In contrast, when the Coalition attacked the means of the Iraqi Army in the field, it also destroyed that army’s will. Thus, when Coalition land forces engaged forty-two Iraqi divisions, the result after four days was 88,000 Iraqi POWs and only 150 U.S. ground force deaths (half of which were accidentally inflicted by U.S. forces).
What went wrong? The first problem was with intelligence. U.S. intelligence operatives have not been trained to think in terms of the effects of military force on a given enemy. As a result, instead of risking judgments, they behave like accountants (with numbers, there is little risk). Intelligence operatives like to count enemy airplanes rather than determine the effect of killing an ace pilot.
The second problem was with the Plan. The Plan is not chiseled in stone. It is a script, and no performance ever goes according to script. After the first bomb drops, the enemy changes. Perhaps he is stronger than before, perhaps he is weaker. But changed. So the theorist is right at the opening moment of the war, and wrong ever after.
We’ll be discussing both problems in more depth later on.
WHAT IS AN AIR CAMPAIGN?
An air campaign is a series of military actions that employs air vehicles in order to achieve a political goal. It may be a phase in an overall campaign that also uses land, sea, and space vehicles, or it may be a phase that uses air vehicles primarily. (Air is the area above the surface of land or sea and below the vacuum of space. The edge of space is currently reckoned to be about 90,000 feet above mean sea level, but in the future it will probably rise to about 350,000 feet above MSL.) A commander has a wide range of missions, available to him as part of those actions—air superiority, air interdiction, air reconnaissance, airlift, and close air support.
In addition, an air campaign (in fact, any campaign) has to address a specific situation—in this case, the invasion south by Iraq into Kuwait and, potentially, Saudi Arabia.
Once the objectives and the actual situation have been determined, how does a commander build an air campaign?
He starts by using his available intelligence information to decide on an overall plan, which contains all the elements he thinks are needed. Then he examines the contributions airpower can make and decides how it will be used. This last is primarily a list of functions, such as: “I want to gain control of the air and keep the Iraqi Army from inflicting casualties on our ground forces.” This, in turn, leads to target selection, such as, for example: “I’ll want to bomb a particular Sector Air Defense Operations Center.” Or, “AWACS sees a MiG-23 flying south. We need to stop it.” Or, “We need to destroy tanks and artillery in order to keep our own losses on the ground low.” Once the targets have been determined (and the target list will always be changing), he aligns the targets with the attack forces he has available. He then overlays all the other support elements needed to get the job done—intelligence, command-and-control measures, refueling, search and rescue, AWACS, electronic countermeasures, Wild Weasels, communication codes—and lists them in the daily Air Tasking Order (called the Frag in Vietnam). This is the control document that tells virtually everything that flies what to do in the air, where to be, and when (including where not to be—“airspace deconfliction”).
We’ll discuss the ATO in depth in a little while. Before that, however, Horner had a much bigger task in front of him as he began to figure out his air campaign.
THE PLAN AND THE CINC
Plans are not made in the abstract. They are addressed to specific commanders, and though this is primarily to satisfy the commander’s expressed needs, it is also inevitably tailored to the commander’s personality. As the various plans that eventually grew into the actual plan of attack in Desert Storm were created and developed, Chuck Horner was sensitive to both the needs and to the personality of H. Norman Schwarzkopf.
He was aware, first of all, that Schwarzkopf was a landman, not an airman. As a result, from the beginning of their relationship in CENTCOM, he had tried to elevate the CINC’s sights into thinking about the importance of airpower to devastate the enemy in ways that were not directly connected to land warfare. He feared that Schwarzkopf would fall into the land-centric error that too many land officers made: thinking that war was only the battlefield meeting of two land armies. Those officers understood that you bombed the enemy homeland, government, and infrastructure, but they were never sure why or what relevance that had to real war, which to them meant surviving on a battlefield and destroying the enemy soldiers. Next to these, all else was of limited relevance.
Horner wanted the CINC to consider the use of airpower to achieve goals that were not about destroying the enemy army. And in fact, he succeeded.
As it turned out, Schwarzkopf wished to be the kind of CINC who approached warfare from a much broader perspective than is usually the case with land-centric thinkers. He wanted Goldwater-Nichols to work. The proof of it was in the way he created a theater leadership capable of blending the best of land, sea, air, space, and special operations activities and capabilities.
Horner didn’t know that yet, however. This is the way he saw him at the time.
First of all, Schwarzkopf was extremely intelligent. It never took him long to grasp what he was being told.
Like Bradley, he deeply loved ground troops. He cared passionately about their safety.
Like Patton, he believed in his own destiny. This meant that he feared history would not remember him as the heroic man of destiny he considered himself to be . . . or rather, that others would foul things up for him and prevent him from achieving his historic destiny.
Finally, his ego was enormous, yet he was enormously insecure.
