By the fifteenth the crisis was over. The next day lead elements of the Eighth Army made contact with a Fifth Army patrol forty miles southeast of Salerno. Von Kesselring recognized that his attempt to push the Allies into the sea had failed. On September 18 he began a deliberate disengagement and withdrawal.
Just as the AFHQ officers were beginning to breathe sighs of relief, offers of support began to pour in on them. The CCS declared that “we are most anxious to give all the help possible at the earliest moment,” and told Eisenhower to “state clearly” what he wanted.14 Churchill, meanwhile, wired Alexander: “Ask for anything you want and I will make allocation of necessary supplies with highest priority irrespective of every other consideration.” Alexander passed the offer along to Eisenhower.15
Considering his superiors’ earlier refusals to give him the equipment that would have made AVALANCHE a sure thing, Eisenhower may have been more inclined to cry than to laugh. Still, he tempered his response, resisting the temptation to say, “I told you so.” In replying to Churchill, he pointed out that the crisis was over, so there was really nothing that could be done from London.16
But he did not let the CCS off completely by any means. He said he wanted some bombing raids by Eighth Air Force against German communications in northern Italy, and that he wanted the three B-24 groups that had been in the Mediterranean returned, even if only for a period of two weeks. “I would appreciate an early reply,” Eisenhower said in conclusion. “I have complete faith that we are going to solve this problem but I feel it my duty to let you know that any possible temporary assistance of the kind indicated would mean a great deal to us.”17
The CCS responded handsomely. That night, within twenty-four hours of Eisenhower’s request, some 340 RAF heavies and five B-17s bombed the railroad yards at Modane in southwestern France in an effort to close the northern end of the Mont Cenis tunnel. The CCS also told Devers to get some B-24s down to AFHQ, and Devers had them there within the week.18
Eisenhower decided to press his advantage, and on September 18 pointed out to Marshall the benefits available to the Allies if they used Italy as a major base for the strategic air offensive against Germany.19 Once the fields at Foggia were available, Eisenhower said, the advantages would be considerable. The Allies could reach targets beyond the reach of bombers operating from the U.K.; there were better weather conditions with less German fighter and anti-aircraft opposition; they would force the Germans to spread their defenses, and the air forces could have some flexibility in meeting cyclic weather changes.20
By this time, however, it was as clear in Washington as in Algiers that the crisis was over and Marshall would not accept this argument. After the B-24s from Eighth Air Force made some raids in Italy, Marshall told Eisenhower to return them to Devers.21 Smith remarked that AFHQ ought to set up a special section whose sole job would be to keep the home front frightened, since that was the only way AFHQ seemed to be able to get material from the CCS.22
On the front, by September 22, the situation showed marked improvement. After two weeks of battle, the British X Corps was on the high ground surrounding its beachhead, ground which the German artillery had used before with great effectiveness. The American VI Corps had a firm link-up with X Corps and with Eighth Army, which in turn had joined with the British V Corps coming from Taranto. The Allies had a continuous line across Italy. Losses had been high but unevenly distributed—Clark had suffered 14,000 casualties to Montgomery’s 600. The drive for Naples and the airfields at Foggia, on the east coast, was under way.
