Next, look from the point of view of the inflexions, and see, for
destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered
fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then
neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'beautifully' is not a property of 'justly',
neither could 'beautiful' be a property of 'just'. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the property
rendered is a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then
also the other inflexion will be a property of the other inflexion.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'walking biped' is a property of man, it would
also be any one's property 'as a man' to be described 'as a walking
biped'. Not only in the case of the actual term mentioned should one
look at the inflexions, but also in the case of its opposites, just as
has been laid down in the case of the former commonplace rules as
well.' Thus, for destructive purposes, see if the inflexion of the
opposite of the property rendered fails to be the property of the
inflexion of the opposite of the subject: for then neither will the
inflexion of the other opposite be a property of the inflexion of
the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'well' is not a property
of 'justly', neither could 'badly' be a property of 'unjustly'. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of
the opposite of the property originally suggested is a property of the
inflexion of the opposite of the original subject: for then also the
inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of the inflexion of
the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'best' is a property of
'the good', 'worst' also will be a property of 'the evil'.
7
Next, look from the point of view of things that are in a like
relation, and see, for destructive purposes, if what is in a
relation like that of the property rendered fails to be a property
of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then neither
will what is in a relation like that of the first be a property of
what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is
like that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it is
not a property of a doctor to produce health, it could not be a
property of a builder to produce a house. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if what is in a relation like that of the
property rendered is a property of what is in a relation like that
of the subject: for then also what is in a relation like that of the
first will be a property of what is in a relation like that of the
second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of a doctor towards the
possession of ability to produce health is like that of a trainer
towards the possession of ability to produce vigour, and it is a
property of a trainer to possess the ability to produce vigour, it
would be a property of a doctor to possess the ability to produce
health.
Next look from the point of view of things that are identically
related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that is
identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property of the
subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question;
for then neither will the predicate that is identically related to
both subjects be a property of the subject which is identically
related to it as the first. If, on the other hand, the predicate which
is identically related to two subjects is the property of the
subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question,
then it will not be a property of that of which it has been stated
to be a property. (e.g.) inasmuch as prudence is identically related
to both the noble and the base, since it is knowledge of each of them,
and it is not a property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble,
it could not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base.
If, on the other hand, it is a property of prudence to be the
knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of it to be the
knowledge of the base.] For it is impossible for the same thing to
be a property of more than one subject. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use: for what is
'identically related' is a single predicate in process of comparison
with more than one subject.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified by
the verb 'to be' fails to be a property of the subject qualified by
the verb 'to be': for then neither will the destruction of the one
be a property of the other qualified by the verb 'to be destroyed',
nor will the 'becoming'the one be a property of the other qualified by
the verb 'to become'. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is not a property
of 'man' to be an animal, neither could it be a property of becoming a
man to become an animal; nor could the destruction of an animal be a
property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should
derive arguments also from 'becoming' to 'being' and 'being
destroyed', and from 'being destroyed' to 'being' and to 'becoming'
exactly as they have just been given from 'being' to 'becoming' and
'being destroyed'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
if the subject set down as qualified by the verb 'to be' has the
predicate set down as so qualified, as its property: for then also the
subject qualified by the very 'to become' will have the predicate
qualified by 'to become' as its property, and the subject qualified by
the verb to be destroyed' will have as its property the predicate
rendered with this qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is
a property of man to be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a
man to become a mortal, and the destruction of a mortal would be a
property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should
derive arguments also from 'becoming' and 'being destroyed' both to
'being' and to the conclusions that follow from them, exactly as was
directed also for the purpose of destruction.
Next take a look at the 'idea' of the subject stated, and see, for
destructive purposes, if the suggested property fails to belong to the
'idea' in question, or fails to belong to it in virtue of that
character which causes it to bear the description of which the
property was rendered: for then what has been stated to be a
property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'being
motionless' does not belong to 'man-himself' qua 'man', but qua
'idea', it could not be a property of 'man' to be motionless. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the property in
question belongs to the idea, and belongs to it in that respect in
virtue of which there is predicated of it that character of which
the predicate in question has been stated not to be a property: for
then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it belong
s to 'living-creature-itself' to be
compounded of soul and body, and further this belongs to it qua
'living-creature', it would be a property of 'living-creature' to be
compounded of soul and body.
8
Next look from the point of view of greater and less degrees, and
first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is more-P fails to
be a property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is
less-P be a property of what is less-S, nor least-P of least-S, nor
most-P of most-S, nor P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
being more highly coloured is not a property of what is more a body,
neither could being less highly coloured be a property of what is less
a body, nor being coloured be a property of body at all. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is more-P is a
property of what is more-S: for then also what is less-P will be a
property of what is less S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of
most-S, and P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a higher
degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of life, a
lower degree of sensation also would be a property of a lower degree
of life, and the highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest
degree, and sensation simply of life simply.
Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication to
the same qualified types of predication, and see, for destructive
purposes, if P simply fails to be a property of S simply; for then
neither will more-P be a property of more-S, nor less-P of less-S, nor
most-P of most-S, nor least-P of least-S. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
'virtuous' is not a property of 'man', neither could 'more virtuous'
be a property of what is 'more human'. For constructive purposes, on
the other hand, see if P simply is a property of S simply: for then
more P also will be a property of more-S, and less-P of less-S, and
least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S. Thus (e.g.) a tendency to
move upwards by nature is a property of fire, and so also a greater
tendency to move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more
fiery. In the same way too one should look at all these matters from
the point of view of the others as well.
Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if the more likely
property fails to be a property of the more likely subject: for then
neither will the less likely property be a property of the less likely
subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'perceiving' is more likely to be a
property of 'animal' than 'knowing' of 'man', and 'perceiving' is
not a property of 'animal', 'knowing' could not be a property of
'man'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the less
likely property is a property of the less likely subject; for then too
the more likely property will be a property of the more likely
subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to be naturally civilized' is less
likely to be a property of man than 'to live' of an animal, and it
is a property of man to be naturally civilized, it would be a property
of animal to live.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails
to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a
property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it
is less likely to be a property: while if it is a property of the
former, it will not be a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as 'to be coloured' is more likely to be a property of a
'surface' than of a 'body', and it is not a property of a surface, 'to
be coloured' could not be a property of 'body'; while if it is a
property of a 'surface', it could not be a property of a 'body'. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is not
of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property
of more than one thing.
Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more likely to
be a property of a given subject fails to be its property: for then
neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its
property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible' is more likely than
'divisible' to be a property of 'animal', and 'sensible' is not a
property of animal, 'divisible' could not be a property of animal. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is less likely
to be a property of it is a property; for then what is more likely
to be a property of it will be a property as well. Thus, for
example, inasmuch as 'sensation' is less likely to be a property of
'animal' than life', and 'sensation' is a property of animal, 'life'
would be a property of animal.
Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong in a
like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is as
much a property fails to be a property of that of which it is as
much a property: for then neither will that which is as much a
property as it be a property of that of which it is as much a
property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'desiring' is as much a property
of the faculty of desire as reasoning' is a property of the faculty of
reason, and desiring is not a property of the faculty of desire,
reasoning could not be a property of the faculty of reason. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a
property is a property of that of which it is as much a property:
for then also what is as much a property as it will be a property of
that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it
is as much a property of 'the faculty of reason' to be 'the primary
seat of wisdom' as it is of 'the faculty of desire' to be 'the primary
seat of temperance', and it is a property of the faculty of reason
to be the primary seat of wisdom, it would be a property of the
faculty of desire to be the primary seat of temperance.
Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a
property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither
will what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as 'seeing' is as much a property of man as 'hearing', and
'seeing' is not a property of man, 'hearing' could not be a property
of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is
as much a property of it is its property: for then what is as much a
property of it as the former will be its property as well. Thus (e.g.)
it is as much a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of
a part that desires as of a part that reasons, and it is a property of
the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires, and so it
be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that
reasons.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a
property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither
will it be a property of that of which it is as much a property as
of the former, while if it be a property of the former, it will not be
a property of the other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to burn' is as
much a property of 'flame' as of 'live coals', and 'to burn'
is not
a property of flame, 'to burn' could not be a property of live
coals: while if it is a property of flame, it could not be a
property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, this commonplace rule is of no use.
The rule based on things that are in a like relation' differs from
the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,' because
the former point is secured by analogy, not from reflection on the
belonging of any attribute, while the latter is judged by a comparison
based on the fact that an attribute belongs.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if in rendering the property
potentially, he has also through that potentiality rendered the
property relatively to something that does not exist, when the
potentiality in question cannot belong to what does not exist: for
then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus
(e.g.) he who has said that 'breathable' is a property of 'air' has,
on the one hand, rendered the property potentially (for that is
'breathable' which is such as can be breathed), and on the other
hand has also rendered the property relatively to what does not
exist:-for while air may exist, even though there exist no animal so
constituted as to breathe the air, it is not possible to breathe it if
no animal exist: so that it will not, either, be a property of air
to be such as can be breathed at a time when there exists no animal
such as to breathe it and so it follows that 'breathable' could not be
a property of air.
For constructive purposes, see if in rendering the property
potentially he renders the property either relatively to something
that exists, or to something that does not exist, when the
potentiality in question can belong to what does not exist: for then
what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus
e.g.) he who renders it as a property of 'being' to be 'capable of
being acted upon or of acting', in rendering the property potentially,
has rendered the property relatively to something that exists: for
when 'being' exists, it will also be capable of being acted upon or of