statsenko report.

  "A force that remains": Szulc, 179.

  "You don't want to celebrate": Beschloss, 501.

  "You'll be interested": Ibid., 502.

  Had Kennedy known: Yesin interviews, July 2004 and May 2006. See also Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 154.

  The targeting cards: Author's interview with Maj. Nikolai Oblizin, deputy head ballistic division, July 2004.

  Launching the missiles successfully: For description of the sequence of firing an R-12 missile, I am indebted to Col. Gen. Yesin, former chief of staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, who served with Sidorov's regiment as a lieutenant engineer.

  The regiment of Colonel Nikolai Bandilovsky: The sites in western Cuba were designated San Cristobal 1, 2, 3, and 4 by the CIA, from west to east. The first two sites (Bandilovsky) were actually sixteen and thirteen miles west of San Cristobal. The other two (Solovyev) were about six miles west and seven miles northeast.

  He ordered Sidorov and Bandilovsky: Statsenko report.

  CHAPTER FIVE: "TILL HELL FREEZES OVER"

  "The Americans have": Presidium protocol No. 61. Fursenko, Prezidium Ts. K. KPSS, 620-2.

  Nikita "shit in his pants": Attributed to Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Kuznetsov, in Kornienko, 96.

  "That's it": Semichastny, 279.

  "You don't have to worry": Testimony of Emilio Aragones in Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 351.

  The two men sent by the CIA: Vera interview.

  The lack of power would also: CIA report, August 29, 1962, Mongoose memo, JFKARC.

  A dispatch from Ambassador Dobrynin: CWIHP, 8-9 (Winter 1996-97), 287.

  a proximity fuse: Alexander Feklisov, The Man Behind the Rosenbergs (New York: Enigma Books, 2001), 127.

  "what we would call": NK1, 372.

  "He sure as hell": Warren Rogers interview in Tulanian (Spring 1998).

  "to finish with Castro": Author's interview with embassy counselor Georgi Kornienko, July 2004; KGB report to Moscow, SVR; Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 261.

  It was the tip: Dobrynin telegram, October 25, 1962, LCV; Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 259-62.

  "Stop the conveyor": Article in Hoy Dominical [Havana], November 18, 1962; CIA report, August 29, 1962, Mongoose memo, JFKARC.

  Coffee could see rows and rows: Author's interview with Lt. Gerald Coffee, December 2005; his mission number was Blue Moon 5012.

  "alertness in a rapidly": Undated letter to Coffee from Marine Corps Cdr. David Shoup.

  The overflight of the Crusader: Gribkov et al., U KrayaYadernoi Bezdni, 253-60.

  Kovalenko controlled two Luna launchers: Malinovsky memorandum, September 6, 1962, LCV, trans. in CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 259. Together with the launchers, each regiment controlled four nuclear Luna missiles and eight conventional missiles.

  His most recent report: Author's interview with Carlos Pasqual, January 2006. CIA Operation Mongoose memo from Richard Helms, December 7, 1962, JFKARC.

  As they sorted through: Richard Lehman, "CIA Handling of Soviet Build-up in Cuba," November 14, 1962, CREST.

  had "come to view": Ibid.

  "the establishment on Cuban soil": NIE 85-3-62, "The Military Buildup in Cuba," September 19, 1962, CREST.

  "large intercontinental rockets": CIA inspector general report on handling of Cuban intelligence information, November 22, 1962, 19, 31, available through CREST. The report was disseminated by CIA on October 2, with the dismissive headquarters comment. The Poltava docked in Mariel on September 16 with eight R-12 missiles on board, according to RSVN documents inspected by Karlov.

  "giant missiles": Marchant dispatch, November 10, 1962, NSAW Cuba; also published in British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.

  a "wide, unpaved": Report by M. B. Collins, November 3, 1962, British Archives on Cuba, Cuba Under Castro, Vol. 5: 1962 (London: Archival Publications, 2003), 155.

  The vaults were hot and humid: Reminiscences of Rafael Zakirov, former FKR nuclear control officer, V. I. Yesin, ed., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 1st ed. (1999), 179-85. See also Zakirov, October 2007 article.

