Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941

46. DRZW, vol. 4, pp. 9–10. And see Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945, p. 307 and p. 924 n. 157, for evidence which counters the view of Robert Cecil, Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia 1941, London, 1975, p. 74, that there is no indication of the generals anticipating Hitler’s wishes in planning the invasion of the Soviet Union, a point (correctly) asserted by Leach, p. 53.

  47. A point also made by Leach, p. 73, whose understanding of a ‘divided and uncertain’ military leadership is closer to the mark than Cecil’s claim (p. 76) that the leaders of the armed forces were ‘at one’ in that they did not want an invasion of Russia.

  48. A point also made by Magenheimer, pp. 44–5; Leach, p. 72, correctly points out, however, that the preparations continued unabated and that Hitler’s verbal orders of 31 July were confirmed in late September 1940.

  49. The naval leadership was not least anxious to emphasize that it had advanced an alternative which stood a good chance of success but had been spurned by Hitler’s insistence upon the attack on Russia (Erich Raeder, Mein Leben, Tübingen/Neckar, 1957, pp. 246–8, and Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, Wiesbaden, 1950, pp. 211–12). Raeder had already claimed his opposition to the Russian war, with reference to his audience with Hitler on 26 September, in his testimony at Nuremberg (Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg, 14 November 1945–1. Oktober 1946, 42 vols., Nuremberg, 1947–9, vol. 14, pp. 117–19). See also Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, pp. 271–2.

  50. The title of the early postwar classic by Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe, Wiesbaden, 1946.

  51. See Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941, 3rd edn., Bonn, 1993, pp. 190–91; Lothar Gruchmann, ‘Die “verpaßten strategischen Chancen” der Achsenmächte im Mittelmeerraum 1940/41’, Vierteljahrshefte fürgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 27/2 (1980), pp. 69–99; and Gerhard Schreiber’s contribution to DRZW, vol. 3, 1984, p. 270.

  52. Explicitly demonstrated by Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Zur Kontinuität des Großund Weltmachtstrebens der deutschen Marineführung’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 25/2 (1979), pp. 101–71.

  53. On the twin strands of German imperialism, see Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, New York/Oxford, 1986.

  54. See Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939, Düsseldorf, 1973, pp. 492 ff.

  55. BA/MA, Freiburg, RM6/71, ‘Gedanken des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine zum Kriegsausbruch 3.9.1939’; quoted in Salewski, vol. 1, p. 91, and in English translation in Charles S. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, London, 1990, p. 187.

  56. See Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, pp. 242–55; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘German Colonial Plans and Policies 1938–1942’, in Waldemar Besson and Friedrich Frhr. Hiller v. Gaertringen (eds.), Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewußtsein. Historische Betrachtungen und Untersuchungen, Göttingen, 1963, pp. 462–91; Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945, Munich, 1969, pp. 652–700; Salewski, vol. 1, pp. 234–41; Gerhard Schreiber, Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben. Marineführung und deutsch-italienische Beziehungen 1919 bis 1944, Stuttgart, 1978, pp. 288–97; and DRZW, vol. 3, pp. 250–71.

  57. Salewski, vol. 3, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, pp. 106–8; DRZW, vol. 3, pp. 254–5.

  58. Salewski, vol. 3, pp. 108–14; DRZW, vol. 3, pp. 255–6. And see the two additional memoranda from this period (Salewski, vol. 3, pp. 114–18), and a further memorandum of 4 July 1940 (pp. 122–35) outlining the implications of the massive territorial expansion for the growth of the fleet.

  59. BA/MA, RM6/83, printed in Schreiber, ‘Zur Kontinuität’, pp. 142–7; DRZW, vol. 3, pp. 257–8.

  60. Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über die Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes 1939–1941, ed. Andreas Hillgruber, paperback edn., Munich, 1969, p. 102 (Hitler’s remarks to Serrano Suñer, at the time Minister of the Interior in Spain, shortly afterwards to become Foreign Minister, 17.9.40).

  61. BA/MA, RM7/894, ‘Studie Nordwest (Landung in England)’, dated December 1939, considered possibilities of a landing in Great Britain, indicating beaches which might come into question, the difficulties of coastal lines, and other factors. Raeder reported the findings–based, he said, on analysis that had begun the previous November–to Hitler on 21 May 1940 (Karl Klee (ed.), Dokumente zum Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe’. Die geplante deutsche Landung in England 1940, Göttingen, 1959, p. 239).

