the pope, who still labored to effect an accommodation, the government

  of Florence had deferred giving their final consent to the war. This

  course, which the Florentines adopted from prudence, was considered by

  the enemy to be only the result of timidity, and with increased

  boldness they led their forces up to Barga, which they resolved to

  besiege. This new attack made the Florentines set aside all other

  considerations, and resolve not only to relieve Barga, but to invade

  the Lucchese territory. Accordingly the count proceeded in pursuit of

  Niccolo, and coming up with him before Barga, an engagement took

  place, in which Piccinino was overcome, and compelled to raise the

  siege.

  The Venetians considering the duke to have broken the peace, send

  Giovan Francesco da Gonzaga, their captain, to Ghiaradadda, who, by

  severely wasting the duke's territories, induced him to recall Niccolo

  Piccinino from Tuscany. This circumstance, together with the victory

  obtained over Niccolo, emboldened the Florentines to attempt the

  recovery of Lucca, since the duke, whom alone they feared, was engaged

  with the Venetians, and the Lucchese having received the enemy into

  their city, and allowed him to attack them, would have no ground of

  complaint.

  CHAPTER III

  The Florentines go to war with Lucca--Discourse of a citizen of

  Lucca to animate the plebeians against the Florentines--The

  Lucchese resolve to defend themselves--They are assisted by the

  duke of Milan--Treaty between the Florentines and the Venetians--

  Francesco Sforza, captain of the league, refuses to cross the Po

  in the service of the Venetians and returns to Tuscany--The bad

  faith of the Venetians toward the Florentines--Cosmo de' Medici at

  Venice--Peace between the Florentines and the Lucchese--The

  Florentines effect a reconciliation between the pope and the Count

  di Poppi--The pope consecrates the church of Santa Reparata--

  Council of Florence.

