Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Epigraph
Preface
Chapter 1 - A FOREIGN COUNTRY
Chapter 2 - THE PACIFICATION PROCESS
Chapter 3 - THE CIVILIZING PROCESS
Chapter 4 - THE HUMANITARIAN REVOLUTION
Chapter 5 - THE LONG PEACE
Chapter 6 - THE NEW PEACE
Chapter 7 - THE RIGHTS REVOLUTIONS
Chapter 8 - INNER DEMONS
Chapter 9 - BETTER ANGELS
Chapter 10 - ON ANGELS’ WINGS
NOTES
REFERENCES
INDEX
ALSO BY STEVEN PINKER
ALSO BY STEVEN PINKER
Language Learnability and Language Development
Learnability and Cognition
The Language Instinct
How the Mind Works
Words and Rules
The Blank Slate
The Stuff of Thought
EDITED BY STEVEN PINKER
Visual Cognition
Connections and Symbols (with Jacques Mehler)
Lexical and Conceptual Semantics (with Beth Levin)
The Best American Science and Nature Writing 2004
VIKING
Published by the Penguin Group
Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A. • Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4P 2Y3 (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.) • Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2RoRL, England • Penguin Ireland, 25 St. Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd) • Penguin Books Australia Ltd, 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) • Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi—110 017, India • Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, Auckland 0632, New Zealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd) • Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196, South Africa
Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R oRL, England
First published in 2011 by Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
Copyright © Steven Pinker, 2011
All rights reserved
Excerpts from “MLF Lullaby,” “Who’s Next?,” and “In Old Mexico” by Tom Lehrer.
Excerpt from “It Depends on What You Pay” by Tom Jones.
Excerpt from “Feel Like I’m Fixin’ to Die Rag,” words and music by Joe McDonald. © 1965, renewed 1933 by Alkatraz Corner Music Co.
LIBRARY OF CONGRES CATALOGING -IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Pinker, Steven, 1954–
The better angels of our nature: why violence has declined / Steven Pinker. p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN : 978-1-101-54464-8
1. Violence—Psychological aspects. 2. Violence—Social aspects. 3. Nonviolence—Psychological aspects. I. Title.
HM1116.P57 2011
303.609—dc22
2011015201
Charts rendered by Ilavenil Subbiah
Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.
The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrightable materials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated.
http://us.penguingroup.com
TO
Eva, Carl, and Eric
Jack and David
Yael and Danielle
and the world they will inherit
What a chimera then is man! What a novelty, what a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all things, feeble earthworm, repository of truth, sewer of uncertainty and error, the glory and the scum of the universe.
—Blaise Pascal
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1–1 Everyday violence in a bodybuilding ad, 1940s 25
1–2 Domestic violence in a coffee ad, 1952 26
2–1 The violence triangle 35
2–2 Percentage of deaths in warfare in nonstate and state societies 49
2–3 Rate of death in warfare in nonstate and state societies 53
2–4 Homicide rates in the least violent nonstate societies compared to
state societies 55
3–1 Homicide rates in England, 1200–2000: Gurr’s 1981 estimates 60
3–2 Homicide rates in England, 1200–2000 61
3–3 Homicide rates in five Western European regions, 1300–2000 63
3–4 Homicide rates in Western Europe, 1300–2000, and in
nonstate societies 64
3–5 Detail from “Saturn,” Das Mittelalterliche Hausbuch
(The Medieval Housebook, 1475–80) 65
3–6 Detail from “Mars,” Das Mittelalterliche Hausbuch
(The Medieval Housebook, 1475–80) 66
3–7 Percentage of deaths of English male aristocrats from violence, 1330–1829 81
3–8 Geography of homicide in Europe, late 19th and early 21st centuries 86
3–9 Geography of homicide in the world, 2004 88
3–10 Homicide rates in the United States and England, 1900–2000 92
3–11 Geography of homicide in the United States, 2007 93
3–12 Homicide rates in England, 1300–1925, and New England, 1630–1914 95
3–13 Homicide rates in the northeastern United States, 1636–1900 96
3–14 Homicide rates among blacks and whites in New York
and Philadelphia, 1797–1952 97
3–15 Homicide rates in the southeastern United States, 1620–1900 98
3–16 Homicide rates in the southwestern United States and California, 1830–1914 104
3–17 Flouting conventions of cleanliness and propriety in the 1960s 112
3–18 Homicide rates in the United States, 1950–2010, and Canada, 1961–2009 117
3–19 Homicide rates in five Western European countries, 1900–2009 118
4–1 Torture in medieval and early modern Europe 131
4–2 Time line for the abolition of judicial torture 149
