Moreover, calculating—naturally, this is a calculation that does not have a scientific basis and serves only as a means of expressing ideas—that the development process of the countries that are presently underdeveloped and that of the industrialized countries remains the same, it would take the underdeveloped countries 500 years to achieve the same per capita income as in the developed countries. We understand that, when the situation in Latin America is like this—and there is a reason for our having held this economic conference—we cannot talk about such grand purposes while setting such small goals for ourselves.

  In education and health, the goals have also been very modest—in some cases more modest than the proposals that international organizations, such as UNESCO, set several years ago. Our country has more than met some of these goals, and it will more than meet all of them with in the next five years.

  No goals were defined in housing, and we did not even come up with a qualitative definition of what the region’s industrial development will be.

  Moreover, we have noted some lack of precision in setting goals in agriculture, where large and small landholdings are treated the same way and where the activities of the foreigners who have large landholdings—which distort the economies of many Latin American countries—are not even considered.

  Cuba felt that if many of these goals, which had already been stated, were left in more or less the same form as in the original documents that were submitted to us for our consideration and, if the system of direct private investments from abroad was maintained, it would be impossible to attain the fundamentals required for really establishing the right of the Latin American peoples to begin to lay the foundations of the healthy economies required for achieving high growth rates.

  In addition, during the conference, the Cuban delegation repeatedly asked what mechanism would be used for distributing the resources of the so-called Alliance for Progress and if Cuba would have access to those resources. These two questions have not been answered.

  With regard to Latin American economic integration, Cuba pointed out that integration was not a panacea and could not serve as an alternative to basic socioeconomic reforms, and it asked if countries with different forms of economic and social organization would be included in that integration, since Cuba was willing to support Latin American integration if its specific socioeconomic characteristics were respected.

  Moreover, Cuba pointed out that full territorial sovereignty was a prerequisite for solid integration and referred specifically to the Guantánamo Naval Base that exists in Cuban territory, as well as to the Panama Canal. In addition, some further requests were made—requests that were sometimes whittled down considerably from their original form—which were incorporated in one way or another in the meeting’s final documents. But others, such as the demand for guarantees for the ships and planes of all the member countries, were not even taken up.

  With regard to raw materials and commodities, we pointed to the instability of prices and markets; denounced economic aggression and asked that it be condemned and proscribed; pointed to the need for the Latin American countries to diversify their exports, increasing the processing of raw materials and commodities, incorporating new products in their exports and opening new markets; and specifically pointed to the market of the socialist world, which now has a global growth rate of 10 percent.

  Cuba criticized subsidies and the dumping of raw materials and commodities by the industrialized countries and pointed to the risks that the accumulation of agricultural surpluses or strategic mineral reserves may bring to the raw materials and commodities markets. Cuba’s proposals and warnings were echoed by some countries, and it echoed those of other countries in some cases because, naturally, many of these problems are common to our underdeveloped countries.

  However, the final document has reduced the real intentions of the promoters of these ideas to practically nothing, just pulling teeth. For example, while the Cuban delegation urged that restrictions on imports and subsidies for the domestic production of raw materials and commodities by the industrialized countries be abolished, the final document spoke only of reducing those restrictions until they were abolished, “if possible.”

  The same thing happened with many other specific proposals, all of them ending up as vague declarations including the phrases “if possible,” “within the regulations,” “conditions permitting,” “if so required” and “if permitted.” Thus, the escape clauses have already been established.

  According to the [UN] Food and Agriculture Organization, the United States spent—this is what is stated in the data I have—US$2.525 billion to support agricultural prices in 1955. This is much more than the amount it has given in any one year to the countries in the Alliance for Progress.

  This document does not even offer an effective guarantee that subsidized production in the United States will not continue to expand.

  Cuba participated constructively in many proposals, trying to achieve effective resolutions that, without infringing on the sovereignty of any member country—not even the sovereignty of that powerful country which, because of its industrial development, is in a different situation from others—could lead to an understanding that would give the smaller and underdeveloped countries in general full guarantees that they could initiate that new era so many people are talking about.

  Yesterday, the declaration that we worked on, and on which Cuba abstained because it contains several debatable points—some of them basic and others a matter of wording, as had happened throughout the meeting—was presented.

  The main point is that, once again, the United States did not reply to Cuba’s question, so its silence should be interpreted as a negative, and Cuba will not take part in the Alliance for Progress. You cannot support an alliance in which one of the allies will not have any participation. In addition, the declaration does not attack the main root of our ills—the existence of foreign monopolies that distort our economies and even tie our international policies to dictates from abroad.