  The count commenced operations against Lucca in April, 1437, and the

  Florentines, desirous of recovering what they had themselves lost

  before they attacked others, retook Santa Maria in Castello, and all

  the places which Piccinino had occupied. Then, entering the Lucchese

  territory, they besieged Camaiore, the inhabitants of which, although

  faithful to their rulers, being influenced more by immediate danger

  than by attachment to their distant friends, surrendered. In the same

  manner, they obtained Massa and Serezana. Toward the end of May they

  proceeded in the direction of Lucca, burning the towns, destroying the

  growing crops, grain, trees, and vines, driving away the cattle, and

  leaving nothing undone to injure the enemy. The Lucchese, finding

  themselves abandoned by the duke, and hopeless of defending the open

  country, forsook it; entrenched and fortified the city, which they

  doubted not, being well garrisoned, they would be able to defend for a

  time, and that, in the interim, some event would occur for their

  relief, as had been the case during the former wars which the

  Florentines had carried on against them. Their only apprehension arose

  from the fickle minds of the plebeians, who, becoming weary of the

  siege, would have more consideration of their own danger than of

  other's liberty, and would thus compel them to submit to some

  disgraceful and ruinous capitulation. In order to animate them to

  defense, they were assembled in the public piazza, and some of the

  eldest and most esteemed of the citizens addressed them in the

  following terms: "You are doubtless aware that what is done from

  necessity involves neither censure nor applause; therefore, if you

  should accuse us of having caused the present war, by receiving the

  ducal forces into the city, and allowing them to commit hostilities

  against the Florentines, you are greatly mistaken. You are well

  acquainted with the ancient enmity of the Florentines against you,

  which is not occasioned by any injuries you have done them, or by fear

  on their part, but by our weakness and their own ambition; for the one

  gives them hope of being able to oppress us, and the other incites

  them to attempt it. It is then vain to imagine that any merit of yours

  can extinguish that desire in them, or that any offense you can

  commit, can provoke them to greater animosity. They endeavor to

  deprive you of your liberty; you must resolve to defend it; and

  whatever they may undertake against us for that purpose, although we

  may lament, we need not wonder. We may well grieve, therefore, that

  they attack us, take possession of our towns, burn our houses, and

  waste our country. But who is so simple as to be surprised at it? for

  were it in our power, we should do just the same to them, or even

  worse. They declare war against us now, they say, for having received

  Niccolo; but if we had not received him, they would have done the same

  and assigned some other ground for it; and if the evil had been

  delayed, it would most probably have been greater. Therefore, you must

  not imagine it to be occasioned by his arrival, but rather by your own

  ill fortune and their ambition; for we could not have refused

  admission to the duke's forces, and, being come, we could not prevent

  their aggressions. You know, that without the aid of some powerful

  ally we are incapable of self-defense, and that none can render us

  this service more powerfully or faithfully than the duke. He restored

  our liberty; it is reasonable to expect he will defend it. He has

  always been the greatest foe of our inveterate enemies; if, therefore,

  to avoid incensing the Florentines we had excited his anger, we should

  have lost our best friend, and rendered our enemy more powerful and

  more disposed to oppress us; so that it is far preferable to have this

  war upon our hands, and enjoy the favor of the duke, than to be in

  peace without it. Besides, we are justified in expecting that he will

  rescue us from the dangers into which we are brought on his account,

  if we only do not abandon our own cause. You all know how fiercely the

  Florentines have frequently assailed us, and with what glory we have

  maintained our defense. We have often been deprived of every hope,

  except in God and the casualties which time might produce, and both

  have proved our friends. And as they have delivered us formerly, why

  should they not continue to do so. Then we were forsaken by the whole

  of Italy; now we have the duke in our favor; besides we have a right

  to suppose that the Venetians will not hastily attack us; for they

  will not willingly see the power of Florence increased. On a former

  occasion the Florentines were more at liberty; they had greater hope

  of assistance, and were more powerful in themselves, while we were in

  every respect weaker; for then a tyrant governed us, now we defend

  ourselves; then the glory of our defense was another's, now it is our

  own; then they were in harmony, now they are disunited, all Italy

  being filled with their banished citizens. But were we without the

  hope which these favorab
le circumstances present, our extreme

  necessity should make us firmly resolved on our defense. It is

  reasonable to fear every enemy, for all seek their own glory and your

  ruin; above all others, you have to dread the Florentines, for they

  would not be satisfied by submission and tribute, or the dominion of

  our city, but they would possess our entire substance and persons,

  that they might satiate their cruelty with our blood, and their

  avarice with our property, so that all ranks ought to dread them.

  Therefore do not be troubled at seeing our crops destroyed, our towns

  burned, our fortresses occupied; for if we preserve the city, the rest

  will be saved as a matter of course; if we lose her, all else would be

  of no advantage to us; for while retaining our liberty, the enemy can

  hold them only with the greatest difficulty, while losing it they

  would be preserved in vain. Arm, therefore; and when in the fight,

  remember that the reward of victory will be safety, not only to your

  country, but to your homes, your wives, and your children." The

  speaker's last words were received with the utmost enthusiasm by the

  people, who promised one and all to die rather than abandon their

  cause, or submit to any terms that could violate their liberty. They

  then made arrangements for the defense of the city.

  In the meantime, the Florentine forces were not idle; and after

  innumerable mischiefs done to the country took Monte Carlo by

  capitulation. They then besieged Uzzano, in order that the Lucchese,

  being pressed on all sides, might despair of assistance, and be

  compelled to submission by famine. The fortress was very strong, and

  defended by a numerous garrison, so that its capture would be by no

  means an easy undertaking. The Lucchese, as might be expected, seeing

  the imminent peril of their situation, had recourse to the duke, and

  employed prayers and remonstrances to induce him to render them aid.

  They enlarged upon their own merits and the offenses of the

  Florentines; and showed how greatly it would attach the duke's friends

  to him to find they were defended, and how much disaffection it would

  spread among them, if they were left to be overwhelmed by the enemy;

  that if they lost their liberties and their lives, he would lose his

  honor and his friends, and forfeit the confidence of all who from

  affection might be induced to incur dangers in his behalf; and added

  tears to entreaties, so that if he were unmoved by gratitude to them,

  he might be induced to their defense by motives of compassion. The

  duke, influenced by his inveterate hostility against the Florentines,

  his new obligation to the Lucchese, and, above all, by his desire to

  prevent so great an acquisition from falling into the hands of his

  ancient enemies, determined either to send a strong force into

  Tuscany, or vigorously to assail the Venetians, so as to compel the

  Florentines to give up their enterprise and go to their relief.

  It was soon known in Florence that the duke was preparing to send

  forces into Tuscany. This made the Florentines apprehensive for the

  success of their enterprise; and in order to retain the duke in

  Lombardy, they requested the Venetians to press him with their utmost

  strength. But they also were alarmed, the marquis of Mantua having

  abandoned them and gone over to the duke; and thus, finding themselves

  almost defenseless, they replied, "that instead of increasing their

  responsibilities, they should be unable to perform their part in the

  war, unless the Count Francesco were sent to them to take the command

  of the army, and with the special understanding that he should engage

  to cross the Po in person. They declined to fulfil their former

  engagements unless he were bound to do so; for they could not carry on

  the war without a leader, or repose confidence in any except the

  count; and he himself would be useless to them, unless he came under

  an obligation to carry on the war whenever they might think needful."

  The Florentines thought the war ought to be pushed vigorously in

  Lombardy; but they saw that if they lost the count their enterprise

  against Lucca was ruined; and they knew well that the demand of the

  Venetians arose less from any need they had of the count, than from

  their desire to frustrate this expedition. The count, on the other

  hand, was ready to pass into Lombardy whenever the league might

  require him, but would not alter the tenor of his engagement; for he

  was unwilling to sacrifice the hope of the alliance promised to him by

  the duke.

