Before I go further, let’s break down the organization of ODA 745 for the “hit” mission. The following chart shows where each member of the team was assigned:
The four elements were task organized, with the two sniper teams and the blocking position elements out front to conduct the “hit,” while the three MSS personnel were in the rear. The MSS element was tasked with maintaining communications with the FOB, and providing security for the exfiltration route from the killing zone. While there was little redundancy in this plan, only six men would be working in an area of several hundred wooded and grassy acres. Darkness and ground cover should allow the forward elements of ODA 745 to avoid detection by the OpFor patrols.84 And besides, it was assumed that the OpFor did not have NVGs.
The window of opportunity for the shoot opened at 2030 hours and closed at 2130 hours. As the deadline neared, Major Fitzgerald worked the radio circuits hard to make sure the team had an open range and a clear shot. By 2015 hours, all three teams were in position.
The bunker and the road ahead of us dropped off into a large meadow, with the shack about 500 yds./m. directly in front of us. Captain Greg’s blocking position was concealed by brush, perhaps 300 yds./m. from the target. Meanwhile, the sniper teams had moved into the meadow from the woods on our right, maintaining a minimum of 15° of separation from the target between each team. This meant that Sniper Team #1 would be firing into the window of the shack from an angle of around 45° from the front. Sniper Team #2 had a better shot, with only about 30° from the optimum front shot.
Visibility was good (no ground fog or mist), there was almost no crosswind, and the cover in front of the shack actually got thicker than what was on the slope down from the road. This meant that Sniper Team #1 had cover and a good shot from only 298 yds./273 m. to the target,85 and Sniper Team #2 would fire from a similar range. While the high graze angles would increase the difficulty of the shots, the short range would offset the bad geometry.
But then, as luck would have it, just as the shoot window was opening, the range control officers put the range on a “hold;” a civilian emergency rescue helicopter was flying over in response to an automobile accident a few miles away, and it was feared that a live round might ricochet upwards and hit the helicopter (this is not as farfetched as it sounds).
A map of ODA 745’s "hit" on Major Benitiz at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.
RUBICON INC., BY LAURA DENINNO
During the hold, Captain Greg used the extra time to get a firm handle on the exact locations of his sniper teams. Each man in ODA 745 had been equipped with a multifunction strobe light, which could be set to pulse only directional infrared signals. These light pulses are invisible to the unaided human eye, but to users of NVGs or FLIRs they stand out brightly. Greg had each team show their positions with their IR strobes, so there would be no chance of a stray round from his position hitting anyone on the sniper teams.
At 2045 hours, the range control group cleared the hold, and the hard part of DA001 was underway: shooting the target and getting away with it. Sergeants Jim and Glenn began to work their spotting scopes, taking their time to line up Major Benitiz in the dimly lit shack window.
It is an axiom of the sniper trade that a shot of less than 500 yards is a fairly simple task. Now don’t get me wrong, hitting a man-sized target at quarter-mile range is not easy. But it can be easily learned by a skilled rifleman. The hard part, as the two rated snipers were well aware, was not hitting the target, but acquiring it visually. This is why they had chosen to be the spotters, the better to coach Sergeants Shannon and Sean with their M24s onto the target.
Major Fitzgerald and Captain Greg gave the sniper teams the green light. At that moment time slowed to a crawl. The radio circuit went silent, and we could see and hear nothing. After what seemed like hours (actually four minutes), the spotters came up on the circuit signaling their readiness. Captain Greg gave the word that the hit was a “go.” And then things moved fast.
Though the target was not actually visible through Sergeants Shannon’s and Sean’s scopes (the light pickup was not adequate), the spotters carefully coached them onto the target. They were to aim at a point on the dark blur in the window that represented Major Benitiz.
Back on the bunker, we heard the dual cracks of the M24 7.62mm sniper rifles firing fractions of a second apart.
