Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941

  95. Esnouf, pp. 214–15; Roberts, p. 218.

  96. Summarized in Lukacs, Five Days in London, pp. 141–5.

  97. See Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, p. 89.

  98. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, pp. 77, 80,.

  99. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp. 290–91 (27.5.40).

  100. John Colville, The Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955, London, 1985, pp. 140–41 (27.5.40).

  101. Borthwick Institute, University of York, Diary of Lord Halifax, A7.8.4, fol. 142 (27.5.40).

  102. For British perceptions of German economic crisis and social unrest, see Reynolds, ‘Churchill and the British "Decision” to Fight on in 1940’, pp. 157–9; and R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1994, pp. 208–12.

  103. PRO, Cab 65/13, fols. 175–81 (27.5.40); Bell, pp. 42–5; Esnouf, pp. 218–20; Lukacs, pp. 146–53; Roberts, pp. 219–20. Jonathan Knight, ‘Churchill and the Approach to Mussolini and Hitler in May 1940. A Note’, British Journal of International Studies, 3 (1977), pp. 92–6, also discusses this meeting of the War Cabinet, though (p. 93)–after misdating Halifax’s meeting with Bastianini to 26 rather than 25 May–he then appears to assume that it comprised the only discussion of the peace terms and mistakenly concludes: ‘it quickly became apparent that the Cabinet was opposed to making any approach to Mussolini.’

  104. Borthwick Institute, University of York, Diary of Lord Halifax, A7.8.4, p. 142 (27.5.40). Halifax voiced his anger and frustration to the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and also told him of his scarcely veiled resignation threat, saying he could not work with Churchill any longer. Cadogan’s response was: ‘Nonsense: his rhodomontades probably bore you as much as they do me, but don’t do anything silly under the stress of that.’ Before he did anything, Cadogan advised, he should consult Chamberlain. Halifax promised to do this, and added that, as Cadogan knew, he was not one to take hasty decisions (The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 291 (27.5.40)).

  105. See Roberts, pp. 220–21.

  106. Birmingham University Library, Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/24A, fol. 118 (27.5.40).

  107. Reynaud, p. 408, citing the account of William Phillips, the American ambassador in Rome.

  108. Ciano’s Diary 1939–1943, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge, London, 1947, p. 255 (27.5.40).

  109. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 291.

  110. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, pp. 84–6 (quotation p. 84).

  111. Reynaud, pp. 411–12; The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 371 (27.5.40).

  112. Birmingham University Library, Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/24A, fol. 119 (28.5.40).

  113. The following report of the discussion at the War Cabinet from PRO, Cab 65/13, fols. 184–90 (28.5.40); extracts in Lukacs, pp. 180–83.

  114. Hill, pp. 174–5. How far, in fact, Churchill himself believed that an eventual negotiated peace settlement was avoidable has been questioned by David Reynolds, ‘Churchill the Appeaser? Between Hitler, Roosevelt and Stalin in World War Two’, in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (eds.), Diplomacy and World Power. Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1950, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 211–15.

  115. Birmingham University Library, Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/24A, fol. 119 (28.5.40).

  116. Borthwick Institute, University of York, Diary of Lord Halifax, A7.8.4, p. 144 (28.5.40).

  117. His own views were outlined in an incomplete, undated and unsigned handwritten draft among Churchill’s papers, which was prepared around this time as the basis of his comments either to the War Cabinet or to the wider group of ministers whom he met on 28 May. In the draft, Churchill stated: ‘I cannot feel that the offer wh[ich] France is proposing to make to Mussolini will have the slightest influence upon the realities of the case [‘situation’ crossed out]’, continuing: ‘I fear that if we entered upon this path we sh[oul]d soon find that it lead [sic] to Mussolini being a mediator between us & Germany, & to an armistice & conference under the conditions of our being at Hitler’s mercy’ (PRO, Prem 3/174/4, fols. 11–13).

  118. A point made by Charmley, p. 405.

  119. The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940–1945, ed. Ben Pimlott, London, 1988, pp. 26, 28; also printed in The Churchill War Papers, vol. 2, pp. 182–4.