  62. Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, ed. Werner Rahn and Gerhard Schreiber, Herford/Bonn, 1989 (= KTB der Seekriegsleitung), vol. 10, part A (mimeographed reproduction from BA/MA, 7/13), p. 186 (18.6.40).

  63. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, pp. 157–8.

  64. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, pp. 169–71.

  65. KTB der Seekriegsleitung, vol. 11, part A (= BA/MA, 7/14), p. 190 (19.7.40), pp. 219–24 (19.7.40). And see Salewski, vol. 1, pp. 58–9.

  66. KTB der Seekriegsleitung, vol. 11, part A, p. 201 (18.7.40).

  67. KTB der Seekriegsleitung, vol. 12, part A, (= BA/MA, 7/15), p. 3 (1.8.40).

  68. KTB der Seekriegsleitung, vol. 12, part A, pp. 353–4 (30.8.40).

  69. KTB der Seekriegsleitung, vol. 12, part A, pp. 354–6 (30.7.40), pp. 364–5 (31.7.40); Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939–1945, ed. Gerhard Wagner, Munich, 1972, pp. 126–8 (31.7.40).

  70. Karl Klee, Das Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe’. Die geplante deutsche Landung in England 1940, Göttingen, 1958, p. 205.

  71. Salewski, vol. 1, pp. 259–60.

  72. Salewski, vol. 1, pp. 275–6.

  73. KTB der Seekriegsleitung, vol. 11, part A, pp. 236–9 (21.7.40).

  74. Salewski, vol. 3, pp. 137–44.

  75. Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, pp. 78–9.

  76. KTB d. OKW, vol. 1, 1965, pp. 17–18, 31–2 (9.8.40, 14.8.40); Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, pp. 78–9.

  77. BA/MA, RM7/233, fols. 78–85: ‘Kriegführung gegen England bei Ausfall der Unternehmung "Seelöwe”’; printed in Lagevorträge, pp. 138–41 (6.9.40). See also Schreiber, Revisionismus, pp. 281–2.

  78. BA/MA, RM7/233, fols. 83–4.

  79. On the destroyer deal, see Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, chapter 20; also John Lukacs, The Duel. Hitler vs. Churchill, Oxford, 1992, pp. 225–7; and Chapter 5 below.

  80. DRZW, vol. 3, pp. 192–4; Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, p. 80.

  81. Lagevorträge, pp. 134–41 (6.9.40). Curiously, the passage on ‘Problem S’ is omitted in the translated Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939–1945, London, 1990, p. 135.

  82. Lagevorträge, pp. 143–6 (26.9.40); Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, p. 81; DRZW, vol. 3, pp. 199–201; Gruchmann, p. 463.

  83. He nevertheless put the arguments for full cooperation with France less forcefully than they had been advanced within the Naval Warfare Executive. See BA/MA, RM8/1209, ‘Die Bemühungen der Skl. um einen Ausgleich mit Frankreich und um die Sicherstellung des französischen Kolonialreiches in Afrika’, draft analysis of Vice-Admiral Kurt Assmann. Compiled in 1944, this was intended to absolve the Seekriegsleitung (Naval Warfare Executive) from responsibility for the disastrous course of the war. It nonetheless points up the divergence in strategic preference. In the introduction (fol. 11), Assmann wrote: ‘The problem of a French-German understanding and the upholding of the French colonial empire in north and west Africa was one of the fateful questions of this war. In dealing with this issue, the decisions and actions of the supreme German leadership were not in accord with the views of the Skl. The Skl. correctly foresaw the coming development, repeatedly warned against it, and tried to convey its view.’

  84. KTB d. Seekriegsleitung, vol. 13, part A (= BA/MA, 7/16), p. 352 (26.9.40), ‘Führer agrees in principle with the ideas of the head of the Naval Warfare Executive’ (‘Führer stimmt den Ge
dankengängen des Chefs Skl. grundsätzlich zu’). See also Raeder, pp. 246–8 and Assmann, pp. 211–12, though, in fact, Hitler’s reported remarks to his naval adjutant were ambivalent–that Raeder’s comments to him had been most valuable in that it served as a control on his own views, to see ‘if he was right’.

  85. Lagevorträge, pp. 143–4 (26.9.40).

  86. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 124 (3.10.40).

  87. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, pp. 178, 190; Wolfgang Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933–1940, Munich, 1980, pp. 247–59.

  88. Wolfgang Michalka, ‘Vom Antikominternpakt zum euro-asiatischen Kontinentalblock. Ribbentrops Alternativkonzeption zu Hitlers außenpolitischen "Programm”’, in Michalka, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, pp. 490–91.

