One minute to midnight

  Hunched over their monitors: See McNamara and Taylor comments to ExComm, JFK3, 446, 451. Taylor mistakenly refers to the Fruit Set radar as a "fruitcake" radar. According to McNamara, the Fruit Set signals were picked up by the intel plane "at the same time" the U-2 was overhead.

  The senior raven: History of the 55th SRW, October 1962, FOIA. Willson detected three "Big Cigar" radars on October 27. He reported a total of fourteen miscellaneous "missile intercepts," i.e., radars associated with different Soviet missile systems.

  "whip anybody else": Martin Caidin, Thunderbirds (New York: Dell, 1961), 109.

  gone "terribly wrong": Maultsby memoir. All passages describing Maultsby's personal thoughts and actions are taken from this unpublished memoir; they have been checked against other sources, including contemporaneous astronomical charts, and a State Department chart of his flight route.

  seemed "highly suspect": Ibid.

  "especially important": Letter to Adm. George Burkley, October 24, 1962, Kraus files, JFKL.

  "personal effects": Memo from Burkley, October 25, 1962, JFK medical file, JFKL.

  "to live every day": Dallek, 154.

  "addicted to excitement": Reeves, 19.

  "capacity for projecting": Dallek, 72.

  "This war here": Quoted in Stern, 39-40.

  "every officer in the Army": Reeves, 306.

  "How did it all": Sorensen, Kennedy, 513. 227 "The book says": Reeves, 306.

  "the red button": JCS Emergency Actions File, Scott Sagan records, NSAW.

  These were hardly abstract questions: See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, "JFK's First Strike Plan," Atlantic Monthly (October 2001).

  "orgiastic, Wagnerian": Reeves, 229-30, 696; target data from Kaplan, "JFK's First Strike Plan." When Power briefed McNamara on SIOP-62, he told him with a smirk, "Well, Mr. Secretary, I hope you don't have any friends or relations in Albania, because we're just going to have to wipe it out."

  "a substantial deterrent to me": White House transcript, December 5, 1962, quoted by David Coleman in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (May-June 2006). See Reeves, 175, for Civil War comparison.

  "insane that two men": Goodwin, 218.

  CHAPTER TEN: SHOOTDOWN

  As Anderson entered Cuban airspace: Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 124.

  The ground floor of the command post: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 273; memoirs of former PVO officer Col. Pavel Korolev in Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 246-53; author's interview with PVO political officer Col. Grigory Danilevich, July 2004.

  "Target Number 33": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 124.

  "a pile of junk": Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 1-3.

  Kennedy was so concerned about: October 22, 1962, memo, McNamara Papers, OSD.

  "Our guest has been up": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 199-200. The Soviet defense minister later reported that the U-2 was "shot down with the aim of not permitting the photographs to fall into U.S. hands"--Malinovsky memo, October 28, 1962, CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 262. According to Derkachev, 56, Pliyev was furious when he learned about the shootdown. "You shouldn't have done this," he reportedly told his subordinates. "We can seriously complicate the [diplomatic] negotiations."

  "establish a pattern of operation": JFK3, 240; flight tracks for October 27 reported in NPIC Photo Interpretation Report on Missions 5017-5030, CREST.

  The canvas covers had been taken off: JCS meeting notes for October 27, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2. The notes were made in 1976 by a JCS historian, Walter Poole, on the basis of original transcripts. According to the JCS, the original transcripts were subsequently destroyed. Photographs taken by these missions are contained in SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 2, FOIA.

  "First of all": Malakhov notes, MAVI.

  "The people at large": British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 242.

  "a city of children": Saverio Tutino, L'Occhio del Barracuda (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995), 134.

  "Of course we were frightened": Desnoes interview.

  "We are expecting": Adolfo Gilly, "A la luz del relampago: Cuba en octubre," Perfil de la Jornada, November 29, 2002.

  "Keep two or three buckets": FBIS trans. of Radio Rebelde, October 28, 1962.

  "Love Thy Neighbor": October 27 UPI report from Havana; see NYT, October 28, 1962.

  On a hill above: Author's interview with Alfredo Duran, former inmate, December 2005.

