Just before lunch on August 2nd, Butcher met Eisenhower in the hall at SHAEF Main, Widewing. The Supreme Commander was all smiles. “If the intercepts are right,” he said, “we are to hell and gone in Brittany and slicing ‘em up in Normandy.”31 The situation was the culmination of a soldier’s dreams. Eisenhower had strong forces loose in the enemy rear and they could go in any direction he wanted them to. The options, if not unlimited, were wide. Patton might be sent east, toward Paris, or northeast, toward the German rear at Caen, or south into central France, or west into Brittany. Each option had something to recommend it. The seemingly most advantageous route was east into Brittany, both because this fit into the over-all OVERLORD plan and because SHAEF desperately needed the Brittany ports. Because of Eisenhower’s desire to beef up Bradley’s forces, the Americans already had more divisions in France than had been scheduled, but the port capacity controlled was less than anticipated. Thus supply for the onrushing armies was Eisenhower’s major concern. If he were to keep the essential material flowing forward to the front lines, he had to have more ports, and Brest and Lorient were the best immediately available.
Ruppenthal, the leading student of the logistical support of the armies has concluded, “The importance of Brittany in the OVERLORD plan can hardly be exaggerated.” The very success of OVERLORD seemed to depend on getting Brest and Lorient, for without them the necessary divisions could not be supported on the Continent. This was true even if there was no, or practically no, German opposition at all.32
The great urgency of getting Brittany, however, had to be balanced against other possibilities. If Eisenhower sent Patton tearing into the peninsula toward Brest, the Third Army would be moving away from the bulk of the German forces. As Eisenhower explained to Marshall on August 2, he did not want to lose a golden opportunity. The German Army in Normandy had been defeated; it was now possible to destroy it. When the flank opened and the options increased, Eisenhower decided to send only one corps of Patton’s army into Brittany, devoting the “great bulk of the forces to the task of completing the destruction of the German Army, at least that portion west of the Orne, and exploiting beyond that as far as we possibly can.” Brittany remained important, indeed “the rapid occupation of Brittany is placed as a primary task,” but with the Germans on the run everywhere Eisenhower thought the objective could be obtained at small cost. Once Brittany was secure, Eisenhower told Marshall, the War Department could send over the divisions piling up in the United States. Even divisions that had been scheduled to enter the Continent via ANVIL should be diverted to Brittany. In conclusion Eisenhower said, “I am very hopeful as to immediate results, and believe that within the next two or three days we will so manhandle the western flank of the enemy’s forces that we will secure for ourselves freedom of action through destruction of a considerable portion of the forces facing us.”33
On the basis of Eisenhower’s decision, Patton sent one corps into Brittany while his other three corps sped southward from Avranches. Middleton led the drive into Brittany and in four days overran the peninsula. He did not, however, have enough strength to take Brest and Lorient, and he was forced to lay siege to the two ports. In the end Middleton had to be content to contain the German garrisons, and neither port contributed anything to the Allied port capacity. Brest did not fall until mid-September, and Lorient held out to the end of the war. Critics charged that the only reason Eisenhower sent any troops into Brittany was blind obedience to an outdated OVERLORD plan, but it was equally true that had he strengthened Middleton’s attack Brest and Lorient might not have held out, and Twelfth Army Group could have used the ports for support in the drive to the Seine. On the other hand, if another of Patton’s corps had joined Middleton in Brittany, Patton might not have been strong enough in the Falaise area. It is also possible that had Eisenhower ignored Brittany altogether and sent Middleton toward Falaise with Patton, he could have achieved a greater success there.
The arguments were nicely balanced. War is a matter of choices among limited options, for always, no matter how powerful the force a general commands, there are limits to what he can do. In this case Eisenhower decided to try to get away with deploying as few troops as possible in Brittany in order to achieve as much as possible elsewhere. In effect, he failed everywhere. Patton was too weak at Falaise, and Middleton was too weak in Brittany. The policy of scattering forces had nothing to recommend it, especially in view of Eisenhower’s insistence on DRAGOON. If he needed the Brittany ports, he did not need Marseilles; since he had DRAGOON, he did not need the Brittany ports.
