enriched by the victories he obtains, when the enemy is crushed and
possession is retained of the plunder and ransom. Victory is injurious
when the foe escapes, or when the soldiers appropriate the booty and
ransom. In such a case, losses are unfortunate, and conquests still
more so; for the vanquished suffers the injuries inflicted by the
enemy, and the victor those occasioned by his friends, which being
less justifiable, must cause the greater pain, particularly from a
consideration of his being thus compelled to oppress his people by an
increased burden of taxation. A ruler possessing any degree of
humanity, cannot rejoice in a victory that afflicts his subjects. The
victories of the ancient and well organized republics, enabled them to
fill their treasuries with gold and silver won from their enemies, to
distribute gratuities to the people, reduce taxation, and by games and
solemn festivals, disseminate universal joy. But the victories
obtained in the times of which we speak, first emptied the treasury,
and then impoverished the people, without giving the victorious party
security from the enemy. This arose entirely from the disorders
inherent in their mode of warfare; for the vanquished soldiery,
divesting themselves of their accoutrements, and being neither slain
nor detained prisoners, only deferred a renewed attack on the
conqueror, till their leader had furnished them with arms and horses.
Besides this, both ransom and booty being appropriated by the troops,
the victorious princes could not make use of them for raising fresh
forces, but were compelled to draw the necessary means from their
subjects' purses, and this was the only result of victory experienced
by the people, except that it diminished the ruler's reluctance to
such a course, and made him less particular about his mode of
oppressing them. To such a state had the practice of war been brought
by the sort of soldiery then on foot, that the victor and the
vanquished, when desirous of their services, alike needed fresh
supplies of money; for the one had to re-equip them, and the other to
bribe them; the vanquished could not fight without being remounted,
and the conquerors would not take the field without a new gratuity.
Hence it followed, that the one derived little advantage from the
victory, and the other was the less injured by defeat; for the routed
party had to be re-equipped, and the victorious could not pursue his
advantage.
From this disorderly and perverse method of procedure, it arose, that
before Niccolo's defeat became known throughout Italy, he had again
reorganized his forces, and harassed the enemy with greater vigor than
before. Hence, also, it happened, that after his disaster at Tenna, he
so soon occupied Verona: that being deprived of his army at Verona, he
was shortly able to appear with a large force in Tuscany; that being
completely defeated at Anghiari, before he reached Tuscany, he was
more powerful in the field than ever. He was thus enabled to give the
duke of Milan hopes of defending Lombardy, which by his absence
appeared to be lost; for while Niccolo spread consternation throughout
Tuscany, disasters in the former province so alarmed the duke, that he
was afraid his utter ruin would ensue before Niccolo, whom he had
recalled, could come to his relief, and check the impetuous progress
of the count. Under these impressions, the duke, to insure by policy
that success which he could not command by arms, had recourse to
remedies, which on similar occasions had frequently served his turn.
He sent Niccolo da Esti, prince of Ferrara, to the count who was then
at Peschiera, to persuade him, "That this war was not to his
advantage; for if the duke became so ruined as to be unable to
maintain his position among the states of Italy, the count would be
the first to suffer; for he would cease to be of importance either
with the Venetians or the Florentines; and to prove the sincerity of
his wish for peace, he offered to fulfill the engagement he had
entered into with regard to his daughter, and send her to Ferrara; so
that as soon as peace was established, the union might take place."
The count replied, "That if the duke really wished for peace, he might
easily be gratified, as the Florentines and the Venetians were equally
anxious for it. True, it was, he could with difficulty credit him,
knowing that he had never made peace but from necessity, and when this
no longer pressed him, again desired war. Neither could he give
credence to what he had said concerning the marriage, having been so
repeatedly deceived; yet when peace was concluded, he would take the
advice of his friends upon that subject."
The Venetians, who were sometimes needlessly jealous of their
soldiery, became greatly alarmed at these proceedings; and not without
reason. The count was aware of this, and wishing to remove their
apprehensions, pursued the war with unusual vigor; but his mind had
become so unsettled by ambition, and the Venetians' by jealousy, that
little further progress was made during the remainder of the summer,
and upon the return of Niccolo into Lombardy, winter having already
commenced, the armies withdrew into quarters, the count to Verona, the
Florentine forces to Tuscany, the duke's to Cremona, and those of the
pope to Romagna. The latter, after having been victorious at Anghiari,
made an unsuccessful attack upon Furli and Bologna, with a view to
wrest them from Niccolo Piccinino; but they were gallantly defended by
his son Francesco. However, the arrival of the papal forces so alarmed
the people of Ravenna with the fear of becoming subject to the church,
that, by consent of Ostasio di Polenta their lord, they placed
themselves under the power of the Venetians; who, in return for the
territory, and that Ostasio might never retake by force what he had
imprudently given them, sent him and his son to Candia, where they
died. In the course of these affairs, the pope, notwithstanding the
victory at Anghiari, became so in want of money, that he sold the
fortress of Borgo San Sepolcro to the Florentines for 25,000 ducats.
