enriched by the victories he obtains, when the enemy is crushed and

  possession is retained of the plunder and ransom. Victory is injurious

  when the foe escapes, or when the soldiers appropriate the booty and

  ransom. In such a case, losses are unfortunate, and conquests still

  more so; for the vanquished suffers the injuries inflicted by the

  enemy, and the victor those occasioned by his friends, which being

  less justifiable, must cause the greater pain, particularly from a

  consideration of his being thus compelled to oppress his people by an

  increased burden of taxation. A ruler possessing any degree of

  humanity, cannot rejoice in a victory that afflicts his subjects. The

  victories of the ancient and well organized republics, enabled them to

  fill their treasuries with gold and silver won from their enemies, to

  distribute gratuities to the people, reduce taxation, and by games and

  solemn festivals, disseminate universal joy. But the victories

  obtained in the times of which we speak, first emptied the treasury,

  and then impoverished the people, without giving the victorious party

  security from the enemy. This arose entirely from the disorders

  inherent in their mode of warfare; for the vanquished soldiery,

  divesting themselves of their accoutrements, and being neither slain

  nor detained prisoners, only deferred a renewed attack on the

  conqueror, till their leader had furnished them with arms and horses.

  Besides this, both ransom and booty being appropriated by the troops,

  the victorious princes could not make use of them for raising fresh

  forces, but were compelled to draw the necessary means from their

  subjects' purses, and this was the only result of victory experienced

  by the people, except that it diminished the ruler's reluctance to

  such a course, and made him less particular about his mode of

  oppressing them. To such a state had the practice of war been brought

  by the sort of soldiery then on foot, that the victor and the

  vanquished, when desirous of their services, alike needed fresh

  supplies of money; for the one had to re-equip them, and the other to

  bribe them; the vanquished could not fight without being remounted,

  and the conquerors would not take the field without a new gratuity.

  Hence it followed, that the one derived little advantage from the

  victory, and the other was the less injured by defeat; for the routed

  party had to be re-equipped, and the victorious could not pursue his

  advantage.

  From this disorderly and perverse method of procedure, it arose, that

  before Niccolo's defeat became known throughout Italy, he had again

  reorganized his forces, and harassed the enemy with greater vigor than

  before. Hence, also, it happened, that after his disaster at Tenna, he

  so soon occupied Verona: that being deprived of his army at Verona, he

  was shortly able to appear with a large force in Tuscany; that being

  completely defeated at Anghiari, before he reached Tuscany, he was

  more powerful in the field than ever. He was thus enabled to give the

  duke of Milan hopes of defending Lombardy, which by his absence

  appeared to be lost; for while Niccolo spread consternation throughout

  Tuscany, disasters in the former province so alarmed the duke, that he

  was afraid his utter ruin would ensue before Niccolo, whom he had

  recalled, could come to his relief, and check the impetuous progress

  of the count. Under these impressions, the duke, to insure by policy

  that success which he could not command by arms, had recourse to

  remedies, which on similar occasions had frequently served his turn.

  He sent Niccolo da Esti, prince of Ferrara, to the count who was then

  at Peschiera, to persuade him, "That this war was not to his

  advantage; for if the duke became so ruined as to be unable to

  maintain his position among the states of Italy, the count would be

  the first to suffer; for he would cease to be of importance either

  with the Venetians or the Florentines; and to prove the sincerity of

  his wish for peace, he offered to fulfill the engagement he had

  entered into with regard to his daughter, and send her to Ferrara; so

  that as soon as peace was established, the union might take place."

  The count replied, "That if the duke really wished for peace, he might

  easily be gratified, as the Florentines and the Venetians were equally

  anxious for it. True, it was, he could with difficulty credit him,

  knowing that he had never made peace but from necessity, and when this

  no longer pressed him, again desired war. Neither could he give

  credence to what he had said concerning the marriage, having been so

  repeatedly deceived; yet when peace was concluded, he would take the

  advice of his friends upon that subject."

