“I am,” Eisenhower replied.
“I don’t permit smoking in my office,” Montgomery said sternly. Eisenhower put out the cigarette. When he returned to the United States, Eisenhower reported that Montgomery was “a decisive type who appears to be extremely energetic and professionally able.”19
On the morning of May 28 Eisenhower met with the BCOS to discuss over-all command organization for ROUNDUP. The British submitted two proposals, one of which called for a supreme commander, while the other called for a committee system. Eisenhower explained that the Americans believed “that single command was essential and that committee command could not conduct a major battle.” There was no need to hurry the selection of a supreme commander, however, since ROUNDUP was nearly a year away, and if SLEDGEHAMMER went off, it would be under a British officer. The British then asked with whom they should deal in the meantime. Eisenhower, astonished, replied that Chaney was the theater commander, Marshall’s representative and the operational and administrative commander of all U.S. forces in the United Kingdom. “This idea had apparently never occurred to the British,” Eisenhower noted.
None of Eisenhower’s answers satisfied the British. They wanted a command organization agreed to at once, and they were not impressed with Chaney (neither was Eisenhower, who found Chaney and his staff still wearing civilian clothes, working an eight-hour day, and taking weekends off). On the main point, Eisenhower noted, “It is quite apparent that the question of high command is the one that is bothering the British very much and some agreement, in principle, will have to be reached at an early date in order that they will go ahead wholeheartedly to succeeding steps.”
That afternoon Eisenhower met with Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations. At this first meeting with the admiral, Eisenhower was so impressed with the way in which he had created a joint staff and made it work that he asked permission to send some American officers over to join Combined Operations. Eisenhower also discussed landing craft with Mountbatten and found that the admiral was as concerned about the subject as he was. Eisenhower had not thought in any detail about types of landing craft and was a willing listener when Mountbatten explained that he wanted the largest ones he could get since he believed that strong ground formations had to hit the beaches suddenly and simultaneously. This could not be accomplished in small boats because the required density was not possible in them. At the conclusion of the meeting Eisenhower may have felt as if he had been at school. Within a year he would be assuming the teacher’s role, with Mountbatten as student. But neither man felt anything stiff or formal about their relationship, and they were well on the way to becoming close friends.
That was not the case with Eisenhower’s relationship with General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), with whom Eisenhower had a session on May 29. Brooke, a fiery Irishman with impressive battle credentials, carried throughout the war the handicap of a prejudice against the Americans. After his first meeting with Marshall, Brooke had commented that the American Chief of Staff was “rather overfilled with his own importance,” a unique judgment. Brooke admitted that Marshall was “a pleasant and easy man to get on with” (a conclusion he would later change), “but I should not put him down as a great man.”20 Brooke’s comments on Eisenhower, from beginning to end, were similar but more scathing. He put Eisenhower down as an affable type with no strategic sense or practical ability.
Eisenhower’s practice was either to say something nice about an associate or not mention him, and he seldom mentioned Brooke.
At their first meeting the contemptuous British officer lectured to the diffident American. In view of the difference in their ranks and positions, Eisenhower had to listen and, occasionally, raise an objection, but he could not speak for himself—his responsibility was to relay Marshall’s opinions. The results of the meeting, in which high command and the organization of American forces in England were discussed, were inconclusive.
On June 3 Eisenhower returned to America filled with dissatisfaction. The British seemed to know what they were about and where they were going, but their idea, shared by everyone except Mountbatten, that the attack would be risky and it would take at least three months to build up a beachhead and launch a major offensive, seemed to Eisenhower to be unnecessarily timid. He was even more disturbed by what he had seen of the American contingent in London, which seemed hardly to know that the United States was in the war. The low opinion the British held of Chaney and his staff and the British desire to go over Chaney’s head directly to Marshall emphasized the point. The day after his return to his desk in OPD, Eisenhower noted, “It is necessary to get a punch behind the job or we’ll never be ready by spring, 1943, to attack. We must get going!”21
Upon his return to Washington, Eisenhower sent a memorandum to Marshall saying it was “immediately necessary” to send to England the officer who would command the American ground forces in ROUNDUP. He recommended for that position Major General Mark Clark. Marshall agreed, but he rejected Eisenhower’s next recommendation. Eisenhower said he had given “a great deal of study” to the problem of who should be the commanding general of all American forces in England, and suggested McNarney. “I believe that General McNarney has the strength of character, the independence of thought, and the ability to fulfill satisfactorily the requirements of this difficult task.” Marshall, however, wanted McNarney to stay on as his deputy chief of staff.22
Three days later Eisenhower added another thought on the subject of command in England. He felt that whether Marshall decided to retain Chaney or replace him, the officer in command should be promoted to lieutenant general, so that the British would pay him a little more respect than they were currently giving Chaney. Eisenhower realized that the question of promotion might appear trivial, but in this case he thought it imperative. Then he tried again to get Marshall to appoint McNarney, pointing out that McNarney was familiar with British organization and methods and had the outstanding characteristic of patience, “which he possesses to a noticeable degree at no sacrifice of energy and force.” In a prophetic statement, Eisenhower concluded, “Patience is highly necessary because of the complications in British procedure.”23
On June 8 Eisenhower took to Marshall a draft directive he had prepared in early May for the commander of the European Theater of Operations. It was essential, Eisenhower argued, in view of the distance between the European Theater and the United States, “that absolute unity of command should be exercised by the Theater Commander.” The officer himself should be able to organize, train, and command the combined forces of all arms and services set up in the BOLERO plan, and should also be qualified to assume the duties of chief of staff to the eventual ROUNDUP commander (it was widely assumed by now that this would be Marshall).