  "Destroy Target Number 33": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 124; Putilin, 111-12. There are slight variations in the time of the shootdown. I have relied on the time given by Col. Korolev, who was on duty at the Camaguey command post (see Gribkov et al., 250). For the location of the wreckage, see October 28, 1962, report from Unidad Military 1065, NSAW Cuba.

  "Que vivan los Sovieticos": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 235.

  a "munitions storage site": See NPIC reports, October 26 and October 27, 1962, CREST.

  The commander of the missile troops: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 67.

  On the other hand: Statsenko report; Yesin interview.

  "You are irritating": Malinovsky (Trostnik) order to Pliyev, October 27, 1962, NSAW Cuba, author's trans. See a different trans. in CWIHP, 14-15 (Winter 2003), 388.

  "bearded, energetic man": Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 69.

  "the definitive victory": Verde Olivo, October 10, 1968, quoted in Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 47.

  "established a military command post": CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 26, 1962, CREST; author's visit to Cueva de los Portales; Blue Moon missions 5019-5020, October 27, 1962, NPIC report, CREST.

  the "final stage": Blue Moon missions 5023-5024, NPIC report, CREST.

  The Soviets had even dropped a live: See, e.g., David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 326-8.

  Nuclear-capable IL-28s: CIA memorandum, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, November 6, 1962, CREST. The CIA reported that the Air Force IL-28s "almost certainly" arrived on the Leninsky Komsomol, which docked near Holguin on October 20. According to Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 173, NPIC already had its eye on Holguin because of construction activity similar to that seen in the Soviet Union prior to the deployment of IL-28s. Unlike the IL-28s at San Julian, the planes at Holguin were never taken from their crates, and were removed around November 26--Brugioni, 536.

  "those things that nobody": Anastasiev interview.

  According to the original Defense Ministry: Malinovsky memoranda, September 6 and 8, 1962, trans. in CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 258-60. See also Raymond Garthoff, "New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis," ibid., 251-4.

  "In the event": CINCONAD message 262345Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC; for JCS reply, see Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis, October 27, 1962, NSAW Cuba, and OPNAV 24-hour resume of events, 270000 to 280000, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "an atomic delivery": Chronology of JCS Decisions, October 28, 1962, NSAW Cuba.

  "any movement of FROG": CINCLANT history, 95.

  After earlier discounting: Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 255, 261; amendment to CINCLANT history, JCS request for casualty estimates, November 1, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  The nuclear cores for the bombs: Polmar and Gresham, 230; USCONARC message to CINCLANT 291227Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  a "surprise first strike": Taylor memos to McNamara and the President, May 25, 1962, JCS records, NARA.

  "I know the Soviet Union": Sorensen OH, JFKL.

  At the same time that U.S. generals: JCS memo to McNamara, October 23, 1962; Gilpatric memos to President and Bundy, October 24, 1962; Sagan Collection, NSAW; Sagan, 106-11. On October 22, Gilpatric had told aides that he saw no reason for a change in rules governing the two-stage weapons--Gilpatric desk diary, OSD.

  "so loose, it jars": Lt. Col. Robert Melgard quoted in Sagan, 110. br />
  As the B-52 began a series: Author's interview with 1st Lt. George R. McCrillis, pilot on CALAMITY, February 2006.

  "Three minutes--NOW": Procedures described in Dominic Operations Plan, September 1962, History of Air Force Participation in Operation Dominic, Vol. III, DOE.

  CHAPTER ELEVEN: "SOME SONOFABITCH"

  Alone in the vast blackness: Maultsby memoir.

  The befuddled pilot: Data tracking Maultsby's U-2 and Soviet interceptors are taken from U.S. government charts. I found the most detailed map in the files of the State Department Executive Secretariat, SDX, Box 7. A second map tracking Soviet interceptors that appear to have taken off from an air base at Pevek is located in National Security Files--Cuba, Box 54, Maps, charts, and photographs folder, JFKL.

  "unusually somber and harried": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 456.

  The mere mention of "civil defense": Official transcript, McNamara press conference, October 22, 1962, OSD.

  If the Soviets attacked: Report to National Governors' Conference by Assistant Defense Secretary Steuart L. Pittman, October 27, 1962, JFKL.

  Earlier in the week: Steuart L. Pittman OH, JFKL.

  In the absence of government action: Alice L. George, Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 78-80.

  "Invade Cuba, Attack the Reds": AP and UPI reports, October 27, 1962; WP, October 28, 1962.

