The big NRO satellites produce a huge volume of high-quality “close look” and “wide area” imagery, but many urgent demands compete for limited time slots on these precious national assets. Smaller and less expensive collection systems will come on line in the early 21st century. NRO is trying to improve the timeliness of the images they deliver, and to “downgrade” the Super-Secret classification of final products, so that more people and organizations can see them. An alternative that will become available in 1998 is commercial satellite imagery at one-meter resolution (good enough to distinguish tanks from trucks, but not to identify specific models). In the long run, the military will probably be one of the biggest users of commercial imagery, since it will be cheap, timely, and best of all, unclassified!

  UAV systems continue to make steady progress toward the goal of long-duration, stealthy, unmanned airborne reconnaissance. The Pioneer UAV continues in service with the Marine Corps. Also, the first Air Force Predator unit (the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron), at Nellis AFB, Nevada, formed several years ago. Predator is derived from the Gnat 750 UAVs, which were combat-tested by the CIA in Bosnia back in 1994; and Predators were used during a recent workup of the Carl Vinson (CVN-70) CVBG off the southern California coast. The Navy today can receive the data feed from Predators, and control them from carriers. Trials have even tested controlling the big UAVs from nuclear submarines! On the downside, there are no facilities for carrier takeoffs or landings, and Predators must be launched from a land site. But the multi-day endurance of the Predator makes this a minor limitation in most areas.

  A Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flies over the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) during an exercise off the southern California coast. Within a few years, such UAVs will be a common asset supporting carrier groups.

  OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  In addition to the Predator and Pioneer programs, progress is being made on long-endurance surveillance UAVs, like Dark Star, produced by the Lockheed Martin “Skunk Works.” The even-longer-range Teledyne Ryan Global Hawk is also on track, as well as the data links and common control stations needed to make the UAV available to users. Traditional manned reconnaissance systems include the RF-18D Hornet introduced in 1997, equipped with a new Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS).

  • Intelligence Support—In addition to imagery and mapping support, the GW battle group can also make use of many of the other products generated by the various “spook” agencies. Some of these include:—National Security Agency (NSA)—The NSA, which controls all electronic and signals intelligence collection, is a significant supporting agency for an amphibious unit like the GW battle group. A cramped, high-security compartment called the “Ships Signals Exploitation Space” (SSES) lets battle group, ARG, and MEU (SOC) commanders tap into a wealth of electronic intelligence sources including RC-135 Rivet Joint and EP-3 Orion electronic intelligence aircraft, as well as communications intelligence satellites. Ship-based sensors (like the Classic Outboard ESM system) can intercept and analyze electronic signals, from SAM and air traffic radar to cellular phones and television signals.

  —U.S. Space Command (US SPACECOM)—Based at Falcon AFB, Colorado, US SPACECOM provides space-based services to support combat operations. Key assets include weather, GPS navigation and communications satellites, ballistic missile warnings, and in the future, theater missile defense command and control.

  —Cable News Network (CNN)—Intelligence analysts, after a few drinks, will usually agree that CNN is the finest real-time intelligence-gathering service in the world. In fact, one of the greatest benefits of the Challenge Athena system was to give commanders and staffs access to networks like CNN, Skynet, and MSNBC. A side benefit is improved crew morale when up-to-the-minute news and sports from home are available.

  Battle Group Operations: The Concept

  When the Army guys talk about “doctrine,” Navy guys talk about CONOPS. “Doctrine” or CONOPS is how we think about the way we fight. For American Naval commanders, tradition, more than technology, dominates the way they look at CONOPS. Carrier-based air units tend to be more “brittle” than land-based wings and squadrons. When you have very few aircraft, and reinforcements may be weeks away, the loss of each plane and crew hurts—a lot. That means that battle group and air wing commanders have to be very cautious when they commit their limited resources, yet very bold in employing them to make the effort effective. Balancing such conflicting objectives takes a special gift—even a kind of operational and tactical genius. The capacity for such judgment is rare.

  Aviators are an incredibly select group to begin with, and only the best of the best ever rise to command carriers, air wings, and battle groups. Perhaps this explains why naval aviators seem to be so successful, not only in the top ranks of the military, but also in government and industry. They don’t just have “the right stuff.” They have the right CONOPS.

  A trained, well-led battle group is an ideal tool for many different missions. These missions include:• Presence—Global naval presence is the primary mission of every peacetime CVBG deployment. Just having a carrier group in the neighborhood encourages regional bullies and opponents to back off, as seems to have happened in the Straits of Taiwan in 1996 when a pair of CVBGs deterred aggression by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. It’s really very simple: If you attack even a small American ship, you’ve got yourself an international incident. If you attack an American carrier, you’ve got yourself a war against the people of the United States. You lose. Any questions?

  • Show of Force—This might be best described as a one-time application of military power for the purpose of sending a message. It is a punitive military action designed to apply a measured amount of force against a specific target. Operation Desert Strike against Iraq in 1996 and the 1986 raid on Libya are prime examples.