  The Venetians, who were sometimes needlessly jealous of their

  soldiery, became greatly alarmed at these proceedings; and not without

  reason. The count was aware of this, and wishing to remove their

  apprehensions, pursued the war with unusual vigor; but his mind had

  become so unsettled by ambition, and the Venetians' by jealousy, that

  little further progress was made during the remainder of the summer,

  and upon the return of Niccolo into Lombardy, winter having already

  commenced, the armies withdrew into quarters, the count to Verona, the

  Florentine forces to Tuscany, the duke's to Cremona, and those of the

  pope to Romagna. The latter, after having been victorious at Anghiari,

  made an unsuccessful attack upon Furli and Bologna, with a view to

  wrest them from Niccolo Piccinino; but they were gallantly defended by

  his son Francesco. However, the arrival of the papal forces so alarmed

  the people of Ravenna with the fear of becoming subject to the church,

  that, by consent of Ostasio di Polenta their lord, they placed

  themselves under the power of the Venetians; who, in return for the

  territory, and that Ostasio might never retake by force what he had

  imprudently given them, sent him and his son to Candia, where they

  died. In the course of these affairs, the pope, notwithstanding the

  victory at Anghiari, became so in want of money, that he sold the

  fortress of Borgo San Sepolcro to the Florentines for 25,000 ducats.

  Affairs being thus situated, each party supposed winter would protect

  them from the evils of war, and thought no more of peace. This was

  particularly the case with the duke, who, being rendered doubly secure

  by the season and by the presence of Niccolo, broke off all attempts

  to effect a reconciliation with the count, reorganized Niccolo's

  forces, and made every requisite preparation for the future struggle.

  The count being informed of this, went to Venice to consult with the

  senate on the course to be pursued during the next year. Niccolo, on

  the other hand, being quite prepared, and seeing the enemy unprovided,

  did not await the return of spring, but crossed the Adda during severe

  weather, occupied the whole Brescian territory, except Oddula and

  Acri, and made prisoners two thousand horse belonging to Francesco's

  forces, who had no apprehension of an attack. But the greatest source

  of anxiety to the count,
and alarm to the Venetians, was the desertion

  of his service by Ciarpellone, one of his principal officers.

  Francesco, on learning these matters, immediately left Venice, and,

  arriving at Brescia, found that Niccolo, after doing all the mischief

  he could, had retired to his quarters; and therefore, finding the war

  concluded for the present was not disposed to rekindle it, but rather

  to use the opportunity afforded by the season and his enemies, of

  reorganizing his forces, so as to be able, when spring arrived, to

  avenge himself for his former injuries. To this end he induced the

  Venetians to recall the forces they had in Tuscany, in the Florentine

  service, and to order that to succeed Gattamelata, who was dead,

  Micheletto Attendulo should take the command.

  On the approach of spring, Niccolo Piccinino was the first to take the

  field, and encamped before Cignano, a fortress twelve miles from

  Brescia; the count marched to its relief, and the war between them was

  conducted in the usual manner. The count, apprehensive for the city of

  Bergamo, besieged Martinengo, a castle so situated that the possession

  of it would enable him to relieve the former, which was closely

  pressed by Niccolo, who, having foreseen that the enemy could impede

  him only from the direction of Martinengo, had put the castle into a

  complete state of defense, so that the count was obliged to lend his

  whole force to the siege. Upon this, Niccolo placed his troops in a

  situation calculated to intercept the count's provisions, and

  fortified himself with trenches and bastions in such a manner that he

  could not be attacked without the most manifest hazard to his

  assailant. Hence the besiegers were more distressed than the people of

  Martinengo whom they besieged. The count could not hold his position

  for want of food, nor quit it without imminent danger; so that the

  duke's victory appeared certain, and defeat equally inevitable to the

  count and the Venetians.