Marshall was intrigued by the possibilities inherent in the quick overrunning of the Brittany ports, and by Eisenhower’s suggestion that new divisions should come into the Continent through Brest. On August 8 the Chief therefore asked Eisenhower if he wanted divisions sent forward ahead of schedule. Eisenhower replied that the advance shipment of two infantry divisions was “very desirable” and said he could handle them at Cherbourg or over the Normandy beaches if the Brittany ports were not usable when they arrived.34 When it became clear that Brest and Lorient were not going to fall quickly, Eisenhower told Marshall he was still unwilling to detach troops from his main forces “merely in order to save a week or so in capturing the Brest Peninsula ports.” He explained that he had a chance for a great victory which if successful “will allow us complete freedom of action in France and will have incalculable results.”35*
Clausewitz had long ago insisted on the necessity of careful planning in managing a large organization, with the first requirement being the definition of an objective. He also emphasized that all decisions had to be based on probability. Managers, he declared, had to accept uncertainty and act on the basis of thorough analysis and planning designed to minimize the uncertainty as much as possible. He advocated decisions based on science rather than on hunch.36 In the case at hand, the planners told Eisenhower that when SHAEF’s armies reached the Seine they would have to pause to regroup and refit. Within that context, capture of the Brittany ports was essential. On the other hand, Eisenhower knew he would never have a better opportunity to crush the bulk of the German armed forces in France. To allow that opportunity to pass would have been indefensible caution.
In the end, what threw everything out of balance and made Eisenhower’s decision to go into Brittany appear overly cautious was the success elsewhere. The German Army in France was, if not crushed, badly beaten, and was unable to man another defensive line in France. There was no pause by SHAEF’s armies at the Seine. As a result, by the time Brest was taken the Allied armies were so far from it that there was no point in using it. Eisenhower’s staff was a much more scientific bureaucracy than anything Clausewitz ever imagined possible, but in Eisenhower’s time, as in Clausewitz’, chance, accident, and most of all the seizing of an opportunity at hand could combine to render all plans meaningless.
While Dempsey and Hodges continued to attack, contain, and destroy the Germans in Normandy, Patton’s forces made a wide sweep around the German left flank. Third Army moved with amazing speed, taking Rennes on August 3 and Le Mans five days later. Tedder, Spaatz, Harris, and the air forces generally gave Third Army all possible support. Fighters and fighter bombers protected the armored columns’ flanks. The American tanks had direct ground-to-air radio communication, ensuring immediate tactical support and reconnaissance. The big bombers, meanwhile, continued to interdict behind the German lines. Attacks all along the Seine, the Loire, and in between isolated the battlefield by destroying bridges, roads, and railroads. The Germans were reduced to moving troops by night; their supply deficiencies were acute. French Resistance activities added further to the German woes.
On August 4, caught up in the excitement, Montgomery issued a directive that aimed at the total destruction of the enemy. He decided the time had come for the Canadians near Caen to do more than contain Germans and ordered them to drive for Falaise not later than August 8, thus hopefully cutting off the withdrawal of German forces facing
Dempsey. Second Army should continue its move south and east toward Argentan, while Hodges would maintain his drive eastward. Patton was to attack due east from Rennes toward Laval and Angers. Summing up, Montgomery said the Allies had “unleashed the shackles that were holding us down and have knocked away the ‘key rivets.’ ” He intended to force the enemy back on the Seine, where the bridges had been destroyed, and then elimate Von Kluge’s divisions as a fighting force.37
Eisenhower was thinking of bigger things. On August 7 he told Marshall his three main objectives were to get the Brittany ports, to destroy as much of Von Kluge’s forces as possible, and “to cross the Seine before the enemy has time to hold it in strength, destroy his forces between the Seine and Somme and secure the Seine ports.”38 Eisenhower, in short, was already considering leaping the Seine, rather than pausing for regrouping when the river was reached. He did not, however, reach the next logical conclusion of pulling Middleton’s wasted troops out of Brittany.
