fully certain.

  Of late years it has been the fashion to talk about Gandhi as though he were not only sympathetic to the western left-wing movement, but were even integrally part of it. Anarchists and pacifists, in particular, have claimed him for their own, noticing only that he was opposed to centralism and State violence and ignoring the otherworldly, anti-humanist tendency of his doctrines.

  But one should, I think, realize that Gandhi's teachings cannot be squared with the belief that Man is the measure of all

  things, and that our job is to make life worth living on this earth, which is the only earth we have. They make sense only

  on the assumption that God exists and that the world of solid objects is an illusion to be escaped from. It is worth considering the disciplines which Gandhi imposed on himself and which - though he might not insist on every one of his followers observing every detail - he considered indispensable if one wanted to serve either God or humanity. First of all, no meat eating, and

  if possible no animal food in any form. (Gandhi himself, for the sake of his health, had to compromise on milk, but seems

  to have felt this to be a backsliding.) No alcohol or tobacco, and no spices or condiments, even of a vegetable kind, since

  food should be taken not for its own sake, but solely in order to preserve one's strength. Secondly, if possible, no sexual

  intercourse. If sexual intercourse must happen, then it should be for the sole purpose of begetting children and presumably

  at long intervals. Gandhi himself, in his middle thirties, took the vow of bramahcharya, which means not only complete chastity but the elimination of sexual desire. This condition, it seems, is difficult to attain without a special diet and frequent fasting. One of the dangers of milk drinking is that it is apt to arouse sexual desire.

  And finally - this is the cardinal point - for the seeker after goodness there must be no close friendships and no exclusive

  loves whatever.

  Close friendships, Gandhi says, are dangerous, because 'friends react on one another' and through loyalty to a friend one can be led into wrong-doing. This is unquestionably true. Moreover, if one is to love God, or to love humanity as a whole,

  one cannot give one's preference to any individual person. This again is true, and it marks the point at which the humanistic

  and the religious attitudes cease to be reconcilable. To an ordinary human being, love means nothing if it does not mean loving some people more than others. The autobiography leaves it uncertain whether Gandhi behaved in an inconsiderate way to his

  wife and children, but at any rate it makes clear that on three occasions he was willing to let his wife or a child die rather than administer the animal food prescribed by the doctor. It is true that the threatened death never actually occurred, and

  also that Gandhi - with, one gathers, a good deal of moral pressure in the opposite direction - always gave the patient the

  choice of staying alive at the price of committing a sin: still, if the decision had been solely his own, he would have forbidden the animal food, whatever the risks might be. There must, he says, be some limit to what we will do in order to remain alive,

  and the limit is well on this side of chicken broth. This attitude is perhaps a noble one, but in the sense which - I think

  - most people would give to the word, it is inhuman. The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable

  price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals. No doubt alcohol, tobacco and so forth are things that a saint

  must avoid, but sainthood is also a thing that human beings must avoid. There is an obvious retort to this, but one should

  be wary about making it. In this yogi-ridden age, it is too readily assumed that 'non-attachment' is not only better than

  a full acceptance of earthly life, but that the ordinary man only rejects it because it is too difficult: in other words,

  that the average human being is a failed saint. It is doubtful whether this is true. Many people genuinely do not wish to

  be saints, and it is probable that some who achieve or aspire to sainthood have never felt much temptation to be human beings.

  If one could follow it to its psychological roots, one would, I believe, find that the main motive for 'non-attachment' is

  a desire to escape from the pain of living, and above all from love, which, sexual or non-sexual, is hard work. But it is

  not necessary here to argue whether the otherworldly or the humanistic ideal is 'higher'. The point is that they are incompatible.

  One must choose between God and Man, and all 'radicals' and 'progressives', from the mildest Liberal to the most extreme Anarchist, have in effect chosen Man.

  However, Gandhi's pacifism can be separated to some extent from his other teachings. Its motive was religious, but he claimed also for it that it was a definite technique, a method, capable of producing desired political results. Gandhi's attitude

  was not that of most western pacifists. Satyagraha, first evolved in South Africa, was a sort of non-violent warfare, a way of defeating the enemy without hurting him and without feeling or arousing hatred. It entailed such things as civil disobedience, strikes, lying down in front of railway trains, enduring police charges without running away and without hitting back, and the like. Gandhi objected to 'passive resistance' as a translation

  of Satyagraha: in Gujarati, it seems, the word means 'firmness in the truth'. In his early days Gandhi served as a stretcher-bearer on the British side in the Boer War, and he was prepared to do the same again in the war of 1914-18. Even after he had completely abjured violence he was honest enough to see that in war it is usually necessary to take sides. He did not - indeed, since

  his whole political life centred round a struggle for national independence, he could not - take the sterile and dishonest

  line of pretending that in every war both sides are exactly the same and it makes no difference who wins. Nor did he, like

