Eisenhower finally agreed to a less ambitious plan, Operation MARKET, in which Montgomery would use the First Allied Airborne Army (three divisions) to get across the Lek River at Arnhem, outflanking the Rhine and the West Wall. There would be a companion operation, GARDEN, an attack northward by British Second Army designed to link up with the paratroopers near Arnhem.28
It was a bold plan involving a high degree of risk, and only commanders who were convinced that the enemy was routed could have agreed to it. “Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into SHAEF with a hangover,” Bradley recalled after the war, “I could not have been more astonished than I was by the daring adventure he proposed. For in contrast to the conservative tactics Montgomery ordinarily chose, the Arnhem attack was to be made over a 60-mile carpet of airborne troops.… Monty’s plan for Arnhem was one of the most imaginative of the war.”29 It did have obvious disadvantages. By concentrating on MARKET-GARDEN, Montgomery would not be able to give his attention to Antwerp, so there would be a delay in opening the port. By moving northward, Second Army would open a gap between its right flank and First Army’s left. Hodges would have to slide his divisions to his left to cover the gap, which meant an even broader front than before, with more stretching by everyone. Finally, the direction of the attack would carry Montgomery away from the Ruhr and give him another river to cross.
Eisenhower nevertheless decided to let Montgomery mount MARKET-GARDEN. Patton and Hodges were already slowing down, and although it was felt that their pause was only temporary and would be halted once supplies caught up with them, Eisenhower did want to make sure of getting a bridgehead over the Rhine before the momentum of the offensive was lost. The use of the Airborne Army in a major strategic operation as a unified force appealed to him, especially since both Arnold and Marshall had been recommending just such a deployment of the paratroopers for months. An added advantage of the plan was that the airborne troops could be supplied without imposing a further strain on the overburdened transport lines. Montgomery liked the operation because he felt it would outflank the West Wall, hit the enemy at a place he could hardly expect an Allied offensive, and occur in an area within easy range of support from the airborne forces.30
The conference ended on a happy note of agreement. Tedder wired his superior in London, “I felt the discussion cleared the air, though Montgomery will, of course, be dissatisfied in not getting a blank cheque.”31 Eisenhower returned to Granville, where in order to rest his knee he spent the next few days in bed. The morning he got up, he received a wire from Montgomery, who said that because the Supreme Commander had failed to give him priority in supplies he would not be able to launch MARKET-GARDEN until September 26.32 Bradley, Bull, Smith, and Strong joined Eisenhower for lunch at his small house, where from his bedroom window they could see Mont St. Michel; together they discussed the logistical situation and MARKET-GARDEN.
Bradley was opposed to the Arnhem operation, in part because he thought it too risky, in part because it would cost him elements of his First Army and meant therefore that Patton had lost the contest of supplies (Patton had just started across the Moselle River).33 Montgomery later made the serious charge that Bradley opposed the operation for fear it “should open up possibilities on the northern flank and I might then ask for American troops to be placed under my command to exploit them.”34 Tedder rather agreed with this view, although he tended to think that Montgomery, not Bradley, was the villain. “The advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue,” he said in his report on the Brussels airport meeting, “nor do I think it was so intended. The real issue is the degree of priority given to the American Corps operating on Montgomery’s right flank, and the extent to which Montgomery controls its operations.”35
