Meanwhile, the Defense Minister was curious about the AN-2 biplane at the end of the field, and asked one of the ground personnel if a pilot was available to fly him and his guests back to Hanoi. The annoyed crew chief was about to curse at the old man in the grimy uniform when he saw the gold braid and stars. He ran off to ask Captain Tran to get ready to fly one more time.
Royal Palace, Hue, May 11, 2000
Amid the chaos of the Coalition airstrikes on the leadership caves, it took several hours to establish that the Defense Minister General Truong Le was the senior surviving official of the DRV. From Bach Mai, the general had called Beijing, and the Chinese comrades had patched him through to Duc Oanh’s temporary headquarters at Bien Hoa Air Base outside Saigon. Their conversation was brief, frank, and cordial. Both parties were well aware that every intelligence agency with two SIGINT analysts to rub together was recording, translating, and analyzing every word. At times like these in the life of nations, symbolism was important. So they agreed to meet face-to-face in the most politically symbolic location in their country, the walled and moated Royal Palace complex in Hue.
“I regret that I never had the opportunity to serve under your leadership,” said Duc.
“I regret that I did not have a hundred thousand soldiers like you,” said the general. “We have to end this conflict before our people suffer irreparable harm. What will it take to keep our country together?”
“We would like to propose a return to the provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements. We both know that our people have little experience with elections. It will take generations for democracy to take root in this land we both love. We had better start soon, by working out a constitution. I would be honored if you would stand for election as President. I would be honored to serve as your Vice President.”
The signing of the agreement was a formality. The photo of the old general and the middle-aged former guerrilla and postal clerk embracing in tears was a Pulitzer Prize winner.
366th Tactical Operations Center, RTNAS U-Tapao, May 11, 2000
General Perry sat in his command cell and looked out the window upon the scene of his force of B-1Bs and F-15Es, uploading maximum loads of CBU- 87 cluster bombs. The sight sickened him, because of where the deadly “eggs” were scheduled to be dropped. After the completion of the last mission against the leadership caves the previous day, he had received an order from the National Security Council, with an endorsement from the UN Security Council, to begin mass cluster bomb strikes against the four DRV infantry divisions moving up the eastern slope of Mu Gia Pass. It would be a slaughter when the canisters of CEMs opened over the exposed troops, filling the air with hot metal, fire, and screams. The vision filled him with remorse. Unfortunately, if the fifty thousand men of those units did not return to their barracks in the DRV, the action was going to be necessary. The great nations of the world had allowed the people of this region of the world to draw them into conflicts too many times to allow it to happen again. Thus, the fifty thousand young men marching to Mu Gia were doomed, unless the guys running things in Hanoi came to their senses. The knock at his door broke the spell of his thought, and he turned to see Major Goldberg standing in his door with a message flimsy in his hand and a broad grin on his face. “Good news, sir,” said the younger man. “Messages from both security councils.”
The general took the fragile paper and read the short message. It was a cease-fire. The DRV had sued for terms under the old 1954 accord, and there was going to be peace. The ground units of the peacekeeping force were being assembled and would be on their way within hours. He went limp from relief, and it was a long minute before he could look at Major Goldberg.
“Major, tell the ordies that they are to download those munitions dispensers immediately. Then pass the word that we’re to plan for peacekeeping and enforcement operations. We may be here a while doing that. Lastly, please try and get a line on the two crewmen from King-3 through the UN. I want to know about them ASAP.”
The major said, “Yes, sir,” saluted, and left the room.
Security Council, United Nations, New York
RESOLUTION 1398
The Security Council,
Recognizing the collapse of civil government and lawful authority in the DRV,
Concerned over the loss of life, destruction of property, and environmental damage resulting from the continuation of hostilities in Southeast Asia,
Determined to restore conditions of peace, justice, and democracy throughout the territory of the Republic of Vietnam and the former DRV:1. Declares that the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords regarding free elections throughout the northern and southern regions of Vietnam are to be implemented within six months of the date of this resolution,
2. Authorizes the Secretary General to nominate a Vietnam Electoral Commission, representing all segments of the Vietnamese people, including those presently residing outside Vietnam, to publish and disseminate throughout the territory under control of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the territory of the former DRV regulations for the conduct of political parties, candidates, and electoral campaigns, in accordance with international standards of fairness and equal access,
3. Authorizes the Secretary General to take all necessary action to ensure that voter registration and balloting are conducted without fraud, coercion, or violation of human rights,
4. Encourages all member nations to provide technical assistance, electoral observers, and material contributions to support the implementation of this resolution,
5. Requests the Secretary General to provide a progress report on the implementation of this resolution no later than thirty days from this date.
The “Yes” vote was unanimous.
Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, July 4, 2000
The entire wing had staged out of Elmendorf AFB in Alaska in order to make the final leg home as one formation. The UN peacekeeping force had relieved the wing of its duties the day before, and the no-fly operation had been concluded with the implementation of the final UN resolution. Now, as the formation broke into the base pattern, General Perry saw thousands of people waiting on the flight line for what he knew was going to be an incredible homecoming. Somewhere down there was the President of the United States, ready to pin on medals and make the campaign speech of a lifetime. Also down there were representatives of the UN Security Council, to award the wing its special streamer for peacekeeping. Best of all, though, was that his family was down there—and the family of every deployed member of the wing, including the two downed Strike Eagle crewmen. The new Vietnamese Vice President had taken personal responsibility for getting them home, and Perry made a mental note to write a letter of thanks to the man. As he broke his Strike Eagle into the pattern, he smiled in the knowledge that this time there was going to be a parade for the Gunfighters coming home from Vietnam.
Update
by Barrett Tillman
FACING THE FUTURE
Americans take many things for granted: freedom, prosperity, baseball, and air supremacy. None are guaranteed. Freedom had to be seized and periodically must be defended, at home and abroad. Prosperity comes and goes, while the sentimentality accorded “the boys of summer” can prove misplaced during contract negotiations.
But air supremacy seems eternal. The Air Force likes to remind us that no American soldier has been subjected to enemy air attack since the Korean War, and even then it was extremely rare. In the three decades since the Vietnam “conflict,” America has owned the sky, dominating a variety of enemies with precious little loss. In 2003, at the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there was no reason to doubt that America would continue dominating any airspace it chose.
And therein may lie the problem. The United States armed forces are no more immune to complacency than any other bureaucracy. Consequently, we need the devil’s advocates who continue asking, “What price air supremacy?”
First, a definition of terms:
“Air superiori
ty” and “air supremacy” are often used interchangeably, but they possess distinct meanings to airmen.
Air superiority is more common than outright supremacy, but the difference is more a matter of degree than of substance. Some practitioners refer to air superiority as domination of the sky over friendly territory. Superiority exists when friendly aircraft have dominated the enemy, forcing him on the defensive, but opposition still exists “without prohibitive interference.” The United States enjoyed a high degree of air superiority in the Korean War and, ultimately, over North Vietnam.
More important, though, the air superiority achieved over North Korea and North Vietnam yielded undisputed U.S. and allied air supremacy in South Korea and South Vietnam. The ability of friendly attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters to operate unimpeded is the goal toward which air superiority strives.
Air supremacy is air superiority writ large. It exists when the opposing air defense force (not merely its aircraft) is wholly suppressed in its own area as well as ours. The opposition may still inflict occasional losses, but far too few to affect the outcome of the conflict. Air supremacy existed over Normandy, over Japan, throughout most of Southeast Asia, and was quickly gained in Desert Storm. In fact, Coalition supremacy was never in doubt in “the sandbox.” Nor was it even contested during Operation Iraqi Freedom, when, for the first time in history, more allied jet losses were attributed to friendly fire than enemy action.