  General Power was on: Author's interview with Maj. Orville Clancy, former SAC HQ officer, June 2003.

  "Peace is our Profession": Reminiscences of Col. Maynard White, America's Shield, The Story of the Strategic Air Command and Its People (Paducah, KY: Turner, 1997), 98.

  "what the hell you are doing": Des Portes OH, NSAW.

  The ability to "read the mail": Interviews with Clancy; Gerald E. McIlmoyle; and former SAC intelligence officer James Enney, October 2005.259 "We have a problem": Author's interview with Fred Okimoto, August 2005.

  "while engaged in a high-altitude": Taubman, 455.

  His thoughts went back: Maultsby was shot down over North Korea on January 5, 1952; he was released on August 31, 1953--Maultsby personnel file, NPRC. A copy of his interrogation record by the North Koreans was supplied to Russia, and released through the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs.

  "the muzzles of": Martin Caidin, The Silken Angels: A History of Parachuting (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), 230-6.

  "missing in action": Maultsby personnel file.

  When he learned of the stand-down order: Correspondence and interview with McNamara aide Col. Francis J. Roberts, May 2006.

  "Tell the admiral": CNO Office logs, October 27, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC. The naval aide was Capt. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.

  "missiles flying through": Council for Correspondence, Newsletter No. 22, Herman Kahn files, NDU; author's interview with Irvin Doress, February 2006.

  When the military radar station: Charts of Maultsby flight.

  Earlier in the week: Author's interviews with former F-102 pilots Leon Schmutz and Joseph W. Rogers, June 2003. See also Sagan, 136-7; Alaskan Air Command Post log, October 22, 1962.

  "Khrushchev, like every doctrinaire": Message to Joint Staff from Maj. Gen. V. H. Krulak, October 26, 1962, JCS Maxwell Taylor records, NARA.

  "diplomatic blackmail": JCS memo for the President, JCSM-844-62, OSD.

  "Attacking Sunday or Monday": JCS Poole notes.

  "much worse if Khrushchev": Kaplan, 256.

  "You must have lost": David Burchinal OH, NSAW Cuba.

  "the ablest combat officer": McNamara interview; see also McNamara interviews for The Fog of War, film documentary, directed by Errol Morris (Sony Pictures Classics, 2003).

  He slept on a cot: LAT, October 28, 1962; McNamara desk diaries, OSD.

  "A U-2 has been lost": JCS Poole notes. In his 1975 oral history, Burchinal claimed that McNamara yelled hysterically, "This means war with the Soviet Union. The president must get on the hot line to Moscow!" McNamara denies saying this. The Moscow-Washington "hot line" was inaugurated after the missile crisis.

  "got off course": Secret U-2 memo, National Security Files, Box 179, JFKL.

  Returning from his swim: I have reconstructed events from the president's telephone logs for October 27, 1962; the White House gate logs, JFKL; and O'Donnell and Powers, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye, 338-9. The latter account confuses the timing of when JFK found out about the two U-2 incidents.

  "There's always some sonofabitch": Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 221; JFK letter to Jacqueline Kennedy, March 6, 1964, JFKL; Roger Hilsman interview, CNN CW.

  "the last time I asked": According to O'Donnell and Powers, 337, JFK had "ordered the removal of the Jupiter missiles in August." Bundy later disputed this claim, arguing that "a presidential opinion is not a presidential order"--see Stern, 86. A presidential memorandum (NSAM 181) dated August 23, 1962, tasked the Pentagon with examining "what action can be taken to get Jupiter missiles out of Turkey"--see Nash, 110.

  "the people deciding": Parallel drawn by Stern, 39, 296.

  "The possibility of the destruction": RFK, 127, 106.

  "You might as well come back": Herman interview; History of the 4080th Strategic Wing, October 1962, FOIA.

  He personally got on the phone: Author's interview with McNamara military aide Sidney B. Berry, May 2006.

  "operating on the basis": Gilpatric OH, NSAW.

  He ordered its immediate recall: History of the 4080th Strategic Wing, October 1962, FOIA; McNamara memo to Air Force secretary, October 28,1962, OSD.

  "A U-2 overflying Cuba": JCS Poole notes. The news was brought by Col. Ralph D. Steakley of the Joint Reconnaissance Group.