Eisenhower’s view was less parochial than that of his army group commanders. He was more concerned with getting across the Rhine than he was with who commanded what units, and he decided to give Montgomery all the support he could within the over-all structure of the broad-front policy. He told Smith to go to Montgomery’s headquarters and inform the British field marshal that he could count on 1000 additional tons of supply per day, to be delivered by Allied planes and U.S. truck companies. In return, Eisenhower wanted MARKET-GARDEN started much sooner than September 26. To get the trucks to deliver the goods, Eisenhower ordered three newly arrived U.S. infantry divisions stripped of their vehicles, which immobilized the units at their ports of debarkation. Their trucks were used to supply Montgomery. The field marshal responded handsomely; he pushed the target date of MARKET-GARDEN up to September 17 and wired Eisenhower, “Most grateful to you personally and to Beetle for all you are doing for us.”36
MARKET-GARDEN was designed to exploit a favorable local situation and had a limited objective. If successful, it would bar the land exit of the German troops in western Holland, outflank the West Wall, and position Twenty-first Army Group troops for a subsequent drive into Germany along the north German plain. It was not strong enough to qualify as a single thrust and did not, therefore, provide a test of the feasibility of Montgomery’s plan. What it did do was to slow Patton and, much more important, delay the opening of Antwerp. For although Montgomery captured the city in early September, the Germans had reinforced the Scheldt Estuary and Walcheren Island, and as long as they held these places they could deny the use of Antwerp as a port to the Allies. The Canadian First Army was in the process of attacking the Germans, but since the British Second Army was getting all available supplies, no great gains could be expected. On September 11 Eisenhower wrote in the office diary, “Monty seems unimpressed by necessity for taking Antwerp approaches,” but in effect Eisenhower’s decision for MARKET-GARDEN meant he was agreeing to slow Patton and ignore Antwerp to achieve a tactical—not a strategic—gain. All the AEF was now involved in half measures, or less.
Eisenhower made his decision knowing full well the importance of Antwerp. On September 13 he wrote Bradley and the other commanders to explain his position. He said he was “confirmed in my previously expressed conviction that the early winning of deep water ports and improved maintenance facilities in our rear are prerequisites to a final all-out assault on Germany proper.”37 SHAEF pre-invasion planning had declared, “… until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will … limit the forces which can be maintained,” and getting Antwerp operating was a major factor in Eisenhower’s decision to strengthen Montgomery’s northern thrust in the first place. Tedder later pointed out that both he and Eisenhower had “insisted from the start that without Antwerp we could not get to Berlin,” and he also contended that Montgomery’s basic mistake was his underestimation of the difficulties of opening the approaches to Antwerp. “He thought, wrongly, that the Canadian Army could do it while 21 Army Group was making for the Ruhr.”38 But since SHAEF approved of MARKET-GARDEN, it had to share in whatever blame was attached to this mistaken view.*
On September 14 Eisenhower explained his thinking to Marshall. He outlined Montgomery’s proposal for a dash to Berlin, gave his reasons for rejecting it, and said, “The only profitable plan is to hustle all our forces up against the Rhine … build up our maintenance facilities and our reserves as rapidly as possible and then put on one sustained and unremitting advance against the heart of the enemy country.” He said he had “sacrificed a lot” to give Montgomery the strength he needed to get across the Rhine, for “that is, after all, our main effort for the moment.” As soon as MARKET-GARDEN was over, Eisenhower added, “it is absolutely imperative” that Montgomery take the approaches to Antwerp. The Supreme Commander admitted that he had previously been willing to “defer capture of ports in favor of bolder and more rapid movement to the front,” but bad weather was coming and now he had to control Antwerp.
