Eisenhower then tried another tack. The three B-24 groups that had participated in TIDALWAVE were waiting for good weather to return to the United Kingdom. On August 12 Eisenhower again asked the CCS to be allowed to retain them. “We consider that at this juncture every available force should be brought to bear against Italy and the German in Italy,” he declared.41 Again Devers protested, and again Eisenhower’s superiors said the planes would have to be returned.
Eisenhower was not accustomed to having his requests to Marshall turned down and he found it difficult to accept. After getting off his cable to the CCS, he sent a fervent plea to Marshall. “I am not submitting any detailed argument on the point,” he began, “because I am sure you understand that we are not asking, from this theater, for anything we do not believe to be absoluely necessary to carry out our mission.” He asked that before Marshall gave any adverse decision, “I first be given further opportunity to describe the situation in detail. The hostile bomber strength has been steadily building up in this theater for some days and we simply must be on top of this matter if AVALANCHE is to be a success.”42
Arnold replied for Marshall. He told Eisenhower that the Eighth Air Force was engaged in a “critical battle” for air supremacy over Germany and the three groups would provide Eaker with another long-range striking force “which might well account for an aircraft factory each week.” These actions, he emphasized, turning Eisenhower’s original argument end to end, would help the Mediterranean forces as much as those in England. The three groups returned to Eighth Air Force that week.43
It was a victory for the advocates of strategic bombing, a defeat for those who felt the air forces made their greatest contribution by working in close co-ordination with the needs of the ground campaign. It was also a decision which, within a month, Eisenhower’s superiors would sadly regret, and one which they would have to reverse.
The decision also emphasized that Marshall remained wedded to OVERLORD. He would do nothing that even hinted at reducing the commitment to the cross-Channel invasion, even for his protégé. The incident also showed that Eisenhower did not handle affairs with his usual smoothness when his theater was relegated to a secondary status. When it came to stripping AFHQ of material he protested as vigorously as MacArthur in his Pacific domain. He did so, however, only after convincing himself that he would be using the planes on operations that would help OVERLORD as much as AVALANCHE. Still, he was a long way from the position he had taken a year earlier, when he promised Marshall he “would not be adding to your troubles by insistently clamoring for more than you can furnish.…”44
Eisenhower could not resist firing one parting shot. He told the CCS that, despite the adverse decision, he was going ahead with AVALANCHE “with whatever forces we have at the moment. But I think it only fair to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give them the essential factors on which risks must be calculated.” There was a German corps of three divisions in the Naples area, plus the Hermann Goering Division, which had just evacuated Sicily. German bomber strength was increasing daily, while AFHQ’s was diminishing. The way to keep air activity over Salerno down on D-Day was to bomb German airfields, but there were not enough Allied bombers in the Mediterranean to do this. Salerno was at the extreme range of fighter cover: “As a consequence of these things our convoys will have to anticipate higher losses from air attack while at sea and while lying offshore.” Tedder and Spaatz, Eisenhower added, agreed with his view. “I repeat,” Eisenhower ended, “that my plans for attack will not repeat not be altered as a result of this transfer.”45
Despite the statement, Eisenhower was disturbed at his apparent inability to get the CCS to understand his needs. He felt that the Chiefs still did not appreciate the precariousness of the air situation in the Mediterranean. In addition, they apparently were not aware of the high replacement rate required for landing craft. Most important of all, neither the Chiefs nor the governments seemed to have a sense of urgency about the Italian situation. Because of his material shortages, Eisenhower was still extremely anxious to take advantage of Mussolini’s fall and make a deal with the Italians, but he had been unable to get even a directive on armistice terms. He would very soon have need of one.
CHAPTER 18
The Italian Surrender Negotiations
“The first Italian-Allied exchanges resembled two persons talking to each other in their sleep, each the victim of his own hallucination. In the nightmare of German occupation, Italy gasped, ‘Help, I am not free.’ After a long pause, the Allies replied, ‘Say Uncle.’ ”1
One of Eisenhower’s major characteristics was his desire to simplify. Faced with a complex situation, he usually tried to separate it into its essentials, extract a principal point, and then make that point his guiding star for all decisions. The defeat of Germany’s armed forces was his aim and anything that contributed to that end was good, while anything that did not was, if not bad, at least superfluous. Thus, since the Allies could defeat Germany more quickly and easily if they fought together, Eisenhower bent every effort to make the alliance work. Or, equally pragmatically, since the greatest contribution the French could make to victory would be to provide a secure rear in North Africa for the Allied forces, Eisenhower’s sole criterion for picking a French leader was simple: “Who can control?” At first it was Darlan, then Giraud, and finally De Gaulle, and Eisenhower worked smoothly with each one.
What Eisenhower wanted from the Italians was help in getting ashore and up to the Po Valley, where there were airfields in striking distance of the heart of Germany. He would gladly deal with any Italian government that would co-operate.
It has been argued that Eisenhower’s approach represented not so much a desire to simplify as simple-mindedness. He had forgotten his Clausewitz, critics charged, and did not realize that in war the real objective is not the defeat of the enemy but rather the political end of the continuing security of the nation, which involves much more than victory on the battlefield. In the critics’ view, Eisenhower’s political naïveté cost the Americans dearly in the postwar world.