Affairs being thus situated, each party supposed winter would protect
them from the evils of war, and thought no more of peace. This was
particularly the case with the duke, who, being rendered doubly secure
by the season and by the presence of Niccolo, broke off all attempts
to effect a reconciliation with the count, reorganized Niccolo's
forces, and made every requisite preparation for the future struggle.
The count being informed of this, went to Venice to consult with the
senate on the course to be pursued during the next year. Niccolo, on
the other hand, being quite prepared, and seeing the enemy unprovided,
did not await the return of spring, but crossed the Adda during severe
weather, occupied the whole Brescian territory, except Oddula and
Acri, and made prisoners two thousand horse belonging to Francesco's
forces, who had no apprehension of an attack. But the greatest source
of anxiety to the count,
and alarm to the Venetians, was the desertion
of his service by Ciarpellone, one of his principal officers.
Francesco, on learning these matters, immediately left Venice, and,
arriving at Brescia, found that Niccolo, after doing all the mischief
he could, had retired to his quarters; and therefore, finding the war
concluded for the present was not disposed to rekindle it, but rather
to use the opportunity afforded by the season and his enemies, of
reorganizing his forces, so as to be able, when spring arrived, to
avenge himself for his former injuries. To this end he induced the
Venetians to recall the forces they had in Tuscany, in the Florentine
service, and to order that to succeed Gattamelata, who was dead,
Micheletto Attendulo should take the command.
On the approach of spring, Niccolo Piccinino was the first to take the
field, and encamped before Cignano, a fortress twelve miles from
Brescia; the count marched to its relief, and the war between them was
conducted in the usual manner. The count, apprehensive for the city of
Bergamo, besieged Martinengo, a castle so situated that the possession
of it would enable him to relieve the former, which was closely
pressed by Niccolo, who, having foreseen that the enemy could impede
him only from the direction of Martinengo, had put the castle into a
complete state of defense, so that the count was obliged to lend his
whole force to the siege. Upon this, Niccolo placed his troops in a
situation calculated to intercept the count's provisions, and
fortified himself with trenches and bastions in such a manner that he
could not be attacked without the most manifest hazard to his
assailant. Hence the besiegers were more distressed than the people of
Martinengo whom they besieged. The count could not hold his position
for want of food, nor quit it without imminent danger; so that the
duke's victory appeared certain, and defeat equally inevitable to the
count and the Venetians.
But fortune, never destitute of means to assist her favorites, or to
injure others, caused the hope of victory to operate so powerfully
upon Niccolo Piccinino, and made him assume such a tone of unbounded
insolence, that, losing all respect for himself and the duke, he sent
him word that, having served under his ensign for so long, without
obtaining sufficient land to serve him for a grave, he wished to know
from himself what was to be the reward of his labors; for it was in
his power to make him master of Lombardy, and place all his enemies in
his power; and, as a certain victory ought to be attended by a sure
remuneration, he desired the duke to concede to him the city of
Piacenza, that when weary with his lengthened services he might at
last betake himself to repose. Nor did he hesitate, in conclusion, to
threaten, if his request were not granted, to abandon the enterprise.
This injurious and most insolent mode of proceeding highly offended
the duke, and, on further consideration, he determined rather to let
the expedition altogether fail, than consent to his general's demand.
Thus, what all the dangers he had incurred, and the threats of his
enemies, could not draw from him, the insolent behavior of his friends
made him willing to propose. He resolved to come to terms with the
count, and sent Antonio Guido Buono, of Tortona, to offer his daughter
and conditions of peace, which were accepted with great pleasure by
the count, and also by the colleagues as far as themselves were
concerned. The terms being secretly arranged, the duke sent to command
Niccolo to make a truce with the count for one year; intimating, that
being exhausted with the expense, he could not forego a certain peace
for a doubtful victory. Niccolo was utterly astonished at this
resolution, and could not imagine what had induced the duke to lose
such a glorious opportunity; nor could he surmise that, to avoid
rewarding his friends, he would save his enemies, and therefore to the
utmost of his power he opposed this resolution; and the duke was
obliged, in order to induce his compliance, to threaten that if he did
not obey he would give him up to his soldiers and his enemies. Niccolo
submitted, with the feelings of one compelled to leave country and
friends, complaining of his hard fate, that fortune and the duke were
robbing him of the victory over his enemies. The truce being arranged,
the marriage of the duke's daughter, Bianca, to the count was
solemnized, the duke giving Cremona for her portion. This being over,
peace was concluded in November, 1441, at which Francesco Barbadico
and Pagolo Trono were present for the Venetians, and for the
Florentines Agnolo Acciajuoli. Peschiera, Asola, and Lonato, castles
in the Mantuan territory, were assigned to the Venetians.
The war in Lombardy was concluded; but the dissensions in the kingdom
of Naples continued, and the inability to compose them occasioned the
resumption of those arms which had been so recently laid aside.