  The Florentines were thus embarrassed by two contrary impulses, the

  wish to possess Lucca, and the dread of a war with Milan. As commonly

  happens, fear was the most powerful, and they consented, after the

  capture of Uzzano, that the count should go into Lombardy. There still

  remained another difficulty, which, depending on circumstances beyond

  the reach of their influence, created more doubts and uneasiness than

  the former; the count would not consent to pass the Po, and the

  Venetians refused to accept him on any other condition. Seeing no

  other method of arrangement, than that each should make liberal

  concessions, the Florentines induced the count to cross the river by a

  letter addressed to the Signory of Florence, intimating that this

  private promise did not invalidate any public engagement, and that he

  might still refrain from crossing; hence it resulted that the

  Venetians, having commenced the war, would be compelled to proceed,

  and that the evil apprehended by the Florentines would be averted. To

  the Venetians, on the other hand, they averred that this private

  letter was sufficiently binding, and therefore they ought to be

  content; for if they could save the count from breaking with his

  father-in-law, it was well to do so, and that it could be of no

  advantage either to themselves or the Venetians to publish it without

  some manifest necessity. It was thus determined that the count should

  pass into Lombardy; and having taken Uzzano, and raised bastions about

  Lucca to restrain in her inhabitants, placed the management of the

  siege in the hands of the commissaries, crossed the Apennines, and

  proceeded to Reggio, when the Venetians, alarmed at his progress, and

  in order to discover his intentions, insisted upon his immediately

  crossing the Po, and joining the other forces. The count refused

  compliance, and many mutual recriminations took place between him and

  Andrea Mauroceno, their messenger on this occasion, each charging the

  other with arrogance and treachery: after many protestations, the one

  of being under no obligation to perform that service, and the other of

  not being bound to any payment, they parted, the count to return to

  Tuscany, the other to Venice.

  The Florentines had sent the count to encamp in the Pisan territory,

  and were in hopes of inducing him to renew the war against the

  Lucchese, but found him indisposed to do so, for the duke, having been

  informed that out of regard to him he had refused to cross the Po,

  thought that by this means he might a
lso save the Lucchese, and begged

  the count to endeavor to effect an accommodation between the

  Florentines and the Lucchese, including himself in it, if he were

  able, declaring, at the same time, the promised marriage should be

  solemnized whenever he thought proper. The prospect of this connection

  had great influence with the count, for, as the duke had no sons, it

  gave him hope of becoming sovereign of Milan. For this reason he

  gradually abated his exertions in the war, declared he would not

  proceed unless the Venetians fulfilled their engagement as to the

  payment, and also retained him in the command; that the discharge of

  the debt would not alone be sufficient, for desiring to live peaceably

  in his own dominions, he needed some alliance other than that of the

  Florentines, and that he must regard his own interests, shrewdly

  hinting that if abandoned by the Venetians, he would come to terms

  with the duke.

  These indirect and crafty methods of procedure were highly offensive

  to the Florentines, for they found their expedition against Lucca

  frustrated, and trembled for the safety of their own territories if

  ever the count and the duke should enter into a mutual alliance. To

  induce the Venetians to retain the count in the command, Cosmo de'

  Medici went to Venice, hoping his influence would prevail with them,

  and discussed the subject at great length before the senate, pointing

  out the condition of the Italian states, the disposition of their

  armies, and the great preponderance possessed by the duke. He

  concluded by saying, that if the count and the duke were to unite

  their forces, they (the Venetians) might return to the sea, and the

  Florentines would have to fight for their liberty. To this the

  Venetians replied, that they were acquainted with their own strength

  and that of the Italians, and thought themselves able at all events to

  provide for their own defense; that it was not their custom to pay

  soldiers for serving others; that as the Florentines had used the

  count's services, they must pay him themselves; with respect to the

  security of their own states, it was rather desirable to check the

  count's pride than to pay him, for the ambition of men is boundless,

  and if he were now paid without serving, he would soon make some other

  demand, still more unreasonable and dangerous. It therefore seemed

  necessary to curb his insolence, and not allow it to increase till it

  became incorrigible; and that if the Florentines, from fear or any

  other motive, wished to preserve his friendship, they must pay him

  themselves. Cosmo returned without having effected any part of his

  object.

  The Florentines used the weightiest arguments they could adopt to

  prevent the count from quitting the service of the League, a course he

  was himself reluctant to follow, but his desire to conclude the

  marriage so embarrassed him, that any trivial accident would have been

  sufficient to determine his course, as indeed shortly happened. The

  count had left his territories in La Marca to the care of Il Furlano,

  one of his principal condottieri, who was so far influenced by the

  duke as to take command under him, and quit the count's service. This

  circumstance caused the latter to lay aside every idea but that of his

  own safety, and to come to agreement with the duke; among the terms of

  which compact was one that he should not be expected to interfere in

  the affairs of Romagna and Tuscany. The count then urged the

  Florentines to come to terms with the Lucchese, and so convinced them

  of the necessity of this, that seeing no better course to adopt, they

  complied in April, 1438, by which treaty the Lucchese retained their

  liberty, and the Florentines Monte Carlo and a few other fortresses.

  After this, being full of exasperation, they despatched letters to

  every part of Italy, overcharged with complaints, affecting to show

  that since God and men were averse to the Lucchese coming under their

  dominion, they had made peace with them. And it seldom happens that

  any suffer so much for the loss of their own lawful property as they