Among them Eisenhower, Portal, and Tedder worked out a solution. They proposed that Tedder supervise all air operations for OVERLORD. Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, and Portal, who was the CCS executive for POINTBLANK, would approve of the air program that Tedder developed. The key sentence in the draft directive the three men prepared read, “The responsibility for supervision of air operations out of England of all the forces engaged in the programme including U. S. Strategic and British Bomber Command together with any other air forces that might be available should pass through the Supreme Commander.” After OVERLORD had been “established” on the Continent the directive for the employment of the Strategic Air Forces could be revised.16 The BCOS accepted the proposal. Eisenhower was completely satisfied. He told Marshall, “I must say that the way it is now shaping up I am far happier than I was a week ago.”17
Although Eisenhower described the new organization as “exactly what we want,” and although everyone on the British side accepted it, opposition unexpectedly arose on the other side of the Atlantic. The JCS protested that the new proposal did not give Eisenhower “command” of the Strategic Air Forces. The British replied that Eisenhower had helped write and had already approved the proposal. They had objected to the word “command” and insisted that “supervision” was adequate. It suddenly struck Eisenhower that the British were going to back out, that he would not after all be given control of the bombers. He confessed himself “astonished” at the British reluctance to substitute the word “command” for “supervision,” for in his talks with Portal it had always been clear that command was in fact what was meant. “The question of exact terms and phraseology did not arise at that time,” Eisenhower reported to Marshall, “but it was clearly understood that authority for operational control of forces … should reside in me.” He recommended that Marshall find some word “that leaves no doubt as to the right of the Supreme Commander to control these air forces.…”18
The morning of March 22 Eisenhower dictated a memorandum for the diary. He recounted the history of his air problems, and by the time he got to the end he was so upset that he declared, “If a satisfactory answer is not reached I am going to take drastic action and inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that unless the matter is settled at once I will request relief from this Command.” That same morning the British Chiefs were meeting. When Eisenhower heard the results of their deliberations he added a handwritten postscript to his memorandum: “I was told the word ‘direction’ was acceptable to both sides of the house. Amen!”19
“Whether strategic bombers work on oil or transportation is a question up to Ike for determination,” Butcher noted on March 27.20 But it was not quite that simple. Eisenhower was still responsible to the CCS and, beyond that body, to Churchill and Roosevelt. He still had to take the views of Harris and Spaatz into account. Superiors and subordinates alike had to be shown that the Transportation Plan was feasible, and the politicians had to be convinced that the damage done in France would not leave a heritage of hatred. Some proof was already available. Portal had ordered a test, and on the night of March 6 Bomber Command carried out a raid against the railway center at Trappes. No planes were lost and civilian casualties were far lighter than opponents of the plan had predicted. Trappes itself did not function properly for a month. Somewhat gloatingly, Tedder noted that Harris had “underestimated the skill of his crews.”21
But Trappes was just a trial run that settled nothing definitely. Spaatz continued to argue against pulling his bombers off their targets inside Germany much before D-Day, since it would give the Germans too long to repair the damage at home. He grew almost frantic late in March, therefore, when Leigh-Mallory, exercising his jurisdiction over Ninth Air Force’s P-47 fighters, transferred them from escort duty with Eighth Air Force to the strafing of railroad targets in France. Spaatz complained to Eisenhower that without the P-47s as escorts his “deep penetrations will result in greatly increased heavy bomber losses and we will be losing many opportunities to deal punishing blows.…”22 Eisenhower called both Leigh-Mallory and Spaatz into his office, listened to both sides, and decided in favor of Spaatz. It was too early to begin the Transportation Plan, so “for the present” he gave Eighth Air Force first call on the fighters.23 The dispute illustrated that much remained to be settled. To thrash it out, Eisenhower called a meeting for March 25 at his headquarters. Portal, Spaatz, Harris, Leigh-Mallory, and Tedder would attend.