  • Maritime Embargo—In the days of sailing ships, this mission was called a blockade. Though modern interpretations of international law have made the historic concept of blockade obsolete, maritime embargo and inspection operations are a staple of CVBG operations today. At one point in 1994, the U.S. and its allies were simultaneously running embargo operations against Iraq, Haiti, and in the Balkans.

  • Freedom of Navigation Exercise—“Freedom of the Seas” is a concept the U.S. Navy inherits from the Pax Britannica—the age of British global empire, when the Royal Navy enforced the “right of innocent passage” at gunpoint, anywhere in the world. To tyrannical regimes, the notion of free navigation is as incomprehensible as most other freedoms. Dictators are often tempted to simply close their coastal waters, applying the surfer punk’s rule of “my beach, my wave!” As a matter of policy, the United States will challenge any attempt to prevent or restrict free navigation in recognized international waters. Our operations on the Libyan “Line of Death” in the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 and 1986 are classic examples of this mission.

  • Maritime Escort—High—value commercial vessels, like tankers and container ships, or military transports (like Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons) sometimes have to be escorted past hostile shores and through dangerous waters. CVBGs provide powerful force for escort missions, with their array of air, surface, and subsurface capabilities. Our escort of American-flagged Kuwaiti-owned tankers during 1988 and 1989 in the Persian Gulf demonstrates this mission.

  • Expeditionary Support—“Expeditionary” is a fancy word for invasion, the ultimate exercise of force. Though rare, invasions still happen. Recent examples are the 1983 invasion of Grenada, our landings in Beirut during the same period, and the liberation of Haiti in 1994. CVBGs and ARGs were the key units in prosecuting each of these actions.

  • Power Projection—Sometimes, you just have to fly a lot of sorties over some beach for a long time to support a long-term national commitment. Desert Storm and operations in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War are examples. This kind of operation usually involves two or more CVBGs sharing the burden of operations over a period of days o
r weeks. The key to this kind of warfare is pacing the air crews and maintaining an adequate supply of munitions for delivery onto the targets.

  Each of these missions depends on having all the elements of the CVBG team in place, so that the battle group commander has a full range of options to block or defeat any hostile action. A battle group commander can only do his job, however, if he has political support from the National Command Authorities, necessary freedom of action from his regional CinC, and Rules of Engagement (ROE) that allow him to accomplish the mission.

  A Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) being run by U.S. Marines. These operations have become almost commonplace since the end of the Cold War.

  OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  So how would a CVBG commanded like Admiral Mullen use the tools at his command to prosecute an actual crisis? Consider the problem facing many American travelers in some of the world’s rougher neighborhoods: walking into the middle of a civil war. Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s, literally dozens of national, tribal, ethnic, or religious conflicts have sprung up. They drag on for years without one side or the other gaining a decisive advantage. During particularly chaotic periods, immediate evacuation of American citizens and other non-combatants from the war zone is required to prevent massacres or hostage situations from developing, as they did in Iran back in 1979.

  In a “typical” NEO (Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation), Marines from the MEU (SOC) fly into a capital city to reinforce the guard in the American embassy, and then safeguard the helicopter evacuation of non-combatants to the waiting ships offshore. The U.S. and our allies have conducted literally dozens of NEOs in the last few years, particularly in West Africa and the Balkans. Usually an NEO is accomplished by detaching and dispatching the ARG/MEU (SOC) team and a few escorts to conduct the mission independently. During Desert Shield (1990), simultaneous NEOs were required in Somalia and Liberia, without taking forces away from the buildup in the Gulf. Most combatants in civil wars these days have the good sense to let us run our NEOs without getting in the way. However, some truly fanatical terrorists or tribal warriors just can’t resist the urge to test their prowess against the Marines.

  A “worst case” NEO in our time might involve rebel forces closing in on a city; not just ragtag guerrillas with AK-47’s and RPG-7’s, but well-equipped and trained forces with artillery, armor, helicopters, and fighter-bombers. Let’s say that they have taken a hard stand against American intervention; not just nasty rhetoric but closing off normal evacuation routes. Overland roads, seaports, and airports have been closed, and several thousand civilians are trapped inside embassies in the surrounded city. To emphasize their dislike of Westerners, rebels have taken shots at embassy guards and killed some news crews, inciting outrage from the world media.

  Since the situation is clearly getting out of hand, an entire CVBG/ARG/ MEU (SOC) team is dispatched to bring the civilians out with a minimum of losses. With the orders and ROE from the National Command Authorities in hand, the battle group commander brings the force to the offshore waters of the embattled country, then calls his unit commanders together for a planning conference aboard the flagship. Meanwhile, intelligence agencies will be working overtime to gather, generate, and deliver the necessary imagery, maps, and data on potential threats.