4–3 Time line for the abolition of capital punishment in Europe 150
4–4 Execution rate in the United States, 1640–2010 151
4–5 Executions for crimes other than homicide in the United States, 1650–2002 152
4–6 Time line for the abolition of slavery 156
4–7 Real income per person in England, 1200–2000 171
4–8 Efficiency in book production in England, 1470–1860s 172
4–9 Number of books in English published per decade, 1475–1800 173
4–10 Literacy rate in England, 1625–1925 174
5–1 Two pessimistic possibilities for historical trends in war 191
5–2 Two less pessimistic possibilities for historical trends in war 192
5–3 100 worst wars and atrocities in human history 197
5–4 Historical myopia: Centimeters of text per century in a historical almanac 199
5–5 Random and nonrandom pat
terns 205
5–6 Richardson’s data 205
5–7 Number of deadly quarrels of different magnitudes, 1820–1952 211
5–8 Probabilities of wars of different magnitudes, 1820–1997 212
5–9 Heights of males (a normal or bell-curve distribution) 213
5–10 Populations of cities (a power-law distribution), plotted on linear and log scales 214
5–11 Total deaths from quarrels of different magnitudes 221
5–12 Percentage of years in which the great powers fought one another, 1500–2000 224
5–13 Frequency of wars involving the great powers, 1500–2000 225
5–14 Duration of wars involving the great powers, 1500–2000 226
5–15 Deaths in wars involving the great powers, 1500–2000 227
5–16 Concentration of deaths in wars involving the great powers, 1500–2000 227
5–17 Conflicts per year in greater Europe, 1400–2000 229
5–18 Rate of death in conflicts in greater Europe, 1400–2000 230
5–19 Length of military conscription, 48 major long-established nations,
1970–2010 256
5–20 Military personnel, United States and Europe, 1950–2000 257
5–21 Percentage of territorial wars resulting in redistribution of territory, 1651–2000 259
5–22 Nonnuclear states that started and stopped exploring nuclear weapons, 1945–2010 273
5–23 Democracies, autocracies, and anocracies, 1946–2008 279
5–24 International trade relative to GDP, 1885–2000 286
5–25 Average number of IGO memberships shared by a pair of countries, 1885–2000 290
5–26 Probability of militarized disputes between pairs of democracies and other pairs of countries, 1825–1992 294
6–1 Rate of battle deaths in state-based armed conflicts, 1900–2005 301
6–2 Rate of battle deaths in state-based armed conflicts, 1946–2008 301
6–3 Number of state-based armed conflicts, 1946–2009 303
6–4 Deadliness of interstate and civil wars, 1950–2005 304
6–5 Geography of armed conflict, 2008 306
6–6 Growth of peacekeeping, 1948–2008 314
6–7 Rate of deaths in genocides, 1900–2008 338
6–8 Rate of deaths in genocides, 1956–2008 340
6–9 Rate of deaths from terrorism, United States, 1970–2007 350
6–10 Rate of deaths from terrorism, Western Europe, 1970–2007 351
6–11 Rate of deaths from terrorism, worldwide except Afghanistan 2001–and Iraq 2003– 352
6–12 Islamic and world conflicts, 1990–2006 366
7–1 Use of the terms civil rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights,
and animal rights in English-language books, 1948–2000 380
7–2 Lynchings in the United States, 1882–1969 384
7–3 Hate-crime murders of African Americans, 1996–2008 386
7–4 Nonlethal hate crimes against African Americans, 1996–2008 387
7–5 Discriminatory and affirmative action policies, 1950–2003 390
7–6 Segregationist attitudes in the United States, 1942–1997 391
7–7 White attitudes to interracial marriage in the United States, 1958–2008 391
7–8 Unfavorable opinions of African Americans, 1977–2006 392
7–9 Rape prevention and response sticker 400
7–10 Rape and homicide rates in the United States, 1973–2008 402
7–11 Attitudes toward women in the United States, 1970–1995 404
7–12 Approval of husband slapping wife in the United States, 1968–1994 409
7–13 Assaults by intimate partners, United States, 1993–2005 411
7–14 Homicides of intimate partners in the United States, 1976–2005 411
7–15 Domestic violence in England and Wales, 1995–2008 412
7–16 Abortions in the world, 1980–2003 428
7–17 Approval of spanking in the United States, Sweden, and New Zealand, 1954–2008 436
7–18 Approval of corporal punishment in schools in the United States, 1954–2002 438
7–19 American states allowing corporal punishment in schools, 1954–2010 438
7–20 Child abuse in the United States, 1990–2007 440
7–21 Another form of violence against children 441
7–22 Violence against youths in the United States, 1992–2003 443
7–23 Time line for the decriminalization of homosexuality,
United States and world 450
7–24 Intolerance of homosexuality in the United States, 1973–2010 452
7–25 Antigay hate crimes in the United States, 1996–2008 454
7–26 Percentage of American households with hunters, 1977–2006 467
7–27 Number of motion pictures per year in which animals were harmed, 1972–2010 469