  The Soviet trailer-launched missiles: Malinovsky memo, May 24, 1962, LCV, trans. in CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 254.

  "to deliver a blow": Malinovsky order to Pliyev, September 8, 1962, LCV, in ibid., 260.

  a "liberated zone": Author's visit to Mayari Arriba, March 2006.

  Raul understood immediately: Yazov, 157; see also Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 119.

  The Soviet officer responsible: Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 90, 302-3.

  Soon after arriving in Oriente: Cuba under Castro, Vol. 5, 152.

  Everything was in place: Svetlana Chervonnaya interview with Sgt. Vitaly Roshva, May 2006; Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 87-8.

  Raul received regular intelligence: Blight and Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 102.

  They took elaborate precautions: Zakirov, October 2007 article.

  Known to the Marines: "Guantanamo Bay Compared to Attack-Ready Suburbia," Washington Evening Star, November 14, 1962.

  By nightfall, 2,810 dependents: CINCLANT history, chap. VII. Evacuation details from Cuba Fact Sheet, October 27, 1962, NSAW.

  But nearly half the 2,400: Gitmo situation report No. 15 250100Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  a series of yellow, green, and red: AP report from Guantanamo in Chicago Tribune, November 13, 1962.

  At first, Adlai Stevenson: George Plimpton OH, JFKL.

  Stevenson was humiliated: Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Legacy (New York: William Morrow, 1989), 488.

  "What year is this?": Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), 114.

  "Missile," he wrote: Presidential doodles file, JFKL.

  "Terrific": O'Donnell and Powers, 334.

  The nightwatchman: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 99; NORAD Combat Operations Center logs, October 26, 1962, Sagan Collection, NSA.

  Nobody knew what to make of: E-mail message to the author from Jim Artman, former F-106 pilot, Duluth.

  "discretion was": ADC Historical Study No. 16, 212-14.

  At Williams Air Force: Ibid., 121, 129.

  The order to flush: Historical Resume of 1st Fighter Wing Operations During Cuban Crisis, December 13, 1962, AFHRA; e-mail correspondence with Dan Barry, former F-106 pilot, Selfridge AFB.

  They eventually concluded: NORAD log, NSA.

  CHAPTER SIX: INTEL

  "brainwash" the press: Handwritten note from Maj. Gen. Chester Clifton, October 22, 1962, JFKL.

  it would be "nice": The suggestion was made by Vice Adm. Wallace Beakley, deputy commander of the Atlantic Fleet--Diary of Vice Adm. Alfred Ward, commander Task Force 136, USNHC. See also deck logs for Pierce and Kennedy, NARA.

  "friendly gestures": Message 251800Z from COMSECONDFLT, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  labeled "scientific instruments": Personal notes of L
t. Cdr. Reynolds, Battleship Cove Naval Museum. The Kennedy is now on permanent display in Fall River, MA.

  The streets around: Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 190-2.

  The overnight intelligence haul: Photo Interpretation Report, NPIC/R-1047/62, October 25, 1962, CREST.

  were "fully operational": Supplement 6, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, October 26, 1962, CREST; Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 436-7. For information provided by Penkovsky, see Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 334-46. The Penkovsky materials were labeled IRONBARK and CHICK ADEE, and mentioned in the October 19, 1962, Joint Evaluation, CREST.

  "a fear or stampede": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 437.

  He liked to boast: Arthur Lundahl OH, July 1, 1981, Columbia University Oral History Research Office.

  In October 1962 alone: Photo Interpretation Report, October 1962, CREST.

  Cratology scored its greatest triumph: Thaxter L. Goodall, "Cratology Pays Off," Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1964), CREST. The ship was the Kasimov, photographed on September 28.

  "The hot morning sun": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 195-6.

  B-36 was sighted: Chronology of Submarine Contacts, C-20, CNO Cuba, USNHC. See also Summary of Soviet Submarine Activity 272016Z, also in Electronic Briefing Book 75, NSAW.

  More than eight hundred contacts: SOSUS activity in Atlantic, CTG 81.1 message 261645Z, USNHC; Electronic Briefing Book 75, NSAW.

  "a reliable contact": Summary of Soviet Submarine Activity, 272016Z.