Alfonso, of Aragon, had, during these wars, taken from Ren? the whole
kingdom except Naples; so that, thinking he had the victory in his
power, he resolved during the siege of Naples to take Benevento, and
his other possessions in that neighborhood, from the count; and
thought he might easily accomplish this while the latter was engaged
in the wars of Lombardy. Having heard of the conclusion of peace,
Alfonso feared the count would not only come for the purpose of
recovering his territories, but also to favor Ren?; and Ren? himself
had hope of his assistance for the same reason. The latter, therefore,
sent to the count, begging he would come to the relief of a friend,
and avenge himself of an enemy. On the other hand, Alfonso entreated
Filippo, for the sake of the friendship which subsisted between them,
to find the count some other occupation, that, being engaged in
greater affairs, he might not have an opportunity of interfering
between them. Filippo complied with this request, without seeming to
be aware that he violated the peace recently made, so greatly to his
disadvantage. He therefore signified to pope Eugenius, that the
present was a favorable opportunity for recovering the territories
which the count had taken from the church; and, that he might be in a
condition to use it, offered him the services of Niccolo Piccinino,
and engaged to pay him during the war; who, since the peace of
Lombardy, had remained with his forces in Romagna. Eugenius eagerly
took the advice, induced by his hatred of the count, and his desire to
recover his lost possessions; feeling assured that, although on a
former occasion he had been duped by Niccolo, it would be improper,
now that the duke interfered, to suspect any deceit; and, joining his
forces to those of Niccolo, he assailed La Marca. The count,
astonished at such an unexpected attack, assembled his troops, and
went to meet the enemy. In the meantime, King Alfonso took possession
of Naples, so that the whole kingdom, except Castelnuova, was in his
power. Leaving a strong guard at Castelnuova Ren? set out
and came to
Florence, where he was most honorably received; and having remained a
few days, finding he could not continue the war, he withdrew to
Marseilles.
In the meantime, Alfonso took Castelnuova, and the count found himself
assailed in the Marca Inferiore, both by the pope and Niccolo. He
applied to the Venetians and the Florentines for assistance, in men
and money, assuring them that if they did not determine to restrain
the pope and king, during his life, they would soon afterward find
their very existence endangered, for both would join Filippo and
divide Italy among them. The Florentines and Venetians hesitated for a
time, both to consider the propriety of drawing upon themselves the
enmity of the pope and the king, and because they were then engaged in
the affairs of the Bolognese. Annibale Bentivoglio had driven
Francesco Piccinino from Bologna, and for defense against the duke,
who favored Francesco, he demanded and received assistance of the
Venetians and Florentines; so that, being occupied with these matters
they could not resolve to assist the count, but Annibale, having
routed Francesco Piccinino, and those affairs seeming to be settled,
they resolved to support him. Designing however to make sure of the
duke, they offered to renew the league with him, to which he was not
averse; for, although he consented that war should be made against the
count, while King Ren? was in arms, yet finding him now conquered, and
deprived of the whole kingdom, he was not willing that the count
should be despoiled of his territories; and therefore, not only
consented that assistance should be given him, but wrote to Alfonso to
be good enough to retire to his kingdom, and discontinue hostilities
against the count; and although reluctantly, yet in acknowledgment of
his obligations to the duke, Alfonso determined to satisfy him, and
withdrew with his forces beyond the Tronto.
CHAPTER II
Discords of Florence--Jealousy excited against Neri di Gino
Capponi--Baldaccio d'Anghiari murdered--Reform of government in
favor of the Medici--Enterprises of Sforza and Piccinino--Death of
Niccolo Piccinino--End of the war--Disturbances in Bologna--
Annibale Bentivoglio slain by Battista Canneschi, and the latter
by the people--Santi, supposed to be the son of Ercole
Bentivoglio, is called to govern the city of Bologna--Discourse of
Cosmo de' Medici to him--Perfidious designs of the duke of Milan
against Sforza--General war in Italy--Losses of the duke of Milan
--The duke has recourse to the count, who makes peace with him--
Offers of the duke and the Venetians to the count--The Venetians
furtively deprive the count of Cremona.
While the affairs of Romagna proceeded thus, the city of Florence was
not tranquil. Among the citizens of highest reputation in the
government, was Neri di Gino Capponi, of whose influence Cosmo de'
Medici had more apprehension than any other; for to the great
authority which he possessed in the city was added his influence with
the soldiery. Having been often leader of the Florentine forces he had
won their affection by his courage and talents; and the remembrance of
his own and his father's victories (the latter having taken Pisa, and
he himself having overcome Niccolo Piccinino at Anghiari) caused him
to be beloved by many, and feared by those who were averse to having
associates in the government. Among the leaders of the Florentine army
was Baldaccio d'Anghiari, an excellent soldier, for in those times
there was not one in Italy who surpassed him in vigor either of body
or mind; and possessing so much influence with the infantry, whose
leader he had always been, many thought they would follow him wherever
he chose to lead them. Baldaccio was the intimate friend of Neri, who
loved him for his talents, of which he had been a constant witness.
This excited great suspicion in the other citizens, who, thinking it
alike dangerous either to discharge or retain him in their service,