7–28 Vegetarianism in the United States and United Kingdom, 1984–2009 471
8–1 Rat brain, showing the major structures involved in aggression 498
8–2 Human brain, showing the major subcortical structures involved in aggression 502
8–3 Human brain, showing the major cortical regions that regulate aggression 503
8–4 Human brain, medial view 504
8–5 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 533
8–6 Apologies by political and religious leaders, 1900–2004 544
9–1 Implicit interest rates in England, 1170–2000 610
9–2 The Flynn Effect: Rising IQ scores, 1947–2002 652
10–1 The Pacifist’s Dilemma 679
10–2 How a Leviathan resolves the Pacifist’s Dilemma 681
10–3 How commerce resolves the Pacifist’s Dilemma 682
10–4 How feminization can resolve the Pacifist’s Dilemma 686
10–5 How empathy and reason resolve the Pacifist’s Dilemma 689
PREFACE
This book is about what may be the most important thing that has ever happened in human history. Believe it or not—and I know that most people do not—violence has declined over long stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species’ existence. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth; it has not brought violence down to zero; and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is an unmistakable development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children.
No aspect of life is untouched by the retreat from violence. Daily existence is very different if you always have to worry about being abducted, raped, or killed, and it’s hard to develop sophisticated arts, learning, or commerce if the institutions that support them are looted and burned as quickly as they are built.
The historical trajectory of violence affects not only how life is lived but how it is understood. What could be more fundamental to our sense of meaning and purpose than a conception of whether the strivings of the human race over long stretches of time have left us better or worse off? How, in particular, are we to make sense of modernity—of the erosion of family, tribe, tradition, and religion by the forces of individualism, cosmopolitanism, reason, and science? So much depends on how we understand the legacy of this transition: whether we see our world as a nightmare of crime, terrorism, genocide, and war, or as a period that, by the standards of history, is blessed by unprecedented levels of peaceful coexistence.
The question of whether the arithmetic sign of trends in violence is positive or negative also bears on our conception of human nature. Though theories of human nature rooted in biology are often associated with fatalism about violence, and the theory that the mind is a blank slate is associated with progress, in my view it is the other way around. How are we to understand the natural state of life when our species first emerged and the processes of history began? The belief that violence has increased suggests that the world we made has contaminated us, perhaps irretrievably. The belief that it has xxi decreased suggests that we started off nasty and tha
t the artifices of civilization have moved us in a noble direction, one in which we can hope to continue.
This is a big book, but it has to be. First I have to convince you that violence really has gone down over the course of history, knowing that the very idea invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. Our cognitive faculties predispose us to believe that we live in violent times, especially when they are stoked by media that follow the watchword “If it bleeds, it leads.” The human mind tends to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which it can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age.1 No matter how small the percentage of violent deaths may be, in absolute numbers there will always be enough of them to fill the evening news, so people’s impressions of violence will be disconnected from the actual proportions.
Also distorting our sense of danger is our moral psychology. No one has ever recruited activists to a cause by announcing that things are getting better, and bearers of good news are often advised to keep their mouths shut lest they lull people into complacency. Also, a large swath of our intellectual culture is loath to admit that there could be anything good about civilization, modernity, and Western society. But perhaps the main cause of the illusion of ever-present violence springs from one of the forces that drove violence down in the first place. The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. By the standards of the mass atrocities of human history, the lethal injection of a murderer in Texas, or an occasional hate crime in which a member of an ethnic minority is intimidated by hooligans, is pretty mild stuff. But from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen.