the Rohrboughs: For simplicity, I used "the Rohrboughs" periodically to denote both sides of Danny's family, the Rohrboughs and Petrones.
gun-control legislation: In April 2000, a few bills were pending to allow concealed weapons in Colorado. Those were quickly defeated in the wake of the tragedy.
CHAPTER 48. AN EMOTION OF GOD
a big problem: Eric cited getting the bombs in as a major issue.
If only he had a little more cash: Eric expressed frustration about his limited funds and drew up budgets for his arsenal.
Dylan wrote a short story: Jeffco released the story, with Judy Kelly's notes.
Three friends went with them: The boys videotaped quite a bit of the target practice, and Jeffco released the tape.
They made three target-practice trips: Manes told lead investigator Kate Battan they made three trips, but she could not determine whether they were before or after the videotaped trip.
Dylan leaked again: Zack told police his conversation with Dylan occurred in February. His memory might have been off slightly, or Dylan might have begun training earlier--with or without Manes.
Desperado: Robert Rodriguez directed the film. Tarantino appeared as an actor and is closely associated with Rodriguez.
CHAPTER 49. READY TO BE DONE
Most of the Parents Group attended: The scenes at the opening of the atrium came from my observations.
Jeffco was forced to cough up: I followed the slow release of the information over several years and examined most items as they came out, but I did not write about these events at the time. Westword and the Rocky did an excellent job covering the slow trickle, and I relied on their work. I considered the reports from the Colorado attorney general and the grand jury definitive.
the affidavit to search Eric's house: After months of silence, the DA responded to a written request from the Browns. His response letter alluded to Guerra's affidavit, which for two years his agency had insisted did not exist. Randy and Judy couldn't believe it. They took it to CBS, and 60 Minutes cornered Thomas. Judge Jackson demanded to see it--it had been withheld from him as well.
The affidavit was more damning: Guerra was exceptionally convincing. He demonstrated motive, means, and opportunity. From a threat-assessment perspective, the specificity of Eric's attack raised it to high risk. The details regarding the weaponry increased it further. The capstone, though, came in connecting Eric's plans to physical evidence. The affidavit described the pipe bomb found near Eric's home and stated twice that it matched his descriptions of "Atlanta" and "Pholus."
"Based on the aforementioned information your affiant respectfully requests the court issue a search warrant for the residence," Guerra's affidavit concluded. The police would have found a great deal. Eric had made quite a few bombs by that time. The former chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, who had chaired a commission set up by the governor to investigate Columbine, eventually weighed in. He chided Jeffco for missing a "massive" number of clues. The massacre could have been prevented, he concluded. He lamented the perimeter response; if the SWAT team had stormed the building, he said, several lives could have been saved.
The affidavit also revealed that Division Chief Kiekbusch had told at least three whopping lies at the press conference ten days after Columbine: that the Browns had not met with Investigator Hicks, that the department couldn't find bombs like those in Eric's Web descriptions, and that it had been unable to locate his Web postings. The affidavit contradicted all three, and Kiekbusch had to have been familiar with it, since he had just attended the Open Space meeting with one topic: how to suppress it.
Jeffco responded with new lies. It issued a press release claiming it had disclosed the affidavit's existence a few days after Columbine--at the very time commanders were meeting to plot how to hide it. All the local media called Jeffco on the lie.
"It's amazing how long": Sue Klebold recalled this exchange to David Brooks in 2004. He reported it in his New York Times column.
The FBI and Secret Service: The FBI released its report, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, in 2000. Two years later, the Secret Service and the Department of Education teamed up for a broader analysis: The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative. Both reports were excellent, and I relied on them extensively. I also used news accounts to document foiled copycats in other cities. I interviewed school administrators, students, and mental health experts about zero tolerance policies.
two biggest myths: The Secret Service studied every targeted attack at schools from December 1974 to May 2000. There had been forty-one attackers in thirty-seven incidents. Disciplinary history and academic performance also varied widely. The loner myth was perhaps the single biggest misconception. Some of the attackers were loners; two-thirds were not.
they "snapped": "Nonviolent people do not 'snap' or decide on the spur of the moment to meet a problem by using violence," the FBI report said. Planning ranged from a day or two in advance to over a year.
in video games: Only an eighth were fond of violent video games. A larger group--about a third--exhibited violence in their own written assignments or journals.
Most perps shared: In many cases, bullying may have played a role: 71 percent of attackers had experienced persecution, bullying, threats, or injury. Initially that sounds dramatic, but the study did not address how many nonattackers suffer that sort of experience; it's pretty commonplace for a high school kid. Several of the shooters experienced severe or long-term bullying, though, and in some cases, it seemed to be a factor in the decision to attack.
suffered a loss or failure: Loss came in different forms: 66 percent had suffered a drop in status; 51 percent had experienced an external loss, which included the death of a loved one but was more commonly being dumped by a girlfriend. The key was that the attacker perceived it as significant and felt his status drop.
More than half told: There were at least two outsiders in the know 59 percent of the time. Someone had suspected the attack 93 percent of the time.