At this juncture Marshall sent Eisenhower a criticism of his recent tactics and a suggestion for the future. On September 23 Marshall told Eisenhower that he had been talking with Field Marshal Dill, and they agreed that if AVALANCHE had been started before the operations in the toe of Italy the Germans would have been caught unprepared and probably would have fallen back beyond Naples. More to the point, Marshall said he and Dill feared Eisenhower was about to repeat the mistake. If Eisenhower took the time to develop a secure position around Naples, Marshall said, the Germans would have time to prepare their defenses and thus make the road to Rome long and difficult. He wondered if Eisenhower had considered the possibility of halting Fifth and Eighth Army efforts in Naples once it was “under the guns” and making a dash for Rome, perhaps by amphibious means.23 These thoughts coincided with Eisenhower’s wishes; as he told Handy, “I would give my last shirt to be able to push a strong division landing into the Gulf of Gaeta,” which was north of Naples.24
Eisenhower took any criticism from Marshall seriously and went through a “great deal of mental anguish” while dictating his reply. His usual practice was to pace the room, talking rapidly, or else to shift from chair to chair. This time he became so engrossed in getting the answer just right that he walked right out the open door into the hallway and kept on dictating. His secretary scurried after him, taking shorthand all the while.25
Eisenhower began his reply by saying that the subject of Marshall’s message had been the chief topic of discussion at the Commanders’ Conference the previous day. Eisenhower and his deputies had searched for the means to make a landing behind the German flanks because they knew it would offer great results, but that they had been unable to come up with anything that promised even a fair chance of success. He reminded Marshall that the Germans had a Panzer division in the Gulf of Gaeta area, another in Rome, and a reserve division that could reinforce either one. Eisenhower felt that if he landed a small force it would be quickly eliminated, while a force large enough to sustain itself could not be mounted “for a very considerable period.”
“I cannot repeat not agree that the Salerno operation could have logically preceded” the landing on the toe, Eisenhower said. It came hard, after the tense days at Salerno, to be obliquely accused of excessive caution, and Eisenhower dictated a full two pages defending his program. AVALANCHE could not have begun any sooner even if there had been no landings at the toe, he said, and added that Montgomery’s drive northward played in fact a considerable role in saving the day at Salerno. Marshall had also expressed disappointment at AFHQ’s failure to seize Rome initially; Eisenhower said that he and his subordinates had given a complete study to a Rome operation and had to reject it because the port there was inadequate and because it was beyond the range of fighter cover.
“As a final word,” Eisenhower concluded, “I want to say that we are looking every minute for a chance to utilize our air and naval power to turn the enemy positions and place him at a disadvantage. I do not see how any individual could possibly be devoting more thought and energy to speeding up operations or to attacking boldly and with admitted risk than I do. My staff is imbued with this same attitude and I should like to reassure you that nothing that offers to us a chance for a successful stroke will be ignored.”
As Eisenhower was dictating, a message came in from Churchill. The Prime Minister congratulated Eisenhower on the landing and deployment in Italy and commented, “As the Duke of Wellington said of the battle of Waterloo, ‘It was a damned close-run thing.’ ” Churchill said he was proud of Eisenhower for his policy of “running risks.” Eisenhower passed the message along to Marshall and commented, “I feel certain that some of his [Churchill’s] correspondents in this area look upon me as a gambler.”26
Gambler or not, by September 26 Eisenhower was committed to the slow, direct, overland approach to Rome. The basis of his decision was G-2’s reading of German intentions, reinforced by Allied shortages in landing craft. G-2 had learned of Hitler’s plan to withdraw into northern Italy, and without the landing craft to make wide sweeping end runs, or the aircraft to block the German retreat, Eisenhower and Alexander felt there was little they could do beyond staying on the Germans’ heels. There had been some talk about shutting down operations once Naples and Foggia were secure; Eisenhower rejected this idea because he wanted to stay on the offensive, because he was aware of the political prestige of Rome, because there were airfields arou
nd Rome which AFHQ could use, and most of all because if the Allies ceased any initiative the Germans might launch a counteroffensive which could wipe out the hard-won gains.
The trouble was that the G-2 information was dated. Hitler had wanted to withdraw to northern Italy, but Von Kesselring convinced him that he could wage a successful defense for a considerable period south of Rome. Von Kesselring was also acting on a misreading of his enemy’s intentions, for he reasoned that once the Allies had Foggia they would halt their Italian campaign and launch a major invasion of the Balkans. But unlike Eisenhower’s, his misreading was not of serious consequence. Hitler was much concerned with the Balkans, and Von Kesselring found it fairly easy to convince him that the Germans should stay as far south as possible in order to prevent an invasion of Yugoslavia. Thus Hitler duly authorized Von Kesselring to build a “Winter Line,” a series of defensive lines, organized in depth, along the general line of the Garigliano and Sangro rivers. By October 1 Fifth Army had Naples and the British had Foggia, but from that point on resistance began to stiffen.
