Valentino

the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner

  enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by

  the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in

  respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain

  them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state

  which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not

  get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his

  own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more

  powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And

  he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he

  has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless

  difficulties and troubles.

  The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely

  these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations

  with[*] the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept

  down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain

  authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The

  Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of

  Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the

  Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase

  their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans

  to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of

  Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the

  country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent

  princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but

  also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy,

  because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait

  until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the

  malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians

  say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it

  is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time,

  not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it

  becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens in

  affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen

  (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly

  redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been

  permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no

  longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt

  with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come

  to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to

  be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight

  with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in

  Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor

  did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise

  ones of our time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather

  the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives

  everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as

  evil, and evil as well as good.

  [*] See remark in the introduction on the word "intrattenere."

  But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the

  things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[*] (and not of Charles[+]) as

  the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held

  possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he

  has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain

  a state composed of divers elements.

  [*] Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People," born 1462,

  died 1515.

  [+] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

  King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians,

  who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention.

  I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get

  a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that

  every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was

  forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would

  have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had

  not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,

  regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;

  the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke

  of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of

  Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,

  the Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then

  could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,

  which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made

  the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

  Let any one now consider with that little difficulty the king could

  have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above

  laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although

  they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the

  Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been

  forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have

  made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no

  sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander

  to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he

  was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who

  had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church

  by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater

  authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to

  follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of

  Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was

  himself forced to come into Italy.

  And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and

  deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of

  Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime

  arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that

  country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to

  shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own

  pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to

  drive him, Louis, out in turn.

  The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men

  always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not

  blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means,

  then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have

  attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she

  could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition

  which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the

  excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition

  merited bla
me, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

  Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,

  he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he

  brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did

  not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to

  injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from

  the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought

  Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to

  humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to

  have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always

  have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians

  would never have consented except to become masters themselves there;

  also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in

  order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they

  would not have had the courage.

  And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to

  Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the

  reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to

  avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to

  your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the

  king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise,

  in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[*] and for the cap to

  Rouen,[+] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the

  faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

  [*] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and

  married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order

  to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.

  [+] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, created a

  cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

  Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the

  conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries

  and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much

  that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at

  Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope

  Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal

  Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I

  replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning

  that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such

  greatness. And in fact is has been seen that the greatness of the

  Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin

  may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which

  never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming

  powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about

  either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him

  who has been raised to power.

  CHAPTER IV

  WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL

  AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

  Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly

  acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great

  became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was

  scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole

  empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained

  themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose

  among themselves from their own ambitions.

  I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to

  be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of

  servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his

  favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that

  dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such

  barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords

  and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by

  a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,

  because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as

  superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as

  to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular

  affection.

  The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the

  King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one

  lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into

  sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and

  changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the

  midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,

  and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the

  king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers

  both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the

  state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding

  it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk

  are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the

  kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt

  of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons

  given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only

  be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little

  advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot

  carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who

  attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and

  he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of

  others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the

  field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is

  nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being

  exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no

  credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them

  before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

  The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because

  one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,

  for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such

  men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render

  the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with

  infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from

  those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated

  the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make

  themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are

  unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost

  whenever time brings the opportunity.

  Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of

  Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and

  therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him

  in the field, and then to take the
country from him. After which

  victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,

  for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they

  would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no

  tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.

  But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted

  like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the

  Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities

  there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them

  endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the

  power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed

  away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting

  afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself

  his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had

  assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated,

  none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

  When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with

  which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which

  others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;

  this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the

  conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

  CHAPTER V

  CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH

  LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

  Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been

  accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are

  three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin

  them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit

  them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing

  within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because

  such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot

  stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to

  support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to

  freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than

  in any other way.

  There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held

  Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they

  lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,

  dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as

  the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did

  not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many

  cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain

  them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a

  city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be

  destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of

  liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither

  time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may

  do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges

  unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they

  immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had

  been held in bondage by the Florentines.

  But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince,

  and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed

  to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree

  in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to

  govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms,

  and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more

  easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and

  more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the

  memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to