It was a dramatic confrontation. Eisenhower acted as chairman, listening judiciously to both sides, then making the final decision. Leigh-Mallory spoke first. The Strategic Air Force advocates had offered to participate in an interdiction program that would begin shortly before D-Day and would concentrate on line-cutting, strafing, bridge-breaking, and the destruction of a few railroad focal points. Leigh-Mallory wanted instead a prolonged attack on rail yards, sidings, stations, sheds, repair shops, roundhouses, turntables, signal systems, switches, locomotives, and rolling stock. This, he claimed, would destroy the German’s capacity to move reinforcements to the beachhead while interdiction would only prove to be a temporary irritant.
Tedder supported Leigh-Mallory. He emphasized the military maxim of concentration of effort. If the air forces had their way, Spaatz would have his bombers flying over Germany making precision attacks against oil targets, Harris would be engaged in area drops against cities, while Leigh-Mallory’s fighters worked over the battlefield. This was to him unsatisfactory. The Allies could derive full value from their immense air power, Tedder argued, only by selecting “one common object towards which all the available air forces can be directed.” He admitted that the Oil Plan would “ultimately produce grave effects on the whole German war effort,” but he did not think it could be done in time to assist OVERLORD.
Tedder cited other advantages to the Transportation Plan. It would retard the movement of supplies to the V-weapons launching platforms in France, and it would force the Germans to move by road, where they would become targets for strafing. It offered a wide selection of targets. Since the Oil Plan had to be concentrated on a few sites, it often was hampered by bad weather, which would not be the case with the Transportation Plan. In sum, Tedder declared that the Transportation Plan “is the only one offering a reasonable prospect of disorganizing enemy movement and supply in the time available, and of preparing the ground for imposing the tactical delays which can be vital once the land battle is joined.”24
Spaatz rose to speak. It was a crucial moment in his life. He had begun his combat flying career in 1916 with the First Aero Squadron of the Mexican Punitive Expedition. As much as Harris, he was wedded to the doctrine that strategic bombing could win the war alone. He believed, according to the official historians of the AAF, that “the effects of such bombings [oil] on German industry and troop mobility on all fronts would be so drastic that the enemy high command might consider whether or not to oppose OVERLORD, or even to continue the war.”25 Graying around the temples, with a rather distinguished mustache and a wide, hard-set mouth, Spaatz was a poker player who enjoyed the good life. Extraordinarily efficient, with a sharp, incisive mind, he had an air about him of a man who was willing to indulge those who had not yet realized the true potentialities of the new weapons of war. Now Spaatz was happy to instruct them.
The Transportation Plan would not work, he began. At best, the Allies could reduce by thirty per cent the present efficiency of the enemy railroads, which was hardly sufficient. The Germans could make up that loss by cutting down on the food carried for the civilian population. On the other hand, fourteen synthetic oil plants produced eighty per cent of all German petrol and oil; by concentrating on them, Eighth Air Force could practically dry up the German supply. He therefore recommended continuing the destruction of the German Air Force (all agreed to this), an all-out attack against Axis oil production, and finally tactical support of OVERLORD beginning shortly before D-Day. This last should include “attacks in great strength upon communications and military inst
allations of all kinds to assist to the maximum the initial phases of OVERLORD.” To cement his argument, Spaatz presented an order from a German quartermaster general of the high command which declared that since motor fuel was short every unit should economize whenever possible.
Portal began the questioning. He forced Spaatz to admit that, since the Germans had plenty of stocks in France, the Oil Plan would produce no noticeable effect until four or five months after it began. Harris then said he wanted no part of the oil program; rather he wished to continue attacking cities at night.
