But Eisenhower was only beginning to change his mind and had not yet made a final decision. The French, meanwhile, were growing more excited by the minute. Representatives from the Resistance had come from Paris to beg of Eisenhower, Bradley, Leclerc, or anyone they could find in authority that the Allies enter Paris immediately. They implied, falsely, that they controlled the city, but they said the Germans could not be trusted, might break the tenuous armistice at any time, and were capable of destroying the city. Leclerc pleaded with Gerow for permission to strike out toward the city; when Gerow refused, Leclerc started units toward Paris anyway.
Eisenhower was under pressure for a decision from all sides, from De Gaulle, from Leclerc, from the Resistance representatives, even from his own commanders. Paris was a magnet, attracting everyone toward her. France, it was felt, would not be free until Paris was free. Combat soldiers, American and British as well as French, could hardly wait to get into the city and sample its pleasures. Every division, corps, and army commander in Europe wanted the honor of liberating the city.
For Eisenhower, however, there were other pressures. He had held the alliance together so far by stoutly refusing to make any decision on political grounds. He had worked long and hard to gain British trust and had succeeded only by convincing them that all his actions were based on the Allies’ military needs, not American or any other political objectives. To violate that rule now for De Gaulle’s sake would open a Pandora’s box. If the French could use their military formations independently of SHAEF for political purposes, so could the British, the Poles, and everyone else. Before he could allow Leclerc to dash for Paris he would have to find a military reason—really, a rationalization—for doing so.
By August 22 Eisenhower was beginning to formulate a satisfactory reason. He later told Marshall that, although it would be desirable to defer capture of the city for supply reasons, “I do not believe this is possible. If the enemy tries to hold Paris with any real strength he would be a constant menace to our flank. If he largely concedes the place, it falls into our hands whether we like it or not.”15 Eisenhower’s inclination was reinforced when Resistance representatives convinced him that they held the city by a thread, that Von Choltitz would withdraw if regular troops appeared in Paris, and that guerrilla warfare would begin if they did not. Sending troops into Paris thus became a matter of military reinforcement of success, and Eisenhower was able to think of the liberation as a military, not a political, move. Late on August 22, therefore, he decided to send Leclerc, along with the American 4th Division and a British contingent, into Paris.* He also ordered 23,000 tons of food and 3000 tons of coal dispatched to the city immediately.16 In his orders, Eisenhower emphasized that “no advance must be made into Paris until the expiration of the Armistice [noon, August 23] and that Paris was to be entered only in case the degree of the fighting was such as could be overcome by light forces.” He did not “want a severe fight in Paris,” nor did he “want any bombing or artillery fire on the city if it can possibly be avoided.”17
Leclerc and the other Allied forces entered the city on August 25. De Gaulle was with them. There was only scattered German resistance in Paris. Von Choltitz surrendered to Leclerc and the commander of the Paris FFI, who accepted his surrender in the name of the provisional government of France, not as representatives of SHAEF. De Gaulle appointed Koenig the military governor of the city (Eisenhower gave an identical job to Gerow), and the Gaullists moved immediately to take control of the government buildings. De Gaulle also ordered Leclerc to hold a parade on August 26, a parade that De Gaulle intended to lead. Gerow meanwhile had already ordered Leclerc to move his division in pursuit of the retreating Germans, and in addition was fearful of the possible bloodshed involved in a parade. This was not only because of the number of Resistance members who were now armed in Paris but also because there were pockets of German troops in the city who had not yet surrendered. Gerow told Leclerc to “disregard” De Gaulle’s orders, but instead Leclerc ignored Gerow.18
On August 26, after relighting the flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, De Gaulle led the parade down the Champs Elysées. It was one of the great scenes of the war. Nearly two million people were there, on the streets, at the windows, on the roofs, hanging on flagpoles and lampposts. De Gaulle marched. Occasionally there were spurts of gunfire, but no one, least of all De Gaulle, paid any attention. Finally he stopped, turned, looked at the crowd, drew himself to his full height, and in a hoarse, off-key voice, with his tears soaking the sacred soil of France, began to sing “La Marseillaise.”
The same day Eisenhower visited Bradley at his command post near Chartres. The lure of Paris had become too much for him to resist, and he suggested to Bradley that they enter the city the next morning. It would be a Sunday, Eisenhower reminded Bradley, and “everyone will be sleeping late. We can do it without any fuss.” He radioed Montgomery to ask him to join the party, but Montgomery replied that he was too busy.19
Sunday brought a beautiful, sunny morning, adding to the general air of gaiety and the exultant feeling of liberation. No one, it turned out, had slept late. Bicycles crowded the road. Gay and cheering Parisians quickly recognized Eisenhower and Bradley and surrounded them, holding up their fingers in Churchill’s V sign, waving enthusiastically, and occasionally grabbing and kissing the generals. One huge Frenchman slathered Eisenhower on both cheeks as the crowd squealed in delight. Bradley had better luck; he got caught by one of Paris’ beautiful girls.20
The American generals called on De Gaulle at the Prefecture of Police. He had surrounded himself with the traditional Republican Guards, resplendent in their Napoleonic tunics and black patent leather hats. But despite the show, De Gaulle was worried. He told Eisenhower he had to have food and other supplies immediately. He also needed thousands of uniforms, for he wanted to bring the FFI into the regular army. He would require help in disarming unruly members of the FFI whom he expected, correctly as it turned out, to resist being incorporated into a disciplined establishment. He had to establish his own authority in order to preserve stability in the capital, and he asked Eisenhower for a show of force.