What the critics have failed to recognize was the political motivation inherent in Eisenhower’s thought. The decision to defeat Germany was not his, but he heartily agreed with it, for the obvious reason—too easily forgotten during the Cold War—that the sine qua non of American security in 1943 was the defeat of the armed forces of Nazi Germany. Within that context, anything that speeded up the process was a political gain, since it would save American lives and money and would also allow the United States to turn its full might against the Japanese sooner.
In the case under consideration, the Italian surrender negotiations, Eisenhower was the man on the spot, responsible not only for victory but also for the lives of the men entrusted to him. He saw clearly that which Churchill and Roosevelt always failed to recognize—that the Italians had something to offer and to get it the Allies had to give them some positive inducement, not just the sterile and negative formula of surrender and occupation.
Eisenhower also realized that success in war can justify almost anything. In their national capitals, close to the critics, Roosevelt and Churchill could not help but take into account the liberal sentiment that permeated the Allied world throughout the war. When an Italian double-cross of the Germans became a real possibility, the soldier leading the Allied forces thought only of the advantages offered, while the heads of government thought of the reaction at home. “The merest suggestion of recognition of the Badoglio government,” Robert Sherwood noted, “brought down more and more opprobrium on the State Department which by now was regarded in liberal circles as the very citadel of reaction.…”2
Churchill and Roosevelt were perfectly aware that it would have been supreme folly not to exploit the Italian situation, but they also felt that it was impossible to make an open deal with the King and Badoglio on the Darlan model. Their solution was to ignore Eisenhower’s pleas for an easy armistice and demand unconditional surrender, then give that surrend
er an elastic implementation. They would ultimately allow the Italians to prove their worth by joining in the crusade against the Nazis. This had the advantage of keeping morale at home high and satisfying public opinion and, somewhat later, of getting Italian help.3
The only trouble was that it took so long in coming. By the time the agreement was concluded to everyone’s satisfaction, the Germans had nineteen divisions in Italy. The bill for the delay was paid in blood at Salerno, Anzio, and Cassino.
The tangled story began on the morning of August 17. Eisenhower had just returned from Sicily to Algiers. When he got to his headquarters he found copies of three messages from Eden, in London, to Churchill, who was in Quebec for the QUADRANT Conference of the CCS. Eden reported that General Giuseppe Castellano, assistant to the chief of the Italian high command, had arrived in Madrid and talked with the British ambassador there. Castellano had no credentials from his government to work out an armistice, but he did want to negotiate with Allied military representatives in order to arrange an Italian double-cross. He wanted the Allies to first land on the Italian mainland in force, to be followed by Italy’s joining the war against the Germans.
Eden was the first high official to react to the Italian offer and his attitude set the tone for the Allies throughout the negotiations. “Although at first sight this offer of cooperation sounds tempting,” Eden told Churchill, “I feel that if we accept it it will land us in all sorts of difficulties both military and political with few if any corresponding advantages.… I am sure we ought to stick to our present policy of refusing to make the Italian government any promises or enter into any bargain with them in return for their surrender.”4
Eisenhower took the opposite view. After consulting with his G-2, Brigadier Strong, and Macmillan, he sent a message to the CCS at Quebec. He said he wanted to send Strong, in civilian clothes, to Lisbon (where Castellano was headed) with instructions to get all the military information he could from Castellano. The proposal was that Strong should tell the Italian general that if Italy was anxious to speed up the day when an Allied force would land on the mainland, the Italians should undertake widespread sabotaging operations. Eisenhower also wanted Strong to tell Castellano that the Italians “have no recourse except to depend upon the decency and sense of justice of the Allied Governments when once we have arrived in Italy.” In short, Eisenhower wanted to avoid all the complications of any formal negotiations, make a simple military agreement with the Italians, and deal with the political aspects of the situation once the Allies were firmly ashore.5
The CCS replied the next day, August 18, in what became known as the Quebec Memorandum. The Chiefs told Eisenhower to send two staff officers—Strong and an American—to meet Castellano. They should tell Castellano that the Allies would accept the unconditional surrender of Italy on the basis of the “short terms,” which followed closely the terms Eisenhower had outlined and wanted to offer the Italians on July 27. Churchill and Roosevelt, meanwhile, would work out at Quebec the “long term” agreements, which would include economic, political, and financial terms and which the Italians would eventually also be required to sign. Under the short terms, the Italians were to announce the armistice at once and to send their fleet and air force to Allied territory. The army was to “collaborate with the Allies and resist the Germans.” If the Italians complied, Eisenhower had the authority to soften the armistice terms proportionately to the scale of the assistance the Italians rendered to the Allies.6
The Quebec Memorandum was a strange document. Eisenhower was supposed to require Italian collaboration, but he was specifically forbidden to reveal his military plans to Badoglio’s representative. How, under such circumstances, could the Italians collaborate? Eisenhower was supposed to demand “unconditional surrender” on the conditions of the short terms, in itself a comment on the logic being used. In addition the question of to whom Badoglio was to surrender was open. There were no Allied troops in Italy, much less in Rome, to accept a surrender. The Chiefs gave Eisenhower the power to accept a surrender, but he—the man on the spot—could not negotiate.