  89. Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Der Faktor Amerika in Hitlers Strategie 1938–1941’, in Michalka, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, p. 513.

  90. Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, p. 80; DRZW, vol. 3, p. 194.

  91. Hillgruber, ‘Amerika’, pp. 512–13.

  92. Staatsmänner, pp. 112–13.

  93. Reports of the discussions in Staatsmänner, pp. 104–23; and Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge, London, 1948, pp. 395–9.

  94. Staatsmänner, pp. 132–40; and see Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler. The Myth of Hendaye 1940’, Contemporary European History, 1 (1992), pp. 1–16.

  95. Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, ed. Leonidas E. Hill, Frankfurt am Main, 1974, p. 221 (21.10.40)–before Hitler’s meeting with Franco. Hitler retrospectively asserted that he recognized the limited strategic value of Spanish intervention: the acquisition of Gibraltar, but also of much Atlantic coastline that would have needed defending (Hitlers politisches Testament, p. 60). For the extent of Spanish demands, see Elena Henández-Sandoica and Enrique Moradiellos, ‘Spain and the Second World War, 1939–1945’, in Neville Wylie (ed.), European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 251–3.

  96. Staatsmänner, pp. 142–9.

  97. Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, pp. 220–21 (21.10.40).

  98. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms. A Global History of World War II, Cambridge, 1994, p. 206. Towards the end of his life (Hitlers politisches Testament, p. 73), Hitler regarded Germany’s lenient treatment of Vichy France as ‘complete nonsense’ (vollkommener Unsinn).

  99. Below, p. 250.

  100. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, pp. 163–6 (4.11.40), quotation p. 165; KTBd. OKW, vol. 1, pp. 148–52 (4.11.40).

  101. Warlimont, p. 120; Donald S. Detwiler, Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar. Die Frage des spanischen Eintritts in den Zweiten Weltkrieg, Wiesbaden, 1962, pp. 68–79; DRZW, vol. 3, pp. 205–7; Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, pp. 84–5; Gruchmann, p. 466.

  102. For the talks, see Staatsmänner, 165–93.

  103. Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, ed. Walther Hubatsch, paperback edn., Munich, 1965, pp. 77–82.

  104. Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnugen des Majors Engel, ed. Hildegard von Kotze, Stuttgart, 1974, p. 91 (15.11.40).

  105. Lagevorträge, pp. 151–5, 160–63 (14.11.40); Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, pp. 86–7.

  106. Schreiber, ‘Der Mittelmeerraum’, p. 87.

  107. Below, p. 253.

  108. KTB d. OKW, vol. 1, pp. 208–9 (5.12.40).

  109. KTB d. OKW, vol. 1, p. 222 (10.12.40); Hitlers Weisungen, p. 90.

  110. KTB d. OKW, vol. 1, p. 255 (9.1.41). On 28 January (p. 284), he accepted that there was no possibility of renewing preparations to take Gibraltar, which he momentarily envisaged taking place in April, because troops were needed for ‘Barbarossa’. Even in mid-February, he was exhorting Franco to reconsider his decision not to enter the war (Domarus, p. 1666).

  111. Hitlers Weisungen, p. 96.

  112. In the eyes of the navy leadership, the chance to exploit British weakness in the Mediterranean was still not exhausted in spring 1941, following the German landing in Crete and Rommel’s successes in north Africa (Lagevorträge, pp. 240, 258–62 (6.6.41); Gruchmann, pp. 471–4). By this time, however, there was not a shadow of doubt about Hitler’s priorities. Preparations for the imminent ‘Barbarossa’ took such precedence that, unlike autumn 1940, any strategic alternative existed purely in theory.

  113. KTB d. OKW, vol. 1, p. 996 (17.12.40).

  114. Hitler pointed this out to Mussolini during their meeting on 4 October 1940 (Staatsmänner, p. 115).

  115. Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–45. Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetchers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas, Bonn, 1953, pp. 516–17; Heeresadjutant, p. 88 (28.10.40).

  116. By the end of 1940, in duress, Mussolini reversed his earlier objections to an increase in French strength in the Mediterranean and had come to favour an arrangement between Germany and France (Weinberg, A World at Arms, p. 214 n. a). But by then the strategic situation was different to that of the preceding October, when Hitler and Pétain had met. Most importantly, the decision to attack Russia had been confirmed. The Mediterranean was now for Hitler–though this had not always been the case–a sideshow.