Eisenhower turned to Bradley to ask what could be done. Bradley was already planning to attack eastward out of Paris, and he said he could march his men straight through the city rather than around its outskirts. Eisenhower thereupon decided to have two American divisions march through the city on their way to battle. This not only gave De Gaulle his show of force, but it also reminded the Parisians that the city had been liberated by “the grace of God and the strength of Allied arms.” The parade became, in Eisenhower’s words, “possibly the only instance in history of troops marching in parade through the capital of a great country to participate in pitched battle on the same day.”21
By August 28 Paris was militarily secure, and on that day Gerow called on Koenig to formally turn over the capital to him. Koenig flatly informed Gerow, “The French authorities alone have handled the administration of the city of Paris since its liberation.… Acting as the military governor of Paris since my arrival, I assumed the responsibilities … the 25th of August, 1944.”22 Eisenhower was inclined to be charitable about the situation. “I guess we should not blame the French for growing a bit hysterical under the conditions,” he told Marshall, “and I must say that they seem now to be settling down in good order.”23
Hardly had the front line troops moved out of Paris than the rear-echelon people began to move in. First, there were the French. De Gaulle asked Eisenhower for help in moving some three thousand administrative officers from Algiers to Paris. SHAEF officials bluntly informed him that such a “mass immigration” was impossible. Eisenhower asked De Gaulle to establish a priority for necessary personnel. The issue was soon worked out, and on September 11 Eisenhower ordered that the hundred most important officials be brought in by air. The total movement was not completed until November. British and American businessmen, especially newspaper publishers who wanted to reopen their Paris o
ffices, meanwhile plagued Eisenhower with requests for permission to enter the city.24
Far more important, however, was the way in which Headquarters, Communications Zone (Com Z, under General Lee), moved into the city. Eisenhower had reserved the city and its hotels, at least in his own mind, for the use of combat troops on furlough. He had frequently expressed his view that no major headquarters should be located in or near the temptations of a large city. During the early days of September, nevertheless, without Eisenhower’s knowledge, Lee moved his entire enormous headquarters into Paris. His advance parties requisitioned most of the hotels and buildings previously occupied by the Germans and also took schools and additional billets. Koenig, when he learned that 8000 officers and 21,000 men were settling in Paris, pointed out that they would require more hotels than the city possessed, and the French began to complain that U. S. Army demands were in excess of those made by the Germans.25
The GIs were also unhappy. “Field forces in combat have always begrudged the supply services their rear-echelon comforts,” Bradley wrote after the war, “but when the infantry learned that Com Z’s comforts had been multiplied by the charms of Paris, the injustice rankled all the deeper and festered there throughout the war.” The field commanders were furious also because Lee’s move took place just at a time when transportation was short.26 Led by Patton, they charged that Lee had used up precious gasoline in order to enjoy the hotels of Paris, and that by moving when he did he was out of touch with the supply situation at a time when fuel conservation was critical. Eisenhower then reiterated that he prohibited the establishment of any Allied headquarters within the area of Paris without his specific approval, but it was already too late for that.27
And when Eisenhower learned that supply service troops were engaged in black market activities in Paris on a grand scale, his patience was exhausted. He sent a firm order to Lee to stop the entry into Paris of every individual not absolutely needed there and told him to remove from the city every man whose presence was not essential. He made it explicit that essential duties “will not include provision of additional facilities, services and recreation for Line of Communication troops or Headquarters.” Eisenhower said the initial move had been made without his knowledge or consent. Presented with a fait accompli, however, he had to allow Lee to remain, if only because he did not want to waste more gasoline in moving his headquarters out. But he said the influx of supply personnel was “extremely unwise” and insisted that the situation be corrected as soon as possible. Lee and his headquarters nevertheless stayed in the hotels of Paris.28*
With De Gaulle safely established in Paris, the only remaining step in his accession to political power was formal recognition of his provisional government by the British and Americans. Roosevelt still hesitated on this question, even though the French had gained de facto recognition through the device of a formal civil affairs agreement, concluded on August 26. The agreement declared that there would be two zones in France, a forward zone and a zone of the interior. In the former, Eisenhower’s powers would be practically complete, while in the zone of the interior the French authorities would have full power of administration, subject to Eisenhower’s military requirements. The French guaranteed the Allies’ rights to use ports, naval bases, and troop concentration points in the zone of the interior. There were two difficulties with this arrangement. First, it seemed too early to set up a zone of the interior, so that all of liberated France remained officially in the forward zone. Second, although the British ratified the agreement at the foreign minister level, the Americans did so only by an exchange of ratifications between Eisenhower and Koenig. The United States, in other words, held to its policy of dealing with the French at a military rather than a governmental level.29
Throughout September De Gaulle pressed Eisenhower on both issues. Eisenhower in turn told Roosevelt, through the American representative to the FCNL, Jefferson Caffery, that it was in the Allies’ interest to have a strong French government in power and warned that, if an early recognition was not forthcoming, forces of disorder would take advantage of the situation to endeavor to break down governmental authority in France, thereby creating an intolerable behind-the-lines problem for SHAEF. He also remarked that it would be a long cold winter and that SHAEF could provide only one third the amount of coal for civilian purposes that the Germans had allotted; better that a French government than SHAEF be blamed for this.