  120. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, pp. 87–8; and see Bell, pp. 46–8; Charmley, pp. 405–7; Lukacs, pp. 2–5, 183–4; Roberts, p. 225; and Roy Jenkins, Churchill, London, 2001, pp. 607–8.

  121. PRO, Cab 65/13, fols. 189–90 (28.5.40).

  122. PRO, Cab 65/13, fol. 189.

  123. The concession, which Churchill had made at the War Cabinet, of leaving open the possibility of mediation by Mussolini at some future date was the one worrying aspect of the reply in the eyes of Oliver Harvey, formerly private secretary to Anthony Eden and now at the British embassy in Paris. Harvey had evidently read between the lines of the telegram, or heard something of Halifax’s proposal: ‘It looks as if Halifax’, whom he had also served as private secretary, ‘may have evolved some scheme for mediation by Italy on an offer of terms of Hitler,’ he wrote. ‘Incredible though it sounds, I cannot put it past him. It would be fatal’ (The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 372 (29.5.40)).

  124. PRO, Cab 65/13, fols. 197–8; printed in Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, pp. 109–11, and Reynaud, pp. 412–13. See also Bell, p. 47; and Esnouf, 220–22.

  125. Reynaud, pp. 414–15; Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, p. 111.

  126. Ciano’s Diary, p. 263 (10.6.40).

  127. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, p. 102; Bell, p. 17. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms. A Global History of World War II, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 142–3, suggests that ‘only until it became obvious, as it did by May 28 and 29, that substantial numbers of the British Expeditionary Force could be extricated from the disaster on the continent, was there any willingness even to think about the possibility of peace. As evacuation became a reality, and it thus appeared possible to organize some defense of the home islands, all thought of a compromise vanished.’ But by 30 May no more than 120,000 men had been brought off the Dunkirk beaches (Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, p. 95), and even then organized successful home defence was far from assured. The decision not to entertain negotiation had been taken before there appeared to be any hope of rescuing almost the whole of the trapped army.

  128. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, pp. 103–4; and quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill 1939–1941, vol. 6: Finest Hour, paperback edn., London, 1983, pp. 464, 468.

  129. Quoted in Hill, p. 183. This did not, however, stop the speculation in Britain and abroad that a peace settlement would still be sought. The high point of the rumours and suspicions, which continued to circulate in June and July, came on the day of the French capitulation when an indiscretion by R. A. Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, reported by the Swedish chargé d’affaires in London, Bjorn Prytz, created a misleading impression (which soon leaked out) that Britain was ready to entertain a compromise peace. Prytz also passed on remarks from other Members of Parliament that Lord Halifax would soon replace Churchill as Prime Minister. For a reliable summary of the Butler–Prytz affair, see Ulrich Schlie, Kein Friede mit Deutschland. Die geheimen Gespräche im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1941, Munich/Berlin, 1994, pp. 214–16. Lukacs, pp. 203–4, provides a brief account, Costello, pp. 303–20, a longer one–though an interpretation much criticized in an unpublished paper, ‘The Political Beliefs of R. A. Butler’, by Patrick Higgins (which the author kindly allowed me to see).

  130. Hill (pp. 160–62) suggests that Halifax, despite his experience and seniority, was at a disadvantage not just–or even mainly–because of Churchill’s dynamism and force of personality, but because he was attempting to feel his way towards an argument in which a deal with Mussolini and a general settlement involving Hitler were not clearly separated, and in a War Cabinet
where he was opposed by the leader of the government while his other colleagues were initially undecided. Even so, this is another way of stating that the clearer–and more compelling–argument was on Churchill’s side.

  131. As Reynolds, ‘Churchill the Appeaser?’, p. 213, points out, though it was perhaps in part a debating gambit to show Halifax that he was not an unreasonable ‘diehard’, Churchill meant it.

  132. A point also recognized by Jenkins, p. 602.

  133. See Dalton’s recollection of what Churchill had said at the meeting of those ministers not in the War Cabinet on 28 May 1940, in The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, p. 28.

  134. Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 171.