The Chiefs ignored the reality of the Italian situation. Italy was caught between the hammer and the anvil. Germany had lost the military momentum and it was time for Italy, never fully mobilized and absolutely unable to carry on, to get out. Allied troops in Sicily were poised for invasion, while Allied planes pounded Italian cities from the skies. But the Germans were already in Italy in large numbers, with more coming in every day. If Italy surrendered to the Allies before Eisenhower’s divisions occupied the peninsula at least up to Rome, the Germans would overthrow the government and occupy the country.
The Italians scarcely knew where the greater threat lay. Their key question to Eisenhower, the one on which their decision would have to be based, was: Are you able to occupy Rome and protect us from the Germans? If so, the Italians would do all they could to help, and do it immediately. But in the Quebec Memorandum the Chiefs told Eisenhower that under no circumstances should he answer the Italian question. All he could do was send Smith and Strong to see Castellano in Lisbon to demand surrender.
One reason the Chiefs were so hesitant to let the Italians have any information, and one which would later play a role in Eisenhower’s decisions, was that they felt they could not afford to have the Italians discover how weak the Allies were in the Mediterranean. As far as the Italians knew, the Mediterranean was still the main theater of war for the Allies, and Eisenhower had unlimited resources. Castellano, for example, was thinking of a landing of fifteen divisions in the Rome area; in fact Eisenhower did not have enough resources to land three divisions. The Chiefs wanted to keep the Italians ignorant so that they would continue to overestimate Allied strength. In short, they did not allow Eisenhower to answer the key question because the answer would have been “No, we cannot occupy and protect Rome.” Eisenhower was still unhappy because he felt that with generous terms he could get Italian co-operation and occupy the peninsula before the Germans built up their strength.
Smith and Strong flew to Lisbon on August 19 and held a nine-hour conference with Castellano. Smith told Castellano that the Allies were prepared to accept an unconditional surrender. Castellano, taken aback, replied that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the question of how Italy could join the Allies in operations against the Germans, and more specifically to ask what help the Allies could give the Italians on the mainland. Smith said that he was only prepared to discuss surrender and read to Castellano the “short terms.” Castellano tried to make it clear that such matters were irrelevant; what he needed to know was something quite different and in any case he had no authority to discuss any terms. Smith understood well enough, but his hands were tied because of the orders Eisenhower had received from the CCS. He did manage to emphasize to Castellano the statement in the Quebec Memorandum that declared that the armistice terms would be modified in favor of Italy in accordance with the amount of help the Italians gave the Allies. Castellano grasped at the straw and said he would take the short terms back to Rome for governmental approval. He and the AFHQ representatives arranged to meet again on August 31.
Smith returned to Algiers on August 20 and helped Eisenhower prepare a report to the CCS. Castellano had given much useful military information on German formations and positions in Italy, and it all matched what AFHQ G-2 already knew. Eisenhower emphasized to the CCS that Castellano had given the impression of “intense hatred and intense fear of Germans” and said the Italians seemed completely willing to co-operate “if they have reasonable assurance of protection and support.”7
During the next week Castellano made his way home; because of the need to keep his mission a secret from the Germans, he took extreme precautions and did not reach the capital until August 27. The CCS, Churchill, and Roosevelt, meanwhile, discussed Eisenhower’s cable and prepared their position. The result was approval of the comprehensive surrender document, known as the “long terms,” which were transmitted to Eisenhower on Augu
st 27.
The long terms contained forty-one tightly worded paragraphs covering military, civil, social, economic, and political affairs. Macmillan called the long terms “a planner’s dream and a general’s nightmare.”8
Eisenhower, meanwhile, was pushing ahead with preparations for AVALANCHE. He was not at all happy about the prospects, since he was undertaking the operation with limited forces and resources, especially in landing craft and bombers. In addition he had learned from Castellano that the Germans had 400,000 men in Italy, with more coming every day. His G-2 confirmed this estimate, which meant that the Germans were far stronger than AFHQ had thought they would be when AVALANCHE was planned. Eisenhower thus could use all the help he could get from the Italians and was willing to make any concession to get it.
The CCS and heads of government were not, and on August 27 ordered Eisenhower to use the long terms in all future negotiations with the Italians. Aside from the fact that the sternness of the long terms would cause the Italians to hesitate before accepting them, the situation was doubly complicated because the day Eisenhower received his orders Castellano was in Rome showing his government the “short terms.”9 At Eisenhower’s urging, Macmillan told his government that it was possible that Castellano might not return to meet his August 31 date with Smith but would simply send over the radio the Italian government’s acceptance of the short terms. If the Italians did do this, Macmillan said, Eisenhower should be empowered to proceed to conclude a military armistice. The British War Cabinet agreed.
Eisenhower passed this information on to the CCS and added that, if the Italians took only the short terms, “I strongly urge that the matter be closed on the spot.” He would then transmit the long terms to Castellano and tell him that “these are the complete surrender terms which will be imposed by the United Nations.”10