The key to Eisenhower’s current thought came near the end of his letter to Marshall. After outlining all his reasons for wanting to capture Antwerp, he declared, “My own belief is that … we will have to fight one more major battle in
the West. This will be to break through the German defenses on the border and to get started on the invasion.” Once into Germany, he thought the advance would not be as rapid as it had been in France, “but I doubt that there will be another full-dress battle involved.” The major battle would be MARKET-GARDEN. Once it was won, Montgomery could clear Antwerp, which would yield port capacity enough to support all the armies, and the drive through Germany could begin.39
Eisenhower seemed to have come close to accepting Montgomery’s plan for directing all of SHAEF’s efforts to help the major drive in the north, but there remained a sharp difference in their views. In order to win the last big battle, Eisenhower was doing all he could to help Twenty-first Army Group. “It is my concern so to shape our operations that we are concentrating for that purpose,” he told Montgomery on September 16, referring to the coming battle at Arnhem, “and by concentrating I include all troops and supplies that can be efficiently employed.… So Bradley’s left is striking hard to support you; Third Army is pushing north to support Hodges; and Sixth Army Group is being pushed up to give right flank support to the whole.”40 In a message to Lee the next day, however, Eisenhower said that Com Z’s first priority was to maintain the United States units in forward areas. “Equal with this priority” was delivery of 500 tons daily to Twenty-first Army Group by truck.41
Eisenhower made clear the reason for his emphasis on keeping Bradley’s troops well supplied in a note to Montgomery in which he discussed post MARKET-GARDEN operations. The note also emphasized the difference between Eisenhower’s policy and Montgomery’s plan. Clearly, Eisenhower began, “Berlin is the main prize,” the place where the Germans would concentrate their defenses. There was no doubt in the Supreme Commander’s mind, therefore, “that we should concentrate all our energies and resources on a rapid thrust to Berlin.” But he did not really mean “all,” as he indicated by pointing out that it was also important to get the northern German ports and seal off the Danish Peninsula, and in addition to seize the industrial area of Leipzig-Dresden and the political center at Munich. He wanted, that is, to send his forces eastward on two main lines, one in northern Germany and the other through the center toward Leipzig. If the Russians got to Berlin first, Eisenhower wanted to make sure of at least taking the northern ports plus Leipzig-Dresden.42
Eisenhower’s program was based on the assumption that Antwerp would soon be opened and would provide all the necessary supplies for the two-pronged drive into Germany. But he had not mentioned this in his letter. This was dangerous, for Montgomery’s attention was already centered on Berlin, and to get him to look back at Antwerp, an immediate need, was difficult.
The letter kept Montgomery’s mind on the east. Accordingly, Montgomery did not discuss Antwerp in his reply. Instead he said that a concentrated operation “in which all the available land armies move forward into Germany is not possible,” since it could not be done “quickly.” He again advocated that Twenty-first Army Group, reinforced by First Army, drive on to Berlin over the northern route and that these forces be given all the supply they needed. The other armies would do their best with what remained. “In brief,” Montgomery concluded, “I consider that as time is so very important, we have got to decide what is necessary to go to Berlin and finish the war; the remainder must play a secondary role.” He evidently included Antwerp among “the remainder.”43
On September 17, on schedule, MARKET-GARDEN began. Good weather and excellent detailed planning combined to make the drop successful. The Germans were surprised and allied losses on the first day were slight. The U. S. 101st Airborne captured its assigned bridges, while the 82d Airborne, farther north, began its attack against the vital Nijmegen bridges. The British 1st Airborne landed seven miles west of Arnhem and secured the north end of the Arnhem bridge. The paratroopers were on the verge of opening the corridor to the German rear. An elated Eisenhower told Marshall that “the Team is working well. Without exception all concerned have now fully accepted my conception of our problem and are carrying it out intelligently and with energy.” This was wishful thinking—neither Bradley nor Montgomery approved of Eisenhower’s policy, as each thought the other was getting too much support. “I believe we can establish a firm bridgehead over the Rhine at Arnhem,” Eisenhower added, and the next job on the northern flank would be to open Antwerp. “Meantime Hodges is going well. His operations are coordinated with those of Montgomery. Hodges is driving straight on to Cologne and Bonn for the eventual purpose of attacking the Ruhr from the south as Montgomery swings into it from the north.”44
By September 20 prospects were not so bright, for bad weather had set in and it was impossible to reinforce the paratroopers. Contact with the airborne troops was limited, but it was known that the Germans were counterattacking fiercely, especially against the British around Arnhem. There was still hope, however, for on that day the 82d Airborne took the Nijmegen bridges. That day, also, SHAEF Main moved to Versailles. Weather forced Eisenhower’s plane to circle the airfield for half an hour, but he finally landed and moved into his new headquarters in the Trianon Palace, where he held a conference with Bradley, Lee, Smith, and Tedder. He emphasized that Hodges had to be supplied so that he could keep his left wing up close to Montgomery’s right, where the British Second Army was driving north in Operation GARDEN.
