Valentino

the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the

  college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master

  of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa

  was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for

  the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the

  Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill),

  he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at

  once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the

  Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he

  continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander

  died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would

  have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the

  forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

  But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He

  left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the

  rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick

  unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and

  he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the

  foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not

  had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he

  would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his

  foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a

  month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and

  whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome,

  they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made

  Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would

  not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death

  of Alexander,[*] everything would have been different to him. On the

  day that Julius the Second[+] was elected, he told me that he had

  thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and

  had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated

  that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to

  die.

  [*] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

  [+] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad

  Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

  When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to

  blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought

  to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the

  arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty

  spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct

  otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own

  sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it

  necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends,

  to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and

  feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to

  exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the

  old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous

  and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to

  maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they

  must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more

  lively example than the actions of this man.

  Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom

  he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a

  Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being

  elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of

  any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they

  became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom

  he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,

  San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[*] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear

  him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their

  relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the

  kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above

  everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,

  failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad

  Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages

  to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his

  choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

  [*] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.

  CHAPTER VIII

  CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

  Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither

  of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is

  manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could

  be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are

  when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the

  principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private

  person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first

  method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other

  modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider

  these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow

  them.

  Agathocles, the Sicilian,[*] became King of Syracuse not only from a

  private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a

  potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous

  life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability

  of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military

  profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being

  established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make

  himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others,

  that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an

  understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who,

  with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the

  people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them

  things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers

  killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he

  seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil

  commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and

  ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but

  leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked

  Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The

  Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to

  terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content

  with the possession of Africa.

  [*] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

  Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man

  will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune,

  inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence
, as is shown above, not by the

  favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which

  steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were

  afterwards boldly held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it

  cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends,

  to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may

  gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in

  entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered,

  together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming

  hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the

  most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and

  inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated

  among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed

  either to fortune or genius.

  In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da

  Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by

  his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his

  youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under

  his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military

  profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,

  and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body

  and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing

  a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of

  some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was

  dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to

  seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away

  from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in

  some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not

  laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the

  citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to

  come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his

  friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he

  should be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be

  not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had

  brought him up.

  Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,

  and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he

  lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and

  having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto

  gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the

  chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that

  are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began

  certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander

  and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse

  Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such

  matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook

  himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens

  went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued

  from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these

  murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town

  and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the

  people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he

  made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able

  to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military

  ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the

  principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had

  become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would

  have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed

  himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the

  Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year

  after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with

  Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness.

  Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after

  infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his

  country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be

  conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by

  means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold

  the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that

  this follows from severities[*] being badly or properly used. Those

  may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well,

  that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and

  that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the

  advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which,

  notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with

  time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are

  able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as

  Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to

  maintain themselves.

  [*] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern

  equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of "crudelta"

  than the more obvious "cruelties."

  Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought

  to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for

  him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to

  repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to

  reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does

  otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to

  keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor

  can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and

  repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so

  that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given

  little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

  And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in

  such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil,

  shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in

  troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones

  will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and

  no one will be under any obligation to you for them.

  CHAPTER IX

  CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

  But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the

  prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,

  but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil

  principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain

  to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a

  principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the

  favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties

>   are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be

  ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and

  oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises

  in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-

  government, or anarchy.

  A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,

  accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the

  nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the

  reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that

  under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,

  finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of

  one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his

  authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles

  maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the

  aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around

  him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can

  neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches

  sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around

  him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

  Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to

  others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their

  object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing

  to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to

  be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile

  people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can

  secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may

  expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from

  hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they

  will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-

  seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and

  to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the

  prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do

  well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them

  daily, and to give or wake away authority when it pleases him.

  Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to

  be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape

  their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or

  they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious,

  ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may

  be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through

  pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought

  to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and

  thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not

  have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun

  binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to

  themselves than to you, and a prince out to guard against such, and to

  fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they

  always help to ruin him.

  Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people

  ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they

  only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the

  people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above

  everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may

  easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when

  they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound

  more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more

  devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their

  favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as

  these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,