  most western pacifists, specialize in avoiding awkward questions. In relation to the late war, one question that every pacifist had a clear obligation to answer was: 'What about the Jews? Are you prepared to see them exterminated? If not, how do you

  propose to save them without resorting to war?' I must say that I have never heard, from any western pacifist, an honest answer to this question, though I have heard plenty of evasions, usually of the 'you're another' type. But it so happens that Gandhi

  was asked a somewhat similar question in 1938 and that his answer is on record in Mr Louis Fischer's Gandhi and Stalin. According to Mr Fischer Gandhi's view was that the German Jews ought to commit collective suicide, which 'would have aroused the world and the people of Germany to Hitler's violence'. After the war he justified himself: the Jews had been killed anyway, and might as well have died significantly. One has the impression that this attitude staggered even so warm an admirer as Mr Fischer, but Gandhi was merely being honest.

  If you are not prepared to take life, you must often be prepared for lives to be lost in some other way. When, in 1942, he

  urged non-violent resistance against a Japanese invasion, he was ready to admit that it might cost several million deaths.

  At the same time there is reason to think that Gandhi, who after all was born in 1869, did not understand the nature of totalitarianism and saw everything in terms of his own struggle against the British Government. The important point here is not so much that

  the British treated him forbearingly as that he was always able to command publicity. As can be seen from the phrase quoted

  above, he believed in 'arousing the world', which is only possible if the world gets a chance to hear what you are doing.

  It is difficu
lt to see how Gandhi's methods could be applied in a country where opponents of the regime disappear in the middle of the night and are never heard of again. Without a free press and the right of assembly, it is impossible not merely to

  appeal to outside opinion, but to bring a mass movement into being, or even to make your intentions known to your adversary.

  Is there a Gandhi in Russia at this moment? And if there is, what is he accomplishing? The Russian masses could only practise

  civil disobedience if the same idea happened to occur to all of them simultaneously, and even then, to judge by the history

  of the Ukraine famine, it would make no difference. But let it be granted that non-violent resistance can be effective against one's own government, or against an occupying power: even so, how does one put it into practice internationally? Gandhi's

  various conflicting statements on the late war seem to show that he felt the difficulty of this. Applied to foreign politics,

  pacifism either stops being pacifist or becomes appeasement. Moreover the assumption, which served Gandhi so well in dealing with individuals, that all human beings are more or less approachable and will respond to a generous gesture, needs to be seriously questioned. It is

  not necessarily true, for example, when you are dealing with lunatics. Then the question becomes: Who is sane? Was Hitler

  sane? And is it not possible for one whole culture to be insane by the standards of another? And, so far as one can gauge

  the feelings of whole nations, is there any apparent connexion between a generous deed and a friendly response? Is gratitude

  a factor in international politics?

  These and kindred questions need discussion, and need it urgently, in the few years left to us before somebody presses the button and the rockets begin to fly. It seems doubtful whether civilization can stand another major war, and it is at least

  thinkable that the way out lies through non-violence. It is Gandhi's virtue that he would have been ready to give honest consideration to the kind of question that I have raised above; and indeed, he probably did discuss most of these questions somewhere or

  other in his innumerable newspaper articles. One feels of him that there was much that he did not understand, but not that

  there was anything that he was frightened of saying or thinking. I have never been able to feel much liking for Gandhi, but

  I do not feel sure that as a political thinker he was wrong in the main, nor do I believe that his life was a failure. It

  is curious that when he was assassinated, many of his warmest admirers exclaimed sorrowfully that he had lived just long enough to see his life work in ruins, because India was engaged in a civil war which had always been foreseen as one of the by-products of the transfer of power. But it was not in trying to smooth down Hindu-Moslem rivalry that Gandhi had spent his life. His main political objective, the peaceful ending of British rule, had after all been attained. As usual, the relevant facts cut across one another. On the one hand, the British did get out of India without fighting, an event which very few

  observers indeed would have predicted until about a year before it happened. On the other hand, this was done by a Labour

  Government, and it is certain that a Conservative Government, especially a government headed by Churchill, would have acted

  differently. But if, by 1945, there had grown up in Britain a large body of opinion sympathetic to Indian independence, how

  far was this due to Gandhi's personal influence? And if, as may happen, India and Britain finally settle down into a decent

  and friendly relationship, will this be partly because Gandhi, by keeping up his struggle obstinately and without hatred,

  disinfected the political air? That one even thinks of asking such questions indicates his stature. One may feel, as I do,

  a sort of aesthetic distaste for Gandhi, one may reject the claims of sainthood made on his behalf (he never made any such

  claim himself, by the way), one may also reject sainthood as an ideal and therefore feel that Gandhi's basic aims were anti-human and reactionary: but regarded simply as a politician, and compared with the other leading political figures of our time, how

  clean a smell he has managed to leave behind!