After the conference Eisenhower dictated a letter to Montgomery. As usual, he stressed the views they had in common. “Generally speaking I find myself so completely in agreement” with Montgomery’s latest letter, Eisenhower began, “that I cannot believe there is any great difference in our concepts.” The Supreme Commander declared that never at any time had he implied that he was going to advance into Germany with all armies moving abreast, and he intended to continue to give priority to the northern thrust. He refused, however, to consider stopping in place all divisions not involved in the “single knife-like drive toward Berlin.” Eisenhower knew that Montgomery felt it was a waste of effort to give Patton any supplies, for a Third Army offensive had no connection with the main blow. The Supreme Commander therefore pointed out that the Germans were concentrating against Patton and that in the past four days the Third Army had captured 9000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks.45 This had happened because, prior to the opening of MARKET-GARDEN, Hitler had feared above all else a breakthrough by Third Army into southern Germany. Against Von Rundstedt’s wishes, therefore, he had assigned nearly all the 400 new Panthers and Mark VI tanks available for the western front to a counterstroke against Patton.46
Montgomery replied on September 21. His tendency in the letter was as usual to emphasize differences. “I can not agree that our concepts are the same and I am sure you would wish me to be quite frank and open in the matter,” he declared. He definitely did want to stop the right flank of Twelfth Army Group, by binding orders, and “put every single thing into the left hook and stop everything else. It is my opinion that if this is not done you will not get the Ruhr.”47 To clear the air, Eisenhower called for a conference at Versailles on September 22. Before the meeting he told Marshall his hopes for a quick breakthrough were still high. British Second Army had linked up with the American airborne divisions and, although the ground troops had not yet gotten through to Arnhem, “we should get through … quickly.” His major problem remained maintenance. The entire line was in bad shape, “reminiscent of the early days in Tunisia—but if we can only get to using Antwerp it will have the effect of a blood transfusion.”48
The Versailles conference was the most important since D-Day. There were twenty-three generals, admirals, and air marshals there, including all the senior officers at SHAEF. Everyone of importance in the AEF, in fact, attended, except for the man whose name was uppermost in the minds of those present. For Montgomery had decided not to attend, and sent De Guingand to represent him. The field marshal had good reason for not coming. He knew he was not particularly good at persuasion, especially before a hostile audience, and the group at Versailles was almost uniformly
hostile toward him. De Guingand, on the other hand, was popular at SHAEF, even with Bradley and Patton.49
Eisenhower was disappointed by Montgomery’s absence for he felt that the best way to work out differences was in a face-to-face confrontation.* Before he left his office to go to the conference room, he dictated a letter to Montgomery, saying he still wanted to make the main drive in the north, with Twelfth Army Group in support. “It is because I am anxious to organize that final drive quickly upon the capture of the Ruhr,” he added, “that I insist upon the importance of Antwerp.” He said he would give Montgomery whatever he needed to open Antwerp, “including all the air forces and anything else that you can support.”50
He then moved over to the conference room, where he began the meeting by asking for “general acceptance of the fact that the possession of an additional major deep-water port on our north flank [is] an indispensable prerequisite for the final drive into Germany.” He also asked for an understanding of the clear distinction between logistical requirements for operations to breach the West Wall and the requirements for a drive to Berlin. He said that the main operations for the present were those of Twenty-first Army Group, which would both free Antwerp and attack the Ruhr from the north. De Guingand then presented Montgomery’s views and persuaded Eisenhower to agree that “the envelopment of the Ruhr from the north by 21st Army Group, supported by the First Army, is the main effort of the present phase of operations.” By contrast, opening Antwerp was “a matter of urgency.” Spelling out the details of Montgomery’s position for Bradley, Eisenhower said he should support Montgomery’s operations by taking over a part of the Second Army’s line and continuing the First Army attack toward Cologne and Bonn. Bradley could take whatever opportunities that presented themselves to attack the Ruhr from the south, but Third Army should take no more aggressive actions until the full requirements of the main effort had been met.