  As the battle group arrives offshore, rebel and loyalist forces are fighting in the streets around the embassies, and the rebel air force is bombing the capital city. The embarked CVW is tasked to take out the air threat to the Marine helicopters, and escort and protect the evacuees as they are flown back to the ships of the ARG. The CVW sets up a combat air patrol (CAP) station of F-14 Tomcats backed up by an E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft. At the same time, the State and Defense Department spokesmen back in Washington, D.C., are making the intentions of the force clear to the rebels and the rest of the world: Americans will fire on anyone interfering with the evacuation.

  Initially, the show of force deters any rebel response, which is exactly the intent. Meanwhile, additional air units are already being prepared for operations. Each operational mission is known as an “event” to the air boss on the carrier, who manages and controls the local airspace to ensure that no midair collisions or enemy incursions interfere with operations. Events are normally scheduled about one hour apart to allow a little slack time for flight and deck crews to “respot” aircraft (shuffle them around on the deck) and take a few breaks. These “cyclic ops” can be maintained indefinitely if required.

  Meanwhile, an Aegis ship moves closer inshore, with one of the HH- 60G SAR/special operations helicopters aboard standing by for Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) in case a plane goes down. The escort provides inshore radar coverage of the airspace, and establishes a forward SAM “bubble” to protect the ships of the ARG should the rebels try an air strike against them. About this time, the first wave of Marine reinforcements aboard its helicopter transports arrives at the embassy and prepares to take out the first of the evacuees. Within a few hours of the initial Marine guard reinforcement, the helicopters loaded with evacuees will be shuttling out to the ARG ships on a regular schedule. Since evacuations can involve rescuing hundreds and sometimes thousands of civilians, and it can take hours to get them all clear of the war zone, trouble can easily occur during this period.

  A few hours into the evacuation cycle, the rebels have carefully noted the timing and routes of the evacuation helicopters, with a view to teaching the Americans a lesson. Under cover of darkness a mobile battery of radar-controlled SAMs moves into the evacuation corridor. And just as dawn is breaking, a flight of MiG fighters attempts to intercept one of the helicopter groups. These threats do not go unnoticed. A few miles offshore, systems operators in the backseats of an ES-3 Shadow ESM aircraft intercept radio messages between the SAM battery and rebel headquarters, as well as communications traffic going out to the MiG base outside the city. To deal with this threat, the battle group commander reinforces the next rescue group with additional CAP escorts, and orders alternative route planning for the helicopters.

  Suddenly an escorting EA-6B Prowler begins to detect the telltale signals of the SAM surveillance radar. The Prowler fires a pair of AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles at the radar vehicle, destroying it in seconds. Moments later, a pair of F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombers dive into the area, destroying the SAM launch vehicles with LGBs and AGM-65 Maverick missiles.

  As the strike aircraft finish their deadly work, word goes out over the secure data links that the AEW Hawkeye and ES-3 have detected several flights of MiG fighters being vectored into the area. Rapidly, the CVW commander maneuvers his fighters into position to stop them. He orders his most capable fighters to intercept (these aircraft have Low Probability of Intercept—LPI—radars equipped with NCTR operating modes). As the American fighters move into place, they acquire the rebel fighters on radar, and fire their AIM-120 AMRAAM AAMs at maximum range. Over half of the rebel MiGs are vaporized in clusters of oily fireballs. The rest flee back to their base. Now that the immediate danger is past, the evacuation continues without a break until the last of the civilians and embassy staff have safely reached the ships of the ARG.

  As the Marine guard and reinforcement force is recovered, the National Command Authorities decide to punish the rebel violations of international law prior to withdrawal. With the Marines and helicopters back aboard, the ARG heads back out to sea, and one last strike is planned, briefed, and assembled aboard the carrier. Throughout the NEO operations, national intelligence agencies and the CVBG’s own TARPS F-14’s have been trying to locate and identify critical rebel command posts and heavy-weapons sites. Because of the earlier attacks on U.S. forces, a one-time show of force against the rebels is authorized and rapidly executed.

  Close inshore, the Aegis ship launches several dozen BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles to attack fixed radars and command posts. Behind them come a wave of fighter-bombers and support aircraft, which attack the rebel MiG base, as well as
the headquarters of the insurgent forces. To minimize collateral damage, only PGMs are used to hit bunkers and aircraft shelters. Once their ordnance is expended, all aircraft safely return to the “boat” for a well-deserved rest.

  As the battle group withdraws, Aegis ships and one CAP section provide a “rear guard” until the force exits the threat area. A few days later, the evacuees safely disembark; and weapons, fuel, and supplies are replenished. Then the battle group moves on to its next destination, the cycles of normal operations are reestablished, and the crews begin to think about their next port call and the exercises that will follow. While this scenario is much simplified, it illustrates how CVBGs can rapidly adapt to a fast-breaking situation. Getting a battle group into such a high state of readiness is, of course, no simple matter. The next chapter explains how Admiral Mullen, Captain Rutheford, and CAG Stufflebeem spent the hot summer of 1997 preparing their people, ships, and aircraft for the challenge of an actual deployment. Join me, and I’ll show you how they spent their vacation!