  Lieutenant Anatoly Andreev: Andreev diary provided by Svetlana Savranskaya, NSAW. Portions of the diary were published in Krasnaya Zvezda, October 11, 2000.

  B-36 reached the approaches: Dubivko memoir, "In the Depths of the Sargasso Sea," in Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 314-30, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya, NSAW.

  he was instructed: Memoirs of Capt. Vitaly Agafonov, commander of submarine flotilla, in Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 123.

  "that lying bastard": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 287.

  "Now this is interesting": The references to the FROG launcher and tactical nuclear weapons have been redacted from the official transcripts of the meeting. However, they are included in JFK Library release notes prepared by Sheldon M. Stern.

  to be put out "right now": Bundy conversation with George Ball, FRUS, Vol. XI, 219; 10:00 a.m. ExComm meeting, October 26, 1962.

  a "weapon," to be used: U.S. News & World Report, November 12, 1962; Newsweek, November 12, 1962. See also Arthur Sylvester OH, JFKL.

  "Please identify yourself": Ship's log, as reported by Ahlander, Krig och fred i Atomaldern, 24-5; author's interview with Nils Carlson, September 2005.

  "temperamental and headstrong": Cable from U.S. Embassy, Stockholm, October 27, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "STAY WITH SWEDISH SHIP": Coolangatta file, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  He wanted to share: Alekseev telegram to Moscow 49201, October 26, 1962, NSAW.

  "You are going to hear": Yevtushenko article, Novaya Gazeta, July 11, 2005.

  Castro's "personal courage": JFK1, 492.

  In April 1962, Pravda began: Halperin, 155.

  "unlimited confidence": Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 83, 254.

  "Well, it looks like war": Ibid., 213.

  is "inevitable": Reports from Brazilian and Yugoslav embassies, quoted in James Hershberg, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Journal of Cold War Studies (Summer 2004).

  "So you are": David Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 127

  "that fucker": Martin, 136. See also David Corn, Blond Ghost (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 82.

  "We don't mind going": Martin, 144; see also Thomas, Robert Kennedy, 234. RFK's diary lists a telephone call from San Roman in Miami on October 27 and a meeting scheduled for October 26, but it is unclear whether the meeting actually took place.

  "using such valuable Cuban": McCone memo on meeting, October 29, 1962, JFKARC; see also Parrott minutes, FRUS, Vol. XI, 229-31.

  "Sink in Cuban": Lansdale memo, October 26, 1962, JFKARC. The shipping sabotage plan was approved on October 27, but suspended on October 30, after Khrushchev agreed to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba--Lansdale memo, October 30, 1962, JFKARC.

  "presumed lost": Chronology of the Matahambre Sabotage Operation, November 21, 1962, JFKARC.

  "obviously plastered": Parrott interview.

  "Harvey has destroyed": Martin, 144.

  The FBI had been searching: Report from SAC, Los Angeles, to FBI director, October 26, 1962, JFKARC.

  "would work anywhere": Senate Church Committee Report, Alleged Assassination Plots, 84.

  "every single team": Harvey testimony to Church Committee, July 11, 1975, JFKARC.

  "gathering intelligence": Roselli testimony to Church Committee, June 24, 1975, JFKARC.

  While there is no smoking gun: Thomas, 157-9; Lansdale memo to RFK, December 4, 1961, JFKARC; CIA memo to Church Committee, September 4, 1975, JFKARC.

  "getting rid": Samuel Halpern interview with CIA history staff, January 15, 1988, JFKARC.

  "liquidation of leaders": Thomas, 159.

  "no holds barred": Halpern interview with CIA history staff; Harvey testimony to Church Committee.

  "If you fuckers": Stockton, Flawed Patriot, 141.

  "idiocy": Harvey testimony to Church Committee.

  During the course of 1962: Branch and Crile III, "The Kennedy Vendetta" comments by CIA review staff, August 14, 1975, JFKARC; Corn, Blond Ghost, 74-99.

  "I don't have time": Author's interview with Warren Frank, former JM/WAVE officer, April 2006.

  A "counter-revolutionary handbook": RFK confidential file, Box 10, JFKARC.