Using two guns to go through a window to hit a target was an old sniper’s trick. The first round smashes the glass, and perhaps hits the target. The second round, without the glass to deflect it, flies true to the target. That was what Shannon and Sean were doing. The first round from Sniper Team #1 flew toward the six-paned window, smashed the lower right pane, took a turn after the impact, and punched into Major Benitiz’s lower abdomen (into his liver if he had been real). The second 7.62mm round flew truer. After passing through the hole made by the first round, it impacted the major in the lower left chest. If he had been real, it would have ripped apart the blood vessels just below his heart. Both rounds would have killed a human victim.
Major Raul Benitiz of the CLF was officially judged “dead.”
Both sniper teams had done a perfect job. Now it was time to get the hell out of there.
This was not going to be easy.
As soon as the sniper rounds impacted, the range control operator who controlled the pyrotechnics hit his buttons, and within seconds the two (simulated) machine gun nests opened up. At the same time, mortar round simulators began to go off near the treeline to our right, well back from the sniper teams but still in the area they would have to soon transit. This was exactly the reason for the blocking position. Sergeant Louis opened up with the M249 SAW on the enemy positions, and Captain Greg added rounds from his own M4 carbine. In all, the two of them poured some 860 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition onto the machine gun nests and mortar pit. This gave the sniper teams time to gather their gear and get moving to their escape routes.
Once they were moving, Greg and Louis abandoned the blocking position and set off after them toward the rally point—the comer of an antenna behind the bunker.
Here the rest of us on the bunker gathered about thirty minutes later, during an artificial training hold to allow the team members to “safe” their weapons and turn in any remaining live ammunition. Everyone was still wearing PVS-7B NVGs, so the heat from the M249 SAW barrel glowed bright green through what the guys call “nods.”
Though the six ODA 745 members were still coming down from their adrenaline rush and wanted to talk, time was short, and as soon as they had reloaded with blank ammunition, they were headed back to the MSS. They blended silently into the night, and were gone.
Then Major Fitzgerald collected Major McCollum and me, and we headed back to the rental car for the six-hour run back to Fort Polk.
Saturday, October 10th—Fort Polk
I slept until noon.
It was midafternoon before I got over to FOB 72 to get the word about how ODA 745 was doing.
After the hit, everyone had made it safely back to the hide site. As soon as it got dark, they would move to the exfiltration site—another meadow LZ like the one where they had landed two nights earlier. Here they would be picked up about 2230 hours by two 160th SOAR MH-60Ls and flown directly to the FOB 72 LZ, where there would be an immediate debriefing (which I was invited to sit in on).
Meanwhile, the rest of the missions seemed to be running well.
The big news was the substantial reinforcement of the SOAR aviation contingent at Barksdale AFB, which had grown to four MH-60Ls, two MH-60Ks, and an MH- 47K. These aviation assets were being heavily utilized during JRTC 99-1. (This would be noted when future SOAR tasking was considered for field operations.)
Following dinner with the JRTC PAO staff in Leesville, I returned with Major Bill Shaw to the FOB 72 compound for an update on the progress of ODA 745:
When the two MH-60Ls had arrived at the exfiltration LZ, an OpFor machine gun team had been ready to ambush the choppers. But the door gunners
on the Blackhawks had opened up with their six-barreled 7.62mm miniguns, instantly killing the three members of the CLF team. Quickly loading up ODA 745, they turned west, and exited Atlantican airspace. The rest of the flight went smoothly, and the two choppers landed at the FOB 72 LZ at 0140 hours. Lieutenant Colonel Smith and much of the 2/7th SFG staff were there to greet ODA 745 and escort them back to their team room.
The men were given a few minutes to safe their weapons and stow rucksacks, and then they sat down for a debriefing.
Sunday, October 11th—Fort Polk
Ever since the lies of Vietnam, the after-action debriefing and After Action Review (AAR)—honest assessments of the success or failure of an operation—have become Army absolutes.