Hitler, meanwhile, had plans of his own. As Patton’s Third Army moved away from Avranches, Hitler saw an opportunity to reverse the situation, cut Patton off, recapture the Cotentin ports, and possibly even drive the Allies back into the sea. He proposed to do this by a counterattack, moving out to Mortain and then the coast. If successful, the attack would at the least isolate Patton, leaving him without a supply line and in danger of being engulfed by the enemy. Hitler described the plan as “a unique, never recurring opportunity for a complete reversal of the situation.”39 To strengthen the attack, he sent units to Von Kluge from Pas de Calais—the Germans having finally seen through FORTITUDE—as well as troops from the Vire and Caen area.
Von Kluge launched the Mortain counterattack late in the evening of August 6. Six armored divisions, some of them drastically under strength, led the way. The 30th Division of First Army caught the entire blow, and elements of the division were encircled. They continued to fight, and Bradley sent two additional divisions into the battle to help.
On the map, the situation for the Allies looked serious. The main problem for Eisenhower was deciding how much strength to leave in the Mortain area to keep the Germans away from the sea, so that the supply lines to Patton could remain open. This problem, like that of the question of the commitment to Brittany, was compounded by the opportunity at hand, an opportunity that had ironically been suddenly increased by the counterattack. For Hitler was risking more than he knew. By attacking westward, he was pushing his best formations deeper into the potential Allied trap. For Eisenhower, the question of allocation of resources was crucial. If he agreed to a thin line at Mortain, Von Kluge might break through, with incalculable results. But if the Supreme Commander strengthened the line at Mortain by slowing Patton’s advance and using Third Army troops on the defensive mission, he would lose the chance to encircle and destroy Von Kluge.
By coincidence, Eisenhower was on the scene. He had been anxious for a long time to set up an advance command post in Normandy, and on the evening of August 7 had done so. The next day he met with Bradley. Both generals responded to the challenge in the same way—to hold Mortain with as little as possible and rush every available division south. Tedder was with Eisenhower and Bradley as they talked; he later remembered that Eisenhower approved of Bradley’s decision “there and then. He [Eisenhower] told Bradley that if the Germans should temporarily break through from Mortain to Avranches and thus cut off the southward thrust, we would give the advance forces two thousand tons of supply per day by air.”40 The following morning Eisenhower told Marshall, “The enemy’s … counter attacks … make it appear that we have a good chance to encircle and destroy a lot of his forces.”41
The gamble paid off. Von Kluge’s attack gained only a little ground, at an enormous cost. Late on August 8 the German general discontinued his offensive and refused to renew it despite Hitler’s orders. The Canadians were by then posing a threat he could not ignore, for they had struck with tanks, artillery, and air east of the Orne on the Caen-Falaise road. Concerned about his rear, Von Kluge had to divert troops intended for the Mortain counterattack to meet the threat. To his left, meanwhile, an ever stronger Patton was getting into position to drive toward Falaise with Third Army.42
The Allied offensive was in full swing. Except for Middleton’s corps stranded in Brittany, all forces were meshing perfectly, aiming for the same objective—the destruction of Von Kluge’s forces. “Ike keeps continually after both Montgomery and Bradley,” Butcher noted, “to destroy the enemy now rather than to be content with mere gains of territory.”43
At the end of the first week of August the bulk of two German armies, the Seventh and Fifth Panzer, were within a huge salient, with the tip at Mortain and the base on the Falaise-Argentan line. To the east, U. S. First Army blocked the German path to Avranches, while the British Second Army covered the enemy on the north side of the salient. The Canadian First Army, meanwhile, was preparing to move south from Caen to meet with Patton’s Third Army, swinging to the north from Le Mans. Under the original plan following the breakout, Montgomery had wanted Patton to drive straight east, in the general direction of Paris, but following the Mortain counterattack Bradley had decided to try to encircle the German armies and changed Third Army’s course. He convinced Montgomery of the merit of the new plan. Eisenhower, meanwhile, had come to the same conclusion, and on the afternoon of August 8 visited Bradley at his headquarters to suggest to him that Patton “should swing in closer in an effort to destroy the enemy by attacking him in the rear.” He found that Bradley “had already acted on this idea …” which was a typical example of the similarity of strategic thought among the members of the high command at this stage of the battle.44
The Allied generals licked their lips at the prospect of devouring two entire German armies whole, but they could not ignore two very real dangers. First, as the Canadians from the north and the Yankees from the south moved toward each other through the haze of smoke, crashing shells, and dive-bombing fighter planes, the prospect of their clashing by accident grew with each step that they took. Few things in war are more demoralizing to a soldier than to be shot at by one of his allies. Second, the Allies might effect the juncture and create a line across the base of the German salient, only to find that they did not have enough strength to hold it. For sooner or later the Germans would realize the desperate nature of their position, at which point they could be expected to make a dash for the safety of the west bank of the Seine. Two German armies would come full force against the American or Canadian corps holding the line; in the process the Allied troops might be trampled.