  It does not denounce economic aggression, and Cuba, which knows from its own experience just how harmful such aggression is, feels that it is very important to denounce that aggression.

  The declaration insists on solving Latin America’s problems by means of monetary policy, assuming that monetary changes will change the countries’ economic structures. We have stated over and over again that a complete structural change in the relations of production is required in order to create the conditions that must exist if the peoples are to make any progress.

  It also remains within a free enterprise framework, which Cuba has publicly condemned in philosophical terms, together with the exploitation of human beings by others. In practice, free enterprise, which has nothing to do with the new development processes, has been nearly eliminated in our territory.

  Fellow delegates, these are the reasons why Cuba cannot sign this document.

  However, I would like to say that some constructive work has been done and that Cuba has not felt isolated during this conference. Many meetings were held to which Cuba was not invited—and, naturally, we cannot express an opinion on the content of the discussions that took place. But we do know that the main topic in many of them was Cuba, and we also know that there were good friends, people holding strong convictions and positions, who maintained an attitude favorable to Cuba.

  So, we have reached the final session of this conference in harmony, and we believe that we have shown that, at all times, we sought to cooperate in expanding the inter-American system on the basis of real independence and friendship with the peoples—not on the basis of making all of us dependent, under the orders of one.

  Cuba has been satisfied with the proceedings here, insofar as we think new perspectives are opening for Latin America, even though our delegation could not sign the document.

  One of the paragraphs explicitly admits the existence of systems that are different from those based on the philosophy of free enterprise; th
erefore, it admits that this meeting includes a country that has some specific characteristics that differentiate it from the others but that still allow it to be part of the whole, since it is explicitly defined in one of the “whereases.”

  Therefore, we think that the first link of true peaceful coexistence in the Americas has been established and that the first step has been taken for those governments that are resolutely opposed to our government and to our system at least to acknowledge the irreversibility of the Cuban revolution and its right to be recognized as an independent government, with all of its specific characteristics—even though they do not like its system of government.

  The US government has voted for all the parts of this document, and we understand that it has also taken a positive step, establishing that regimes may exist whose philosophy adversely affects that of free enterprise in this part of the Americas. We think this is a very positive step.

  We have always been willing to settle our differences with the US government—differences that have given rise to a lot of discussion and to some meetings in this part of the world—and we have always said that we can meet anywhere, as long as there are no strings attached.

  Once more, our government expressly states this willingness. It also states that it is not begging for any kind of rapprochement or asking for a truce; rather, it is simply stating its position and letting all the friendly countries know clearly that Cuba wants to live in peace with all the peoples of the Americas that want to do the same.

  However, we believe that there is still a danger. We would fail to uphold the Cuban revolution’s tradition of being totally forthright if we did not say that we know that all those meetings were somehow linked to a meeting of foreign ministers in which the case of Cuba was discussed. We understand that a lot of traveling has been done in this regard, seeking affirmative votes for the meeting.

  Nevertheless, something constructive has been achieved. Years ago, the foreign ministers met to denounce Guatemala, and then an economic conference was promised. More or less the same thing happened with Costa Rica. Now, an economic conference is being held, and the foreign ministers will later meet.

  We think that this is a great step forward, and we hope that the foreign ministers’ meeting will not be held; if it is not, that would constitute an even bigger step forward. But now the main dilemma of this era has been posed; this is a crucial moment for the peoples of the world, one whose importance is also reflected in the Americas.

  Several delegates—maybe all of you—have wondered, “What will happen if the Alliance for Progress fails?” This is a very important question. The United States has felt the pressure exerted by the peoples. It has seen that the situation in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is one of extreme tension; that it threatens the very foundations of the imperialist regime; and that we must seek a solution.

  This Alliance for Progress is an attempt to seek a solution within the framework of economic imperialism. We believe that, in these conditions, the Alliance for Progress will be a failure. First of all, without any desire to offend, I doubt that it will have US$20 billion to work with in the next few years. The administrative restrictions of the great country to the north are such that it sometimes threatens—as I think it is doing today—to attach strings to foreign loans of as little as US$5 million. If that threat exists for such small amounts, you can imagine the threats there will be for amounts as large as the one already mentioned.

  Moreover, it has been stated explicitly that those loans will be used mainly to promote free enterprise. And, since the imperialist monopolies that have been consolidated in almost all Latin American countries have not been denounced in any way, it is logical to suppose that the loans that are agreed to will be used to develop those monopolies. Unquestionably, this will bring about an upsurge in industry and business and result in profits for the companies. In the free trade system in effect in nearly all of Latin America, this would mean greater exports of capital to the United States—so, in short, the Alliance for Progress would become a means for Latin American countries to finance foreign monopolies.

