If all went as planned, the heavy fighting should be over by daylight, with all targets either neutralized or protected, as the case may be.
Later that day, the remaining two brigades of the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Carmen Cavezza, would arrive from Fort Ord, California, while the remainder of the 16th Military Police Brigade would fly in from Fort Bragg. These units would round out the forces necessary to bring stability and security to Panama City and Colon, and in time to the rest of the country.
ON Friday, October 13, Carl Stiner drove from Fort Bragg to Knoxville, Tennessee, for his daughter Carla’s wedding the next day at the Ball Camp Baptist Church. Just in case he couldn’t make it, he had arranged for his brother Tom to stand in; but in fact, everything worked out fine—with one hang-up. When he linked up with his wife, Sue, at the Holiday Inn, he found her sitting there with a shoe off and pain on her face.
“What’s wrong?”
“I broke a bone in my foot yesterday,” she answered, “and it hurts bad.”
“Arc you going to be able to go through with the wedding?”
“One way or another. This is my first daughter’s wedding, and I’m certainly going to do my part. What I want you to do is go out and get me an ace bandage, and wrap my foot real tight. We’ve got to get on over to the rehearsal.”
That I did, Stiner remembers. Sue could always withstand a lot of pain, but what she did that night during the rehearsal and the next evening during the wedding was just out of sight. It was beyond me how she made it through the entire ceremony, walking without a limp, and with a heatific smile on her face.
Talk about courage.
During the reception, at about ten in the evening, I received a call: The Chairman wanted to see me and Gary Luck the following day for a briefing on the revisions to OPLAN BLUE SPOON.
We were stuck with two cars in Knoxville. That meant Sue had to drive one back to Bragg; my other daughter, Laurie, drove the second.
At six the next morning, Sue dropped me off at Cherokee Aviation at Knoxville Airport, where a plane was waiting to fly me to Washington. Then she headed back to North Carolina—in pain. The next day, her foot was placed in a cast, but that didn’t do the job; and a month later she had to have screws put in.
Meanwhile, I linked up with Gary Luck in the Pentagon, and we proceeded to the Chairman’s office, where I brought General Powell up to speed on the conventional side (pointing out our efforts to make the operation more responsible and decisive), while Gary Luck covered the special mission part. After we had both explained the revised command arrangements and our plans to integrate efforts, General Powell praised the work everyone had put into the plan, then released me to return to Fort Bragg. Gary Luck stayed overnight, and accompanied Powell to the Oval Office to brief the President on his special task forces’ mission in Panama.
FINALIZING THE PLAN
On October 19, Stiner, his key staffers, and the commanders of his major units made another civilian clothes visit to Panama, this time in two special mission aircraft. For two days, the warfighting commanders met to discuss the plan and put the final details in place. Joining them were General Thurman and the SOUTHCOM staff; Lieutenant General Pete Kemph; Brigadier General Robin Turnow, the commander of Howard Air Force Base; and Rear Admiral Jerry C. Gnechnow, CINCLANT’s representative to the operation.
The meeting started with an intelligence estimate:
The Panamanian Defense Forces numbered almost 13,000 troops, including the national guard, the police, and other separate units, but only 4,000 to 5,000 of these could be counted real combat troops. The ground forces were deployed throughout thirteen military zones, and consisted of two infantry battalions, ten independent companies, one cavalry squadron, a riot control company, and a special forces command, which numbered about four hundred specially trained and equipped troops. PDF army equipment included twenty-eight V-150 and V-300 armored cars. The navy numbered about four hundred sailors and was equipped with twelve high-speed patrol boats, all armed with cannons. The Air Force numbered about five hundred troops and was equipped with thirty-eight fixed-wing aircraft, seventeen helicopters, and numerous air defense weapons systems. There were, finally, up to eighteen paramilitary units—“Dignity Battalions”—but intelligence about these units and their missions was spotty.
Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies had begun to develop a most wanted list—people who would have to be removed or neutralized if there was to be a democratic environment in Panama. In addition to Noriega, up to a hundred others were expected to be on the list: Noriega’s disciples and henchmen, those in key government positions, and others wanted for crimes against the people, or simply for racketeering—the whole gang was up to their eyeballs in crime.
STINER then presented his concept of operations: After an analysis of the mission statement, his “Commander’s Intent, the operational command structure, the targets assigned to each major subordinate command, and the allocation of forces, he gave his thoughts on the phasing of the operation:
PHASE I
Clandestinely deploy JSOTF Headquarters, Army Special Missions Unit, and Special Aviation assets to in-country forward staging base (FSB).
Infiltrate other needed conventional weapons systems for H-hour activities to in-country FSB.
Marshall other CONUS [Continental United States] forces for deployment.
PHASE II
Begin reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).
Deploy rangers to CONUS intermediate staging bases (ISBs).
Deploy selected CONUS forces to in-country FSB.
PHASE III
Conduct pre H-hour activities—i.e., secure critical facilities.
II-hour activities.
PHASE IV
Conduct follow-on/stability operations.
Handover and redeployment.
Transition to nation building (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY).
Stincr concluded by summarizing H-hour activities:
Fire Support: Just before H-hour, the AC-130 gunships will he in orbit with a full load of ammunition and prepared to respond to the fire-support needs of all task forces. Apache helicopters will also be ready to deliver precision fire support against all major targets.
Beginning at H-hour, the following will occur simultaneously:
In conjunction with the opening of comhat activities, JTF South will use EF-111 aircraft to jam all PDF tactical communications, and use EC-130 Compass Call and Volant Solo aircraft to override all Panamanian media and broadcast this message to the people: “We are the Americans, your friends. We are here to give your freedom back. We will be attacking only those targets that are necessary for that purpose. Stay in your homes and no one will be harmed.”
Task Force Red: The 75th Ranger Regiment will conduct concurrent parachute assaults to secure Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport and neutralize the 2nd Infantry Company, and at Rio Hato to neutralize the 4th and 6th PDF Companies, the Sergeant Majors Academy, and the Cadet Academy.
The Joint Special Operations Task Force will conduct operations to rescue Kurt Muse from the Modelo prison; render unusable the airfield at Paitilla (in Panama City), along with Noriega’s executive jet located there; disable Noriega’s presidential yacht; secure the waters of the Canal south of the Miraflores locks (that is, between the locks and Panama City and the Pacific—about five or six miles); conduct activities as necessary to capture Noriega and other priority targets on the most wanted list; and conduct hostage-rescue operations and other special mission activities as directed.
Task Force Bayonet (the 193rd Brigade): Will conduct operations to neutralize the Comandancia; secure Fort Amador; and neutralize the 5th Independent Company, Ancon DENI stations (PDF intelligence), PDF engineer compound, Balboa Harbor (the harbor at Panama City), and the PDF dog compound.
Task Force Semper Fi: Will conduct operations to secure and protect the Bridge of the Americas; Howard Air Force Base; seize the port of Voca Monte; and neutrali
ze all PDF and Dignity Battalion units in its area of operations (AOR).
[Task Force Semper Fi had initially deployed to Panama as a battalion-size unit, but was now brigade-size after augmentation by U.S. Army attachments.]
Task Force Atlantic [elements of the 7th Infantry Division]: Will be responsible for securing most of the former Canal Zone north of those operations areas in the neighborhood of Panama City. It will conduct operations to secure Fort Sherman and the Caribbean entrance to the Panama Canal; the Gatun Locks; Coco Solo; Fort Espinar; the Madden Dam; rescue political prisoners from the Renacer Prison; and secure Cerro Tigre (a PDF supply complex).