  "The trouble with us Cubans": WP, October 28, 1962, E5.

  at the "highest possible pitch": CIA memo to Lansdale, "Operation Mongoose--Infiltration Teams," October 29, 1962.

  Typical of the fighters: Unpublished 1996 memoir by Carlos Obregon; author's interview with Obregon in February 2004.

  CHAPTER SEVEN: NUKES

  "forget his role as host": Mikoyan conversation with U.S. officials, November 30, 1962, SDX.

  "Cuba does not accept": Acosta, 170.

  "emergency operational capability": CIA memo, October 21, 1962, CREST/JFKL.

  "Missile units ready": Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 111; Statsenko report.

  "Turn on the radars": Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 113.

  And he wanted the forty-three thousand troops: Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 65.

  "freedom-loving Cuba": TASS report, October 27, 1962; Revolucion, October 27, 1962, 8; NYT, October 27, 1962, 6.

  "Somos socialistas": Cuba Under Castro, 1962, 107.

  "stronger discipline": Alekseev cable to Soviet Foreign Ministry, October 23, 1962, NSAW.

  "primitiveness": Desnoes interview, April 2006.

  "They were years": Franqui, 187. For a contemporaneous report on Franqui's views, see CIA telegram, June 5, 1963, JFKL.

  "a crazy wonderland": Cuba Under Castro, 1962, 147.

  "a large number": Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 161-2.

  "not all that important": Halperin, 190.

  "Their Spanish blood": Cuba Under Castro, 1962, 619-20.

  "This is a joke": Air Force message on JCS authentication system 57834, October 25, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  The problem was even worse: Kornienko interview.

  "under considerable strain": Beschloss, 521; Abel, 162.

  "a lot of bullshit": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 288.

  As relayed by Scali: Scali memo to Hilsman, October 26, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XI, 227.

  "I have reason": Ibid., 241.

  "Does this come": Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 274-6.

  no "official information": KGB foreign intelligence refused to distribute many of Feklisov's reports because they lacke
d secret information--SVR.

  "an exuberant type": Feklisov, 371.

  After pondering the rezident's report: Ibid., 382; Dobrynin, 95. Dobrynin refers to Feklisov as "Fomin," his cover name in Washington.

  The most Feklisov could do: Feklisov report to Andrei Sakharovsky, October 27, 1962, SVR. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "Using KGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis," CWIHP, 5 (Spring 1995), 58. See also Semichastny, 282. The KGB chief described Feklisov's dealings with Scali as "unauthorized."

  "within forty-eight hours": B. G. Putilin, Na Krayu Propasti (Moscow: Institut Voennoi Istorii, 1994), 104.

  "suspended within": Hershberg, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," 34; Putilin, 108.

  "full military readiness": Putilin, 106.

  "Don't panic": Derkachev, 45.

  Now even Pliyev: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 113.

  "We have nowhere to retreat": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 167, 226.

  Pliyev rejected: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 51; Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 115; Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 64-5; Putilin, 105.

  There had been some initial confusion: See Svetlana Savranskaya, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba: New Evidence" CWIHP, 14-15 (Winter 2003), 385-7; also Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis" CWIHP, 3 (Fall 1993), 40.

  "To the Director": LCV.

  Colonel Sergei Romanov: Romanov was commander of a special military unit responsible for storing and servicing nuclear weapons, known as a Podvizhnaya Remontno-Technicheskaya Baza (Mobile Repair-Technical Base), or PRTB. A PRTB was attached to each missile regiment, FKR regiment, motorized rifle regiment, or IL-28 squadron that operated nuclear warheads. Prior to arriving in Cuba, the warheads were under the control of an arsenal headed by Col. Nikolai Beloborodov, which reported to the original nuclear design bureaus. Once the warheads had arrived safely in Cuba and had been checked out, Beloborodov transferred formal control over them to the individual PRTBs, but shared responsibility for their proper maintenance.

  A drive-through bunker: Cuba Activity Summary, 1963; CIA, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, October 19, 1962, LBJ Library; NPIC memorandum, December 4, 1961, "Suspect Missile Sites in Cuba," NPIC/B-49/61, CREST.