Since the 1990s there has also been reference to “air dominance,” which extends beyond supremacy. Air dominance involves joint operations which rule the enemy’s ground territory as well as his airspace. The conclusion of the 2003 Iraq War is a classic example: We finally did it right and parked the Bradleys in downtown Baghdad.
In its simplest form, air supremacy exists when enemy tank drivers run over their own people while operating with their eyes on the sky instead of on the road.
Whatever the definitions, the 366th Fighter Wing is thoroughly familiar with air superiority and air supremacy.
A WING IN TRANSITION
The 366th has a long history of aerial combat. In World War II it ranked eighth among twenty fighter and recon groups in the Ninth Air Force, with 103 German planes shot down. In Vietnam the Danang Gunfighters notched twenty MiG kills. But by far the greatest contribution the 366th has provided in nearly sixty years has been in the air-to-ground role. “Mud movers” seldom make much press, but they are beloved of infantrymen.
Since 1943 the wing has flown an awesome variety of aircraft: at least nine fighters (both P and F), two bombers, and its own tankers. From Thunderbolts to Phantoms to Stratofortresses and Stratotankers, the 366th has adapted itself to changing equipment and missions. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect that the 366th eventually will operate F/A-22s and F-35s.
For ten years the 366th was the flagship of the Air Force’s expeditionary concept. In 1991 it was redesignated the 366th Wing (no longer specifically Fighter) with a variety of attached units, including the 34th Bomb Squadron with B-1Bs, 22nd Air Refueling Squadron KC-135Rs, and EF-111A Ravens. The Air Force’s battle laboratory focused on Mountain Home in 1997, laying extra emphasis on the quick deployment of a composite wing containing its own fighters, bombers, tankers, and support units.
But the force structure began changing: the Ravens left service in 1993, leaving the wing dependent on Navy and Marine jammers when deployed. Eventually the Lancers and Stratotankers were removed in 2002. The 389th Fighter Squadron’s F-16Cs also departed. In September 2002, the 366th once again was a Tactical Fighter Wing, no longer in the expeditionary business but still highly capable with F-15Cs and -Ds in the 390th Wild Boars and Strike Eagles in the 391st Bold Tigers.
If the 366th’s history proves anything, it is the constant change in force structure and mission emphasis. Therefore, we wonder where the next decade will take us. How will those developments affect the aircrews, maintainers, and planners of the 366th in the 21st century?
MILLENNIUM PLANNING
The Air Force began planning for the post-millennium era with a doctrinal study titled Global Reach-Global Power. But it became dated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, forcing the service to begin a year-and-a-half survey to determine the force structure through 2025.
The result was Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force. Like previous studies, it focused on the best means of achieving and maintaining the ability to deter, fight, and win future conflicts in air and space. Global Engagement was linked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff document titled Joint Vision 2010. While all services acknowledge the increasing reliance on mutual support and joint war fighting, the Air Force insists, “it embodies our belief that in the 21st Century, the strategic instrument of choice will be air and space power.”
The Pentagon loves buzzwords and key phrases, and Global Engagement is no exception. Nor was Joint Vision 2010. The latter stressed a range of military operations under the umbrella of “full spectrum dominance.” It includes joint operations featuring concepts such as Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics. It also realizes the increasing importance of superior intelligence in the information age: “the ability to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information while denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.” While probably few aircrews of the Wild Boars or Bold Tigers are thinking of such things when they tuck their gear in the well, the concepts govern tactical missions and capabilities.
CORE COMPETENCIES
The Air Force deals in what it calls “core competencies,” those features that distinguish the aerospace mission. They include Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Global Attack, Air and Space Superiority, Information Superiority, and Agile Combat Support.