Task Force Pacific: The 82d Airborne Division conducts parachute assault at H+45 at Tocumen Airport; assumes OPCON of 1st Ranger Battalion and security of the airport; beginning within thirty minutes, conducts air assault operations to secure in priority Panama Viejo (a primarily ceremonial cavalry squadron and a 170-man detachment from Noriegas elite and fiercely loyal special operations antiterrorist unit known as the USEAT), Tinajitas (5th Rifle Company), and Fort Cimarron (Battalion 2000).
Following my presentation, each major subordinate commander presented. his portion of the plan and described how he expected to accomplish his mission.
TOWARD the end of the first day, each commander made a clandestine reconnaissance of his targets. That night, they made adjustments to their plans, and these were briefed and finalized the next day in open session, with everyone present. That way, the process was coordinated, and each commander was familiar with the overall plan and its details.
Toward the end of the second day, three fire support concerns came up:
First: The fire support systems available at H-hour were not powerful enough for the 193d Brigade’s building-busting mission in and around the Comandancia. Although the 82d Airborne would be dropping twelve Sheridans at H+45, these would not be available for support of the 193d brigade as they entered the built-up area near the Comandancia.
Second: It was feared that low cloud cover could limit the effectiveness of the AC-130 gunships. Given the kind of “surgical” fighting planned for built-up areas, an additional highly accurate fire support system was needed.
Third: Colonel Buck Kernan, commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, pointed out that the airfield at Rio Hato, the only available drop zone for the parachute assault, was close to the 6th and 7th PDF Companies, two of Noriega’s best. If surprise was not achieved, his Rangers could take heavy casualties during the jump. For that reason, Kernan asked for air strikes against these two companies’ barracks.
“This was a serious problem,” Carl Stiner observes, “because air strikes against the PDF had been ruled out by the Secretary of Defense, on the grounds that most of them were our friends—just misguided—and if at all possible, we had to give them a chance to surrender.
“We had to find another way to deal with this threat. In fact, over the coming days, we had to come up with solutions to each of these three problems—and we did.”
At the end of the conference, the commanders discussed the various employment options—the time necessary to round up all the planes and crews and get them to the right bases for loading the assault troops. BLUE SPOON would most likely be launched following a Noriega-inspired provocation. He had already stepped up the frequency of these events, a flash point was always possible.
The urgency of the provocation would determine the launch time available. The deliberate employment option was based on a forty-eight-to-sixty-hour notification—plenty of time.
However, there always remained a strong possibility that Noriega would create an incident requiring a quicker response than BLUE SPOON allowed. To cover that possibility, two corollary plans had to be worked out: a no-notice response (in case of a hostage situation or a threat to a key facility—such as the canal locks), and a short-notice response (less urgent, but still requiring action within fourteen to sixteen hours).
In either case, the initial response would have to come from forces already in place—seven U.S. combat battalions, including a Special Forces battalion, and aviation support; General Luck’s forces would follow on from CONUS within twelve hours. Responsibility for both the no-notice and short-notice option was laid on General Cisneros, the U.S. Army South commander, who was tasked to develop these plans.
On the way back to Fort Bragg, Stiner worked on fire support issues: The 193rd Brigade H-hour problem at the Comandancia was relatively easy to solve. They would clandestinely pre-position four Sheridans, with their large-caliber main guns; six Apache helicopters, with their hellfire missiles; and three OH-58 scout helicopters. A few days later, he put this into a formal request, and on November 7th, Secretary Cheney signed the deployment order.
Buck Kernan’s problem with the drop at Rio Hato was tougher. They had to keep the PDF from killing Rangers when they were most vulnerable—descending in parachutes—but they also had to do all they could to avoid killing PDF, if that was prudently possible.
The answer, when it hit Stiner, was logical: “We don’t have to kill PDF in their barracks. We just have to put them in no condition to fight.” A way had to be found to stun them long enough—five minutes would do it—for the C-130s to get safely across the drop zone. Once the Rangers were on the ground, they could do the rest.