The danger skyrockets: The FBI offered this example of a high-risk threat: "At eight o'clock tomorrow morning, I intend to shoot the principal. That's when he is in the office by himself. I have a 9mm. Believe me, I know what I am doing. I am sick and tired of the way he runs this school."
Melodramatic outbursts: Melodrama and wild flourishes of punctuation are common--for example: "I hate you!!!!... You have ruined my life!!!!" Most laymen assume that such drama signals greater danger. That's a common fallacy, the report said. Perpetrators are just as likely to remain calm. No correlation has been established between emotional intensity and the actual danger it foretells.
A subtler form of leakage: The FBI said a kid had reached the point of leakage when the same ugly ideas grabbed hold of him "no matter what the subject matter, the conversation, the assignment, or the joke."
list of warning signs: The FBI listed criteria in four different areas: behavior, family situation, school dynamics, and social pressures. The behavioral list alone included twenty-eight characteristics. It cautioned that lots of innocent kids exhibited one or two or even several of its warning signs; the key was evidence of a majority of the items from all four areas. The risk factors were also highly correlated with substance abuse.
A national task force: It included officers involved in Columbine, and leaders in the field, from the Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT team to the National Tactical Officers Association.
CHAPTER 50. THE BASEMENT TAPES
The first installment: Jeffco showed the Basement Tapes to Time, then the Rocky, and then to a small group of reporters at a single screening. I was not included and have not seen them. My depictions came from three sources: a detailed account in the police files, news stories from the reporters who viewed them, and descriptions by Agent Fuselier and Kate Battan, who each studied them for six months. The police report ran ten pages and documented each scene in detail, with extensive quotations.
After t
he initial press showing, Jeffco promised more but never held another. The Klebolds then filed a motion asserting that the tapes belonged to the killers' estates. Other suits followed. Most victims' families eventually fought for release of the tapes. Jeffco worked with the killers' families to suppress them, a legal alliance that infuriated the victims. In December 2002, U.S. District Judge Richard Matsch threw out the copyright claim with an angry rebuke. He called it "a transparent attempt to hide something of public interest." But Stone's department insisted that the killers' words were too dangerous to expose to the public.
A Denver Post motion worked its way up to the Colorado Supreme Court. The court ruled against Jeffco. It unanimously declared the material to be public records. Colorado law includes a loophole, though, stating that records may be withheld in cases of "public interest." It was then up to the new sheriff to rule whether the tapes and writings were a risk to the community. He decided that the killers' journals were safe but the Basement Tapes were not. The Post chose not to appeal. Any future sheriff has the power to release the tapes at any time.
The Colorado attorney general's Web site states the following: "The 'public interest' exception is a specific exception in the Open Records Act. According to this law, an agency may hold public records confidential if the records custodian decides that making them available to the public would cause substantial injury to the public interest. This is the case even if the record is something that would otherwise be available to the public under the Open Records Act. The reason this law exists is that the Legislature realizes that there will be situations in which information should be kept private, even though no law specifically states that it is private."
Eric made at least three attempts: Chris later reported the three attempts to police detectives.
Zack told the story: But both versions of Zack's account, as recorded in his FBI file, are confusing, so I presented the gist of what he conveyed.
Staff Sergeant Gonzales cold-called: Gonzales had gotten a list of seniors from the high school.
Eric hounded Mark Manes: Manes testified about the ammunition at his sentencing hearing.
Eric spent the night at Dylan's: Dylan's parents described the sleepover in their police interview.
Eric left his microcassette: In its response to the Supreme Court decision, Jeffco ignored the existence of the "Nixon" microcassette. Aside from Eric's odd label and the two sentences recorded in an obscure evidence log, nothing is known about the tape. Even Dr. Fuselier has never heard it. It remains in limbo. The Jeffco sheriff has the power to release it at any time.
CHAPTER 51. TWO HURDLES
to share his analysis: I interviewed Dr. Ochberg several times and eventually gained FBI approval to speak to Agent Fuselier. We began a series of interviews, and he directed me to the classic books on psychopathy and to other experts brought in by the FBI. After several years of research--while also working on other projects--I published the results in the piece cited in the text. It was called "The Depressive and the Psychopath," and ran in Slate.
the first and only media interview: David Brooks wrote an insightful and empathetic summary of his interviews with Tom and Sue Klebold. He was generous enough to share additional thoughts with me by phone.
Kiekbusch filed a formal objection: The Rocky also phoned former sheriff John Stone for a comment. He called the investigation a "bunch of bullshit." He told the reporter he was a "horse's ass" and hung up. The paper printed all that.
Undersheriff Dunaway told the Denver Post he had done nothing wrong and again pointed the finger at Brooks Brown. He repeated, on the record, the old accusation that Brooks had known about the murders in advance. No scrap of evidence has ever come to light supporting that charge.
Mr. D strode out dressed as Barry Manilow: I attended the assembly. I watched from the bleachers and took photos.
He lost big: Thomas lost to incumbent Representative Bob Beauprez (R) 55-42 percent, with all precincts reporting.
the Platte Canyon shooting: My depictions of this event came primarily from live television coverage, which I watched and recorded on two stations as it happened, as well as follow-up reports from authorities.