  117. This remained his view as the end of the Third Reich approached (Hitlers politisches Testament, pp. 78–80). Hitler, unlike others in the Nazi leadership, was never interested in increased trade with the Soviet Union as an alternative to military conquest. On this, see the interesting study by Heinrich Schwendemann, Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion von 1939 bis 1941. Alternative zu Hitlers Ostprogramm?, Berlin, 1993, esp. pp. 355–7.

  118. Warlimont, p. 115.

  119. Warlimont, pp. 257–8, for Jodl’s uncritical admiration of Hitler; see also Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945, p. 533.

  120. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, p. 21 (13.7.40).

  121. Alfred Kube, Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz. Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1986, pp. 336–7.

  122. Warlimont, p. 118.

  123. There is, therefore, a certain unreality to Magenheimer’s conclusion, pp. 69–71 (quotation p. 70), that ‘the critical omission on the German side…was not to have shifted the temporary strategic focus to the Mediterranean in the summer of 1940’.

  124. Fedor von Bock, The War Diary 1939–1945, ed. Klaus Gerbet, Atglen, Pa., 1996, pp. 197–8 (1.2.41); KTB d. OKW, vol. 1, p. 300 (3.2.41).

  CHAPTER 3. TOKYO, SUMMER AND AUTUMN 1940

  1. Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy 1869–1942, London, 1977, pp. 133–42; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, London/New York, 1987, pp. 2–4; Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919–1933, Oxford, 2005, pp. 375–7, 708–10.

  2. See Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific. An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations, New York, 1967, pp. 208–9; Roger D. Spotswood, ‘Japan’s Southward Advance as an Issue in Japanese-American Relations, 1940–1941’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1974, p. 20. Joyce C. Lebra, Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II. Selected Readings and Documents, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, pp. 3–54, provides extracts from contemporary writings illustrating differing concepts of Japanese economic dominance of the region.

  3. For a detailed analysis of the background, from Japanese sources, Seki Hiroharu, ‘The Manchurian Incident 1931’, in James William Morley (ed.), Japan Erupts. The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident 1928–1932, New York, 1984, pp. 139–230.

  4. For an extensive analysis of the way the field army’s expansionist aims propelled Japan towards war with China, see Shimada Toshihiko, ‘Designs on North China 1933–1937’, in James William Morley (ed.), The China Quagmire. Japan’s Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933–1941, New York, 1983, pp. 11–230.

  5. Text in Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War (Part I), Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Japanese Monograp
hs, 144, appendix 1 (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/144/144app01.html); Iriye, Origins, pp. 34–5; Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, London, 2001, pp. 308–12.

  6. See Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, New York, 1944, pp. 169–78, the account of the American ambassador, who was on the spot; also Iriye, Origins, p. 33; Bix, pp. 297–306; Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan from Tokugawa Times to the Present, New York/Oxford, 2003, p. 198; and for a vivid description, John Toland, The Rising Sun. The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945, New York, 1970, Modern Library edn., 2003, ch. 1.

  7. Imai Seiichi, ‘Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen’, in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History. Japanese-American Relations 1931–1941, New York, 1973, p. 66; Iriye, Origins, p. 34. Nish, pp. 215–16, brings out the way in which the Foreign Ministry was ‘outpointed’ by the military and started to play a less significant role. According to Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, Princeton, 1961, p. 86, the Cabinet of Hirota Koki, which entered office after the attempted coup of February 1936, ‘can hardly be regarded as an unwilling tool of the imperial army and navy’.

  8. Iriye, Origins, pp. 37–9.

  9. See, for a detailed analysis, Hata Ikuhiko, ‘The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937’, in Morley, The China Quagmire, pp. 243–86.

  10. Bix, p. 320.

  11. Quoted in Bix, p. 322.

  12. Bix, pp. 325–6.

  13. Iriye, Origins, p. 45.

  14. Bix, p. 332.

  15. Bix, pp. 334–5.

  16. See Bix, pp. 340–41.

  17. Iriye, Across the Pacific, pp. 178–9.

  18. Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War (Part I), Japanese Monographs, 144, appendix 11 (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/144/144app11.html).

  19. Bix, p. 345.

  20. Bix, p. 346.

  21. Iriye, Origins, p. 67.

  22. Iriye, Origins, p. 68.

  23. Akira Iriye, Power and Culture. The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, p. 6.

  24. Bix, p. 353.

  25. David Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, New York, 1971, vol. 2, p. 908; Iriye, Origins, pp. 76–7; Spotswood, pp. 32–4.