His insecurity was the key to his famous rages. For instance, Schwarzkopf could never handle well being put on the spot; and when he was put on a spot, his tendency was to lash out and bully or to throw blame on someone else. For this reason, Horner learned never, never to put him on the spot. He never confronted him in public, but always in his office, when they were alone or with another person the CINC trusted. This not only protected the CINC from himself and his insecurities; but when the CINC was nervous and insecure, he sometimes made wrong decisions, which might require a lot of work to undo.
To have constructed any kind of war plan without taking consideration of these and other personality and character issues would have been far worse than unwise.
INTERNAL LOOK AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLAN
Norman Schwarzkopf took command of CENTCOM on November 23, 1989. Chuck Horner took the first major opportunity he could to talk to him about airpower.
This came during the preparations for the Internal Look exercise planned for July 1990 in which Country Orange invaded Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In April 1990, Horner gave General Schwarzkopf a briefing that covered his planned use of airpower in Internal Look—a briefing that came to have important consequences for Desert Storm, both in the way air was actually used operationally and in the way it added to General Schwarzkopf’s understanding of airpower.
The briefing made a number of key points:
First, it showed the new CINC the deployment priorities for airpower in the Middle East region. The immediate need it foresaw was to build up air defenses (with fighters, AWACS aircraft, and SAMs), so that all the other component forces could deploy under a defensive umbrella covering Saudi airports and seaports. Next, attack and bomber aircraft would deploy to deter invasion, or (if an invasion occurred) to slow the invading forces until sufficient friendly ground forces could be put in place. Then came a whole basket of airpower capabilities most people did not appreciate: command-and-control aircraft to manage and facilitate air support of a ground battle, intelligence-collection aircraft, and vital support systems such as intertheater airlift. These were followed by discussions of mundane but essential issues such as how and where the air forces would be bedded down, supported logistically, and tied together with communications networks. Horner also described how his people would take over the air traffic control system and manage the ai
rspace over the area of responsibility.
During all of this, the CINC listened closely and appeared to appreciate the important details.
Now came a discussion of actual operations. Here Horner described how they would manage intelligence assets and collection; air defense CAPs (Combat Air Patrols) and AWACS coverage; employment of Patriot missiles to defend against Scud attacks, and counter-air attacks on Iraqi airfields, radars, and SAM sites; as well as the overall command-and-control system networking them together. He covered interdiction of Country Orange (Iraqi) forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (if those countries had been invaded), and cutting them off from resupply. He described how they would provide close air support (CAS) to ground forces, using the tactical air control system, and ways to provide that same support to potential Arab allies. And he covered possible nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons targets.
Several elements from this Internal Look briefing remained months later in the plans eventually used in the air attacks on Iraq and its military. These included the first use of Patriot missiles in the ballistic defense mode; the integration of U.S. Marine air into CENTAF plans and operations; Push CAS; and perhaps most important, trust between the CINC and his air commander.
Patriot Missiles
Patriots, it should be noted, were originally developed for the Army as air defense systems (they were, therefore, Army missiles). Later, a ballistic missile defense capability was added, and that was how Chuck Horner wanted to use them in the Gulf, as a defense against Iraqi Scuds, and not as air defense (other systems could handle that task better than adequately).
Some in the Army wanted to use Patriots as both air defense and ballistic defense, which would have located the Patriots in less than optimum sites for ballistic defense and would have involved procedures that would have jeopardized the interception of missiles. Horner, therefore, decided to take early action to ensure that the Patriots would be used in the most effective way.
What happened next is convoluted, but in its twists it shows some of the practical side of Goldwater-Nichols. It’s also a good place to offer a brief primer on the way the various commands interacted.
★ As previously discussed, a service—whether Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps—organized, trained, and equipped forces to conduct military operations, and these forces were apportioned to unified commanders, who could organize their forces for battle in any way they felt was appropriate.
One such way might be to use them as a functional command. For instance, all fixed-wing aircraft from both the Air Force and Navy were assigned to a joint force air component commander—which was Chuck Horner, who was also the CENTCOM Air Force service commander. This dual role wasn’t unusual. As service commander, he had provided the major portion of the forces, and so it was appropriate that he be JFACC. If the Navy had provided the bulk of them, its service commander, Stan Arthur, would have had the position.
Disputes between functional elements in Desert Shield/Desert Storm were ultimately resolved by the CINC. If, let’s say, a Marine air commander wanted to use F-16s to patrol a road instead of his Harriers, then the JFACC would arbitrate. If the former were not satisfied, he could always go to his service commander, who would go to the unified commander. So, in Desert Storm, Walt Boomer of the Marines could go to Schwarzkopf and complain. If the CINC found his arguments had merit, then he could ask the JFACC to justify or reconsider his decision, or he could override it entirely.