  135. They were first fully examined by Philip Bell, in chapter 3 of A Certain Eventuality, thoroughly explored in chapters 7 and 8 of Esnouf’s doctoral thesis (which, remarkably, was never published), analysed by Reynolds, ‘Churchill and the British "Decision” to Fight on in 1940’, and by Hill (ch. 6), vividly described in Costello, chs. 9–10, again outlined, if briefly, in Roberts’s fine biography of Halifax (ch. 22), and made into a gripping book-length drama in Lukacs’ Five Days in London. The debt owed in this chapter to these works will be obvious.

  136. According to Costello, pp. 254–5, the evidence suggests that ‘Halifax was correct in his argument that Germany was prepared to offer terms that did not threaten British independence’. This is to misread Nazi intentions. Hitler’s expressions of his readiness to spare Britain and her Empire did not mean that he would have granted her the independence which Costello implies. Any independence would have been only of the sort accorded the Vichy regime in France, and then merely in the short term. It is an extremely naive view of Hitler’s long-term goals to presume that they allowed for the survival of Britain and her Empire as an independent power entity. In reality, satellite status dependent upon Germany would have been inevitable. A more balanced appraisal is provided by Reynolds, ‘Churchill the Appeaser?’, pp. 200–206.

  137. The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, p. 28.

  138. Lukacs, Five Days in London, p. 128; Nicolson, p. 166 (20.8.39).

  139. Birmingham University Library, Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/24A, fol. 119 (28.5.40). And see Dilks, pp. 82–3. Lukacs, p. 129, writes that ‘during the crucial days of late May Lloyd George’s name did not come up’. As Chamberlain’s diary entry indicates, it did.

  140. Reynolds, ‘Churchill and the British "Decision” to Fight on in 1940’, pp. 150–51.

  141. Schlie, p. 217.

  142. The German Foreign Office learned in mid-July 1940 from sources said to be close to the Duke of Windsor that he had described himself as a firm supporter of a peaceful settlement with Germany, and thought that continued strong bombing would make Britain amenable to negotiations (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, R29571, Fiche-Nr. 191, Frame B002546).

  CHAPTER 2. BERLIN, SUMMER AND AUTUMN 1940

  1. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942, vol. 2: Von der geplanten Landung in England bis zum Beginn des Ostfeldzuges (1.7.1940–21.6.1941), ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Stuttgart, 1963, p. 49 (31.7.40); trans. The Halder War Diary, 1939–1942, ed. and trans. Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, London, 1988, pp. 244–5.

  2. David Stevenson, Cataclysm. The First World War as Political Tragedy, New York, 2004, p. 107; Norman Davies, Europe. A History, Oxford, 1996, p. 903.

  3. Stephen Pope and Elizabeth-Anne Wheal, The Macmillan Dictionary of the First World War, London, 1995, p. 83.

  4. In a speech on 31 May 1921: Eberhard Jäckel and Axel Kuhn (eds.), Hitler. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905–1924, Stuttgart, 1980, p. 426.

  5. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 33; Barry A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia 1939–1941, Oxford, 1973, p. 58.

  6. Quoted in Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front. Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I, Cambridge, 2000, p. 278.

  7. Liulevicius, pp. 6–7.

  8. Jäckel and Kuhn, p. 773; trans. Geoffrey Stoakes, Hitler and the Quest for World Dominion, Leamington Spa, 1986, p. 137.

  9. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 876–880th reprint, Munich, 1943, pp. 741–3; trans. (slightly amended), Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Mannheim with an Introduction by D. C. Watt, paperback edn., London, 1973, pp. 597–8.

  10. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft, Tübingen, 1969, chs. 2–3.

  11. See Ernst Piper, Alfred Rosenberg. Hitlers Chefideologe, Munich, 2005, pp. 49, 57–8. The 20,000 or so ethnic Germans from the Baltic, settled in Germany after the war, particularly in and around Munich, had influence in rightist circles in the immediate postwar years disproportionate to their numbers. See Niall Ferguson, The War of the World. History’s Age of Hatred, London, 2006, illustration 11 (between pp. 122 and 123), for an example of the association of Jewish leadership of the Bolshevik Revolution and ‘Asiatic’ methods of brutality. Such imagery fed into the press of the extreme Right in Germany at this time.

  12. Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 741–3; trans. Mannheim (slightly amended), pp. 597–8.