As always, Eisenhower found it impossible to devote his full attention to the battle. Both the French and the Italians were making trouble. When the German garrison withdrew from Corsica, Giraud had put some French troops onto the island. De Gaulle sent his commendations to Giraud for his conduct of operations, but then he learned that Giraud had for months been secretly dealing with the Communist underground on the island. Disturbed at Giraud’s naïveté, De Gaulle decided to bring the army commander directly under his control. He could not chance a repetition of the Corsican experience in Metropolitan France, where the Communists were even stronger. Eisenhower said he did not care how the trouble ended as long as Giraud stayed in command of the army.27 On September 25 De Gaulle proposed to the FCNL that a single, strong executive replace the existing system of dual command. Giraud protested, but he was heavily outvoted, and the FCNL proceeded to deprive him of all but nominal powers as commander in chief. Giraud, priding himself on his political innocence, then committed political suicide by co-signing the measure that removed him from the co-presidency of the FCNL. A month later he had been ousted from the committee.28
All this made Roosevelt most unhappy. “I have very distinct feelings,” he told Marshall, “that we should not send further equipment of munitions to the French army in North Africa if our prima donna is to seize control of it from the old gentleman.” Marshall dissented from this view, as did Eisenhower, on the grounds that Eisenhower needed the French divisions for forthcoming operations in the Mediterranean.29 De Gaulle continued to receive supplies and increased his hold over the FCNL.
One of the reasons De Gaulle was able to get away with ousting Giraud with only mild protests from the U.S. was American preoccupation with Italian affairs. Immediately after the invasion, having secured Italian neutrality, Eisenhower tried to urge the Italian Army into activity against the Germans. He cabled Badoglio, who had made it to Brindisi, urging him to take action. “The whole future and honour of Italy depends upon the part which her armed forces are now prepared to play,” Eisenhower said. He asked Badoglio to issue a clarion call to all patriotic Italians to “seize every German by the throat.”30
It did no good. Asking the Italian armed forces to act was like beating a dead horse. There were no Italian armed forces left. All the Allies had gotten out of the armistice was a symbol of leadership in the King and Badoglio, and as a symbol they were approximately as valuable as Mussolini, whom Hitler had rescued from his Italian captors. Neither symbol had any appeal at all to the Italian armed forces or people.
But the Allies, like Hitler, had to make do with what they had. Eisenhower did what he could to establish regular relations with Badoglio. He decided to send Lieutenant General Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane (the governor of Gibraltar), Macmillan, and Murphy to Brindisi. A visit from these high-ranking officials would give some prestige to the Brindisi government. When Badoglio learned of their selection he told Eisenhower he was pleased, but suggested that it would be more profitable for him to meet with Eisenhower and his staff “to discuss further operations in Italy, a theater of war which we [Italians] naturally know perfectly.”31
Considering the history of his past dealings with Badoglio, Eisenhower was hardly anxious to confide his plans to members of the Italian government. In addition, Eisenhower commanded large and powerful armed forces, while Badoglio commanded nothing. Why should Eisenhower subject himself to listening to Badoglio telling him how to wage the war? Still, conversation might help to clear the air, and in any case Eisenhower’s superiors wanted him to get Badoglio’s signature on the long terms, a task Eisenhower regarded with repugnance but which had to be done. He therefore agreed to a meeting, but to stall said it would have to be in Tunis. The Mason-MacFarlane mission could work out the details.32
In reporting these developments to Marshall, Eisenhower said that Badoglio wanted to bring along some of his general staff. “I can’t make out what his general staff can possibly be directing just now,” Eisenhower laconically commented.33 The first reports from Mason-MacFarlane, who arrived in Brindisi on September 15, reinforced this contempt for the Italians. “They all say we should have landed north instead of south of Naples,” Mason-MacFarlane said. “On this point I tell them they know nothing about it and to shut up.” He found the King to be “pathetic, very old, and rather gaga,” while Badoglio was “old, benevolent, honest and very friendly.” The Italian Army could be “written off.” As for the government itself, its only importance was that except for Mussolini and his gang, who had announced from Germany the organization of a Fascist Republican Party, no one had challenged its authority.34