  But fortune, never destitute of means to assist her favorites, or to

  injure others, caused the hope of victory to operate so powerfully

  upon Niccolo Piccinino, and made him assume such a tone of unbounded

  insolence, that, losing all respect for himself and the duke, he sent

  him word that, having served under his ensign for so long, without

  obtaining sufficient land to serve him for a grave, he wished to know

  from himself what was to be the reward of his labors; for it was in

  his power to make him master of Lombardy, and place all his enemies in

  his power; and, as a certain victory ought to be attended by a sure

  remuneration, he desired the duke to concede to him the city of

  Piacenza, that when weary with his lengthened services he might at

  last betake himself to repose. Nor did he hesitate, in conclusion, to

  threaten, if his request were not granted, to abandon the enterprise.

  This injurious and most insolent mode of proceeding highly offended

  the duke, and, on further consideration, he determined rather to let

  the expedition altogether fail, than consent to his general's demand.

  Thus, what all the dangers he had incurred, and the threats of his

  enemies, could not draw from him, the insolent behavior of his friends

  made him willing to propose. He resolved to come to terms with the

  count, and sent Antonio Guido Buono, of Tortona, to offer his daughter

  and conditions of peace, which were accepted with great pleasure by

  the count, and also by the colleagues as far as themselves were

  concerned. The terms being secretly arranged, the duke sent to command

  Niccolo to make a truce with the count for one year; intimating, that

  being exhausted with the expense, he could not forego a certain peace

  for a doubtful victory. Niccolo was utterly astonished at this

  resolution, and could not imagine what had induced the duke to lose

  such a glorious opportunity; nor could he surmise that, to avoid

  rewarding his friends, he would save his enemies, and therefore to the

  utmost of his power he opposed this resolution; and the duke was

  obliged, in order to induce his compliance, to threaten that if he did

  not obey he would give him up to his soldiers and his enemies. Niccolo

  submitted, with the feelings of one compelled to leave country and

  friends, complaining of his hard fate, that fortune and the duke were

  robbing him of the victory over his enemies. The truce being arranged,

  the marriage of the duke's daughter, Bianca, to the count was

  solemnized, the duke giving Cremona for her portion. This being over,

  peace was concluded in November, 1441, at which Francesco Barbadico

  and Pagolo Trono were present for the Venetians, and for the

  Florentines Agnolo Acciajuoli. Peschiera, Asola, and Lonato, castles

  in the Mantuan territory, were assigned to the Venetians.

  The war in Lombardy was concluded; but the dissensions in the kingdom

  of Naples continued, and the inability to compose them occasioned the

  resumption of those arms which had been so recently laid aside.

  Alfonso, of Aragon, had, during these wars, taken from Ren? the whole

  kingdom except Naples; so that, thinking he had the victory in his

  power, he resolved during the siege of Naples to take Benevento, and

  his other possessions in that neighborhood, from the count; and

  thought he might easily accomplish this while the latter was engaged

  in the wars of Lombardy. Having heard of the conclusion of peace,

  Alfonso feared the count would not only come for the purpose of

  recovering his territories, but also to favor Ren?; and Ren? himself

  had hope of his assistance for the same reason. The latter, therefore,

  sent to the count, begging he would come to the relief of a friend,

  and avenge himself of an enemy. On the other hand, Alfonso entreated

  Filippo, for the sake of the friendship which subsisted between them,

  to find the count some other occupation, that, being engaged in

  greater affairs, he might not have an opportunity of interfering

  between them. Filippo complied with this request, without seeming to

  be aware that he violated the peace recently made, so greatly to his

  disadvantage. He therefore signified to pope Eugenius, that the

  present was a favorable opportunity for recovering the territories

  which the count had taken from the church; and, that he might be in a

  condition to use it, offered him the services of Niccolo Piccinino,

  and engaged to pay him during the war; who, since the peace of

  Lombardy, had remained with his forces in Romagna. Eugenius eagerly

  took the advice, induced by his hatred of the count, and his desire to

  recover his lost possessions; feeling assured that, although on a

  former occasion he had been duped by Niccolo, it would be improper,

  now that the duke interfered, to suspect any deceit; and, joining his

  forces to those of Niccolo, he assailed La Marca. The count,

  astonished at such an unexpected attack, assembled his troops, and

  went to meet the enemy. In the meantime, King Alfonso took possession

  of Naples, so that the whole kingdom, except Castelnuova, was in his

  power. Leaving a strong guard at Castelnuova Ren? set out
and came to

  Florence, where he was most honorably received; and having remained a

  few days, finding he could not continue the war, he withdrew to

  Marseilles.