Whatever might be said about De Gaulle, Eisenhower added, there was no opposition leader in sight who had the slightest chance of overthrowing him, and if he were by some miracle overthrown chaos would follow. Eisenhower concluded by pointing out that if France fell into the orbit of “any other country” the rest of western Europe would follow. He did not believe that it would be in America’s interest to have the Continent dominated by any single power, since that would result in a super-powerful Europe, a shaken British Empire, and the United States as the only active forces at the end of the war. He asked if that were the case, would America “maintain the adequate military, naval, and air forces” which that situation would demand. Many of these difficulties could be avoided, Eisenhower maintained, by recognizing and working with De Gaulle’s government.30
Even Secretary of State Hull had become convinced of the validity of this position, recommending to Roosevelt on September 17 and again on the twenty-first that the United States recognize De Gaulle’s government as the provisional government of France.31 On August 30 De Gaulle had proclaimed the establishment in Paris of the provisional government of the French Republic, and two weeks later he announced that elections would be held as soon as French sovereignty had been restored, her territories liberated, and—most important—the French prisoners of war and labor deportees returned to their homes.32
Still Roosevelt refused to commit himself. The United States made no decision in September. On October 14 Churchill suggested to Roosevelt that “we can now safely recognize General de Gaulle’s administration,” but the President would not co-operate. He said he preferred to wait until the French had set up a real zone of the interior and the Assembly had been made more representative.33 De Gaulle, meanwhile, had been making steady progress in discussions with Eiisenhower’s representatives about creating a zone of the interior, SHAEF being just as anxious to rid itself of political responsibility as the French were to assume it. On October 20 Eisenhower was able to tell the JCS he had reached a firm agreement on the boundaries of the zone of the interior and would announce it shortly.34
The announcement would leave Roosevelt’s French policy in a total shambles. The President’s own candidates for power in liberated France had long ago dropped by the wayside. Only De Gaulle was left, and Roosevelt could no longer ignore the reality. On October 23 the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and five other nations recognized the French provisional government headed by General de Gaulle. It had been a long, tortuous struggle for everyone involved, and it left a heritage of bitterness. De Gaulle had triumphed, partly with Churchill’s help but primarily on his own, and his great obstacle had always been the United States. France had been liberated, thanks in large part to the Army and Navy of the United States, but few Frenchmen, least of all De Gaulle, were filled with love and appreciation of the Yankees.*
But if the Franco-American relationship was cold, at least there was a relationship. The two sides talked to each other and could still cooperate on common objectives. More than any man on either side, Eisenhower could take the credit for this achievement. A man of fierce temper, he had, despite countless provocations, never lost it in De Gaulle’s presence. In fact, he had come to have a grudging admiration and even liking for the haughty Frenchman. Smith had handled most of the day-to-day details, and he still occasionally exploded when dealing with the French, but Eisenhower, who always accepted the burden of having the final confrontation with De Gaulle and who had to take most of the insults, never did. In 1942 Eisenhower had thought of the French as “those damn Frogs”; by
late 1944, although he still found them troublesome, he respected them.
Because he did, and because they knew that he did, America’s French policy in World War II was not a total failure. Eisenhower had no training as a diplomat, and he hated to be in a position in which Churchill was pulling him one way, Roosevelt another, and the military requirements a third. But through a mixture of patience, common sense, and honesty he accomplished much. His dealings with the French marked one of his greatest achievements.
* For the sake of future relations, Eisenhower would have been better advised to allow the French to liberate Paris themselves. The decision to include British and American troops was his own; I have seen no evidence of any pressure on him from either Churchill or Roosevelt. He may have felt that Leclerc was not strong enough to do the job alone.
* Com Z continued to be a problem throughout the war. In March 1945, for example, Eisenhower made a visit to the front. While there he noticed that one of his army commanders was driving a Chevrolet. The next day he saw a brigadier general from Com Z “in a very fine looking Packard.” The contrast, Eisenhower said, “struck me as being about as illogical as anything I have seen in this Theater,” and he told Lee that until every field commander had the type of automobile he wanted Com Z officers would have to give up their luxury vehicles. Eisenhower to Lee, March 14, 1945, EP, No. 2340.