  Moreover, since the document contains no explicit decision on basic points, such as the maintenance of the prices of raw materials, an obligation to maintain those prices or a prohibition on lowering them, it is very probable that, in the coming years, the present trend will continue, and the prices of Latin America’s raw materials will keep falling.

  In that case, it is probable there will be an ever worsening deterioration in the balance of payments of each of the Latin American countries, to which will be added the effects of the export of capital by the monopolies. All this will translate into a lack of development—the opposite of what the Alliance for Progress is supposed to achieve. The lack of development will bring about more unemployment; unemployment will mean a real drop in wages; and an inflationary process—with which we are all familiar—will begin, in order to meet the shortages in the national budgets that are caused by lack of income. At that point, the International Monetary Fund will begin to play a preponderant role in nearly all the countries of Latin America.

  That is when the crucial choice for the Latin American countries will arise. There are only two possible paths: to confront the people’s discontent, with all that that entails, or to take the path of the liberation of foreign trade, which is of fundamental importance for our economies; to develop an independent economic policy; and to promote the development of all the domestic forces in the country—all this, naturally, within the framework of independent foreign policies that will lead to developing trade with countries in other parts of the world.

  Naturally, not all countries will be able to do this, because it requires some special conditions. First of all, you need a lot of courage. Within the present system, the rulers will have to effect a great change in their economic and foreign policies and will immediately come into conflict with the foreign monopolies. The masses will support the governments that enter into conflict to defend their citizens’ standard of living, but, when the masses defend a position, they also make demands. So the governments will be faced with a double threat, which they will not always manage to deal with successfully: pressure by the imperialist monopolies on the one hand and pressure by the masses, who will be demanding more, on the other. To really take such a road, you must break down former structures, place yourself on the side of the masses and initiate a thorough revolution. But we are not talking about revolution; we are talking about the path that the governments may follow without its leading to the outbreak of revolutionary processes.

  Faced with this choice, if the rulers have the courage to confront the situation, if they satisfy a considerable part of the aspirations of the masses and if they do not back down under pressure from the foreign monopolies, they will be able to make progress for some time.

  Unfortunately, what history shows us is that, when faced with this choice, the rulers, fearing pressure from the masses, ally themselves with the monopolies and the importing sector of the national bourgeoisie and initiate a stage of repression.

  If an independent policy is to succeed, the government must have not only a strong, aggressive national bourgeoisie that wants improvement and is aware of its ideals but also an army that understands the present situation in Latin America and the rest of the world. We cannot predict whether or not this will happen.

  The other path is that of the people’s discontent. In these conditions, their discontent increases to the point that, once again, two historic alternatives arise and a choice has to be made: either the governments are replaced through elections and new governments are installed, this time with the masses’ direct participation in power, or a state of civil war is established. If a government with participation by the masses comes to power, great contradictions will again arise between the masses, who will be trying to have their demands met, and the national armies, which defend different social strata and will still have the weapons. This is fertile ground for anoth
er civil war.

  If the governments manage to eliminate the mass movement and maintain an iron grip on the government apparatus, the threat of civil war— for which Cuba states here and now it will not be responsible—will always hang over their heads. Those civil wars, which will begin in very difficult conditions, in the harshest terrain, will gradually spread to the countryside, laying siege to the cities, and one day the masses will seize political power.

  Mr. President and fellow delegates, this is the message Cuba feels bound to convey to all of you: what it thinks about the Alliance for Progress, the dangers in the Alliance for Progress, and what it foresees in the future of the peoples, if—as has been the case so far—all international meetings turn into mere oratorical contests.

  Therefore, while expressing its affinity with many of the aspirations set forth in this Punta del Este accord, Cuba regrets that it cannot sign it now; Cuba reiterates its desire for friendship with the peoples of the continent. It is willing to discuss any bilateral problem that may arise with other Latin American countries, and expresses its gratitude for the spirit of cooperation with which all delegates have listened to the comments by the Cuban delegation—its address, its warnings and its perhaps too-often-repeated and exhaustive explanations.

  Thank you.

  Cuban Television interview about the Alliance for Progress and the CIES Conference in Punta del Este

  The following is the transcript of the televised press conference held in Cuba on August 23, 1961, where Che Guevara reported on the recent Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES) in Punta del Este.