Most of the core competencies are self-evident. Rapid Global Mobility refers to aviation’s inherent advantage of speed and range. In addition to deploying tactical units almost anywhere on earth in a matter of days, the Air Force can also transport Army or Marine Corps forces to a war theater or trouble spot. The problem, of course, tends to be bases—as the Tailhook Navy likes to remind Congress during appropriation hearings. Aircraft carriers represent four and a half acres of sovereign territory that moves at 30 knots without needing to play “Mother, may I?” with wavering allies, as we saw in Turkey during “Iraqi Freedom.” On the other hand, due to mismanagement in the first Bush Administration, the Navy found itself out of the deep strike mission unless Air Force tankers were available. Jointness came on forced wings, but it came regardless.
Precision Engagement also speaks for itself. The “precision revolution” of the 1990s became standard television fare during Desert Storm, but since then the statistics have flip-flopped. During Desert Storm only about 10% of the ordnance dropped were Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). When America retaliated for 9/11 in Afghanistan, almost 90% of aviation munitions were laser or GPS guided. In some instances, the published “miss distance” of certain weapons was smaller than a typical target.
But precision has other components as well. Intelligence is part of the equation, with more and more “real time” targeting data from a variety of sources. Some aspects are technical, such as satellite coverage, unmanned drones, or radio intercepts. Others are the most basic, “Humint” in the trade, referring to human intelligence sources. One man (or woman) on the ground with an unobstructed view of the “subject” and a cell phone uplink can help put PGMs on target PDQ.
Global Attack is exactly what it says: the ability to strike almost anywhere on the planet’s surface. Whether it’s true or not, the accusation has been made that some airpower zealots insist that the United States can rule the world from Omaha. Certainly the ability to deploy intercontinentally has been demonstrated more than once, since the limiting factor in today’s Air Force is not aircraft or weapons, but aircrew fatigue. It’s one response to the never-ending one-upmanship with the Navy: if it’s politically inconvenient for an ally to permit USAF b
asing, then all the Air Force needs is ample tankers to support B-1s or B-2s from ConUS to reach the target. The problem is, of course, a twelve-hour cycle time, which tends to limit sorties. For the 366th and other fighter wings, such extreme reach is possible but impractical under most circumstances.
Air and Space Superiority now go hand in glove. They are closely related to Information Superiority, since intelligence and targeting are inextricably mixed. In fact, it has been asserted that in reality America no longer has the U.S. Air Force but the U.S. Air and Space Force. Satellites for reconnaissance and communications have become invaluable, and their importance is in no danger of diminishing. Neither are recon drones such as the Predator, which may even take over part of the SEAD mission in suppressing enemy air defenses.
Agile Combat Support addresses the ability to respond quickly and flexibly to specific goals. Joint operations with the Army, Navy, and allied forces figure in the equation, employing varied assets to meet assigned tasks with responsiveness rather than massive logistics. “Reach back” is the operative buzzword, deploying from the continental United States more often than from overseas bases, which are expensive to maintain.
So much for the doctrinal aspects. What about the hardware of the future?
NEW TOOLS FOR OLD MISSIONS
The phrase is “block obsolescence.” In 2003, the U.S. Air Force’s inventory was beginning to show its age. The average airframe was twenty-three years old: 1980 construction. Like all statistics, this is misleading—it reflects forty-year-old B-52s and last year’s F-16s. Increasingly, success in air combat depends on aircraft systems—mainly electronics—rather than on the airplanes themselves, but, especially in the fighter world, high time airframes present problems. With increasing stress and its attendant reduction in remaining fatigue life, combat aircraft just plain wear out. Though the Air Force’s “howgozit” monitoring of critical airframe parts (especially wing spars) can track the trends, aircrews deserve a break. The last F-15Cs were built in 1988, and if an Eagle has a theoretical service life of 1,800 hours remaining, a fudge factor is needed to afford some velvet. That aircraft may well go the full 1,800 hours with no serious trouble. Or it may come apart prematurely. The solution is to replace the critical components or buy a new airplane. Either way, the taxpayer gets tagged again for an airframe or systems upgrade.