The draft called for a European Theater of Operations (ETO), with a commanding general who would “command all U. S. Army forces and personnel” in the theater and would “exercise planning and operational control, under the principle of unity of command, over all U. S. Navy forces assigned to that theater for participation with U. S. Army operations against Western Europe.” Remembering Pershing’s fight in World War I to keep the British and French from absorbing American units into their corps, Eisenhower said that, although the commanding general was required to co-operate with the British, “the forces of the United States are to be maintained as a separate and distinct component of the combined forces.”24
When Eisenhower handed the draft to Marshall he asked the Chief to read it carefully because it could be an important document in the further waging of the war. Marshall replied, “I certainly do want to read it. You may be the man who executes it. If that’s the case, when can you leave?”25
Eisenhower was thunderstruck. He had resigned himself to spending the war in Washington with OPD and had no idea that Marshall had been grooming him for command. The appointment put him in the unusual position of having written his own directive (he later spoke of the di
rective as “the Bible”).
In sending Eisenhower to England in June 1942, Marshall did not expect that Eisenhower would remain in command until Germany’s unconditional surrender. Rather, he wanted Eisenhower to put some energy into the BOLERO program, much of which Eisenhower had created and which he understood thoroughly, and to prepare the way for the eventual Supreme Commander. When that man was appointed, and Marshall probably shared the general view that he himself would be it, Eisenhower would become chief of staff to the Supreme Commander. Marshall’s association with Eisenhower had convinced him that Eisenhower would work perfectly in that assignment.
After the war, when asked about Eisenhower, Marshall remarked, “If he hadn’t delivered he wouldn’t have moved up.” The London trip had been, in part, a test. “I sent Eisenhower and some others over so the British could have a look at them,” Marshall recalled in 1956, “and then I asked Churchill what he thought of them. He was extravagant in his estimate of them, so then I went ahead with my decision on Eisenhower.”26 Marshall’s memory was faulty on this point. While in England Eisenhower met only with British Army and Navy officers and did not see the Prime Minister, and Marshall himself did not see Churchill from the middle of April until June 19. Marshall probably did check with Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, who could have relayed the information that the BCOS had a favorable impression of Eisenhower.
Leaving Marshall’s office after receiving the momentous news, Eisenhower returned to his desk and noted what Marshall had told him. He was flattered, for he knew “It’s a big job—if U.S.-U.K. stay squarely behind Bolero and go after it tooth and nail, it will be the biggest American job of the war.” Then, being a realist, he continued, “Of course command now does not necessarily mean command in the operation—but the job before the battle begins will still be the biggest outside of that of C/S himself.”27
Eisenhower spent the next two weeks preparing for his departure. He spent much of his time with General Handy, his successor, and talked with government officials whose duties included some part in BOLERO. A short talk with Secretary Stimson convinced him that Stimson was the most active backer of ROUNDUP in Washington. He visited with the blunt and abrupt Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, who emphasized that in England the United States was, for the first time in her history, attempting to create a unified command in the field for an indefinite period. King promised to give Eisenhower full support, to see to it that he was “commander” of the U. S. Navy in the British Isles in fact as well as name. If any naval officer violated the unity of command concept by questioning Eisenhower’s single authority, King asked Eisenhower to report him at once.28
On June 19 Eisenhower had to interrupt his last-minute preparations, leave bag-packing to his wife, and attend a meeting between Marshall, Dill, Brooke, and General Hastings Ismay, Churchill’s personal representative on the BCOS. The British had come to Washington to have another discussion on strategy. While the soldiers talked, Churchill and Roosevelt met at Hyde Park, New York. It was a sweltering hot day in Washington. The generals, sitting around a table in the Munitions Building, fumed, wilted their collars, and anxiously imagined all sorts of wild schemes their heads of government might be dreaming up in Hyde Park. Brooke and Marshall had little in common, but they equally dreaded the possible consequences of a Roosevelt-Churchill meeting when they were not present to keep the politicians from making impossible commitments.