Two days later Murphy and Macmillan returned from Brindisi, and Eisenhower and Smith, who had become AFHQ’s expert on Italian affairs, conferred with them. Smith then drafted a long cable on the situation to the CCS. He said that AFHQ wanted to use the Italian divisions that were intact on Sardinia and Corsica for coastal defense and the Italian Navy to transport troops and supplies. The trouble was that such activity, although desirable and even necessary to the Allies, was inconsistent with the terms of the armistice, which called for the Italian armed forces to be disarmed and disbanded. Smith asked for a new Allied policy toward Italy, granting the Badoglio administration “some form of de facto recognition … as a co-belligerent or military associate.” He added that the meeting with Badoglio could not be delayed for more than ten more days, so instructions were needed immediately. And because he realized that his suggestion would “provoke political repercussions,” and perhaps “arouse considerable opposition and criticism,” he recommended that “the burden be placed upon us, on the ground of military necessity, which I am convinced should be the governing factor.”35
The next day, September 19, Eisenhower—who had gone to Tunis—decided that Smith’s telegram was indecisive and drafted a new one. He sent it to Smith at Algiers, asking him to send it along to the CCS if he agreed with it (a typical illustration of how closely the two men worked). Smith sent it on to the CCS on September 20. The message was brief. Eisenhower said that in future relations with Italy there were only two courses: (1) to accept and strengthen the government and to regard it as a co-belligerent, or (2) to sweep Badoglio aside, set up an Allied military government, and accept the very heavy commitments involved. “Of these two courses,” Eisenhower commented, “I strongly recommend the first.”36
Eisenhower’s recommendations forced the Allied governments to make a decision. On September 23, after an exchange of messages with Churchill, Roosevelt laid down a basic policy for Eisenhower’s guidance. Eisenhower was to withhold the long-term armistice provisions until a later date to allow the Italians to fight beside the Allies, and to permit the Italian government to assume the status of a co-belligerent if it declared war on Germany and promised to give the people the right to decide the form of government they wished. Eisenhower immediately passed this on to Mason-MacFarlane and told him to arrange for a m
eeting in Malta between Badoglio and the AFHQ heads.37
The possibility of this simple proposal’s approval seemed too good to be true, and it was. Macmillan sent a private message to Churchill saying that he thought Badoglio would sign the long terms, and Churchill convinced Roosevelt. On September 25, Roosevelt gave his assent to using the long terms if Badoglio’s signature could be obtained quickly. Eisenhower reluctantly accepted the switch in policy, and told Smith to go to Brindisi to prepare for the Eisenhower-Badoglio conference, set for September 29.
A rift in the Italian government added to the complications. Badoglio saw clearly the need for Italy to declare war on Germany, both to regularize the status of Italian soldiers who fell into German hands and as a prerequisite for improving Italy’s position with the Western powers. But the King disagreed. He told Mason-MacFarlane that he alone could declare war on Germany and he did not think it wise to do so until the Germans were ousted from Rome. The King added that he was anxious to drop Badoglio, as it would be difficult to form a representative anti-Fascist government under him. He stressed the danger of the Communist Party in Italy and said “he thought it would be most dangerous to leave the choice of post-war government unreservedly in the hands of the Italian people.”38
The royal political acumen was somewhat limited. As if to illustrate this, Victor Emmanuel III signed his first proclamation from Brindisi as “His Majesty the King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia.” Mason-MacFarlane tried to point out that all these situations were changed, but the King grandly replied that he could not surrender his titles without an act of parliament.39