Disputes involving another Coalition partner were more complicated. If the United Arab Emirate Air Force representative at headquarters did not agree with the JFACC on the employment of his Mirage aircraft, then he could appeal to his Air Force commander, who was supposed to go to the UAE national authority, who would talk to the UAE ambassador in Washington, who would talk to the Secretary of Defense, who would talk to the President, who would talk to the Secretary of Defense, who would talk to Schwarzkopf. Since that was obviously clumsy and slow, the UAE commander more than likely went directly to Schwarzkopf and asked for help with Horner.
The relationship between the service and the functional commanders depended on the way the services’ men and equipment were being used by the functional commander. Though on first glance there might seem to be potential for dispute here, in fact there was rarely a problem, since the functional commander used members of that service to plan how that service’s force would be used.
The functional commander might also ask the service commander about the military readiness of the forces he was using. So, for example, Chuck Horner might say to Walt Boomer, “Hey, Walt, would you please ask the USMC to ship your deployed air wing more anti-radiation missiles?” Similar relationships developed among the air forces of the various Coalition nations. So, for example, even though the JFACC had ordered the U.S. and Coalition air forces to make their bombing runs at medium altitude, the RAF might still want to conduct their attacks at low level. “Okay, Bill,” Chuck Horner would say to Bill Wratten, the RAF commander, “since your munitions can only be delivered at low altitude, go ahead.” Adding to himself, I hope they don’t get their asses shot away in the process.
As for the relationship between the component commander and the unified headquarters, George Crist, a former CINC of CENTCOM, summed it up this way, “The role of the Unified command is to create the environment needed for the component commands to fight the war.” The Unified command creates the proper environment by defining the overall objectives, apportioning forces, ensuring that services or nations share people and material so everybody can fight, and by determining priorities for the employment of the various forces. The Unified command must serve as the connection between those who conduct the politics of war and those who do the fighting.
The problems that develop most often result when the Unified staff decide they’d rather run the war than devote themselves to the less exciting and prestigious job of creating a good working environment for the component commanders. Unfortunately for the staff, the component commanders have a direct link in the chain of command with the CINC. Commanders like commanders more than they like staff, for commanders are the ones who must lay it on the line, and who must be responsible for their decisions and actions. Staffs merely advise and coordinate. So when the truth is difficult to discern, or when the issue has two reasonable alternatives, the CINC will normally side with his subordinate commander rather than a subordinate staff member. He loves and treasures his staff, but he understands the role of command and the importance of trusting his subordinate commander (and showing that trust).
★ As the JFACC, Chuck Horner concludes, I had to live or die by the quality of my ATO planning and execution. And while I looked for assistance from any source, in the end I had to satisfy the other component commanders, and ultimately the CINC, if I was to keep my job. Yet I could disagree with any of these and survive if my work was unassailable in terms of common sense and support to the overall campaign plan. If I failed to do that, it really didn’t matter whether or not I pleased or angered any of the various staffs, components, or authorities with their agendas. I always listened, but always kept my own counsel and did what I thought was best. And in the end, I did what I was trained to do, command. The ATO was the expression of that command.
★ We return now to April 1990, and the question of the Patriot missiles. Before his briefing to Schwarzkopf, Horner stopped into Third Army Headquarters in Atlanta to give John Yeosock (the Third Army commander, and CENTCOM’s Army service commander, or ARCENT) a briefing of his own, since, as CENTCOM’s area air defense commander (AAADC), that was also one of the JFACC’s responsibilities.
Since Horner was the area air defense commander, the Patriots (by virtue of the declaration of air defenses states and the rules of engagement) came under his tactical control; but because the missiles were apportioned to ARCENT, either the Army or Horner could position them. Thus, in meeting with Yeosock, the two men simply needed to reach an understanding about how to use them. Placement
would logically follow. If Horner, as ADC, could not guarantee the Army that they would not be attacked by the Iraqi Air Force, then he would have had a very hard time obtaining agreement about placement of the Patriots. On the other hand, if he and the Army agreed that the ballistic missiles posed a greater threat than air attacks, then there would be no problem deciding where to put them. And this was what happened: Yeosock, the service component commander, said to Horner, “Good idea, you got them.”
After Horner gave his briefing to the land component commander (Schwarzkopf ), Schwarzkopf said the same thing, “Good idea, you got them.” Since the air component commander and the land component commander had agreed, there was no need to raise the issue with the CINC for resolution. Horner simply informed him (Schwarzkopf) at the same time that he was convincing the land component commander (Schwarzkopf).
Thus, the Patriots were to be used in their ballistic defense mode during Internal Look . . . and of course later during Desert Storm.
Integration of Marine Air
Another issue Horner anticipated and headed off was an attempt by the U.S. Marine Corps to carve out their own space (as ground forces tend to do with land space). Marines like to run their own show, so they bring radars and air controllers to the fight, and are fully capable of controlling the airspace above their portion of the battlefield. Nevertheless, the JFACC is the airspace coordination authority under the CINC, and for him to cede a block of airspace to the USMC component would not only be inappropriate (a functional commander giving responsibility to a service commander) but would not provide for optimum management of the theater airspace.