Valentino

destroy them or to reside there.

  CHAPTER VI

  CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED

  BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

  Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities

  as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of

  state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,

  and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep

  entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they

  imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great

  men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his

  ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him

  act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet

  appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength

  of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach

  by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with

  the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

  I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is

  a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,

  accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired

  the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private

  station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or

  other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.

  Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the

  strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no

  other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

  But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through

  fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus,

  Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although

  one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will

  of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made

  him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who

  have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if

  their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not

  be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a

  preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see

  that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought

  them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them.

  Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been

  extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come

  in vain.

  It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people

  of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order

  that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out

  of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba,

  and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should

  become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary

  that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government

  of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long

  peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the

  Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men

  fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the

  opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

  Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a

  principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The

  difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules

  and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their

  government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there

  is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct,

  or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the

  introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for

  enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and

  lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This

  coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws

  on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not

  readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of

  them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the

  opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others

  defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along

  with them.

  It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter

  thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves

  or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate

  their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In

  the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass

  anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then

  they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have

  conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the

  reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it

  is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that

  persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when

  they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by

  force.

  If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not

  have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to

  Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things

  immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no

  means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the

  unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great

  difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers

  are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when

  these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are

  exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue

  afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

  To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears

  some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a

  like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[*] This man rose from a private

  station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to

  fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose

  him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their

  prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that

  one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a

  king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up

  old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and

  allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus,

  whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in

  keeping.

  [*] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

  CHAPTER VII

  CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WH
ICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER

  BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

  Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private

  citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they

  have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they

  have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some

  state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows

  it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the

  Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they

  might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also

  were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being

  citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill

  and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and

  unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the

  position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it

  is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command,

  having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold

  it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and

  faithful.

  States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature

  which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and

  correspondencies[*] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not

  overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become

  princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be

  prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their

  laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they

  became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS.

  [*] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and

  correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning

  of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and

  seventeenth centuries.

  Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or

  fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection,

  and these are Francesco Sforza[*] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by

  proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose

  to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand

  anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare

  Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during

  the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it,

  notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that

  ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the

  states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

  [*] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria

  Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of

  Milan, on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy.

  Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to

  Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to

  the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and

  along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an

  account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the proceedings

  of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino

  nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a translation of which

  is appended to the present work.

  Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations

  may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will

  be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,

  therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be

  seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not

  consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what

  better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;

  and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but

  the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

  Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had

  many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see

  his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the

  Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke

  of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and

  Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides

  this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might

  have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the

  Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It

  behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the

  powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states.

  This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by

  other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would

  not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by

  dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came

  into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of

  Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from

  him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the

  reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the

  Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to

  advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did

  not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to

  say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using,

  would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from

  winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the

  king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when,

  after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very

  unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind

  when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany,

  and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke

  decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

  For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in

  Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,

  making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to

  their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that

  in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and

  turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to

  crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house.

  This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving

  at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin

  to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung

  the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless

  dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the

  French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by

  tru
sting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse

  to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the

  mediation of Signor Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with

  all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the

  Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his

  power at Sinigalia.[*] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned

  their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good

  foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of

  Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity,

  he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of

  notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it

  out.

  [*] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

  When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak

  masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave

  them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was

  full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing

  to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it

  necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer

  Ramiro d'Orco,[*] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest

  power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the

  greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not

  advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but

  that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the

  country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had

  their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused

  some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the

  people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if

  any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in

  the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took

  Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the

  piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The

  barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied

  and dismayed.

  [*] Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

  But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding

  himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate

  dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great

  measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if

  he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,

  for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake,

  would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new

  alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was

  making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were

  besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them,

  and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

  Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the

  future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the

  Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him

  that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways.

  Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had

  despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by

  winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb

  the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting

  the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power

  before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist

  the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he

  had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed

  lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over