  In the meantime, Alfonso took Castelnuova, and the count found himself

  assailed in the Marca Inferiore, both by the pope and Niccolo. He

  applied to the Venetians and the Florentines for assistance, in men

  and money, assuring them that if they did not determine to restrain

  the pope and king, during his life, they would soon afterward find

  their very existence endangered, for both would join Filippo and

  divide Italy among them. The Florentines and Venetians hesitated for a

  time, both to consider the propriety of drawing upon themselves the

  enmity of the pope and the king, and because they were then engaged in

  the affairs of the Bolognese. Annibale Bentivoglio had driven

  Francesco Piccinino from Bologna, and for defense against the duke,

  who favored Francesco, he demanded and received assistance of the

  Venetians and Florentines; so that, being occupied with these matters

  they could not resolve to assist the count, but Annibale, having

  routed Francesco Piccinino, and those affairs seeming to be settled,

  they resolved to support him. Designing however to make sure of the

  duke, they offered to renew the league with him, to which he was not

  averse; for, although he consented that war should be made against the

  count, while King Ren? was in arms, yet finding him now conquered, and

  deprived of the whole kingdom, he was not willing that the count

  should be despoiled of his territories; and therefore, not only

  consented that assistance should be given him, but wrote to Alfonso to

  be good enough to retire to his kingdom, and discontinue hostilities

  against the count; and although reluctantly, yet in acknowledgment of

  his obligations to the duke, Alfonso determined to satisfy him, and

  withdrew with his forces beyond the Tronto.

  CHAPTER II

  Discords of Florence--Jealousy excited against Neri di Gino

  Capponi--Baldaccio d'Anghiari murdered--Reform of government in

  favor of the Medici--Enterprises of Sforza and Piccinino--Death of

  Niccolo Piccinino--End of the war--Disturbances in Bologna--

  Annibale Bentivoglio slain by Battista Canneschi, and the latter

  by the people--Santi, supposed to be the son of Ercole

  Bentivoglio, is called to govern the city of Bologna--Discourse of

  Cosmo de' Medici to him--Perfidious designs of the duke of Milan

  against Sforza--General war in Italy--Losses of the duke of Milan

  --The duke has recourse to the count, who makes peace with him--

  Offers of the duke and the Venetians to the count--The Venetians

  furtively deprive the count of Cremona.

  While the affairs of Romagna proceeded thus, the city of Florence was

  not tranquil. Among the citizens of highest reputation in the

  government, was Neri di Gino Capponi, of whose influence Cosmo de'

  Medici had more apprehension than any other; for to the great

  authority which he possessed in the city was added his influence with

  the soldiery. Having been often leader of the Florentine forces he had

  won their affection by his courage and talents; and the remembrance of

  his own and his father's victories (the latter having taken Pisa, and

  he himself having overcome Niccolo Piccinino at Anghiari) caused him

  to be beloved by many, and feared by those who were averse to having

  associates in the government. Among the leaders of the Florentine army

  was Baldaccio d'Anghiari, an excellent soldier, for in those times

  there was not one in Italy who surpassed him in vigor either of body

  or mind; and possessing so much influence with the infantry, whose

  leader he had always been, many thought they would follow him wherever

  he chose to lead them. Baldaccio was the intimate friend of Neri, who

  loved him for his talents, of which he had been a constant witness.

  This excited great suspicion in the other citizens, who, thinking it

  alike dangerous either to discharge or retain him in their service,