  13. Hitler’s Second Book. The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg, New York, 2003, p. 28.

  14. Hitler’s Second Book, p. 152.

  15. Lew Besymenski, Stalin und Hitler. Das Pokerspiel der Diktatoren, Berlin, 2004, pp. 51–6.

  16. Thilo Vogelsang, ‘Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930–1933’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 2 (1954), pp. 434–5.

  17. For the term, see Martin Broszat, ‘Soziale Motivation und Führer-Bindung des Nationalsozialismus’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 18 (1970), p. 403.

  18. See Jost Dülffer, ‘Zum "decision-making process” in der deutschen Außenpolitik 1933–1939’, in Manfred Funke (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte: Materialen zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Düsseldorf, 1978, pp. 186–204.

  19. DGFP, 1, doc. 19, p. 29.

  20. Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945, Wiesbaden, 1973, p. 1446.

  21. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940, Stuttgart, 1969, p. 208.

  22. Domarus, p. 606.

  23. See Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London, 2006, chs. 7–9, esp. pp. 206–7, 250–59, 285–9, 293–4.

  24. See Timothy W. Mason, Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class, Cambridge, 1995, ch. 4, esp. pp. 128–9.

  25. Hans-Henning Abendroth, ‘Deutschlands Rolle im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg’, in Funke, Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte, 1978, pp. 477, 479.

  26. ‘Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan 1936’, ed. Wilhelm Treue, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1955), p. 205.

  27. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, ed. Elke Fröhlich, part I, vol. 3/II, Munich, 2001, p. 389 (23.2.37); part I, vol. 4, Munich, 2000, p. 214 (10.7.37).

  28. The emergence and conclusion of the pact are extensively surveyed in Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace. Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi–Soviet Pact 1939–1941, London, 1988.

  29. Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission 1937–1939, Munich, 1962, p. 272; trans. Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, London, 1973, p. 88. For doubts about the authenticity of the remarks, see Paul Stauffer, Zwischen Hofmannsthal und Hitler: Carl J. Burckhardt. Facetten einer aussergewöhnlichen Existenz, Zurich, 1991, pp. 178–201; and Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945. Nemesis, London, 2000, pp. 898–9 n. 118.

  30. See Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945, pp. 264–71, 290–91. For the number of new deadlines for the attack, see Milan Hauner, Hitler. A Chronology of his Life and Time, 2nd edn., Basingstoke/New York, 2005, p. 150.

  31. On peace-feelers around this time, see Bernd Martin, ‘Das “Dritte Reich” und die "Friedens”-Frage im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.)
, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, Darmstadt, 1978, pp. 534–7; and esp. Ulrich Schlie, Kein Friede mit Deutschland. Die geheimen Gespräche im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1941, Munich/Berlin, 1994, chs. 10, 12.

  32. Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–1945, Mainz, 1980, p. 242; Domarus, pp. 1540–59 for the speech, p. 1158 for the passage relating to Britain.

  33. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2: Their Finest Hour, London, 1949, pp. 229–30 for the British response.

  34. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 21 (13.7.40); trans. The Halder War Diary, p. 227.

  35. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, pp. 30–34 (22.7.40); trans. The Halder War Diary, pp. 230–32.

  36. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939–45, Novato, Calif., n.d. (original English-language edn., London, 1964), pp. 111–12.

  37. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, p. 188.

  38. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 49; trans. The Halder War Diary, p. 244.

  39. Tooze, pp. 402–3, p. 430, also emphasizes the strategic considerations involving Britain and the United States.

  40. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 33 (21.7.40).

  41. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, pp. 46–7 (30.7.40).

  42. Hitler still insisted on the correctness of his decision, for these reasons (and for posthumous justification), near the end of his life (Hitlers politisches Testament. Die Bormann Diktate vom Februar und April 1945, Hamburg, 1981, pp. 78–80).

  43. DRZW) vol. 4, 1983, pp. 99–106, 109.

  44. Quoted in DRZW, vol. 4, p. 110. See also Tooze, p. 420, and Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler’s War. Germany’s Key Strategic Decisions 1940–1945, London, 1998, pp. 63–4.

  45. DRZW, vol. 4, p. 113.