For the first time, Eisenhower entered the discussion. He cut right to the heart of the matter by reiterating that it was essential to take every possible step to ensure that the troops got ashore and stayed ashore. “The greatest contribution that he could imagine the air forces making to this aim was that they should hinder enemy movement.” Even Spaatz admitted that the Transportation Plan would make a small contribution to that end. A British intelligence officer agreed with Eisenhower’s diagnosis of the problem but said his prescription was wrong. Interdiction just before and during the battle would do as much as the Transportation Plan in hampering German movements. Eisenhower “weighed in to the effect that all he had read had convinced him that apart from the attack on the German Air Force, only the Transportation Plan offered the air forces a reasonable chance of making an important contribution to the land battle in the first vital weeks after the landing.” He added that it was his view that it was only necessary “to show that there would be some reduction, however small, in military movement to justify adopting the plan, provided that there were no alternatives available.”26
Eisenhower decided in favor of the Transportation Plan, and that ended the discussion. Spaatz could not complain, since he had received a fair hearing. There were others, however, who could. As the meeting broke up, Portal warned that political difficulties lay ahead. Eisenhower decided to meet them when they came; meanwhile he sent a directive to Tedder on “Preparation and Execution of OVERLORD Air Plan.” The Supreme Commander made Tedder responsible for preparing an over-all outline plan “for the employment of Air Forces in OVERLORD.” Tedder could call on Leigh-Mallory, Spaatz, Harris, and their staffs for help. Eisenhower enjoined him to keep in mind “the tremendous advantages accruing to OVERLORD through current POINTBLANK operations” and to try to integrate POINTBLANK and the Transportation Plan. This meant, in effect, that Spaatz and Harris should be allowed to continue bombing in Germany, although on a reduced scale. It was a necessary concession; without it the airmen might have grown sullen and done everything by half measures.27
Tedder prepared a list of more than seventy railway targets in France and Belgium. On April 3 it went before the War Cabinet for approval. The ministers were not convinced that the military advantages would outweigh the obvious political drawbacks. “The argument for concentration on these particular targets,” Churchill wrote Eisenhower, “is very nicely balanced on military grounds.” He added that the Cabinet took “rather a grave and on the whole an adverse view of the proposal.”28 Foreign Secretary Eden was especially adamant. He pointed out that after the war Britain would have to live in a Europe which was already looking to Russia “more than he would wish.” He did not want the French people to regard the British and Americans with hatred. He was also concerned with the propaganda value of the raids to the Germans.29 In theory, it was not necessary for Eisenhower to clear targets with the War Cabinet before undertaking the bombing of the transportation network in France. Under the terms of his directive from the CCS, he could have Tedder issue orders to Spaatz and Harris. As Tedder reported, however, “in practice, it was not easy to do so” in the face of War Cabinet opposition.30
Eisenhower consulted with Tedder in making his reply. He admitted to Churchill that the weight of the argument that had been brought against the Transportation Plan was “heavy indeed,” but stated that he was convinced that it would increase the chances for success, “and unless this could be proved to be an erroneous conclusion, I do not see how we can fail to proceed with the program.” The French people, Eisenhower reminded Churchill, were “slaves.” They were the ones who would benefit most from success. “We must never forget,” Eisenhower added in his strongest argument, “that one of the fundamental factors leading to the decision for undertaking OVERLORD was the conviction that our overpowering air force would make feasible an operation which might otherwise be considered extremely hazardous, if not foolhardy.” He thought it would be “sheer folly” to refuse approval to the Transportation Plan.31
Churchill then met with Tedder and Portal. Tedder continued to support the plan while Portal, who had once been opposed to it, said that Tedder and Zuckerman had convinced him that it was a military necessity. Churchill said there was no need to make a firm decision as yet; the debate, therefore, continued over the next few weeks.