Offset bombing28—for shock and awe—was the solution. The question, then, was by what?
He first considered using F-111s, with their standard 750-pound bombs; then called his air component commander, Pete Kcmph, to get his views. What he wanted, he explained, was to create five minutes of shock and confusion by dropping bombs maybe 150 to 200 meters from the 4th and 6th PDF Companies barracks.
“I’m thinking of using F-111s,” Stiner told Kemph.
“There is a much more accurate system,” Kemph replied. “The F-117. And it can carry bigger bombs—two thousand pounds.”
“But F-117s are black,” Stiner said—secret.
“For something as critical as this, it could probably be brought out,” Kcmph pointed out. “I’ll tell you what. The next time you are down in Panama, I’ll send the F-117 wing commander down with bomb data, and you can decide for yourself.”
Not long after that, Stiner reviewed the data with the wing commander, and there was simply no comparison. The F-117s could put 2,000-pound bombs exactly where he wanted them. With the F-111s, there was a significant risk of error. In due course, the Secretary of Defense approved an F-117 drop of two bombs at Rio Hato in support of the Rangers.
TOWARD the end of October, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, asked Stiner and Luck to come to Washington to bring him up to date—primarily to make sure they were getting the support they needed.
“This is the most sophisticated thing I’ve ever seen,” he announced when he’d heard the details. “Over three hundred planes and helicopters in one small area, attacking twenty-seven targets at night. You’d better rehearse this thing all you can.”
“It’s not going to be as messy as it looks,” Stiner explained. “A lot of detailed flight planning has already gone into it. All the pilots are proficient with night-vision goggles, and the AC-130s can illuminate the key targets with their infrared searchlights; the night will look like daytime. We’ll own the night.
“Our units can do this. We’ve trained them that way. ”
Vuono liked what he’d heard and pledged his support.
PLANNING continued until October 30, 1989, when General Thurman signed USCINSCO OPORD 1-90 (BLUE SPOON), making BLUE SPOON official—though planning did not stop there. Stiner’s planners completed the Corps plan a few days later, and he signed it as ready to execute on November 4. Gary Luck’s planners completed their plan the same day.
On November 3, Thurman, Stiner, and Luck gave the BLUE SPOON briefing to the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon in a room called the Tank. Though the Chiefs were generally supportive, like Vuono, they questioned the plan’s complexity. Assurances of the capabilities and readiness of the for
ces convinced them, and they approved it.
M EAN WHILE, the Sheridans and Apaches were set to deploy on the nights of November 15 and 16. The Sheridans would go the first night on a C-5 aircraft, and the Apaches the following night on another C-5.
Stiner took advantage of the transportation to set up another commanders’ conference in Panama. Accompanying him on the C-5 hauling the Sheridans were Colonels Needham, G-3 (operations), and Walters, G-2 (intelligence); Colonel Bill Mason, Corps Signal Officer; and Major Huntoon, one of the chief planners. Three days later, he was joined at Fort Clayton by his major subordinate commanders and staff officers.
The four Sheridans and their crews arrived at Howard AFB at about midnight. For the sake of operational security, the crews had removed their 82nd Airborne division patches and sewed on 5th Mech Division patches.
With their swim shrouds raised to break up their outline, the tanks were loaded on tractor trailers and taken to the mechanized battalion’s nearby motor pool and placed inside large tents, where they’d remain until needed—though the crews drove them two nights a week in the motor pool to keep the seals lubricated to prevent leaking.
In order to familiarize themselves with the environment, the Sheridan crews accompanied the mechanized battalion on their daily Sand Flea exercises, which let them eyeball the targets they’d hit—though they had no idea that was what they were doing.
The C-5 carrying the six Apaches landed at Howard the next night at midnight. They were off-loaded and rolled into hangar number one for reassembly. They remained there during the day, but the crews flew them at night—to familiarize themselves with flying in Panama and to condition the locals to the sound of Apaches.