Naturally, the Special Forces have their own traditions and procedures for handling such things.
As soon as the tired but happy ODA 745 had unshouldered their rucksacks, they sat down in a semicircle in front of the FOB 72 leaders and staff. Pulling out notepads and maps, they began to lay out their activities over the past few days, to give Lieutenant Colonel Smith and his staff a “quick look” report which would be the basis of an initial report to JSOTF (Cortina) and SOCCE (Cortina). (The AAR later would be a more formal review of the entire mission, where all aspects of the mission would be discussed.)
Captain Greg and his troops ran through the basic facts of the hit on Major Benitiz and their exfiltration back to the MSS, including observations about the higher-than-expected level of OpFor activity at Camp Shelby. They even thought the OpFor had tried to use bloodhounds to track them down.
This last made the rest of us break into smiles. The team had not been told that the local raccoon-hunting season had opened the previous week (the fact had not made it into the premission intelligence briefing). During DA001 dozens of hunters and their coon dogs had been hunting at the open post of Camp Shelby. It seemed to ODA 745 that the whole state of Mississippi was out looking for them.
The team went on to discuss other issues, such as OpFor WMD activity (the team had discovered no sign of chemical or other WMD munitions), the use of IR and laser illumination for coordination during the hit, and problems with the exfiltration at the primary LZ. The entire mission had involved slogging through swampy country, and many areas thought to be clear had turned out to be overgrown. Thus, the exfiltration LZ had turned out to be large enough to land only one MH-60 at a time, instead of the planned two.
The absence of WMD activity in DA001’s operational area made the mission a complete success from the JTF (Cortina) point of view. 1/10th Mountain could finish their entry into the “box” with little worry about chemical munitions.
After the debriefing, Lieutenant Colonel Smith and the staff had a few more questions for the team, and then he turned the men loose for chow and rest.
At this point it was time to head back to my hotel. On the way out, Smith gave me still another invitation I couldn’t refuse. The AAR was scheduled for 1800 hours that evening in the SOTD theater on the edge of the FOB 72 compound. Would I like to attend? (SF AARs are almost always kept private.)
“Absolutely,” I answered.
The AAR would be my final JRTC 99-1 activity. After that it was time to go home.
A few minutes before 1800, Paula Schlag of the JRTC/Fort Polk PAO escorted me to the SOTD theater facility. It turned out that I was not to be allowed in the AAR itself (where I might be a disruption), but would watch the live feed in the video control room.
The issues brought up during the AAR were varied—and somewhat scattered. Here is a sample:
The discussion opened with comments on the twenty-four-hour delay in starting the mission. This, it turned out, had not caused a disruption, but had helped the team in route planning, terrain familiarization, and a number of other ways. The delay also allowed the team to get needed rest, which reduced fatigue levels in the field, and gave ODA 745 (which was composed of personnel from five separate teams) greater opportunity to bond and establish working relationships.
On the other hand, the compression of the mission schedule affected the availability of the SOAR helicopters during both infiltration and exfiltration, and meant the team had to rush more than they would have liked. For instance, more time to observe the target area would have been desirable. And while the firefight in the pickup LZ had gone their way, it might have been avoided if they could have moved slower or had had additional pickup LZ options.
Next came comments on the planning cycle. On the one hand, there were problems: The software used to plan movement rates over various types of ground surface had proved unable to deal with the actual muddy, swampy terrain they’d encountered. On the other hand, accurate GPS coordinates made the location planning easy (e.g., locating the MSS/hide site and the shooting positions for the sniper teams).
They turned next to the sardine-can packing of the MH-60s. Four loaded SF soldiers and a four-man crew made the helicopter crowded and uncomfortable. The seats were the problem, and the guys wanted them out. Then they could sit on their rucksacks and exit the bird more quickly.