On April 29 Churchill, following a meeting with the War Cabinet, sent another protest to Eisenhower, repeating the familiar arguments and suggesting that the Transportation Plan be revised to include attacks only on railway centers where the casualties would not exceed 100 to 150 Frenchmen. Eisenhower asked Tedder to draft the reply, which also contained the familiar rejoinders.32 On the evening of May 2 Churchill showed the document to the War Cabinet. The Prime Minister spoke eloquently of Eisenhower’s onerous responsibilities. Care should be taken, he said, not to add unnecessarily to his burdens. Still, he said he had never realized that air power would assume so cruel and remorseless a form. The Transportation Plan, he feared, “will smear the good name of the Royal Air Forces across the world.”33
Neither Eisenhower nor Tedder would give in. As Eisenhower reported to Marshall, the British were trying to make him change his mind, but “I have stuck to my guns because there is no other way in which this tremendous air force can help us.”34 Churchill thought the French themselves should be consulted, so Smith talked to Major General Pierre Joseph Koenig, head of the French forces in the United Kingdom. “To my surprise,” Smith reported, “Koenig takes a much more cold-blooded view than we do. His remark was, ‘This is War, and it must be expected that people will be killed. We would take the anticipated loss to be rid of the Germans.’ ”35
Eisenhower continued to press Churchill for approval of all targets. The Prime Minister, almost but not quite beaten down, decided to take the issue to the President and thus force the Americans to take their share of the responsibility for approval of the plan. He told Roosevelt of the War Cabinet anxiety about “these French slaughters” and of the British doubts “as to whether almost as good military results could not be produced by other methods.” He then, in effect, left the matter up to the President. Roosevelt replied that military considerations must dominate, and his statement was decisive.36
The Transportation Plan had won. It could not have done so had it not been for Tedder, and for Portal standing behind him. If the two RAF leaders had joined with Spaatz and Harris to present a solid phalanx against the program, Churchill never would have accepted it. Tedder’s contribution went beyond simple support. His charm and reasonableness, along with his indefatigable labors, were essential to the plan’s acceptance. But Eisenhower had played the key role in his original choice of Tedder for his staff. He had wanted Tedder at SHAEF precisely because he knew that Tedder’s views on the proper use of air power agreed with his, and he backed Tedder in every confrontation with the strategic bombing advocates and political opponents.
The bombings which began in April were extended in May. By D-Day the Allies had dropped 76,000 tons of bombs on rail centers, bridges, and open lines. The Seine bridges north of Paris were virtually destroyed and remained out of commission until late in June. Based on an index of 100 for January and February 1944, railway traffic dropped from 69 in mid-May to 38 by June 9. The French people accepted the necessity of the program and there were no serious political repercussions. Casualties were light, much less than the pessimists in the War Cabinet had feared. Partly to m
ake it difficult for the Germans to repair damaged facilities, partly to force what remained of the German Air Force to fight, mainly to keep Harris and Spaatz happy, about one quarter of the total strategic air effort continued to concentrate on targets inside Germany.37
Estimates of the effectiveness of the Transportation Plan vary. The official U. S. Army Air Force historians declare, “Long after D-Day, there remained the sobering question as to whether the results of the plan were commensurate with the cost in air effort and the ruin inflicted on French and Belgian cities.”38 The SHAEF historian wrote, “As to the general effectiveness of the bombings, both tactical and strategic, there can be no doubt.” He emphasized that the German generals were “strong in their belief that the various air attacks were ruinous to their counter-offensive plans” against the beachhead.39 Gordon Harrison, the closest student of the cross-Channel attack, concluded that by D-Day the “transportation system was on the point of total collapse,” and this was “to prove critical in the battle for Normandy.”40
Eisenhower had made the Transporation Plan his own and had seen it through. It was a resounding success. The bombers sealed off Normandy and made it almost impossible for the Germans to move reinforcements to the beachhead. Strategic bombing was no panacea offering a short cut to victory but, used properly in close co-ordination with other arms, it proved to be invaluable. Eisenhower thought the Transportation Plan was the decisive factor in his victory at OVERLORD, and he was right.
CHAPTER 4
Le Grand Charles and Other Political Problems
For a year and a half Eisenhower had been trying to find a properly constituted French authority with whom he could deal on a straightforward, impersonal basis, one which would allow him to avoid as much as possible the political complexities inherent in working with a government without a country, authority, or recognition. By early 1944, having gone through various expedients, he felt that he had found it in the form of De Gaulle’s French Committee of National Liberation. In every way that mattered De Gaulle had established the FCNL as sovereign in North Africa and clearly was going to do the same in France when it was liberated. Since the Supreme Commander was counting heavily on the Resistance for help once the Allies got ashore, he thought the time had come to shelve political delicacies and recognize the FCNL as the provisional government of France.