  1949

  Politics and the English Language

  Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilization is decadent, and our language - so the arguments runs - must inevitably share in the general collapse. It follows that any struggle against the abuse of language is a sentimental archaism, like preferring candles to electric light of hansom cabs to aeroplanes. Underneath this lies the half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes.

  Now, it is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes: it is not due simply to the bad influences of this or that individual writer. But an effect can become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same effect in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely. A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts. The point is that the process is reversible. Modern English, especially written English, is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think clearly is a necessary first step towards political regeneration: so that the fight against bad English is not frivolous and is not the exclusive concern of professional writers. I will come back to this presently, and I hope that by that time the meaning of what I have said here will have become clearer. Meanwhile, here are five specimens of the English language as it is now habitually written.

  These five passages have not been picked out because they are especially bad - I could have quoted far worse if I had chosen - but because they illustrate various of the mental vices from which we now suffer. They are a little below the average, but are fairly representative samples. I number them so I can refer back to them when necessary:

  1. I am not, indeed, sure whether it is not true to say that the Milton who once seemed not unlike a seventeenth-century Shelley had not become, out of an experience ever more bitter in each year, more alien (sic) to the founder of that Jesuit sect which nothing could induce him to tolerate.

  Professor Harold Laski (Essay in Freedom of Expression)

  2. Above all, we cannot play ducks and drakes with a native battery of idioms which prescribes such egregious collocations of vocables as the Basic put up with for tolerate or put at a loss for bewilder.

  Professor Lancelot Hogben (Interglossa).

  3. On the one side we have the free personality: by definition it is not neurotic, for it has neither conflict nor dream. Its desires, such as they are, are transparent, for they are just what institutional approval keeps in the forefront of consciousness; another institutional pattern would alter their number and intensity; there is little in them that is natural, irreducible, or culturally dangerous. But on the other side, the social bond itself is nothing but the mutual reflection of these self-secure integrities. Recall the definition of love. Is not this the very picture of a small academic? Where is there a place in this hall of mirrors for either personality or fraternity?

  Essay on psychology in Politics (New York).

  4. All the 'best people' from the gentlemen's clubs, and all the frantic Fascist captains, united in common hatred of Socialism and bestial horror of the rising tide of the mass revolutionary movement, have turned to acts of provocation, to foul incendiarism, to medieval legends of poisoned wells, to legalize the
ir own destruction to proletarian organizations, and rouse the agitated petty-bourgeoisie to chauvinistic fervour on behalf of the fight against the revolutionary way out of the crisis.

  Communist pamphlet.

  5. If a new spirit is to be infused into this old country, there is one thorny and contentious reform which must be tackled, and that is the humanization and galvanization of the B.B.C. Timidity here will bespeak canker and atrophy of the soul. The heart of Britain may be sound and of strong beat, for instance, but the British lion's roar at present is like that of Bottom in Shakespeare's Midsummer Night's Dream - as gentle as any sucking dove. A virile new Britain cannot continue indefinitely to be traduced in the eyes, or rather ears, of the world by the effete languors of Langham Place, brazenly masquerading as 'standard English'. When the Voice of Britain is heard at nine o'clock, better far and infinitely less ludicrous to hear aitches honestly dropped than the present priggish, inflated, inhibited, school-ma'amish arch braying of blameless, bashful mewing maidens!

  Letter in Tribune.

  Each of these passages has faults of its own, but, quite apart from avoidable ugliness, two qualities are common to all of them. The first is staleness of imagery: the other is lack of precision. The writer either has a meaning and cannot express it, or he inadvertently says something else, or he is almost indifferent as to whether his words mean anything or not. This mixture of vagueness and sheer incompetence is the most marked characteristic of modern English prose, and especially of any kind of political writing. As soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of words chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more of phrases tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-house. I list below, with notes and examples, various of the tricks by means of which the work of prose construction is habitually dodged:

  Dying metaphors. A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically 'dead' (e.g. iron resolution) has in effect reverted to being an ordinary word and can generally be used without loss of vividness. But in between these two classes there is a huge dump of worn-out metaphors which have lost all evocative power and are merely used because they save people the trouble of inventing phrases for themselves. Examples are: Ring the changes on, take up the cudgels for, toe the line, ride roughshod over, stand shoulder to shoulder with, play into the hands of, no axe to grind, grist to the mill, fishing in troubled waters, rift within the lute, on the order of the day, Achilles' heel, swan song, hotbed. Many of these are used without knowledge of their meaning (what is a 'rift', for instance?), and incompatible metaphors are frequently mixed, a sure sign that the writer is not interested in what he is saying. Some metaphors now current have been twisted out of their original meaning without those who use them even being aware of the fact. For example, toe the line is sometimes written tow the line. Another example is the hammer and the anvil, now always used with the implication that the anvil gets the worst of it. In real life it is always the anvil that breaks the hammer, never the other way about: a writer who stopped to think what he was saying would be aware of this, and would avoid perverting the original phrase.