  "Bail out!": Maultsby memoir. Maultsby does not mention the name of the pilot who urged him to bail out. Schmutz says it was not him, so it must have been Rands, who has since died.

  The U-2 "did not seem to want": Maultsby calculated his flight time as 10 hours 25 minutes, a record for a U-2 flight. A White House note records his touchdown time as 2:14 p.m. Washington time after a 10-hour 14-minute flight--National Security Files, Box 179, JFKL. He was scheduled to return at 11:50 a.m. after a 7-hour 50-minute flight. I have used the time provided by Maultsby, which is also cited in the October 1962 History of the 4080th Strategic Wing.

  CHAPTER TWELVE: "RUN LIKE HELL"

  SAC already had more planes: Cuba Fact Sheet, October 27, 1962, NSAW.

  the "last thing" Andrus wanted: Reminiscences of Col. Burton C. Andrus, Jr., History of the 341st Space Wing, FOIA.

  "I hate these Krauts": Joseph E. Persico, Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (New York: Penguin, 1995), 50.

  "Khrushchev knows we're after": Interview with Joe Andrew, Missile Maintenance Division, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, September 2005, in Time magazine, December 14, 1962.

  "You can't drive it": Lt. Col. George V. Leffler quoted in Saturday Evening Post, February 9, 1963.

  "If I don't get a light": Andrus reminiscences.

  "have had warheads installed": Eugene Zuckert letter to JFK, October 26, 1962, Curtis LeMay records, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Alpha Six was placed on strategic alert at 1816Z (2:16 p.m. Washington time) on October 26, 1962 (November history, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Sagan Collection, NSAW).

  "required many workarounds": October history, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Sagan Collection, NSAW; Sagan, 82-90.

  Having encouraged Andrus: SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 72-3, 121; SAC message 1827Z, October 27, 1962.

  and "run like hell": Andrew interview in Time.

  Two B-52 Stratofortresses: SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 43. During the missile crisis, B-52s generally carried either four Mark-28s or two Mark-15s.

  "ready to go to war": "A Full Retaliatory Response," Air and Space (November

  2005); author's interviews with former SAC pilots Ron Wink and Don Aldridge, September 2005.

  to deliver the "full retalia
tory response": Sagan, 66.

  "Ocean Station Bravo": SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 90. For jamming, see Air Force messages AF IN 1500 and 1838, October 27 and 28, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  six "target complexes": Kaplan, 268.

  the "dead man's switch": Sagan, 186-8.

  The special storage facilities: CIA, Supplement 8, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat, October 28, 1962, LBJ Library; Yesin interview.

  Soviet missiles could not hit: My source for the targeting of New York from Calabazar is retired Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, who served under Sidorov as a lieutenant engineer and had the opportunity to review archival documents closed to other researchers as chief of staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

  "Don't worry": Malakhov notes, MAVI; Yesin interview.

  The regiment was formally: Yesin interview.

  Communications links with division headquarters: CIA, Supplement 8, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat, LBJ Library.

  "You have to understand": Yesin interview.

  The CIA had long suspected: CIA telegram on Communist plans for Central America in the event of an invasion of Cuba, October 10, 1962, National Security Files, JFKL; CIA memo on Cuban subversion, February 18, 1963, JFKARC.

  On Saturday afternoon: Undated CIA memo obtained through CREST, RDP80B01676R001800010029-3; CIA memoranda, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 29 and November 1, 1962; October 27, 1962, intercept, JFKARC.

  "It is the duty of every revolutionary": Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 18.

  A secret plan known as Operation Boomerang: Blight and Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 99.

  "The United States will not be able": Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 141.

  At the Mongoose meeting on Friday: CIA memo, "Operation Mongoose, Main Points to Consider," October 26, 1962, and McCone memo on Mongoose meeting, October 26, 1962, JFKARC.

  It did not take long: NYT, October 29, 1962.

  a "Communist sabotage ring": NYT, October 30, 1962.

  Operation Bugle Call: Memos on CINCLANT psychological leaflet program, OSD. After initially supporting the operation, the Joint Chiefs described it as "militarily unsound" in an October 27 memorandum (OSD). The chiefs feared that the delivery aircraft might be shot down, providing the Cubans with a propaganda victory.