Montgomery, as the over-all ground commander, was responsible for averting both dangers. His solution was to draw the boundary between the Canadians and Americans at Argentan. When Patton reached that town he was to concentrate his forces there, creating a position of such strength that it could withstand any German onslaught. The Canadians, meanwhile, would move down the Caen road to Falaise, then on to Argentan to complete the encirclement. With a clearly drawn boundary, there would be no difficulty in recognizing each other’s position.
Eisenhower’s role in these tactical arrangements was limited. He set the general policy, but day-to-day operations were in the hands of his subordinates. As Supreme Commander he sometimes had to nod his head in approval of a proposed movement, but often he was not consulted on individual maneuvers. One thing he could do was encourage, and he did a great deal of it, more with Montgomery than with the American generals, since he felt that Montgomery needed it more. Thus after dinner on August 8 he drove to Montgomery’s headquarters “to make certain that Monty would continue to press on the British-Canadian front.…”45
The Canadian attack nevertheless went slowly. Patton, facing much slimmer resistance, made a steady advance. By August 10 Von Kluge, much alarmed, realized that his only hope for escape lay in an immediate withdrawal to the east. Hitler, however, wanted him to continue the attacks to the west. After an exchange of messages and a telephone conve
rsation, Hitler finally consented to allow Von Kluge to suspend the westward attack, shorten his lines, and turn the offensive toward Patton’s lead corps (the American XV) in order to keep the supply lines open. It was already too late. The German Seventh Army had lost its rear installations and was depending on the Fifth Panzer Army for supplies, and Patton’s men had cut off all but one of the German supply roads. The Germans were on the verge of an incredible debacle.46
On August 12 Patton’s XV Corps reached Argentan. The Canadians were still eighteen miles to the north and making only slight progress. Patton, impatient, wanted to cross the army boundary line and close the gap. He called Bradley on the telephone and pleaded, “Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.” Bradley refused. He did not want to take the chance of violating the boundary and having Americans and Canadians fire at one another, and he did not believe Patton had enough strength to hold the line once the Germans started to rush to escape. Besides, he thought the Canadians were strong enough to complete the encirclement.*
By August 14 the Allies were on the verge of closing the trap. If successful, they would practically eliminate all German strength in France, leaving them with open country between the current lines and the German border. DRAGOON would begin the next day, August 15, opening another port and tying down remaining German forces in the south of France, most of which were immobile occupation units in any case. Eisenhower, sensing the possibilities of the situation, called on the Allied forces to make a maximum effort to seize the fleeting opportunity to destroy the Germans in France. On August 14, in a rare Order of the Day (he issued only ten in the course of the war), he exhorted the Allied soldiers, sailors, and airmen. “The opportunity may be grasped only through the utmost zeal, determination and speedy action,” he declared, and asked every flier “to make it his direct responsibility that the enemy is blasted unceasingly by day and by night, and is denied safety either in fight or flight.” He asked the sailors to see to it that the supplies kept coming in, and requested “every soldier to go forward to his assigned objective with the determination that the enemy can survive only through surrender; let no foot of ground once gained be relinquished nor a single German escape through a line once established.” If everyone did his job, “we can make this week a momentous one in the history of this war—a brilliant and fruitful week for us, a fateful one for the ambitions of the Nazi tyrants.” The Order of the Day was broadcast over BBC and the Allied radio network, and distributed to the troops in mimeographed form.47