CHAPTER 52. QUIET
any crap this might instigate: Dylan's quote was slightly longer, with an inaudible word.
that fly CD: It's unclear whether he was using "fly" as an adjective (slang for "cool") or a title. In 2008, iTunes listed eighty-eight songs with fly in the title.
The boys wandered: They were observed by numerous witnesses, and surveillance cameras in the commons recorded their activity there, with time stamps. Jeffco released highlight footage, and Agent Fuselier described his impressions of the full tape to me.
Fuselier and a colleague: I was the colleague.
found the room quite different: Depictions of the library scene when the killers returned to commit suicide were based on several sources, including: autopsy reports; my interviews with investigators who observed the scene; police video of the room after the bodies were removed; and standard medical information on the decomposition of bodies in the first thirty minutes; and checked with investigators for applicability to the actual conditions in this case. The killers' suicides were reconstructed from testimony, autopsy reports, police diagrams, police reports, and police photos of the killers' bodies.
Patrick Ireland, gently breathing: Patrick went in and out of consciousness. It's possible, though unlikely, that he might have already begun to crawl away from his initial position. There's a remote possibility that he could have been conscious during the suicides. He has no memory of them.
CHAPTER 53. AT THE BROKEN PLACES
Two thousand mourners turned out: I attended both events for the memorial, in 2006 and 2007.
They married: Depictions of the wedding came from attendees.
Local churches felt a surge: I interviewed a large number of local pastors about activity in their congregations over the intervening years. The pattern was remarkably similar, and followed historical trends. The Barna Group did a major study on the religious impact of 9/11. It found a similar surge on a national level: half of Americans said their faith helped them cope; church attendance spiked--doubling in some churches the first Sunday; and a sizable minority of people actually altered their core beliefs. The latter change flouted conventional wisdom, though--turning away from fundamentalist beliefs: slightly fewer people believed in an all-powerful God, or in Satan as an actual entity. All the changes disappeared within four months. And five years later, rates on every measure were still indistinguishable from pre-9/11.
When a journalist stopped by: I was the journalist.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
In addition to these sources, this book relies on my reporting for several periodicals, published in somewhat different form. The articles appeared in 1999 through 2007 in Salon, Slate, 5280, and the New York Times. Links to those and online versions of many works below are available on my Web site at davecullen.com/columbine. Instructions for obtaining evidence released by Jefferson County and other agencies are also available there.
GOVERNMENT REPORTS ON COLUMBINE AND SCHOOL SHOOTERS
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "School-Associated Student Homicide: United States, 1992-2006." Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 57, no. 2 (January 18, 2008): 33-36.
EI Paso County Sheriff's Office. Reinvestigation into the Death of Daniel Rohrbough at Columbine High School on April 20, 1990. April 10, 2002.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. U.S. Department of Justice. Critical Incidence Response Group. National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, by Mary Ellen O'Toole. 2000.
Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. Sheriff's Office Final Report on the Columbine High School Shootings. CD. May 15, 2000.
Lindsey, Daryl. "A Reader's Guide to the Columbine Report." Salon, May 17, 2000. http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2000/05/17/guide/index.html.
The Report of Gov
ernor Bill Owens' Columbine Review Commission. Hon. William H. Erickson, chairman. May 2001.
U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education. The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. May 2002.
THE KILLERS: EVIDENCE RELEASED
Colorado Bureau of Investigation. Laboratory Report. Released by Jefferson County on May 31, 2000.
Colorado Bureau of Investigation. Laboratory Report. CD. Released by Jefferson County on February 6, 2002.
Colorado Department of Law, Office of the Attorney General. Columbine-Related Grand Jury Report: Supplemental Attorney General Investigative Report. Released on September 16, 2004.
Colorado Department of Law, Office of the Attorney General. Grand Jury Report: Investigation of Missing Guerra Files. September 16, 2004.
Colorado Department of Law, Office of the Attorney General. Report of the Investigation into Missing Daily Field Activity and Daily Supervisor Reports Related to Columbine High School Shootings. September 16, 2004.
Columbine High School. Cafeteria Surveillance Tapes. DVD. Released by Jefferson County on June 7, 2000.
Denver Police Dispatch. Denver Dispatch Cassette Tapes. CD containing seven and a half hours of communication. Released by Jefferson County on March 6, 2003.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Denver Division. FBI Crime Scene Processing Team Reports and Sketches. CD. Released by Jefferson County on September 5, 2001.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Denver Division. FBI Report of Interview with Randy, Judy and Brooks Brown. CD. Released by Jefferson County on May 22, 2001.
Harris, Eric. Harris Web Site: 1997 Police Report and Web Pages. CD. Released by Jefferson County on October 30, 2003.
Harris, Eric. Journal, school essays, yearbook inscription, IMs, schedules, and hundreds of other pages of accumulated writing. Included in 936 Pages of Documents Seized from Harris and Klebold Residences/Vehicles. CD. Released by Jefferson County on July 6, 2006.