Churchill, in fact, was trying to swing Roosevelt away from BOLERO and back to North Africa (he was also pushing Norway, a prospect that horrified all the soldiers). While they talked at Hyde Park, the soldiers in the Munitions Building—Eisenhower, who was present, kept the minutes—reiterated their commitment to BOLERO and ROUNDUP. They also denounced any operation in French North Africa, Brooke because it would take strength away from the Middle East, Marshall because it would make ROUNDUP impossible. Brooke even agreed that SLEDGEHAMMER was preferable to North Africa.29
The next day, at a formal meeting of the CCS, Brooke explained that, since they had North Africa out of the way, he wanted to express his opposition to a “so-called ‘sacrifice’ operation on the Continent” in 1942, for even if a bridgehead was gained it could not be followed up. Eisenhower replied that “there was a possibility at least of securing a bridgehead and holding it as Malta or Tobruk had been held. If the air forces in Great Britain were concentrated for the operation, the Germans would certainly have to bring back air forces to deal with the situation.” He realized that the circumstances in which such an operation might be feasible were unlikely to arise, but felt that the Allies should be ready to seize any favorable opportunity.30
Churchill, meanwhile, was swinging Roosevelt around to North Africa. The American President had promised the Russians some aid in 1942 and it was easy enough for Churchill to demolish SLEDGEHAMMER. He intimated to Roosevelt that he could sell the Russians on the idea that North Africa constituted a second front. Roosevelt made no promises, but his interest was aroused.
On the night of June 20–21 Churchill and Roosevelt took the train to Washington. Shortly after their arrival, they learned of the fall of Tobruk, the symbol of British resistance to the Germans in Libya. It was one of the heaviest blows Churchill suffered during the war.31 He used it immediately, however, to step up his arguments for a North African invasion. The British-American talks reached no firm conclusions, but a North African invasion was once again very much alive as an alternative to SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP.
When Eisenhower left for England the strategic situation was in a state of flux. He was not taking over as commander of a going concern with a firm objective. Instead of being able to concentrate on building up his forces, training them, and planning for their employment, he would have to engage in still another strategic debate. His son John came down from West Point for two days, and Eisenhower had a brief vacation, but he probably did not enjoy it fully, since the uncertainties loomed so much larger than the certainties.
Of one thing Eisenhower was sure and the knowledge was to sustain him not only in his first trying months in England but throughout the war. It was that as long as he did his job Marshall would stand behind him. Just before leaving, Eisenhower took time to write to Brigadier General Spencer Akin, a friend who was on MacArthur’s staff. Summing up his experience in OPD, Eisenhower said it had been a “tough, intensive grind—but now I’m getting a swell command and, of course, am highly delighted that I got away with this job sufficiently well to have the Chief accord such recognition to me.” This meant everything to Eisenhower, because he felt “the Chief is a great soldier.” Enumerating his characteristics, Eisenhower said Marshall was “quick, tough, tireless, decisive and a real leader. He accepts responsibility automatically and never goes back on a subordinate.” Eisenhower thought the United States was “particularly fortunate in having him for a Chief of Staff,” and declared that it had been a “pleasure to work directly under him.”32
Marshall had almost as high an opinion of Eisenhower, for the younger man had fulfilled all his expectations and met all his tests. But Eisenhower’s achievements, to date, had been as a staff officer, usually serving under strong-willed superiors. All of the men under whom he had worked, including MacArthur, thought he would be a success as an independent commander, but that was only prediction. No one really knew how he would react when commanding on his own, away from the daily influence of a decisive superior. Eisenhower still had to meet that test.
Part II
LONDON TO GIBRALTAR
[June 1942–December 1942]
CHAPTER 4
The Theater Commander
On June 24, 1942, Eisenhower arrived in England. There were no bands to greet him, no speeches at the airport, no ceremonies. He quietly climbed into a car and had his driver take him to his office at 20 Grosvenor Square, an apartment building that served as headquarters for the U. S. Army in Europe. A kitchen in the basement put forth a constant odor of b
oiled cabbage and Brussels sprouts, an odor strong enough to remind all inhabitants of 20 Grosvenor that they were in England and England was at war.1
On his first full day in London, Eisenhower began his career as theater commander by meeting with his staff and impressing on them that their job was to have an army in the field ready to attack the coast of France. He told them that he wanted every American officer in the British Isles to cultivate an attitude of determined enthusiasm and optimism and warned them that he would not tolerate pessimism or defeatism. Eisenhower said that any officer who could not rise above the recognized obstacles should ask for instant release from ETO.
Most of Chaney’s officers had regarded their positions as unimportant and had fallen into the habit of referring anything big back to Washington for decision. Eisenhower informed them that all policy making applying to ETO lay with his headquarters. He urged the officers to adopt the greatest informality, learn to solve their own problems, and stop passing the buck.2 Following his meetings with Chaney’s officers, Eisenhower wrote Marshall, “I am quite certain that this staff and all commanders now realize that we have unique problems to solve, that we have full opportunity and freedom of action in solving them, and that no alibis or excuses will be acceptable.…”3
Eisenhower liked to describe himself as a simple Kansas small-town boy and his typical expressions, such as “Determined enthusiasm and optimism,” certainly struck some observers as pure corn. On the face of it, it was ridiculous for Eisenhower to come into a wartime headquarters and tell cynical, able officers that they had to work hard, assume responsibility, and be cheerful. But something had to be done, for the job was not being accomplished. Eisenhower’s way, at least when applied by Eisenhower, worked.