counter-proof that it is not true, far more likely is he to be thought
ill-tempered-although even counter-proof is not enough: for we often
hear arguments that are contrary to common opinions, whose solution is
yet difficult, e.g. the argument of Zeno that it is impossible to move
or to traverse the stadium;-but still, this is no reason for
omitting to assert the opposites of these views. If, then, a man
refuses to admit the proposition without having either a negative
instance or some counter-argument to bring against it, clearly he is
ill-tempered: for ill-temper in argument consists in answering in ways
other than the above, so as to wreck the reasoning.
9
Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer
should try his hand at attacking it by himself; for clearly his
business is to oppose those positions from which questioners
demolish what he has laid down.
He should beware of maintaining a hypothesis that is generally
rejected: and this it may be in two ways: for it may be one which
results in absurd statements, e.g. suppose any one were to say that
everything is in motion or that nothing is; and also there are all
those which only a bad character would choose, and which are
implicitly opposed to men's wishes, e.g. that pleasure is the good,
and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it. For people
then hate him, supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of
argument but because he really thinks them.
10
Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the right
solution is to demolish the point on which the fallacy that occurs
depends: for the demolition of any random point is no solution, even
though the point demolished be false. For the argument may contain
many falsehoods, e.g. suppose some one to secure the premisses, 'He
who sits, writes' and 'Socrates is sitting': for from these it follows
that 'Socrates is writing'. Now we may demolish the proposition
'Socrates is sitting', and still be no nearer a solution of the
argument; it may be true that the point claimed is false; but it is
not on that that fallacy of the argument depends: for supposing that
any one should happen to be sitting and not writing, it would be
impossible in such a case to apply the same solution. Accordingly,
it is not this that needs to be demolished, but rather that 'He who
sits, writes': for he who sits does not always write. He, then, who
has demolished the point on which the fallacy depends, has given the
solution of the argument completely. Any one who knows that it is on
such and such a point that the argument depends, knows the solution of
it, just as in the case of a figure falsely drawn. For it is not
enough to object, even if the point demolished be a falsehood, but the
reason of the fallacy should also be proved: for then it would be
clear whether the man makes his objection with his eyes open or not.
There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his
argument to a conclusion. It can be done either by demolishing the
point on which the falsehood that comes about depends, or by stating
an objection directed against the questioner: for often when a
solution has not as a matter of fact been brought, yet the
questioner is rendered thereby unable to pursue the argument any
farther. Thirdly, one may object to the questions asked: for it may
happen that what the questioner wants does not follow from the
questions he has asked because he has asked them badly, whereas if
something additional be granted the conclusion comes about. If,
then, the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther, the
objection would properly be directed against the questioner; if he can
do so, then it would be against his questions. The fourth and worst
kind of objection is that which is directed to the time allowed for
discussion: for some people bring objections of a kind which would
take longer to answer than the length of the discussion in hand.
There are then, as we said, four ways of making objections: but of
them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and
stumbling-blocks to prevent the conclusions.
11
Adverse criticism of an argument on its own merits, and of it when
presented in the form of questions, are two different things. For
often the failure to carry through the argument correctly in
discussion is due to the person questioned, because he will not
grant the steps of which a correct argument might have been made
against his position: for it is not in the power of the one side
only to effect properly a result that depends on both alike.
Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker and
not his position, when the answerer lies in wait for the points that
are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when
people lose their tempers in this way, their argument becomes a
contest, not a discussion. Moreover, since arguments of this kind
are held not for the sake of instruction but for purposes of
practice and examination, clearly one has to reason not only to true
conclusions, but also to false ones, and not always through true
premisses, but sometimes through false as well. For often, when a true
proposition is put forward, the dialectician is compelled to
demolish it: and then false propositions have to be formulated.
Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward, it has to be
demolished by means of false propositions: for it is possible for a
given man to believe what is not the fact more firmly than the
truth. Accordingly, if the argument be made to depend on something
that he holds, it will be easier to persuade or help him. He, however,
who would rightly convert any one to a different opinion should do
so in a dialectical and not in a contentious manner, just as a
geometrician should reason geometrically, whether his conclusion be
false or true: what kind of syllogisms are dialectical has already
been said. The principle that a man who hinders the common business is
a bad partner, clearly applies to an argument as well; for in
arguments as well there is a common aim in view, except with mere
contestants, for these cannot both reach the same goal; for more
than one cannot possibly win. It makes no difference whether he
effects this as answerer or as questioner: for both he who asks
contentious questions is a bad dialectician, and also he who in
answering fails to grant the obvious answer or to understand the point
of the questioner's inquiry. What has been said, then, makes it
clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like strain upon
the argument on its own merits, and upon the questioner: for it may
very well be that the argument is bad, but that the questioner has
argued with the answerer in the best possible way: for when men lose
their tempers, it may perhaps be impossible to make one's inferences
straight-forwardly as one would wish: we have to do as we can.
Inasmuch as it is indeterminate whe
n people are claiming the
admission of contrary things, and when they are claiming what
originally they set out to prove-for often when they are talking by
themselves they say contrary things, and admit afterwards what they
have previously denied; for which reason they often assent, when
questioned, to contrary things and to what originally had to be
proved-the argument is sure to become vitiated. The responsibility,
however, for this rests with the answerer, because while refusing to
grant other points, he does grant points of that kind. It is, then,
clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like manner upon
questioners and upon their arguments.
In itself an argument is liable to five kinds of adverse criticism:
(1) The first is when neither the proposed conclusion nor indeed any
conclusion at all is drawn from the questions asked, and when most, if
not all, of the premisses on which the conclusion rests are false or
generally rejected, when, moreover, neither any withdrawals nor
additions nor both together can bring the conclusions about.