In short, in spite of a few limiting factors and “artificialities,”86 DA001 had turned out to be an excellent training event. The guys on ODA 745 had clearly enjoyed their experiences and would take good lessons back to their teams.
Some of these included:• MSS Site—A strong point of DA001 was the choice of the MSS/hide site, deep in the heart of the Camp Shelby swamps. Easy to defend, with a good supply of fresh water, the site also proved excellent for radio transmissions, and was even comfortable (considering the location). Its weakness was no “back door.” (There was only one way in or out.) Still, despite the hunters and dogs running around (they should not have been there; they were a safety hazard), it was a snug and secure place to do business.
• Rehearsals—Many of the critical decisions that made DA001 successful—such as the use of the certified snipers as spotters—were a direct result of rehearsals and tests prior to the mission. Clearly, a mission as complex as DA001 required as many tests and rehearsals as could be crammed in.
• Communications—The DA001 communications plan was excellent, as was the suite of gear selected for the various phases of the mission. This included SATCOM and HF sets to talk back to FOB 72, Saber FM sets for the “walkaround” phases of the mission, and the IR-/laser-signaling devices.
• Feedback—To a man, the ODA 745 team members considered DA001 to be one of the most stressful and realistic training missions they had participated in. Real-world feelings of haste, isolation, and stress were all there.
The members of ODA 745 and their target mannequin following their successful mission and After Action Review at JRTC 99-1. The mannequin was hit by two sniper rounds, both assessed to have “killed” the target.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
After the AAR, I headed back to the FOB 72 operations center for one last look at the other 2/7th SFG’s missions. Nothing much to report: SR001, SR002, SR003, and DA003 were all underway, and all seemed to be going well. There is a rule of thumb in the SOF business that if you get more than a 50% success or positive information flow from your mission matrix, then things are going pretty good. Except for the massacre of CA001, the various missions seem to have done better than that; and this was reflected in the relative ease of 1/10th Mountain’s entry into the JRTC “box.”
This is not to say that anyone had it easy at the JRTC. Units come there to be tested and exercised, not just to go through the motions. Before long, the OpFor began to hit back at 1/10th. They made several effective and vicious attacks on the 1/10th brigade TOC.
But that is another story.
For now, it was time to fly home.
Going West: NTC 99-02
In October, a few weeks after the JRTC, I was once again observing an SF battalion in a force-on-force rotation ... but a very different kind of force-on-force rotation from the one at Fort Polk.
The western desert of the U.S. is about as different from the lush low
country of Louisiana as terrain can be. Though the landscape seems more like Mars than a place where Americans might fight, here the Army and Marines learned important lessons that helped them win the 1991 Persian Gulf War on the ground. Scattered across the desert are facilities like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin and the Marine Desert Training Center at Twenty-Nine Palms in California, and the Yuma Proving Grounds in Arizona. These offer enough real estate to maneuver entire brigades against similar-sized OpFor formations without disturbing their neighbors in Barstow and Palm Springs.
Here also, as at JRTC, SOF troops round out the training scenarios.
My first destination on this trip was the desert town of Yuma, Arizona, about 300 miles southeast of Fort Irwin on the Mexico/California/Arizona border. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (1/3rd SFG) had come to Yuma to support the 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) in their NTC rotation at Fort Irwin.87
NTCs differ from JRTCs in a number of ways. For starters, NTCs focus on traditional large-unit operations by armored and mechanized forces; and at NTCs, operations tend to be more decentralized. Thus, there is greater emphasis on deep operations behind enemy lines for SOF units; CA missions are usually not required; but there are more SR and DA operations. For the same reason, 1/3rd SFG would establish their FOB hundreds of miles/kilometers from the AOR where the conventional unit would deploy.
Because SOF units participate in only a few NTC rotations every year, they are administrated and adjudicated by the same SOTD staff that handles the duty at JRTC. This meant for me another visit in the field with my friends, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Rozsypal, Major Bill Shaw, and Major Tim Fitzgerald.