(2) The second is, supposing the reasoning, though constructed
from the premisses, and in the manner, described above, were to be
irrelevant to the original position.
(3) The third is, supposing certain additions would bring an
inference about but yet these additions were to be weaker than those
that were put as questions and less generally held than the
conclusion.
(4) Again, supposing certain withdrawals could effect the same:
for sometimes people secure more premisses than are necessary, so that
it is not through them that the inference comes about.
(5) Moreover, suppose the premisses be less generally held and
less credible than the conclusion, or if, though true, they require
more trouble to prove than the proposed view.
One must not claim that the reasoning to a proposed view shall in
every case equally be a view generally accepted and convincing: for it
is a direct result of the nature of things that some subjects of
inquiry shall be easier and some harder, so that if a man brings
people to accept his point from opinions that are as generally
received as the case admits, he has argued his case correctly.
Clearly, then, not even the argument itself is open to the same
adverse criticism when taken in relation to the proposed conclusion
and when taken by itself. For there is nothing to prevent the argument
being open to reproach in itself, and yet commendable in relation to
the proposed conclusion, or again, vice versa, being commendable in
itself, and yet open to reproach in relation to the proposed
conclusion, whenever there are many propositions both generally held
and also true whereby it could easily be proved. It is possible also
that an argument, even though brought to a conclusion, may sometimes
be worse than one which is not so concluded, whenever the premisses of
the former are silly, while its conclusion is not so; whereas the
latter, though requiring certain additions, requires only such as
are generally held and true, and moreover does not rest as an argument
on these additions. With those which bring about a true conclusion
by means of false premisses, it is not fair to find fault: for a false
conclusion must of necessity always be reached from a false premiss,
but a true conclusion may sometimes be drawn even from false
premisses; as is clear from the Analytics.
Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated, but
that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing
whatever on the conclusion, then no inference as to the latter can
be drawn from it: and if there appears to be, it will be a sophism,
not a proof. A philosopheme is a demonstrative inference: an
epichireme is a dialectical inference: a sophism is a contentious
inference: an aporeme is an inference that reasons dialectically to
a contradiction.
If something were to be shown from premisses, both of which are
views generally accepted, but not accepted with like conviction, it
may very well be that the conclusion shown is something held more
strongly than either. If, on the other hand, general opinion be for
the one and neither for nor against the other, or if it be for the one
and against the other, then, if the pro and con be alike in the case
of the premisses, they will be alike for the conclusion also: if, on
the other hand, the one preponderates, the conclusion too will
follow suit.
It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a
long chain of steps, when he might employ fewer steps and those
already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e.g.)
that one opinion is more properly so called than another, and
suppose him to make his postulates as follows: 'x-in-itself is more
fully x than anything else': 'there genuinely exists an object of
opinion in itself': therefore 'the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more
fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion'.
Now 'a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more
fully itself': and 'there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself, which
will be "opinion" in a more accurate sense than the particular
opinions': and it has been postulated both that 'a genuine
opinion-in-itself exists', and that 'x-in-itself is more fully x
than anything else': therefore 'this will be opinion in a more
accurate sense'. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply
in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends.
12
An argument is clear in one, and that the most ordinary, sense, if
it be so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions
necessary: in another sense, and this is the type most usually
advanced, when the propositions secured are such as compel the
conclusion, and the argument is concluded through premisses that are
themselves conclusions: moreover, it is so also if some step is
omitted that generally is firmly accepted.
An argument is called fallacious in four senses: (1) when it appears
to be brought to a conclusion, and is not really so-what is called
'contentious' reasoning: (2) when it comes to a conclusion but not
to the conclusion proposed-which happens principally in the case of
reductiones ad impossibile: (3) when it comes to the proposed
conclusion but not according to the mode of inquiry appropriate to the
case, as happens when a non-medical argument is taken to be a
medical one, or one which is not geometrical for a geometrical
argument, or one which is not dialectical for dialectical, whether the
result reached be true or false: (4) if the conclusion be reached
through false premisses: of this type the conclusion is sometimes
false, sometimes true: for while a false conclusion is always the
result of false premisses, a true conclusion may be drawn even from
premisses that are not true, as was said above as well.
Fallacy in argument is due to a mistake of the arguer rather than of
the argument
: yet it is not always the fault of the arguer either, but
only when he is not aware of it: for we often accept on its merits
in preference to many true ones an argument which demolishes some true
proposition if it does so from premisses as far as possible
generally accepted. For an argument of that kind does demonstrate
other things that are true: for one of the premisses laid down ought
never to be there at all, and this will then be demonstrated. If,
however, a true conclusion were to be reached through premisses that
are false and utterly childish, the argument is worse than many
arguments that lead to a false conclusion, though an argument which
leads to a false conclusion may also be of this type. Clearly then the
first thing to ask in regard to the argument in itself is, 'Has it a
conclusion?'; the second, 'Is the conclusion true or false?'; the
third, 'Of what kind of premisses does it consist?': for if the
latter, though false, be generally accepted, the argument is
dialectical, whereas if, though true, they be generally rejected, it
is bad: if they be both false and also entirely contrary to general
opinion, clearly it is bad, either altogether or else in relation to
the particular matter in hand.
13
Of the ways in which a questioner may beg the original question
and also beg contraries the true account has been given in the
Analytics:' but an account on the level of general opinion must be
given now.
People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first
and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point requiring to
be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words; but it is
more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms, or a term
and an expression, that mean the same thing. A second way occurs
whenever any one begs universally something which he has to
demonstrate in a particular case: suppose (e.g.) he were trying to
prove that the knowledge of contraries is one and were to claim that